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Airborne Forces at War: From Parachute Test Platoon to the 21st Century
Robert K. Wright Jr. and John T. Greenwood. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2007. 214 pp. Illus. Maps. Bib. Index. $39.95.
Experienced military historians provide readers with a comprehensive view of U.S. Army airborne forces from their birth to ongoing operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. Retired Army General Frederick Kroesen cited this book as "excellent factual history."
The authors open with a description of how Germany's blitzkrieg in 1940 shocked U.S. leaders into urgent plans for airborne units. Thus, only days after the fall of France, the Parachute Test Platoon was formed at Fort Benning, Georgia. Parachute schooling and rigorous physical conditioning led to the platoon's first unit jump on 29 August 1940. Soon thereafter, the 501st Parachute Battalion was activated.
A description of the rapid expansion to five airborne divisions follows. First came the 82d, derived from a tough World War I outfit, and the 101st, which traced roots to the Iron Brigade of Civil War fame; the 11th, 13th, and 17th followed thereafter. Further, there are accounts of early action in North Africa, Sicily, and Salerno. At Anzio, U.S. paratroops earned an eternal badge of distinction found in the diary of a dead German officer: "devils in baggy pants."
Subsequent chapters cover the remarkable feats of paratroopers in Operations Overlord and Market Garden in 1944, when the 82d and 101st Airborne Divisions suffered nearly 17,000 casualties in six months of hard fighting. The balance of the book covers World War II airborne operations in the Pacific to later conflicts in Korea, Vietnam, Latin America, and the Middle East.
This is a well-written and engaging story that amply demonstrates the importance of military innovation. At the same time, it tells of many Good Men that Marine recruiters missed.
Crossroads of Intervention: Insurgency and Counterinsurgency Lessons from Central America
Todd Greentree. Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2008. 196 pp. Illus. Notes. Index. $49.95.
In the author's view, U.S. involvement in Central America during the 1980s clearly demonstrated the limits of intervention and use of force in internal conflicts. He believes that much can be learned today from our experience in those cases because, while U.S. aims were achieved, the operations "had no tangible impact" on the "greater purpose"—the Cold War overall.
Greentree lays out the strategy and policy of intervention in Nicaragua and El Salvador. He discusses irregular warfare and notes that numerous "gurus," from T. E. Lawrence to Bernard Fall, placed political and military measures as equally important in counterinsurgency strategy.
In "What Was At Stake?" the section on U.S. interests reaches back to the Monroe Doctrine and reports that Ambassador Jeane J. Kirkpatrick and Secretary of State Alexander M. Haig Jr. both saw the absolute need to stem the tide of communism. The answer was an "economy of force strategy," abated by a "sustained muddle of domestic political factions and limits on aims and means."
The last chapter sums up the pros and cons of U.S. engagement in Central America during this period. Under President Jimmy Carter, our policy was well intended but misconceived, and its execution was "politically incompetent." During President Ronald Reagan's administration, however, limited investment of our resources "matched the level of concrete interests."
Crossroads of Intervention demonstrates that the author's experience as a U.S. foreign service officer in Central America and his professorship at the Naval War College have served him well. Andrew Bacevich, author and professor of international relations and history at Boston University, believes this book has "considerable relevance to present-day U.S. foreign policy."
Tanker War: America's First Conflict with Iran, 1987-1988
Lee Allen Zatarain. Philadelphia, PA: Casemate Publishers, 2008. 412 pp. Notes. $32.95.
Largely forgotten today are details of this confrontation in the Persian Gulf. It can be most easily recalled in connection with the accidental shoot-down of an Iranian airliner by the USS Vincennes (CG-49) in 1988, which killed 290 passengers. The affair began a year earlier, when the United States decided to extend protection to Kuwaiti tankers.
On 17 May 1987, the USS Stark (FFG-31) cruised in the central Persian Gulf. At the time, Iran was attacking ships carrying oil from Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, allies of its enemy, Iraq. That evening, an Iraqi Mirage fighter fired two Exocet antiship missiles at the Stark. One of them detonated, blowing a large hole in the hull. Damage was widespread; 37 crewmen were killed and 21 were injured.
The growing pains of Operation Earnest Will, which furnished escorts for the Kuwaiti tankers, are described. The overall commander was the "highly intelligent" and "driving" Marine General George Crist, who headed U.S. Central Command. Not surprisingly, JCS Chairman Admiral William Crowe was irritated that an almost exclusively maritime mission would be "left to a Marine."
Succeeding chapters tell of Operations Nimble Archer and Praying Mantis and increased U.S. commitment to the Gulf. Ultimately, despite command squabbles over vulnerability concerns and shakedown problems, the mobile sea bases initially advocated by General Crist "would prove to be a real success."
My old outfit, the 24th Marine Amphibious Unit (Special Operations Capable), contributed forces to the early phase of Earnest Will, so I was especially drawn to Tanker War. The author has done a fine job of recounting a 20-year-old fight that was no doubt just another round in a continuing struggle.
Winning the War of Words: Selling the War on Terror from Afghanistan to Iraq.
Wojtek Mackiewicz Wolfe. Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2008. 138 pp. Illus. Notes. Bib. Index. $75 ($30 at Amazon).
This book explains the marketing strategy of the war on terror and how it has gathered public support for military commitments in Afghanistan and Iraq.
The author, a professor of international relations at the University of Colorado, examines President George W. Bush's approach to foreign policy. After the 9/11 attacks, he finds a shift from "defensive posturing and selective engagement" to an offensive approach. While some of the President's communication owes to "agenda setting," Wolfe holds that he used "framing effects and threat rhetoric" to successfully accomplish dramatic policy moves. In short, Bush organized the debate around "avoiding future losses."
The author points out that little rhetorical emphasis was put on security issues prior to 9/11. Thereafter, when the President publicly announced commencement of U.S. strikes on enemy forces in Afghanistan, his approval ratings reflected a "rally around the flag" phenomenon. Succeeding chapters move to presidential merchandising of Operation Iraqi Freedom, chiefly by underscoring the WMD threat and need to fight terrorists worldwide.
Wolfe puts forth six broad findings aimed at expanding explanations of the relationship between presidential "framing" and public support for war. When Bush's approval ratings hovered at 38 percent in late 2005, the public continued to be generally optimistic about Iraq. While study results indicate that public opinion is "fairly stable," they do not support findings that the opinion is "rational."
Although it reaches several conclusions that are less than shocking, Winning the War of Words is a thorough analytical study of the power of the presidential "bully pulpit."