At the end of a major confrontation, the United States was forced to shift its security strategy dramatically from one in which there was a clearly defined and traditional adversary with well-defined points of conflict and militarily normal objectives and goals, to one where the adversary was non-homogeneous, irregular, widely dispersed, and where the objectives and goals were drastically less well defined. To compound the difficulties, the previous adversary could not be allowed to totallycollapse, and everything that had to be done was with greatly reduced resources.
If this scenario brings to mind the end of the Cold War with the Soviet Union, that's understandable—it is, however, meant to describe the end of the American Civil War, but the two situations one and a quarter centuries apart presented very similar challenges.
In that first national security event, there was a need to patrol, monitor, and protect U.S. citizens and interests across vast, sparsely settled areas on our western frontier with minimal forces that possessed mobility, endurance, adequate firepower, and limited logistical needs. It is not a surprise that in the late-19th and early-20th centuries this task fell disproportionately to the cavalry arm of the U.S. Army. The modern naval equivalent of cavalry forces are submarines (preferably nuclear-powered now that global reach is involved)—which provides a clue toward how to cope with today's new security environment and its "patrol, monitor, and protection" requirements.
A recent term of some consequence is the "strategic commons," with space, airspace, and maritime dimensions.1 A corollary to the concept is if a national power aspires to shape global events and make international trade safe and secure, then awareness and even some degree of dominance across these commons is a prerequisite. The United States essentially commands these commons but needs to closely review what needs to be done to affordably maintain this dominance. Despite their high initial capitalization, nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs) represent a major and cost-effective component of those assets required to provide not just awareness across the maritime commons domain, but also dominance.
Defining Focal Areas
Four potential security focus areas were considered during the most recent Quadrennial Defense Review: a global Islamic terrorist insurgency, homeland defense, a nuclear-armed failed state, and a near-peer competitor. When necessary traits of systems needed to deal with the daunting range of threats defined by these four "alternative futures" are reviewed, characteristics enhancing the necessary maritime domain awareness (MDA) are pervasive throughout. Among them are agility and capabilities for diverse intelligence gathering, littoral, and special operations forces (SOF).
Other desirable system characteristics supporting what could be called maritime domain dominance (MDD) are specific to some, but not all of the focus areas: insensitivity to anti-access measures, ability to impose sea supremacy, and long-range precision strike.
From a submariner's perspective, the characteristics all but define the attributes that intrinsically multi-purpose SSNs have repeatedly demonstrated through exploitation of their qualities of stealth, mobility, firepower, and endurance.2 It is intriguing to consider the economies of effort obtained when the same platform that performs superbly as a provider of awareness is also a principle source of dominance. If credence is given to speculation that future submarines will have additional multi-mission capabilities, then submarine utility is further enhanced.
What is Maritime Domain Awareness?
Essential to executing the role of the dominant sea power is a pervasive knowledge and awareness of what is happening on the maritime commons. Space-based platforms and patrol aircraft contribute to this requirement, but because an enemy is aware of their presence and knows they are being watched, they alter their behavior. For example, the first hard evidence of the Soviets shipping advanced military hardware to Cuba in 1962 was obtained through the periscope of an SSN tracking information provided by naval patrol aircraft that had seen and photographed nothing but canvas-covered deck cargo. The covers had been temporarily taken off when it was thought no one was looking—but the sub was. More recently, when a merchant ship in the Aegean during the Kosovo affair declared a "mayday" and turned toward the Dalmatian coast, a trailing SSN was able to inform NATO authorities ashore that it was a hoax, and within an hour special operations forces were fast-roping from a hovering helicopter to commandeer the ship and its cargo of military contraband.
Submariners are quick to state that intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) has been their primary mission since the end of World War II, and information recently brought to public light hints how important these missions were to the successful conclusion of the Cold War.3 Not as apparent or intuitive is that in addition to having been a provider of maritime domain awareness from international waters close to the Soviet Union, the submarine force was a significant user of MDA from other sources. Whereas such fiction as The Hunt for Red October would have one believe that American SSNs were always in just about the right place to detect and trail a Soviet submarine, what would more likely happen is that space-based assets would cue the Sound Surveillance System that a submarine had left home port, the system would detect and alert Maritime Patrol Air into an area the size of Colorado, the air patrol would detect and notify the submarine into the right county, and the SSN would detect and localize to a specific street address—to covertly remain with it within weapon range for the remainder of its patrol.
At times decisive offensive action or the credible threat of such will be required in support of each of the four focus areas. Having sufficient ISR to identify a threat is one thing, responding to that threat with appropriate force when necessary is another. The nuclear-powered submarine, with a formidable weapon load in addition to an extensive ISR package, takes the term "armed reconnaissance" to a new and novel naval high, capable of both protecting friendly sea lines of communication and attacking those of the enemy by engaging not only surface and submarine targets, but also time-critical points ashore as directed by an external authority.
As for submarines continuing to provide not just awareness, but also dominance for the four focus areas, consider that when the best interests of the United States are served by a naval presence in a littoral that has a degree of access-denial established, the first unit(s) in will undoubtedly be nuclear-powered submarines as the only platforms insensitive to anti-access measures in the maritime services. That these same units will also be both awareness and domination assets is a bonus.
The Future Security Environment
Along with persistent, covert (and armed) ISR in support of the war on terrorism, these same SSNs/SSGNs and even SSBNs could in the future quite likely represent a remotely operated "magazine" containing anti-theater or anti-intercontinental ballistic missiles. When directed, the ship would prepare for launch, allowing distant command authorities to quickly release interceptors against an opponent's missiles. Just as FORCEnet and ubiquitously available precision navigation have allowed the concentration of force—a key principle of war—without the concentration of forces, they have also enabled the geographic separation of sensors and weapons (and perhaps even the trigger)—a truly disruptive technology.
Because a nuclear-powered submarine does not require a critical mass of nearby supporting forces to be militarily effective, they can be widely dispersed to cover vast areas. For instance, with Tomahawk missiles having an effective range of 1,000 miles, a globally distributed force of some 12 to 14 SSNs can put virtually the world's entire littoral under a less-than-two-hour strike umbrella. Beyond this, within the next 24 hours a given SSN could be positioned to cover an additional three-million square miles not within the original three-million square miles of coverage, and shortly thereafter other submarines could pile on a given littoral area as necessary. When SSGNs, with 154 Tomahawks are added to the equation, and SSBNs with non-nuclear warhead equipped D5 missiles that can strike any spot on the surface of the earth within an hour of being ordered are considered, a continued strong submarine force clearly supports the credible conventional deterrent spoken of by former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld.
As we have watched the Russians conduct a massive military downsizing since 1989, something should be apparent. It is clear that the sine qua non of the Russian Navy, the last capability they would relinquish, is the building and operation of extremely capable and quiet nuclear-powered attack submarines such as the Severodvinsk. To the Russians, global geo-political influence is best retained in a "bear" military portfolio by maintaining global maritime capability. Such an influence is best preserved through ownership and operation of a credible fleet of nuclear-powered submarines. It is easy to imagine that in any consideration of a seaborne invasion attempt, a Chinese military leader might be more unnerved by American SSNs/SSGNs west of Taiwan, than U.S. carrier battle groups to the east of that island. Just as a developing coastal nation's first and most cost-effective naval purchase to defend its home waters is the best non-nuclear-powered submarine available, the last warships in the Russian (or United Kingdom, French, and U.S.) Navy should be the best SSNs it could build or buy—preferably in the quantities required for a credible round-the-world, round-the-clock capability.
Worth Their Weight
Maritime domain awareness is a prerequisite for maritime domain dominance, and ISR is a prerequisite for awareness. A plethora of various assets contribute to this, but no other has a degree of persistence and endurance equal to that of an SSN. Additionally, the fact that the SSN conducts its collection in a covert manner means that the subject of the collection is caught as he is, not as he wishes to be perceived when aware of being monitored.
Pound for pound and unit for unit, there is no platform more capable of discerning, dissuading, deterring, defeating, or destroying an opponent's aspirations or forces on either a global or local, open ocean or littoral basis than a modern nuclear-powered submarine. A single unit—for months at a time, unsupported—gathers and disseminates situational awareness while holding not only sea-based forces at risk, but also key infrastructure ashore within 1,000 miles of the high water mark. As a forward-deployed and survivable picket, it is in a position to call in heavier reserve forces when and where needed—the ideal companion concept to the surface fleet's surge capabilities. The more it is desired to trim forces or facilities, the less that submarines and their basing and support facilities should be considered as a part of the downsizing.
If this sort of exquisitely credible and ubiquitous—albeit unseen—armed presence in the world's maritime commons is deemed a desirable thing, as it intuitively seems, then the issue of force sizing becomes a simple mathematical drill. With about 50 percent of the boats being nominally at sea at any time, and about 50 percent of those on local operations for training and certifications, then the desired force level would be about four times the number deployed, in this case 12 to 14 boats, for a total of 48 to 56. The key to proper submarine force level planning is not just antisubmarine warfare as conventional wisdom generally implies, but rather a universal and secure armed global presence, with minimal logistic support, in support of maritime domain awareness and dominance as required. As submarine force type commanders are fond of saying, SSNs provide presence with both a product (MDA) and a purpose (MDD).
1. See Barry Posen, "Command of the Commons," International Security, Volume 28, No. 1 (Summer 2003), pp. 5-46.
2. These core values were identified as crucial to present and future submarine design and procurement by then VADM Bruce DeMars, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Submarines, during the development of the SSN-21 Seawolf program in the early to mid 1980s.
3. Of note is that in spite of having force levels reduced by one-half over the last two decades, ISR assignments for the submarine force have doubled. The increase is stretching force assets thin, and has resulted in many high-priority assignments not being accepted for execution.