As Americans continue to fight in Iraq, the question persists whether the nation has yet identified the right strategy for the war. Lost in the discussion is a greater issue, which is not an Iraq plan or lack thereof. Success in Iraq is not an end in itself. As the inauguration of a new administration approaches, the nation should weigh the implications of its Iraq policy. What does winning, an objective that remains undefined, or any other outcome mean for our larger interests, not only in the Middle East, but globally?
Iraq is but one campaign in the war on terrorism, which, in turn, essentially is a theater campaign in a fourth-generation warfare (4GW) as opposed to Wesphalian, or geographic, conflict.1 It is time to identify other campaigns the United States must win. Even should the surge prove successful, however measured, the question will remain: what next? Needed is a coherent, comprehensive strategy for defending and advancing national interests.
Current public discourse underscores the urgency for beginning work on a global strategy. Leaders of both political parties have signaled their impatience with progress in Iraq. Their only serious disagreements are over probable milestones for troop departures. While the most common post-Iraq projections anticipate divergent outcomes—one largely assumes a return to pre-war patterns of life whereas a second predicts a nation under constant siege from emboldened terrorists—the two are alike in being fatalistic. They concede the initiative to our enemies. Make no mistake: any withdrawal of forces will be interpreted as a retreat. Our enemies will be quick to seize the resultant psychological advantage. The United States must move swiftly to have in place a counterstrategy that looks beyond Iraq to regain the political-military offensive in what some commentators have identified as the fourth world war era.2
The best entry point for developing a strategy is to recall the day that supposedly changed America: 9/11. Administration officials have contended since then that the nature of war also changed. They warn that Islamic terrorism is as serious a threat as 20th-century fascism and Marxism. If so, the lack of evident corresponding effort to validate that comparison raises the question of how seriously they take their own observations.
Trends and 4GW
Al Qaeda and its confederates, unlike Nazi Germany or Soviet Russia, may not possess the military capacity to destroy the United States, but they do not see the struggle in the context of epic battles fought over a specific period and in definite geographic areas. They plan to wear us down over time by destroying us morally. The United States can expect to live under threat of terrorism for decades. This realization needs to be integrated into the fabric of daily life. One important objective of the new strategy would be to prepare the nation for such an existence, to recalibrate the country's assumptions about war. At the same time, it must look beyond the immediate threat of terrorism to forecast the types of operations that will be relevant to 21st-century conflicts.
The visionaries of 4GW have offered a credible, if grim, vision of the future of war. Two trends in particular seem likely. First, the next decades will be a time of near constant conflict. Military forces supplemented by agents, like Roman legions on the fringes of empire, can expect to be engaged continuously in some level of combat or combat support to regional forces for years to come. Second, while tactics may evolve, the significant break from past wars will not be so much how they are fought, but who fights them and why. In an era of cultural and ideological conflict, the enemy's moral legitimacy, not his fighters or bases, will become the primary strategic objective. The challenge will be to destroy his credibility and authority. This approach mandates advocacy of firm principles that stand in sharp contrast to the ideologies of our opponents, and requires evidence in every action of our firm commitment to the values inherent in those principles.
This may seem contradictory. Should the strategy focus on a war of combat or of ideas? It has to account for both. Previous, stove-piped distinctions between categories of activities have blurred. There will be no clear transitions between war and peace. The future will be troubled by characters whose actions are affronts to what we had come to believe were rational, distinctive patterns of behavior. Previous ideas and formulations soon may seem quaint. We already have been confronted by actors who have not so much justified as sanctified conduct that, to much of the earth's population, is morally repugnant.
Developing a Strategy
There are a set of touchstones or waypoints in the process of creating a strategy that cannot be ignored.
- Base it on domestic reality. Smart policy reflects the art of the possible. Take honest measure of what our nation is able, and willing, to do. There is no merit in crafting an aggressive grand strategy if our citizens aren't resolved to support it. Iraq has dampened public enthusiasm for nation building and most other forms of military intervention. We can't avoid every conflict, but expect the country to be gun-shy in sending large forces abroad. One certain consequence of the Iraq war is the public's expectation that the nation will rely more on allies. The U. S. military, justly or not, has suffered a loss of international prestige, meaning some alliances may be difficult to maintain. Additionally, we Americans think of ourselves as an ethical people. To our credit, we are our own harshest critics. Our strategy is obligated to accommodate the nation's temperament and match it against the characters of our opponents.
- Come to grips with the nature of the enemy. This is a primary objective of any strategy. The problem is we don't have a clear idea who the enemy is. Our leaders prefer to affix a specific face to an opponent. But, having now entered the post-Axis of Evil era, we confront an even more daunting challenge: remaining alert for adversaries about whom we may know next to nothing—both who or where they are, and what tactics they will use. Our forces must be structured, equipped, and trained to be capable of deterring and combating major opponents, yet retain sufficient capacity and flexibility to adjust to emergent foes and rapid shifts in tactics.
No clear enemy also means a strategy less focused on known threats and more directed towards shaping the international environment to our advantage to contain those threats. Two avenues are required to advance this approach. The first is to gain a position of ideological ascendancy. No doubt this already is a challenge for the world's sole superpower whose prominence is certain to draw resentment. Earlier attempts to get out our message have not met with much success, yet we must renew the effort. The second requirement is to reject the adage "you don't know what you don't know." The time has come to figure out what we don't know. Intelligence collection, information analysis, and surveillance investments must be at the forefront of this strategy. - Recognize we are in the 4GW era. Most modern conflicts have involved warrior gangs serving ideological or traditional clan leaders. The challenge is learning how to succeed in a world of shadow non-state criminals and terrorists. 4GW is not a war of battles but of moral victories. It demands less emphasis on force protection and more effort at understanding how to defeat an enemy in his preferred environment. For example, information supremacy is vital to success. This is not the network-centric warfare concept of controlling the battle space, but our ability to define the intellectual battlefield to assert our moral legitimacy. Our enemies thrive in the information environment, and we need to seize it from them. It is puzzling that we are losing a war of ideas to people whom we too quickly dismiss as relics of the Middle Ages.
- Synchronize military and non-military activities in a globally coordinated program. Success demands the wise use of every tool of national power and prestige. Ensure offensive military operations do not conflict with, and detract from, the efforts of other agencies. Creative thinking is required to integrate domestic and international programs, many previously not associated with defense, into strategic planning. There has been some progress in this area. The Army and Marine Corps published a joint counterinsurgency manual (FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5), and the Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard collaborated in a new national maritime strategy, A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower. These should be included in a coordinated whole.
- Soberly assess the world situation and how it relates to our long-term worldwide interests. The United States neither can nor should walk away from any region, but needed is an honest review of where, how much, and what types of presence is required. While a global approach is necessary, two locations merit special attention. The Middle East is a chaotic, dangerous place haunted by deeply ingrained conflicts. Common wisdom says we cannot disengage from the area. This assumption must be challenged. Oil detains us there and also shapes, or misshapes, our policy throughout the region and many places beyond. While we may not want to leave the Middle East completely, it makes sense to move quickly to calculate the actual costs versus return of our presence, and balance our commitments accordingly. In Latin America, a fresh diplomatic, military, and economic approach is overdue. This region is not just the land of Castro, Chavez, drugs, and illegal aliens. After 200 years, there is need for an updated Monroe Doctrine that focuses less on keeping Europe and Asia out, and more on bringing the nations of the Western Hemisphere together.
- Soberly assess the advantages of technology. After 9/11, our leaders assured us our technical know-how would bring success in the war on terrorism. More than six years on, if we have learned anything from our experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq, it is that technology has its limits. The shock and awe effect of new technologies—particularly weapons—is good for about one throw of the dice. By 2003, even Saddam Hussein had figured out ways to mitigate the advantages of our smart munitions. 4GW tribal warriors have proven frustratingly resistant to the surveillance and destructive power of technology. The benefits provided by technological developments depend on their use. For instance, communications and computer technologies are vital to the success of information operations. But, this only is so when employed in support of an aggressive information campaign that transmits an appealing, bold message, targeted to specific audiences and designed to gain control of the debate, rather than simply reacting to an enemy's videos.
Strategy Specifics
A strategy requires priorities and will be more effective if part of a larger campaign that looks beyond defense issues. Take the initiative in addressing programs of international importance and visibility, but be selective by choosing issues that reassert the prestige and beneficent leadership of the United States. Some suggested elements of such a campaign might be:
- Advocate an international environmental and economic treaty. If this item seems out of place, consider the Pentagon commissioned study warning that climate shifts could have major strategic implications.3 Environmental change brought on by economic development is a major international concern, whatever one thinks of the science behind it. Consider the comments of recently elected French President Nicolas Sarkozy. In his victory speech, his offer of greater cooperation with the United States was conditioned by one topic: global warming. There are two options for addressing the issue; either expend national prestige and effort to combat the trend, or get out ahead and guide it. Make the best of the situation by combining a popular cause with a development necessity. Use the opportunity to push forward programs and institutions to improve the nation's image abroad as well as serve longer-term interests. Alliances are built through the confidence established across a range of international relationships. A treaty of this type would do more to earn international confidence than cajoling. Our economic strength is one of our best weapons-material and ideological-and has yet to be used to full advantage. The environmental protection issue could serve as an entry port for more ambitious international development programs reminiscent of those implemented after World War II. And, should it prove to benefit the environment, so much the better.
- Initiate changes to the Geneva Conventions. Americans are troubled by the nation's international image when it comes to prisoner treatment. Again, we must gain control of the issue. Needed is an update to the Geneva Conventions—amendments were added as conflicts identified new concerns to address—to keep pace with the changing nature of war and address the characteristics unique to 4GW combatants. This approach offers several advantages. First, if handled correctly, it will prove to the world our nation's commitment to the rule of law. Second, if the United States does its homework beforehand, it can shape the direction of the changes. Finally, it would send a clear signal that the country, in partnership with other nations, realizes the continuing problem of terrorism and is preparing itself, and courting allies, for future bouts.
- Implement an effective national energy policy and lead a global energy effort. Empires and nations can rise and fall on their economic relevance. The dominant power at the end of the century likely will be the nation, confederation, or whatever that first develops, then markets, alternative energy sources. That power should be the United States. An all out effort to reduce U.S. oil dependence should have begun after 9/11. We've lost precious time. Stop thinking of energy only as an economic commodity; it's a security concern.
The challenge is not simply reducing domestic oil purchases, but to decrease world demand to deny an important source of funding to potential enemies. This means an energy policy with global impact. Such an approach also would benefit developing countries at risk of mortgaging themselves to burdensome debt from high energy costs. The resultant liability only will lead to greater instability, thereby creating more regional al Qaedas as disillusioned populations strike out in frustration. Take constructive action to preclude this outcome. - Incorporate domestic security programs. This means including the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in strategic planning, and also implies the need to structure the agency appropriately. Identify its essential functions and shed the remainder. For example, get the Federal Emergency Management Agency out of DHS. Disaster response distracts from the department's mission of protecting the nation from terrorists. As a result of its poor post-Hurricane Katrina image, whenever a similar calamity bears down on America, emergency relief, not anti-terrorism, will become the department's main focus of effort.
A second suggestion is to invest more DHS resources in community self-defense initiatives. If, as some predict, a withdrawal from Iraq will result in terrorists following us here, mobilize citizens to counter the threat. Failing to do so would constitute negligence on the part of our leadership. Local programs for protecting communities from attack would involve Americans in public service. Tap into this resource, nourish good ideas, and encourage more. Such a move would show the world that the United States is not paralyzed with fear, waiting for the next blow to fall. - Get started, but don't appoint a Strategy Tsar. We have enough stove-piped pseudo-monarchies heading special projects. One government agency will have to take the lead long enough to get things moving. U. S. Northern Command, which was established to "provide command and control of Department of Defense (DOD) homeland defense efforts and to coordinate defense support of civil authorities," should take the fore.4
My vision is a United States with a reinvigorated sense of self made evident by confident, resurgent leadership. A new U. S. administration, Democratic or Republican, with fresh faces proposing bold ideas and projecting a sense of optimism would be a sure example of our nation's continued vigor and strength. I have no doubt the civil world will rally to an America willing to show initiative, yet ready to be cooperative and supportive of nations that share a vision of the future, even if they don't agree on every detail as to how to pursue that vision. If we fail to lead, events will move forward regardless, and probably in harmful directions.
I reject all notion of the inevitable or historically preordained triumph of nations. Our country only will remain great if it deserves to be so. Success demands our firm and courageous commitment to measures that reaffirm our strength and moral legitimacy. America must remain at the forefront of world events, not only for the welfare of its own citizens, but for the benefit of humanity.
1. In fourth-generation warfare the state loses its monopoly on war to warrior bands comprised of criminals, terrorists, ethnic militias, etc. Implied is a challenge to the legitimacy of the nation-state. These challenges could come from ideological, cultural, counter-globalization terrorists, or similar groups.
2. "Ex-CIA Director: U. S. Faces—World War IV'," Charles Feldman and Stan Wilson, CNN.com/U.S., 3 April 2003. In the article, former CIA Director James Woolsey described the Cold War as World War III, and the war on terrorism as World War IV. Norman Podhoretz in World War IV, defined the latter as the struggle against "Islamofascism." He also identified the Cold War as World War III.
3. Peter Schwartz and Doug Randall, "Imagining the Unthinkable: An Abrupt Climate Change Scenario and Its Implications for United States National Security," Global Business Network, October 2003.
4. From the U. S. Northern Command Web site located at www.northcom.mil/About/index.html.