Lead or Get Out of the Way: Winning the Millennium War
(See M. Edwards, pp. 16-19, April 2008 Proceedings)
David Sweetman—While I agree that Vice Admiral Edwards has identified a real and long-standing problem, I do not think he addressed either the root causes or appropriate preventive actions. To me, the issue is not that much different from when, as a "baby-boomer" in the late 1960s, being an electronics technician meant fixing circuits that had vacuum tubes instead of transistors.
The essential problem is that Department of Defense procurement (for the Navy and other services) is still based on concepts for mechanical systems. While in the early stages of integrated circuit (IC) development (which DOD both funded and drove), many of the goals for mechanical and electronic systems were compatible, that has not been true for more than two decades.
To obtain the flexibility and adaptability the article correctly identifies, one must completely update the methods and specifications for electronic hardware, given that the software should be independent of the hardware, but is not.
Software is currently linked to hardware because the DOD can no longer obtain integrated circuits designed and manufactured to military specifications (noting the electronics are mostly just a function of the capabilities of the integrated circuits within). The integrated circuit industry exited the military business around 1990 because it was no longer profitable nor a driver of technology (replaced by video games, cell phones, etc.). The electronics then became much more proprietary and closed because of the unavailability of advanced ICs.
Some of the issues causing the IC industry to exclude the low-volume military world include:
• Reliability. Both demand a low failure rate, but only the military wants long lifetimes, e.g., 20 years vs. 3 years.
• Environmental robustness. The military needs the IC to operate from -55 to 125 degrees Celsius, the commercial world needs 25 ± 20 degrees Celsius.
• Change approval. The commercial world can accept an improved design or process (that reduces cost) usually with no paperwork and worst case with a one- to two-month approval process. The DOD often takes two years to approve a change.
• Standardization and compatibility. The commercial world does not "re-invent the wheel" each time a product goes to the next generation, e.g., memory density, microprocessor speed, bus protocol. There is a roadmap for the future as well as maintaining, where necessary, backward compatibility.
Reliability and temperature range are functions of IC design. If designed for longer lifetimes and wider temperature ranges, the die size is large, so costs more. The low volume of DOD procurement means that essentially a large die size custom design is not economically viable.
Change control and standardization are administrative issues that take time (not counting the extra cost for non-standard requirements). Given Moore's Law is still in effect, the changes in the technology, both design and manufacturing, are significantly faster than current DOD practices can accept.
The procurement practices consistent with the concept that we need a hull to be operational for 50 years are totally incompatible with electronics that should be upgraded every 3 years. If you want to have ever wider bandwidth, ever faster plotting and analysis tools, ever larger relational data bases (that are even remotely as capable as a video game), then the procedures and rules for acquiring electronic equipment to support the ever-improving software must be radically changed.
To put it in business terms, the period of depreciation for electronic equipment needs to be changed from 20 years to 3 years. The period of acquisition and approval needs to be changed from 7 years to 6 months.
Let's Have One Book for Every Sailor, Too
(See S. F. Davis Jr., p. 14, April 2008 Proceedings)
Lieutenant George R. Nugent, U.S. Navy Reserve (Retired)—I must heartily agree with the late Captain Stephen Davis' recommendation that the Navy designate "one book to be read and discussed by every Sailor." His choice of The Last Stand of the Tin Can Sailors by James Hornfischer is an excellent one. This book has particular meaning for me. Rear Admiral Clifton A. F. Sprague, the commander of Task Unit 77.4.3, was a childhood friend of my father, and in fact my family and I had lunch with him on board the new carrier Wasp (CV-18) as she prepared for sea in Boston. He was at that time a captain and commanding officer of the Wasp. Sprague's father and my grandfather had been business partners in Boston at the turn of the 20th century. In addition, when I received a commission as ensign in 1950, my first assignment was to the USS Johnston (DD-821), a successor to the Johnston (DD-557) lost in the Battle of Leyte Gulf.
Hornfischer's narrative of the incredible courage of those Sailors who were on board the ships and in the planes of "Taffy 3," Task Unit 77.4.3, and of the skillful maneuvering by Admiral Sprague and his tiny force of "tin cans" is something I believe every Sailor should know about. Another book, John Wukovits' Devotion to Duty, a biography of Clifton Sprague, also includes a considerable portion about the Leyte battle. Admiral Sprague himself was one of those little-known heroes, a true but modest Navy man who avoided publicity whenever he could. The controversy surrounding the actions of Admiral William F. Halsey during this period could have had repercussions throughout the Navy, but Admiral Chester Nimitz was determined not to allow another Samson/Schley-type dispute to interfere with the war effort.
James Hornfischer's book shows the kind of outstanding performance the Navy received from its personnel when the chips were down. I think it is must reading.
A Tasting Menu
(See R. Timberg, p. 4, April 2008 Proceedings)
Richard S. Elkin—I opened the April issue of Proceedings, as eager as ever to read the articles it contained. I was shocked and saddened to learn of the death of Captain Steve Davis. I first met Steve while he was the XO on the USS The Sullivans (DDG-68). Her CO, then-Commander Gerry Roncolato, and I had built a strong relationship between the ship and the Navy League's North Jersey Council, of which I was President from 1997-2000. Our council had been invited to partake in the commissioning of The Sullivans in New York harbor on 19 April 1997, and we were all excited to be involved.
A pre-commissioning party was held the night before the ceremony, and I was honored to be able to present two commissioning gifts to the ship and crew. The first, from our council, was an actual 1943 U.S. Navy recruiting poster featuring the five Sullivan brothers. The second gift was given in conjunction with the USO of South Texas. It had minted commemorative coins for the event, and had asked us to help offer them to those attending the commissioning. We took coins numbered 1 and 68 and had them mounted in a shadow box that we then presented to Commander Roncolato and the crew of The Sullivans.
During the course of that wonderful evening I had a bit of fun with Steve. He kept trying to find out what had happened to coin number two since he was the second in command. The USO of South Texas had presented it to me, and I had it in my jacket pocket all along as Steve was trying to find it. As the evening drew to a close, I wandered over to Steve and his wife Wynne, and very nonchalantly reached into my pocket and took out the coin. I was delighted to be able to give it to Steve, and he couldn't thank me enough!
I next ran into Steve in 2001 during the turn-around cruise of the USS Constitution in Boston. He was the CO of the USS Klakring (FFG-42), and his ship was docked in Newport, Rhode Island, at the Naval War College. He attended the Fourth of July festivities in Boston with one of his chiefs who had signed on for another four years on board the Constitution. We greeted each other warmly, and as the day drew to a close, Steve invited me to Newport to visit him on the Klakring. I eagerly accepted, and had a wonderful time on board the ship.
I stayed in touch with Steve while he was on the Klakring, but lost contact as he moved onward and upward. I was pleased to see his name appear in Proceedings often, and I was proud to be able to cast my vote for him when he was nominated to the Editorial Board. We've all lost a great friend, a great Sailor, and a true gentleman. Fair winds and following seas, Steve. We will never forget you! And to Captain Gerry Roncolato, thank you for your wonderful eulogy. You were certainly one of Steve's best friends, and it was fitting that you be the one to deliver it.
Capitalizing on al Qaeda's Mistakes
(See M. Cancian, pp. 48-53, April 2008 Proceedings)
Ramadi: From the Caliphate to Capitalism
(See A. Lubin, pp. 54-61, April 2008 Proceedings)
William Thayer—These stories are probably the best two Proceedings articles in the past year. While it is easy to say "winning the people" is the goal in a counterinsurgency manual such as FM 3-24, it is extremely difficult to do this in a hostile environment like al Anbar. These two articles shed light on the importance of the political and deal-making aspects of a very tough guerrilla war. They also highlight the importance of civil affairs. Captain Travis Patriquin, with his Arabic language skills, was a critical part of this process. He is a true American hero who risked his life daily and, in the end, made the ultimate sacrifice. The vital contribution by Captain Patriquin shows the importance of the Advisory Corps advocated by U.S. Army Lieutenant Colonel John Nagl, one of FM 3-24's authors.
If we had had such a language—and culture—trained Advisory Corps in 2003, we probably would have had an Anbar Awakening sooner. The "victory" of a conventional war becomes "transition" in a counterinsurgency. In Malaya, the British transitioned from being the prime military force to the Malayasian Army/Police being the prime military force and finally, the only military force. It took 12 years. We can only hope the Anbar Awakening and the surge are the start of this transition in Iraq.
Sixteen Stars in Four Graves
(See T. L. Constantino, M. Constantino, pp. 62-63, April 2008 Proceedings)
Philip M. Jelley—The article about Admiral Nimitz's grave in Golden Gate National Cemetery prompts me to share a family reminiscence.
In early 1952, the Bureau of Personnel decided to prepare plans for the funeral arrangements and ceremonies for the four fleet admirals so that the same would be available when the occasion arose. The starting point was to learn where each wanted to be buried and under what circumstances. Admirals Leahy and Halsey opted for Arlington with full military honors, and Admiral Nimitz for Golden Gate under the circumstances outlined in the article. No one knew the wishes of Admiral Ernest J. King, who was in Bethesda Naval Hospital at the time.
My father, Rear Admiral Joseph F. Jelley Jr., was Chief of the Bureau of Yards and Docks. He and Rear Admiral Harold Russell, who was JAG, were detailed to go to Bethesda to talk with Admiral King. My father was convinced he was selected for this unenviable task because he was the junior Bureau chief.
Two very nervous rear admirals arrived at Bethesda for the meeting. They flipped a coin and my father lost. They went into Admiral King's room and my father stammered out their mission. Admiral King listened with frosty annoyance and cut off my father with, "Planning nothing imminent gentlemen, I hope."
The interview went downhill from there. The two admirals soon escaped but were able to report that Admiral King wanted to be buried at the Naval Academy Cemetery in Annapolis. And so he was.
Building a Small Surface Warship: Mission Impossible?
(See W. J. Holland, Jr., pp. 14-19, February 2008; K. Lee, D. Criner, p. 6, March 2008; M. T. McNerney, J. H. Doyle, Jr., W. J. Smith, pp. 8-9, 82, April 2008 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Commander M. A. "Tony" Then, U.S. Navy—I read Rear Admiral Holland's article as I was finishing a deployment as CO of the USS Siroco (PC-6). The more I read about the Littoral Combat Ship, and the problems associated with the program, the more I am convinced what we need is more Cyclone-class coastal patrol ships (PCs). The PCs are the ultimate littoral combat ship, with a shallow draft of nine feet, plenty of speed (approximately 35 knots), and the right manning (28 Sailors). In addition, PCs are highly maneuverable, fast, and they pack a punch with a 25-mm MK38, 25-mm MK96, twin .50-caliber mounts, 240B mounts, and MK19 grenade launchers. Navy leadership should take a closer look at this program, conduct minor improvements to the engineering plant and weapon systems, and build 15 or 20 more ships. PCs can perform most littoral missions such as oil platform protection, maritime security operations, close combat support of riverine units, and shallow-water visit, board, search, and seizure (VBSS).
Also, these ships, the smallest commissioned vessels the U.S. Navy currently operates, are great for interaction with smaller navies in the Arabian Gulf, Africa, and Latin America. The Cyclone class needs a few improvements such as a better communications system, a replacement for the MK38 mod 0, and a small portable missile system for surface engagement that would give it more reach or a small multiple rocket launching system that could be used against small boat formations. If the Navy really wants to get creative, a medium-endurance PC can be developed. It would be approximately 200 feet long, have a 12- to 14-foot draft, incorporate the same hull design of the current PCs, and have a combat craft recovery system or stern ramp. These heavier PCs should be equipped with the Rafael Typhoon Gun System, allowing them to accomplish point air defense and have a better surface warfare capability.
The bottom line is that the PCs are the original littoral combat ships and they are a proven design. They provide early command opportunities to junior surface warfare officers, and invaluable shiphandling, weapons, and multi-discipline training to the entire crew. They are tough, minimally manned, and cost a lot less than LCS. Let's build more of them!