Building a Small Surface Warship: Mission Impossible?
(See W. J. Holland, pp. 14-19, February 2008 Proceedings)
Captain Ken Lee, U.S. Navy (Retired)—Admiral Holland's article is on point and is rife with valuable lessons to be learned. I sincerely hope the responsible parties mine the littoral combat ship (LCS) experience for lessons learned and respond accordingly.
There was one LCS program technique that I think was quite valid, and I hope it doesn't become the baby in some tossed-out bath water. Having two bona fide competitors prepare competing prototypes and then selecting the best of both for a production model is a good idea. The problem with the LCS was in both the contract structure (i.e. essentially a fixed price with unconstrained change opportunities) and the contract execution (whoever was responsible didn't use at all, or at least didn't execute correctly, the numerous, proven program monitoring techniques that provide early problem detection and corrective action opportunities).
Perhaps "whoever was responsible" is the key phrase here; as Admiral Holland points out, the line of responsibility today is Byzantine at best and leads too easily to the situation of, "if you can't point your finger at who is responsible, no one is."
Admiral Holland shined a light in the right direction; can someone from the "responsible party" shine a light on the lessons learned and approaches being taken to incorporate them into SecNav/NAVSEA procedures? Could these lessons include (I hope) appointing capable people to responsible positions?
Douglas Criner—As an ancient mariner, I found Admiral Holland's critique of the LCS project quite persuasive and troubling. I would offer a small, additional point.
I wonder about the Navy's nomenclature: littoral combat ship. I am among a tiny minority of U.S. civilians that know the meaning of "littoral." Most people understand what submarines, aircraft carriers, or even destroyers are, and those ships' missions are self evident. But, a littoral combat ship?
This vocabulary would seem to suggest a disconnect between the Navy and the general public.
Let's Have a Fleet of 15 Hospital Ships
(See J. Dolbow, p. 12, February 2008 Proceedings)
Harold N. Boyer—Lieutenant Dolbow is on the mark with his argument for building 15 hospital ships. He accurately summarizes the advantages of using these ships for both military and humanitarian purposes.
I would go a step further, however, and suggest that instead of building new hospital ships from the keel up, we use assets already on hand. As I drive by the Inactive Ships Maintenance Facility at what is left of the Philadelphia Navy Yard, I see vessels that could be modified for this purpose. Currently, there is a destroyer tender, two ammunition ships, and two underway replenishment ships among others awaiting the call of duty.
These vessels will in all likelihood never see active service again for a number of reasons and yet we pay for their maintenance nonetheless. Yes, they are aging. Yes, they have outdated equipment and powerplants. And yes, they are manpower intensive.
But hospital ships do not need the latest gas turbine powerplants, the latest weapon/sensor suites, or the latest technology. What they need is space suitable to accommodate the latest medical/surgical suites and technology, and these ships fit the bill perfectly. Additionally, they have deck cargo handling equipment and helicopter landing decks.
As Lieutenant Dolbow states, manning these ships could be accomplished using hybrid crews made up of any combination of military/civilian men and women. The conversion of these vessels could be accomplished at civilian yards at less cost than designing and building ships from the keel up.
Let's give these "gray ghosts" another opportunity to heed the call of duty. Let's paint 'em white, put the red crosses on them, and send them to sea where they belong!
Michael E. Picray—Why are ships needed for this mission, or even desirable? If the United States wants to deliver medical care in the form of goodwill missions, ships would be the absolute last and least efficient venue with which to do so. Ships are expensive to build, maintain, and operate and are extremely limited in many ways. If there were a natural disaster in Mongolia or Tibet, ships would be nearly worthless. The author sneers at the idea that "other assets could perform the same mission." In fact, not only could other assets perform the same mission, but they could do it better, with greater speed, and for a whole lot less money.
For example, medical teams could be formed on a military model. Small teams could respond to small needs. Combine the small teams to achieve larger teams for larger needs, and for major disasters, you could stack the teams as deep as required and augment them with whatever equipment and personnel necessary, including Seabees, and have them on site within hours by air. Such tailored response from mobile medical teams could provide more effective care with more geographic precision and do it for a lot less money than a 70,000-ton ship.
Humanitarian aid is a worthy objective, and when the Sea Services, or the other services, can provide such assistance it is rewarding to the givers, the receivers, and to the national interests of the United States. But we also need to remember that the principal mission, the entire reason for the Navy's existence, is to maintain freedom of the seas and to prepare to fight America's enemies wherever we may find them, not to be an international relief agency.
The only possible argument to be made for funding and building 15 such ships is that the United States is already building gray elephants like the DDG-1000. Why not throw in a few white elephants for a little variety?
Marketing Is Not a Dirty Word
(See S. Cohen, pp. 34-39, February 2008 Proceedings)
Captain Joseph M. Mazzafro, U.S. Navy (Retired)—I agreed with and enjoyed Steve Cohen's article on the Navy's need to better understand marketing concepts and more effectively tell its story both internally and externally. Mr. Cohen gently observes that the Navy institutionally seems to be unaware of commonly used marketing techniques and that things would improve noticeably if this knowledge gap were closed.
This is certainly true, but I was surprised that someone with Mr. Cohen's marketing experience would not realize that before any marketing technique can be employed effectively, the Navy needs to know what message it wants to get out to whom. Admiral Mullen's unfortunate response to questions about what the Navy wants concerned citizens to tell their elected representative to do in support of our service is indicative to me of the Navy's erratic strategic course since the end of the Cold War. Until the Navy better rationalizes the missions it wants to do with the ones the nation needs it to do (and is willing to pay for), improved marketing practices are not going help much with gaining the support of internal and external constituents for the Navy's role in providing for our national security.
When Principle Is Involved
(See H. Ullman, p. 8, February 2008 Proceedings)
David Derkits—Mr. Ullman's article is unfortunately a work of expediency as he attempts to dismiss the many principles underlying the war on terrorism with a vague and potentially misapplied quotation. On principle, we must not allow terrorists who habitually ignore and brazenly violate the civilized world's laws of war the rewards that supposedly depend on their adherence to those laws. On principle, we must not fool ourselves into believing that we can be a moral compass to the terrorists by the way that we treat their imprisoned colleagues; the terrorists have demonstrated their willingness to torture and decapitate regardless. On principle, we must not allow the powerful definition of the word "torture" to be diluted by lesser acts that, although perhaps inhumane, are not actually torture. If we over-apply words such as "torture," "Holocaust," and "Hitler" in order to enhance our arguments, then we weaken those words.
On principle, we must not rush to compare our nation's anti-terrorist initiatives, which are approved, monitored, and executed by hundreds of law-abiding and moral Americans, to the terrible crimes of Stalin and his regime. On principle, we must rebut a reckless "slippery slope" contention that the way we bring the terrorists to justice and, historically, other war criminals (especially those at Nuremburg) to justice could somehow get introduced into our domestic judicial system.
In reality, the terrorists are war criminals, and they are subject to military justice without the protections of the Geneva Convention or the U.S. Constitution. The American people should understand that, in the end, many of the terrorists we capture will be fairly tried by military tribunal, correctly convicted of war crimes, and executed. Under the flawed premise of the article, these are principles for which I, for one, could be deaf to expediency.
Bait and Switch
(See J. C. Howe, p. 10, January 2008 Proceedings)
Captain Fred P. Moosally, U.S. Navy (Retired)—There has been much public speculation recently about the feasibility of a common hull between the U.S. Navy's littoral combat ship (LCS) and the U.S. Coast Guard's National Security Cutter (NSC). However, time and again, we have heard both Sea Services state that a common hull is not a likely course of action due to each vessel's unique mission requirements. The 418-foot NSC is not designed to achieve LCS requirements of shallow draft, low manning, modular mission payload, survivability, or speed. Conversely, the 378-foot LCS is not currently configured for NSC extended endurance requirements. As both new vessels approach commissioning later this year, a parallel discussion has emerged—the possibility of an NSC as a Navy patrol frigate or an LCS as a Coast Guard offshore patrol cutter.
With an eye toward the Coast Guard, the LCS is already designed to support the humanitarian assistance, interdiction, and disaster relief missions outlined in the new maritime strategy. Moreover, it is capable of performing high-intensity counter-mine, antisubmarine, and anti-surface warfare missions and everything in between where forward presence is important.
While it promises to be a fine cutter, the NSC is not a warship by any stretch of the imagination. The LCS has been designed to meet the stringent Naval Vessel Rules (NVR), which include robust fire fighting capability, damage control, and structural survivability as part of its fundamental design. The NSC was built to commercial standards and has not been designed to meet the Navy's requirements. Design changes to incorporate NVR would result in huge cost increases to the NSC. The notion of waiving these requirements is unlikely in consideration for crew safety during a naval combat engagement. The Navy did not waive the NVR requirements for the 40 Sailors on board the LCS, and I doubt it would consider such a waiver for the nearly150 Sailors on board an NSC configured as a light patrol frigate.
Nevertheless, the high degree of commonality between the NSC and LCS in their electronic and weapon systems will realize tremendous benefits by reducing Fleet costs for training and maintenance. We have already seen cost reductions as the prospective crews of the NSC and LCS have been able to cross-train in San Diego and Petaluma, California, on the 57-mm deck gun and the TRS-3D air search radar, respectively, which are common to both vessels.
It is quite feasible to examine reducing the speed requirement and increasing the endurance of LCS. However, we must avoid undertaking an NSC redesign for a mission far outside its design parameters. Such redesign efforts have not enjoyed much success over time, and should not be repeated.
Captain Moosally is president of Lockheed Martin Maritime Systems & Sensors, responsible for delivery of the nation's first littoral combat ship, Freedom. His business unit is also responsible for the C4ISR systems on board the first National Security Cutter, Bertholf.
Fill the Middle Gap: Rediscover the Corvette
(See J. Rushton, pp. 36-39, January 2008 Proceedings)
Dan Schultz, Vice President and General Manager, Lockheed Martin, Maritime Security and Ship Systems—Lieutenant Rushton provides an insightful overview of the emerging strategic environment and its implications for our Navy. Consistent with the new maritime strategy, he correctly posits that we must develop an agile Navy capable of operating at multiple levels of conflict, ranging from major combat operations at the high end, to low-end operations such as riverine warfare. He states, "In short, we need a small warship that can self-deploy to (and stay in!) areas like the Horn of Africa, South East Asia, and the Gulf of Guinea. A corvette-size ship is ideal." So far, so good! But, he concludes, "Even the littoral combat ship (LCS) is far too expensive to be produced in sufficient numbers, nor is it likely to be low-tech enough to operate unsupported for months at a time out of primitive ports."
Ironically the LCS is precisely the ship that Lieutenant Rushton describes and our Navy needs. The LCS is designed to support a variety of missions across all three tiers, from high intensity (counter mine, antisubmarine, anti-surface warfare) to low intensity (humanitarian, interdiction, disaster relief, etc) and everything in between where "just being there" is important. Mission flexibility will be of paramount importance to the Navy because likely budget constraints will not permit ships designed for each tier. The modular nature of the LCS, and its ability to swap mission packages in 24 hours, will provide the type of flexibility that will become increasingly important. Moreover, the LCS is being built to strict Naval Vessel Rules that will ensure a ship that is capable of deploying to distant theaters and remaining on station for extended periods. Unlike most corvettes, the LCS is being designed with a 30-year ship life, and its modularity will enable it to adapt to changing requirements over those 30 years.
The LCS is designed with sufficient size to adapt to a wide range of missions. In certain cases, no mission packages will be required and LCS will be a "truck" to embark trainers from the U.S. military and inter-agency/non-governmental organizations. With its large flight deck (larger than a cruiser's or destroyer's), the LCS will be able to embark and support two helicopters. These will be key to accomplishing the multiple missions the LCS will be called on to support. Its helicopter capabilities will significantly differentiate the LCS from corvettes. Its shallow draft (less than 13 feet) will enable the LCS to access and operate from primitive ports, thereby assuring the global presence mandated by the new strategy. Moreover, with its innovative reach back sustainment approach, it will indeed be able to operate for extended periods in remote locations.
Lastly, the LCS will be affordable. Once these ships enter serial production for the 55 planned for by the Navy and the complementary orders anticipated by international navies, the cost can be expected to decrease significantly from that of the initial R&D hulls. The Freedom (LCS-1) will go to sea this spring and commence the legacy—the LCS will be the workhorse of the new maritime strategy.
Guadalcanal: A Real Hot Potato
(See M. L. Bartlett, pp. 62-67, November 2007; D. S. Twining, pp. 7, 86, January 2008 Proceedings)
Commander Robert L. Ghormley Jr., U.S. Navy (Retired)—Colonel David Twining's comments in the January 2008 issue of Proceedings about my father being relieved because he no longer supported the Marines on Guadalcanal appears from time to time. Let me set the record straight. Vice Admiral Ghormley was hampered by lack of all forms of support because of decisions made in Washington to send available support to the the forces preparing to invade North Africa rather than to the Pacific.
For example, shortages of aviation gasoline were so severe that, to keep the Marine aircraft flying, one of the old four stack destroyers was sent with a deck load of barrels of avgas that were dumped into the ocean for the Marines to recover. In addition, wrecked aircraft were drained of fuel to keep operational planes in the air. Aid was dispatched only after Under Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal returned to Washington from his trip to the South Pacific in the latter part of September 1942 and told President Franklin D. Roosevelt that if help was not rushed to Ghormley and the South Pacific immediately, there would be hell to pay at the polls in November. It arrived too late for Ghormley but made Admiral William Halsey's take over of the command easier.
It is also strange to find in Ghormley's diary that on 3 October 1943, Admiral Chester Nimitz thought enough of Ghormley to offer him the job of Deputy Commander-in-Chief Pacific Ocean Area (CINCPOA) and Ghormley turned him down. This area included the Aleutian, Gilbert, Marshall, and Marianas islands, the Philippines Sea, Leyte Gulf, Iwo Jima, and Oakinawa.