The Son Tay Raid: American POWs in Vietnam Were Not Forgotten
John Gargus. College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 2007. 332 pp. Illus. Maps. Notes. Bib. Index. $29.95.
In May 1970, aerial photos revealed what looked like a POW camp near the town of Son Tay, 23 miles west of Hanoi. Soon thereafter, U.S. military leaders began developing an intricate scheme to rescue the more than 60 Americans thought to be held captive there.
Because the camp was in the heart of North Vietnam and heavily defended by various antiaircraft sites, the need for meticulous planning and execution was apparent. The Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the rescue operation the following July. It was to be conducted by a task group consisting of volunteers from Army and Air Force special operations forces.
On 20 November, however, the skillful and daring helicopter-borne force found the POWs gone—they had been moved to another location. This was devastating to the men who carried out the raid, and their dismay was deepened by the chorus of armchair warriors and other critics who called their superb effort a huge failure of the nation's intelligence agencies.
The book's five chapters range from "Raid Conception" to the "Vietnamese Story about the Raid," the latter which cites the extreme distress of North Vietnamese authorities over enemy troops "at the gates of the Capital." The appendix is an historical work of art. It lists the multiservice planners and forces involved, and includes details on the Army Special Forces assault, security, and support groups.The author, a retired Air Force colonel, participated in planning the Son Tay mission and flew as a lead MC-130 Combat Talon navigator for the strike force. In The Son Tay Raid, he gives us a fascinating account of a top-secret operation that never got the credit it deserved.
No Greater Love: Life Stories from the Men Who Saved Baseball
Todd Anton. Burlington, MA: Rounder Books, 2007. 253 pp. Illus. Bib. Index. $18.95.
The sheer number of professional baseball players who served in our military during World War II is amazing. Todd Anton has recounted some of their stories.
Billy Southward Jr. played ball from 1936 to 1939, when he was the Most Valuable Player in the Canadian-American League. In 1940, he joined the Army Air Corps and became a B-17 Flying Fortress pilot. Billy's wing-wagging overflight of game two in the 1942 World Series would be the last time he saw a ball game and his father's team, the St. Louis Cardinals, in action. After distinguished service in Europe, Major Southward crashed and died in 1945, while training in the B-29 Superfortress.
Ace Cleveland Indians pitcher Bob Feller had every reason to avoid the war. His father was dying and Feller was his family's sole provider. Yet, he "wanted to throw a few strikes for Uncle Sam." And so he did, as a seagoing Sailor in the USS Alabama (BB-60), which made Murmansk runs and also supported Task Force 58 operations in the Pacific. Feller rose to the rank of chief petty officer.
Ted Williams, the great Boston Red Sox hitter, is mentioned often and his edginess is noted. Williams trained naval aviators in World War II and again served during the Korean War as a Marine pilot at the front. (I met him at a luncheon in 1988, and asked, in jest, why he frequently "threw the finger" to the crowd at Fenway Park. "Because they deserved it," he replied tersely.)
No Greater Love tells of accomplished athletes who volunteered for military service in time of war. I recommend it highly to all baseball fans.
The Quest for Absolute Security: The Failed Relations Among U.S. Intelligence Agencies
Athan Theoharis. Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, Publisher, 2007. 309 pp. Notes. Index. $27.50.
The author, whom his publicist calls the dean of Federal Bureau of Investigation historians, proposes that the 9/11 attacks on the United States appeared to confirm our vulnerability and that they might have been prevented. He believes the concept of absolute security, as a governmental goal, is certain to nurture disappointment.
According to Theoharis, "absolute security" is an illusory quest. In his view, dating from U.S. measures taken before and after the Cold War, we have been entirely secure. Yet, both the Central Intelligence Agency and FBI have turned their efforts into abuses of power and violations of individual liberties.
The first two chapters review in some detail the origins of U.S. intelligence from 1882 to 1919, and its operations from 1919 to 1936. Thereafter, Theoharis relates domestic and foreign intelligence activities from 1936 to 1945, tracing how, in his view, bureaucracy and centralization eventually led to "secrecy" and the "loss of accountability" by 1965.
Chapter 7 provides findings that during the tenure of President Lyndon Johnson, the FBI ran name checks—comparing a subject's name to their files—on prominent reporters critical of the situation in Vietnam: e.g., David Brinkley and Peter Arnett. The final chapter, "Hopes and Realities," emphasizes the importance of congressional oversight on U.S. intelligence activities in checking executive power and abuses of that power.
Although I cannot fully understand the author's underlying frustration over executive-legislative tensions that date from the earliest days of the republic and are essential to our form of government, The Quest for Absolute Security is a most useful historical review for military officers and civil servants, especially intelligence types.
Combat Techniques: An Elite Forces Guide to Modern Infantry Tactics
Chris McNab and Martin J. Dougherty. New York: Thomas Dunne Books, 2007. 192 pp. Illus. Index. $24.95.
This is an up-to-date work on the tactics and assets of today's infantry. Illustrated with color photos and diagrams, it describes how modern soldiers fight in diverse scenarios. The authors cover the various forces and support available to combat commanders, and examine a wide range of tactical procedures.
The introduction acknowledges the chaotic nature of war. "The problem is not that plans do not survive contact with the enemy so much as come apart as soon as they are allowed out of the briefing room." The authors establish that while planning is important, the people on the spot are obligated to struggle through whatever is thrown at them and get the job done.
The initial chapters deal with infantry firepower and tactics. Wisely, the critical importance of personal weapons handling is underscored. Regarding tactics, the emphasis is on knowledge of unit standard operating procedures and steadfast application of core skills at the fire team, squad, and section levels. Interestingly, the problem of overloading infantrymen, which has plagued armies since the days of the Roman legions, is pointed out as well.
The third chapter specifies the backup available to today's infantry, from close air support to armor spearheads and advanced field artillery. Chapter four discusses terrain and climate, and the need for careful advanced preparations. The last two chapters provide useful coverage of "special forces"—including Navy SEALs—and the thorny asymmetric dilemmas faced in counterinsurgency warfare.
Combat Techniques is not a prescriptive, all-encompassing manual for combat infantrymen—nor do I think that was the authors' intent. Rather, it is a valuable handbook for commanders and staff officers of other military specialties who might have infantry units assigned to their operational control.
Colonel Keiser, a former editor at the U.S. Naval Institute, is the author of the U.S. Marine Corps and Defense Unification: 1944-1947 (Nautical & Aviation Publishing Company of America, 1996.)