Separate but Equal
(See J. K. Hafner, pp. 32-35, January 2008 Proceedings)
Admiral James G. Stavridis, U.S. Navy, Commander, U.S. Southern Command-I was pleasantly surprised to see my photo in the provocative article by Commander John Hafner, taken while I was touring the hospital ship USNS Comfort (T-AH-20). The ship was embarked on a four month voyage through Latin America and the Caribbean, in which she would perform almost 400,000 patient encounters. The visit, in which I saw the superb deck performance of the master and the equally superb below-decks performance of the chief engineer, only served to reinforce my long-held view that we in the U.S. Navy should indeed create separate deck/engineering/weaponeering tracks for our surface officers like virtually every other Navy in the world.
In addition to the obvious benefits of enhanced operational performance at sea, such specialization would permit more time and intellectual capital to invest in shore specialties that truly applied to the separate tracks, e.g., engineers studying engineering and technical matters: weaponeers studying technical communications and sensor/weapons issues; and deck officers being freed to focus on financial management, international relations and regional studies, and management theory.
While what we have is far from broken -and over all produces very capable generalists-it is certainly worth looking hard at the idea of specialization and evaluating whether it makes sense to move in that direction. In an increasingly complex world, I think it does.
Captain James W. Orvis, U.S. Navy (Retired)-We have been through this Navy vs. Merchant Marine/foreign navy organization dispute before. It raises its head with monotonous regularity.
The point missed here is that a combatant ship is no more like a merchant ship than a fighter jet is like a 747. As with a combat aircraft, a cruiser or destroyer is an integrated combat system. The commander of any combat system must know that system intimately if he or she is going to fight it to its full capability. That knowledge includes its engineering and weapon systems as well as its shipcontrol system.
Unfortunately, as we have become more and more focused on the bureaucratic needs of the Washington establishment, surface warfighting has become a burden we are not prepared to support. NROTC graduates, who make up half of our new accessions, go directly from an underfunded training program to their ships. We have cancelled Basic Surface Warfare Officer School and watered down all other formal training. Watch teams now get their training from civilian instructors in shore-based trainers, often without their captains present. As a result, you see destroyers and cruisers strap on a tug and let the pilot "driver her in" to an easy berth on a calm day. One can only imagine how the rest of the ship functions. We are fortunate. We have an overwhelming technological advantage over any potential enemy. Therefore we do not have to be very good at using that technology. Pray we keep the advantage.
The Navy's Not Serious About Riverine Warfare
(See D. A. Hancock, pp. 14-19, January 2008 Proceedings)
Captain Wade R. Sanders, U.S. Navy Reserve (Retired)-In my opinion, one which will upset some of my surface line friends, Lieutenant Hancock is far too diplomatic in his article. The cold truth is that it will take a fundamental cultural change for the surface Navy to be comfortable with the littoral/brown-water mission and the forces that support it.
Since the blue-water, "haze-grey under way" Navy, unlike its special warfare and aviation components, is not a combat service like the Marine Corps and Army, it neither possesses nor encourages the warrior ethic. The unconventional warfare environment lacks the gentility associated with mighty fleets and woe betide the junior officer assigned to this "red-headed stepchild" as it will do little to enhance his or her budding career. Bottom line: career survival in the surface Navy is mandated by dedication to the book; survival in the littoral/brown-water environment is mandated by adaptability, imagination, and innovation.
Because of this cultural discomfort, any real emphasis on littoral/brown-water capability is shelved after each conflict, only to be reinvented nearly anew each time circumstances demand. This was true in Vietnam, and it is true today. Further, because assignment to this mission is not particularly career-enhancing, the quality of mid-level and senior surface naval officers assigned to command its components has been spotty, and few are hot running stars. The ones I served with in Vietnam were, for the most part, decent men and tried their best, but they were clearly unprepared to operate apart from the Fleet. They were traditional surface naval officers, generally ruled by excessive caution and inflexibility or, as a reflection of their insecurity, were excessively foolhardy.
A classic example of this kind of thinking is exemplified by the fact that for most of the Navy's operational experience in Vietnam, officers and crews of river patrol craft were ordered to wear regulation uniforms while on patrol (an order that we, their younger and more savvy subordinates, gleefully ignored, donning purloined Army camouflage uniforms at every opportunity). A few unduly risked their men and boats, hoping that some gained glory would resurrect their flagging careers.
I remember more than one senior flag officer (and, independently, a detailer or two) bemoaning my volunteering for Swift boats, suggesting that my career would be better served by grooming myself for flag aide and perfecting my cake-cutting, cocktail conversation skills, and the niceties of social etiquette with the Sixth Fleet. When I returned from Vietnam, I quickly understood the truth of their advice. Combat assignment, even command, as a junior officer was no plum, it was a potential detriment.
While my comrades and I were dodging bullets, our ambitious, and more savvy, competitors were dipping shrimp at Newport and finishing Destroyer or Department Head schools. It was a sad fact that after Vietnam, the surface Navy's inability to move beyond its "Great White Fleet" mentality drove scores of its best junior officers from its ranks. That continues today, for once one got a taste of brown-water assignments, where substance was more important than form, it was nearly impossible to go back. As a result, the Navy continues to lose officers and enlisted who have developed greater initiative, imagination, and flexibilityqualities not sufficiently appreciated by the traditional surface Navy.
Commander Steven L. Smith, U.S. Navy (Retired)-While I appreciate the passion and cognizant argument that lieutenant Hancock brought to bear in his article about the Navy's lack of overt support for riverine warfare, a few integrative principles should not be overlooked when formulating an argument relative to naval commitment.
Principle number one: We view the world from where we sit. Our perception of reality is based on our position. A lieutenant's perception is much different from that of a flag officer and highranking civilian official. That is not to say high-ranking military and civilian officials cannot learn from junior officers due to their proximity to military operations. However, strategic planning operates beyond the here and now; it delves into the abyss of analysis, prediction, and future probabilities. That in and of itself leads to decisions that support some elements of warfare and leaves others lacking indefinitely.
Principle number two: Elements of war are episodic. Everything has a shelf life except personnel. Weaponry and its manner of delivery or operational use evolve while other modes and methods are rendered obsolete. lieutenant Hancock acknowledged that riverine warfare "has continued intermittently" throughout our nation's history, which is a fact that will never change.
Principle number three: Sea lanes must remain free and open while lines of communication inevitably change, depending on the conflict. Riverine warfare is disruptive to enemy intentions-whether it causes a strategic shift is for military historians to debate.
Principle number four: It is all about money. Flags and civilians prioritize funding and expenditures for future requirements. What is critical and gains support in 2005 does not guarantee the same level of commitment in 2008. Priorities and commitments change, which is a fact of life within the geopolitical environment, regardless of the sensibility to do otherwise.
A Great White Fleet for the 21st Century
(See D. K. Richardson, L. V. Packwood, and D. E. Aldana, pp. 26-30, January 2008 Proceedings)
Commander Wade F. Wilkenson, U.S. Navy-The authors have placed a thought-provoking marker on the table of debate, but I offer two counterpoints for discussion.
First, the authors propose the Pacific theater as the ideal starting point to focus on humanitarian assistance. I argue that we should first look toward the Americas. As flooding in Bolivia, the devastating earthquake in Peru, Hurricane Dean in Belize, and Hurricane Felix in Nicaragua this past year demonstrate, disaster is no stranger to our region. Moreover, environmental, cultural, security, and economic ties inextricably link our fate with those of our southern neighbors. Clearly, our nation stands the most to gain from the positive influence provided by a Great White Fleet in the U.S. Southern Command area of operations.
Second, the authors propose soliciting nations to procure platforms to support the new Great White Fleet. I take the opposite view: create the building blocks, deploy routinely, and attract participants through example. That is the true nature of the 1,000-ship navy-no protocol required to join. Those nations with the capacity and motivation to participate will naturally do so when they see our continuing commitment.
The most recent USNS Comfort deployment gave us a great start toward showing that commitment. In just four months, she visited 12 nations in Latin America and the Caribbean. By mission's end, she had completed nearly 400,000 patient encounters. Highlights included nearly 100,000 people treated, more than 1,000 surgeries performed, 32,000 immunizations, nearly 24,000 pairs of eyeglasses distributed, and over 120,000 pharmaceuticals dispensed.
In his keynote speech during one of the Navy's "Conversations with the Country" held in Miami last December, Admiral Jim Stavridis, Commander, U.S. Southern Command, unveiled a vision for implementing strategy by creating a new type of deploying group, a humanitarian service group, or HSG.
With our hospital ships as centerpieces, we already have the foundation for two HSGs. We could assign escort ships from the Navy and Coast Guard to support each. Crews of the escorts would focus their training on humanitarian assistance, noncombatant evacuation, and disasterrecovery missions. Ideally, at least one of the escorts would be a high-speed vessel, like HSV Swift. That vessel's speed, endurance, and shallow draft make her a perfect force-multiplier for an HSG. To round things out, we could assign a permanent squadron commander and staff, ensuring work year-round to foster important partnering relationships.
Regardless of how an HSG is ultimately organized, an inclusive mindset to work hand-in-hand with our partners-international, interagency, non-governmental, and public-private-should be a core competency. Such a concept easily represents the best of our maritime strategy's vision for cooperative and adaptive force packages that will be durable and innovative maritime forces for good.
Fewer Medals Faster
(See W. J. Astore, p. 12, January 2008 Proceedings)
Colonel Fred L. Borch, U.S. Army (Retired)-The author makes valid points, but he errs when he claims that "combat medals . . . notably the Bronze Star" have been debased in Iraq and Afghanistan. While I agree that there appear to be too many awards and that rank is too often used as the criterion for awarding medals, the response is not "fewer" and "faster."
When General George C. Marshall asked President Franklin D. Roosevelt to create the Bronze Star Medal (BSM) in 1944, his intent was for this new award to be a morale-booster and to be liberally awarded. In fact, at the end of World War II, Army leaders decided that insufficient BSMs had been awarded. That's why every Soldier who earned the Combat Infantryman Badge (CIB) or Combat Medical Badge (CMB) in World War II is now automatically awarded the Bronze Star Medal. He has merely to apply for it. Since thousands of Soldiers were awarded CIBs and CMBs in World War II, that translates to many BSMs. Ultimately, the BSM was not intended to be a high-ranking decoration-and never intended to be more than a morale booster.
It follows that it is incorrect to assert that the Bronze Star was debased merely because many thousands have been awarded in Iraq. In fact, a look at Army award statistics shows something different-that BSM awards were relatively few, especially when one understands the significant differences between BSMs for achievement or merit, and others awarded for valor, a very important point. While 51,340 BSMs went to Soldiers for Iraq (as of 30 September 2007), only 1,686 have been awarded for valor. Since more than a million Soldiers have served in Iraq, 1,686 BSMs for valor is a small number and a low percentage of the total awarded. Statistics for the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps certainly reflect a similar ratio.
It is true that the award process favors senior officers and NCOs and that enlisted personnel are often unrecognized. And officers in Iraq are more likely to get a BSM than a private or airman. But the U.S. awards process is highly decentralized and sets no requirement for uniformity among units and commands, much less between the services. There isn't any way to ensure that lower-ranking personnel get more awards, unless we implement a quota system-which would be worse than the status quo.
Lieutenant Colonel Astore's plan is wanting. I don't disagree that three years seems like a long time to approve a Medal of Honor. But the answer is not speeding up the process. Fast-tracking the awards won't make it any fairer, and won't ensure quality. No one in the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, or Air Force wants to drag out the Medal of Honor process. But it is much more complicated than the award process for the Navy, Air Force, or Distinguished Service Crosses.
As for "fewer" awards, who would decide what awards should be eliminated? A good example of the problem is the Air Force's position on the Good Conduct Medal. The service announced last year that it was eliminating the medal because it makes no sense to make an award for good conduct since it is already expected of all Airmen. This makes sense, but does it mean that the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard will follow suit? Unlikely. So the result is that Airmen, Soldiers, Sailors, Coast Guardsmen, and Marines are treated differently. Does this solution serve any greater good? I think not.
Paul J. Madden-Awarding the Bronze Star to officers as if it were a theater service medal is nothing new.
When I was a civilian in Vietnam, the Army officers served six-month tours, and all received Bronze Stars the day before they left. The recipients included the Saigon desk jockeys I worked with. The most daring thing they did was play Softball in afternoon thunderstorms.
By contrast, the enlisted men served one-year tours, with no Bronze Stars, and had to work during the Softball games.
I was informed that there were two Bronze Stars. The "real" Bronze Star has a "V" device to denote valor. To eliminate the confusion, DOD should rename the non-valor medal as the "Brass Star," and annotate the service records accordingly.
Stop Blaming the Press
(See D. J. Danelo, pp. 52-55, January 2008 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Colonel Jay A. Stout, U.S. Marine Corps (Retired)-David Danelo makes an excellent point with his commentary on the press and our fight in Iraq. I readily admit that I was/am sometimes frustrated with the coverage that comes home, but I also know that the mainstream media outlets cannot compromise their credentials with false, or overtly selective, or slanted reporting.
Danelo's article immediately created an analogy in my mind related to my service in naval aviation; it should be instantly recognizable to all military careerists. We used to say: "Don't think about doing your job safely-it's not a safe business. Rather, do your job professionally and safety will take care of itself." Likewise, if we do our job correctly in Iraq, then we don't need to worry about the media; the media are made up of professionals who should do their job properly through accurate and effective reporting.
C'ommander Steve Williams, U.S.. Navy-Mr. Danelo is correct in arguing that the press should not be blamed if Iraq cannot be stabilized, but he fails to level criticism at reporters for not doing their part to ensure victory. As he noted, in World War II the press defended American righteousness. Does today's press feel obligated to defend liberal, democratic righteousness? On 11 September 2001, it wasn't just America that was attacked, but also Western culture and freedoms. The press has a vested interest in success if they hope to continue pursuing their livelihood.
Yes, there is much bad news. The news reports a suicide bomber kills scores of innocents. Because of poor political and military decisions, there are not enough troops to provide security. Factually true, but the assessment is incomplete. Increasing the number of troops will not stop the ultimate smart weapon, a dedicated and patient suicide bomber. The deliberate targeting of innocent civilians, including children, and even the occasional use of them as the delivery mechanism, are the true atrocities of the war. But the condemnation of terrorist tactics and goals is only faintly heard in the press. As for distributing soccer balls, it is a necessary part of the three-block war and deserves to be mentioned.
The esteemed war correspondent William Russell was highly critical in his reporting, but no one ever criticized his dedication to the British soldier or his desire to see Britain succeed. With today's press that is clearly not true. The United States is engaged in a war to protect and expand liberty at home and abroad. Correspondents cannot be mere spectators who report the facts. The press needs to acknowledge the vital role it must play to ensure the liberty that it enjoys.
Major Russ Duenow, U.S. Marine Corps (Retired)-One wonders why victory has eluded America over the past 60 years, but it's no mystery to me. While our fighting men and women have continued to perform as valiantly and professionally as their forefathers, they have also had to perform with three crippling and totally self-inflicted impediments since World War II: politicians, lawyers, and journalists.
During World War II these three divisive forces worked together with the U.S. government to win the war against the Axis Powers; they all knew we had to work together or we would very possibly lose the war. Today, no such collaborations exists. All three have unwittingly undermined our armed forces as the troops battled enemies in wars from Korea to Iraq. Politicians remain mostly concerned with getting re-elected or keeping their party in power, civilian rule of law does not work on the field of battle since lawyers only end up handcuffing our military members with inane rules of engagement, and journalists are the worst of all.
Journalists are interested in getting out the story and for the most part, as David Danelo points out, they get it right. But seldom do they consider the ramifications or impact their stories have on the rest of the world. Just one negative story bolsters our enemies' confidence and resolve while equally destroying support from the public at home, thus eroding our servicemen's and women's resolve on the battlefield. World War II-era journalists understood this fact, but their successors are more concerned with getting out their story to a news-hungry world and in so doing feeding the flames that empower our enemies and foes.
It's sad when today's men and women in the military have to keep one eye focused on their back while battling our foes to the front. Every act and order is scrutinized by journalists and our troops castigated if there is collateral damage or the military member performs an act that the journalists find questionable. If these same absurd rules had been allowed in World War II, German cities would not have been bombed, there would have been no unrestricted submarine warfare by the Allies and we would not have dropped the atomic bomb-and we would also have lost the war.
The United States should immediately move to reestablish control over the media in active theaters of war. Government control of the media would still permit news, but in a manner that would not give the advantage to our enemy or undermine the morale or our troops or the folks at home. Any media members who refuse to act under these rules would operate at their own risk and without military protection. We have been far too accommodating of these fools anyway, especially when their stories could not have been more harmful than if al Qaeda had written them. Until the U.S. government sets up rules for politicians, lawyers, and journalists to follow, our military members will continue to operate on battlefields where the enemy has no such disadvantages.
Women in the Military 'We Are in the Fight'
(See H. Yeager, pp.16-20, December 2007; J. M. Collins and J. E. Babcock, pp. 6-7, January 2008 Proceedings)
Dean Raffaelli-I am not what you would call a supporter of the military-industrial complex. In fact, if I hadn't had a high lottery number during the Vietnam War, I probably would have gone north to Canada.
But a few years ago on a whim I joined your organization and began reading Proceedings. I am not sure what I was expecting, but I know what I got, one of the best-written magazines I have the pleasure to read.
It continues to amaze me how candid your contributors are. Reading their words has given me an entirely new appreciation of the people in the armed forces and the immensity of their mission.
To read that Vice Admiral Rondeau did not have a proper uniform to wear and then in the next article, to see an account of "brownout" landings by lieutenant Hawley, well things have changed dramatically.
When I scanned the Editor's Page, and noted the words "different" and "resistance," I immediately turned to Captain Winters' "Not Home Yet...." Ironic, descriptive, and philosophical writing with an in-your-face quality, makes her story rank with the best writing anywhere.
So please let me, a complete outsider to your world, congratulate you and all the writers who contribute to Proceedings.
Transforming Military Force: The Legacy of Arthur Cebrowski and Network Centric Warfare
(See S. C. Truver, pp. 74-75, January 2008 Proceedings)
Norman Friedman-Dr. Truver's review of the biography of Admiral Cebrowski raises an interesting point. I have long thought that net-centric warfare really was "NTDS on steroids." I think Admiral Cebrowski rejected that possibility because he had arrived at his ideas from a completely different point of view, and possibly also because he thought that they would have been rejected had anyone seen them as other than revolutionary. In fact, different thinkers often arrive at equivalent ideas from very different starting points.
The advantage of seeing network-centricity as a more powerful version of past netted command systems is that experience with them makes it far easier to imagine how the new systems will work, what they will offer, and what problems must be overcome to make them effective. Without this kind of history, the discussion is, as many have observed, overly theoretical and often sterile. It becomes difficult to set priorities-how much data flow do we need, for example? How much would doubling the current capacity be, compared to the ships or aircraft or tanks that might be bought with the same money? History is worthwhile because it is our only source of experiments (with known outcomes) that show how real people and real adversaries interact with systems vaguely like the ones we are buying.