In summer 2004, the Iraqi city of Fallujah symbolized the violent and dangerous Sunni insurgency that had plagued al Anbar Province. Marine Major Kevin "Frantic" O'Rourke, air officer for Regimental Combat Team One (RCT-1), stayed very busy coordinating air strikes against insurgent positions around the city.
One way he and his team detected and tracked targets was by using unmanned aerial vehicles. UAVs could transmit live video feed of enemy activity and maintain positive identification while aircraft providing on-call close air support were scrambled overhead.
When O'Rourke wanted to strike a target, typically the coordinates obtained from the UAV video feed were passed to the aircraft. The pilot then entered the coordinates into his system, enabling his powerful targeting pod (TPOD) sensors to view the target location.
But the location was never exact and friendly forces were often nearby, so a detailed talk-on followed to ensure the pilot had the correct target. In a dense urban environment, this process could easily take 45 minutes or longer not counting the time needed to get clearance to employ ordnance. Often aircraft ran out of fuel before locating or being cleared to attack the target, and the whole process had to start all over again for any new aircraft that checked on station.
The Talk-On Is Important
O'Rourke describes a typical talk-on: "I would compare three items in the target area, like satellite dishes on the roof, cars across the street and trees in the front yard. When I was satisfied, I would proceed to the 9-Line [the ground controller's brief, covering initial point; heading/distance to target; elevation; description; target location; type of mark on the deck, such as smoke, mortars, laser; closest friendly location; egress direction; time on target, and restrictions] . . . I always verified the target with a talk-on."1
This technique, aircraft equipped with TPODs and ground forces with UAVs and imagery, was effective and time-consuming. There was always the potential that the pilot or forward air controller (FAC) would incorrectly convince himself or herself that positive identification had been achieved and attack the wrong location.
More than a year earlier, an AV-8B under the call-sign Toffee 71 made aviation history by flying the first combat TPOD video downlink mission. For several days in spring 2003 aircraft had been attempting to destroy a building in a city west of an Nasiriyah. But the FAC had not gained enough confidence that positive identification had been achieved via talk-on to clear any attacks.
The only configuration difference between Toffee 71 and the previous aircraft was a video downlink transmitter attached to the TPOD. After passing the coordinates, the Marine FAC, now able to see Toffee's targeting footage on a receiver station, directed the pilot to slew onto the target building. Within eight minutes of checking on station, the first laser-guided bomb was dropped.
Back to 2004: Halfway through RCT-1's deployment, both Marine fixed-wing squadrons deployed in Iraq (one Hornet and one Harrier) received the same downlink transmitters that Toffee 71 had used.
Real-time video from the aircraft supporting the Marines in and around Fallujah could now be viewed inside the regimental combat operations center. The impact was immediate, says O'Rourke, "with the video downlink a simple slew left . . . stop . . . that's your target' is all that was needed."2
This new capability dramatically increased O'Rourke's ability to touch the enemy operating three blocks deep (that is, three blocks in front of U.S. forces) during Operation Phantom Fury that November. The ability to fight in that dimension with precision in an urban environment is a huge advantage. The technology proved so effective that by 2006, almost every aircraft in Iraq that was equipped with a Northrop Grumman Litening II targeting pod had downlink capability (Marines and Air Force).
Worth a Thousand Words
The burden of satisfying the Rules of Engagement has become much easier with real-time video feed of an objective area. The decision to destroy a target, or have the aircraft maintain positive identification overhead for a quick reaction force to investigate, is now made with vastly increased situational awareness and a detailed, real-time, common tactical picture.
In an environment where one misplaced bomb can ruin years of established goodwill with the local population, there can be no doubt regarding the legitimacy or location of a target.
By saving time locating and verifying, video downlink has enhanced the most critical component of effective close air support: building an effective relationship between strike aircraft and ground controller.
Radio remains the primary mode of communication, but a picture is indeed worth a thousand words. Video has saved time and eliminated most of the targeting mistakes made by relying only on talk-ons.
The 9-Line brief, which is required and always given in some form, can be reduced to include only pertinent data. A condensed brief now usually includes target elevation, location (often generated from the aircraft TPOD), and restrictions, because the pilot and ground controller have a shared high situational awareness of the target area. Restrictions almost always include a run-in heading, the direction in which the aircraft will point when it attacks the target. This is important, because you want to avoid overflying friendly forces to minimize the potential of fratricide. (Generally air-to-ground ordnance falls short or long, not left to right.)
Because of this new capability, the way the Marine Corps has employed fixed-wing tactical aircraft (TACAIR) to support the Marine Air-Ground Task Force has evolved significantly in the last four years. At the end of Operation Iraqi Freedom I, Marine Corps planners believed TACAIR was ill suited to support the transition to security and stabilization and counter-insurgency operations. Marine F/A-18 and AV-8B aircraft did not deploy with I Marine Expeditionary Force at the start of OIF II in early 2004.
However, after the first battle of Fallujah late that spring, Marine TACAIR equipped with the Litening II targeting pods returned with a very different function. Close air support aircraft now provided non-traditional intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (NTISR) as their primary mission. Simply put, a majority of the air missions focused on using the TPOD to look around the battlespace as opposed to delivering ordnance on targets.
Getting Inside the OODA-Loop
One might ask why commanders in Iraq want 24-hour coverage from fixed-wing aircraft. The answer is that NTISR coupled with the video downlink provides increased situational awareness of the battlespace, along with the firepower of fixed-wing close air support. TACAIR platforms used in combination with UAVs can effectively monitor the battlefield with complete stealth and, if needed, direct friendly forces on the ground to the enemy location or destroy the target without any warning.
The ideas of retired Air Force Colonel John Boyd have influenced Marine Corps warfighting doctrine in a profound and lasting way. Boyd says, "In order to win, we should operate at a faster tempo or rhythm than our adversaries or, better yet, get inside the adversary's Observation-Orientation-Decision-Action time cycle or loop (OODA-Loop)."3
The Litening pod, integrated with the ground combat element through video downlink, increases the probability of operating inside the enemy's OODA-Loop. Real-time battlefield images allow commanders to find, fix, track, target, engage, and assess an agile enemy before he can react to a developing situation. This capability is relevant not only in security and stabilization and counter-insurgency operations, but also in conventional contingencies where operational tempo is critical to achieve the upper hand.
One potential downside of this new technology is a commander's perceived need to see it to believe it. Targeting video, if required to flow up the chain of command before gaining clearance to fire, can slow down an engagement opportunity, thereby circumventing our ability to get inside the enemy's OODA-Loop. A nimble enemy can take advantage of this delay in execution by making hit-and-run attacks before the clearance process is complete.
Those engaged with the enemy ground controllers (aware of the commander's intent and having consulted with the fire support coordination cell), combatants on the ground, and aircrew personnel using the video downlink as a tool, are still the best suited to react quickly to a time-sensitive situation.
How It Works
During the course of multiple deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan, many Marine Harrier and Hornet aircrews, as well as Air Force strike aircraft, have experienced the evolving pilot-to-ground controller relationship using TPOD with video downlink for NTISR. The following example illustrates just how much the battlefield has changed due to downlinked video feed.
In spring 2007, a single Harrier, working autonomously from his wingman, checked on station to conduct NTISR in an area with no friendly forces on the ground. His ground controller, located in a combat operations center approximately ten miles away, directed the aircraft to scan a known trouble area. The pilot soon saw three individuals walking around past curfew.
Unbeknown to the pilot, the ground combat commander was also watching, as he stood behind the FAC. The ground commander saw the live video downlink on a large display (while the pilot's own screen was only five inches square). The commander saw the people dig and place an object in the middle of a road. Acting appropriately under the Rules of Engagement, he immediately declared hostile intent and cleared the aircraft for attack.
The result: Because of the video-downlinked TPOD, three insurgents planting an IED in the middle of the night were observed, tracked, and killed without any friendly forces nearby. The target was never seen with the naked eye; in the past, some sort of illumination would have been needed. These men were targeted only through the TPOD infrared camera and then the pilot's infrared marker (a green laser beam that shoots from the TPOD to the target), used with his night-vision goggles. The pilot strafed the target with 25mm rounds without ever seeing it directly.
Ground forces subsequently assessed battle damage and confirmed the attack was successful against three heavily armed insurgents.
Integrating Ground and Aircrews
This attack, routine today, would have been unachievable four years ago. It was the ground commander who witnessed the hostile act of emplacing the IED, not the pilot. Because of the TPOD's capabilities combined with the video downlink, the commander now has increased capability to maintain awareness of his area of responsibility and react swiftly.
This enhanced capability to achieve a high tempo and operate inside the enemy's OODA-Loop is also valid on a conventional battlefield, and it will only continue to quicken as new technology is introduced.
Precision munitions allow Marine TACAIR to maintain standoff from the target, but the video downlink's capabilities have brought fixed-wing platforms back in close to the fight. This has further integrated the Marine Air-Ground Task Force concept with a lethality and responsiveness never before seen on a battlefield.
The ability to downlink real-time imagery has changed the process by which the Marine Corps conducts close air support which is not necessarily close bombing support. Air support extends beyond weapons employment; it is close because the aircrew must have a detailed understanding and integration with the ground scheme of maneuver.
Taking It to the Next Level
As Marine aviation looks to the future, the focus is on increasing the situational awareness of those on the ground by providing a common tactical picture through vastly increased information flow. Upgrades to the current video downlink are already being tested, and will allow for more than the current one-way video.
Commanders and operators will have access to multiple sources and types of information to share, including Blue/Red Force tracker (real-time friendly and enemy locations), StrikeLINK (shared aircraft sensor information), MiRC (email/chat to aircraft), VOIP (secure voice over internet protocol), and shared two-way video.
The more information we can share from multiple sensors on the battlefield, the more speed and lethality will be increased, while decreasing collateral damage and friendly fire incidents.
In December 2005, Marine Aviation Warfare Tactics Squadron-1 conducted a cooperative technology demonstration called Agile Lion. Marine aircraft and ground forces performed various operational scenarios using the enhanced position location reporting system (EPLRS) radio, which proved to extend the range of effective communications, enhance situational awareness, and provide new ways of collaborating to achieve operational objectives. While Agile Lion was more of a science project than a capabilities demonstration, the technology promised a feasible solution to the problem of linking legacy systems with future weapon systems.
Legacy systems (the current hardware being used) often need updates to interact with newer equipment. Yet they will remain relevant, because they can "talk" to the new hardware that is, the new battlefield. Our current aircraft will become obsolete if they cannot talk to the new systems.
The first step in creating an air-ground link will become a reality in mid-2008. The Marine Corps will equip 35 of its existing TPODs with plug-and-play II kits. The new hardware will include significant improvements to the existing systems, and will be compatible with a future joint system to link air and ground together through the EPLRS radio network.
By using existing DOD hardware and information systems technology, the Marine Corps is affordably increasing the capability and relevance of its legacy attack platforms, including the F/A-18 Hornet, AV-8B Harrier, EA-6B Prowler, AH-1W Cobra, and UH-1N Huey. Thus we are preparing for the future battlefield while awaiting systems such as the coming F-35 joint strike fighter.
As technology rapidly changes the way information is shared on the battlefield, commanders and aircrew will have a more complete common tactical picture. This will allow them to engage targets with ever-greater speed and precision. Today, video downlink has helped create that picture and change the way in which we conduct close air support. In the future, as shared linking technology improves, so will speed and lethality and the concept of combined arms.
1. Email from MAJ Kevin O'Rourke to author, 20 August 2007.
2. Ibid.
3. MAJ Jeffrey L. Cowan, U.S. Air Force, ""From Air Force Fighter Pilot to Marine Corps Warfighting: Colonel John Boyd, His Theories on War, and their Unexpected Legacy,"" master's thesis, USMC Command and Staff College, 2000, http://www.d-n-i.net/fcs/boyd_thesis.htm.