The North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) and U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) have similar goals and missions. Why not combine the two?
In the current strategic climate of asymmetric and transnational threats, the defense and security of the continental homeland will depend on the development of a comprehensive, international, and interagency North American Defense Organization (NADO). Created initially by combining NORAD and U.S. NORTHCOM, this organization must grow to include all of North America and eventually form the backbone of a seamless global defense network dedicated to protecting the continent from indiscriminate attacks aimed at undermining peace and stability.
The silver wings on the NORAD emblem embrace the globe in a protective manner, a proud symbol of military might, cooperation, and unity between Canada and the United States. The motto inscribed below it boldly proclaims "For the Common Defense," echoing the preamble of the U.S. Constitution. In a similar vein, the new U.S. NORTHCOM forges modern strategies for defending the homeland in a difficult threat environment. Born of necessity in different eras, the two commands share a similar history and purpose: the defense of North America.
That mission, however, has become more complex than ever. U.S. NORTHCOM's first strategic vision document states that, "future conflicts will encompass many new and unforeseen challenges to our national security. The new normalcy . . . will not resemble peacetime as we have traditionally considered that concept. New asymmetric threats may include . . . as yet unknown means of harming the homeland." Both commands are using traditional military mission concepts and organizational structures. While each is effective, neither on its own can adequately provide comprehensive homeland defense and security in the future. The time has come to combine them, using a new organizational structure that provides an adaptive and flexible means to integrate other nations and coordinate the capabilities of each to deter and defend against the full range of threats.
The History of NORAD
In 1958, Canada and the United States signed a comprehensive agreement establishing the North American Air Defense Command. As the Cold War intensified and the Soviet threat to North America loomed large, the two governments took deliberate steps to further integrate air defenses designed to deter and prevent air attacks on the homelands.
Language in the original agreement that still rings true today built a compelling case for the high levels of international cooperation necessary to establish such a command:
Studies made by representatives of our two Governments led to the conclusion that the problem of the air defenses of our two countries could best be met by delegating to an integrated headquarters the task of exercising operational control over assigned forces. (Governments of Canada and the United States, Original NORAD Agreement, 1958, p. 2)
Thus, NORAD quickly became in integral part of the successful prosecution of the Cold War, and the agreement remains in effect today, having been renewed nine times.
The commander of NORAD (currently, Air Force General Gene Renuart) is appointed jointly by the President of the United States and the Prime Minister of Canada. Command and control currently emanates from a combined headquarters in Colorado that maintains a continuous picture of the air defense situation over North America.
NORAD's organizational structure—a traditional line-staff organization with regional subordinates—has changed little since its inception. Poised to respond to fast-moving air- or space-based attacks from abroad and largely stood down from the hair-trigger alert status maintained for decades against the Soviet threat, NORAD faced an unanticipated internal crisis on 9/11 when domestic airliners were transformed into weapons. In response, the command quickly adapted to a more inward-looking posture and developed protocols to engage this new type of target.
The History of U.S. NORTHCOM
In response to the 9/11 attacks, the United States established the Department of Homeland Security to centralize and synchronize efforts to protect the United States. Simultaneously, the Department of Defense made significant changes as well. Then-Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld described the security environment and our response, the new Unified Command Plan, in April of 2002:
The spread of weapons of increasing range and power into the hands of the world's most irresponsible regimes threatens to create dangers and instabilities around the globe and we, as a country, have to be ready to defend against, and where possible, prevent even worse attacks in the days ahead. The 2002 Unified Command Plan is fashioned to help do that. It has some historic firsts. This is the first time that the continental United States will be assigned a commander for the Northern Command, or NORTHCOM, as we'll undoubtedly call it. The new commander will be responsible for land, aerospace and sea defenses of the United States. He will command U.S. forces that operate within the U.S. in support of civil authorities. (U.S. Department of Defense, Unified Command Plan, 2002, p. 1)
Thus U.S. NORTHCOM was created, like NORAD, in response to specific threats but with far-reaching goals and missions. Like other unified commands, U.S. NORTHCOM adopted the ubiquitous straight line and staff organization of functional joint directorates J1 through J8, commonly known as the "J-Staff" structure. The headquarters is located with NORAD, under a dual-hatted four star commander, a three-star Canadian NORAD deputy, and a three-star U.S. NORTHCOM deputy. But even though they function side-by-side with the common mission of defending the homeland, their areas of emphasis are distinctly different.
Despite the shift from the clear, bipolar world of the Cold War to the unpredictable, asymmetric situation today, the underlying reasons for NORAD and commands of that type, as captured in the original agreement, are as compelling as ever. The creation of U.S. NORTHCOM further illustrates the importance of and renewed emphasis on homeland defense and security in the United States. Both commands are highly effective within their respective domains. NORAD is without question a highly successful bi-national solution for air and space defense. And U.S. NORTHCOM, in its brief existence, has made significant strides in improving homeland defense and security for the United States.
Limitations and Issues with Current Structures
The problem today is that the mere existence of U.S. NORTHCOM and NORAD don't go far enough. In their current structures, both commands are impeded by significant limiting organizational factors that will prevent fully integrated, seamless homeland defense and security. Vulnerabilities and seams remain, especially along borders and in the information/decision processes. And they will improve only incrementally without a major reorganization that combines the two commands and provides avenues for membership expansion beyond the United States and Canada.
Despite the blurred lines between homeland defense and security, and despite the limitations of the current NORAD and U.S. NORTHCOM structures, three core military competencies must be addressed. Information must be shared, surveillance and warning must be adequate, and agile, flexible forces must be capable of assured and rapid response to prevent attacks and provide required support. These run thematically through the U.S. National Security Strategy, National Military Strategy, and National Strategy for Homeland Security, as well as Canada's National Security Policy. These capabilities serve as the foundation of NADO's proposed organizational structure.
The New Organization
Building on the embedded battle staff of U.S. NORTHCOM, the new NADO would be permanently organized into functional groups. This network style structure reduces boundaries and eliminates the stovepiped staffing common in more traditional hierarchical organizations.
At the center of the structure is the information group, the sun of NADO's solar system. Here all information is gathered, shared, and disseminated in a combined intelligence fusion center. All source intelligence would be analyzed, integrated, and shared directly with all other groups. Also within the information group would be the combined NADO warning/command center, where watch teams would monitor intelligence and interagency feeds, conduct assessments, and control assigned forces around the clock.
The current operations (J3) and plans and policy (J5) directorates would be reorganized into three functional response groups. The offensive response group would carry out offensive aspects of homeland defense by focusing on defeating would-be attackers before they strike. This group would plan and maintain contingency operations both within North America and around the world, in partnership with and in support of other combatant commands. They would directly control tailored force packages within North America across a broad array of threats, to include maritime and air interdiction and decisive land and special operations actions.
The defensive response group would balance the homeland defense mission by joining with other agencies to protect and defend North American territory, population, and critical infrastructure. This group would build and maintain security plans to provide a comprehensive layered defense across our territory. It would also deploy and control specialized security forces during heightened alert periods and other significant events.
The event response group would focus on homeland security, specializing in interagency efforts and integrating appropriate forces into national response plans. It would control and provide consequence management and civil support force teams, trained and equipped to respond and assist other agencies to address incidents from weapons of mass destruction attacks to forest fires or hurricanes. These forces would train and be closely associated with law enforcement and civil response units.
The remaining groups in this new NADO would provide all the critical support functions to the response groups and assigned forces. The resource and support group would be comprised of the current manpower & personnel (J1), logistics & engineering (J4), C4I (J6), training (J7), and programs & resource (J8) directorates. Also included would be the current "special staff" areas like the command surgeon, legal staff, chaplain, and public affairs. Providing a broad range of support, this new group would build and deploy support teams, with all the skills mentioned here, to augment the forces as required when deployed.
The technology & science group would reach out to other agencies and private-sector interests to capture and put in place the latest technological applications. This group would conduct the long-range planning, modeling, and analysis to integrate these technologies across NADO.
Controlling it all, the command & decision group would house the commander and senior leadership from each country represented. They would function as situation assessors, with the delegated authority to command assigned forces across the array of missions prescribed, and to the extent each government allows. They would also provide guidance and direction for all the other groups in NADO.
The internal structure of the groups would maintain most characteristics of the current organization. Retaining the familiar shadow internal structure would allow the staff to function day-to-day with other agencies and commands, while always being ready to sustain continuous operations of the group. Each nation would contribute personnel in its own overlay, matching the contribution of the other nations as closely as possible. Initially, Canada and the United States would provide layers, with Mexico and other nations joining in when able. By maintaining direct control of its layer, each country would exercise full authority over its forces and retain the capability to act unilaterally, protect certain information. and choose which groups and packages to join.
For example, shared information may some day lead to the planning and execution of an offensive response option in Mexico. The United States, while aware and involved with the planning, may choose not to commit or participate in the strike force assigned to the mission. The separate country layers in the common structure would provide that flexibility.
Bold Steps—Agreements
Can an organization like NADO be realized? Yes. And it could be created relatively soon. More than reorganizing into a new structure, NADO represents a new way of thinking about homeland defense and security for an entire hemisphere, not just individual nations. If bold political steps are taken, a North American Defense Organization could be a reality by 2009. In conjunction with the planning now under way for further cooperation with CANADACOM, Canada's equivalent to U.S. NORTHCOM, we should vigorously engage Mexico to join the alliance as well. The principles of cooperation and common defense, indeed the legacy of NORAD applied so effectively across the 49th parallel for decades, must now be extended to America's southern border. We must commit ourselves to the seamless and comprehensive homeland defense of North America that can be achieved only by building on our strong relations with Canada and Mexico. Most important, we should not wait until the next 9/11.
Captain Davis is a naval aviator with background in a helicopter antisubmarine squadron flying the SH-3 and in Fleet air reconnaissance squadrons flying the EP-3. He is also an experienced joint planner, currently assigned as the Deputy Director of Manpower & Personnel at NORAD/USNORTHCOM.