"Challenges for the New Maritime Strategy"
(See W. J. Holland, pp. 14-18, April 2007 Proceedings)
Vice Admiral John G. Morgan, U.S. Navy-Admiral Holland's article is spot on. He has illuminated the challenge. We'll need his help-and yours-to clear the bar.
"Warlord Loop Reading List"
(See J. Collins, pp. 34-39, April 2007 Proceedings)
Michael L. McDaniel-After reading the article on the Warlord Loop Reading List in the April issue. I did some comparisons with the current Navy Reading List and came up with a challenge bigger than any that Rear Admiral Holland mentioned in his article.
The books in the two lists can be roughly grouped into five categories: history, biography, strategy, fiction, and management. But the proportions between the two lists are dramatically different, as can be seen from the following breakdown:
The Warlord Loop list is long on history and strategy, and very short on management. The Navy list shortchanges history and strategy for more fiction and far more management. More management than is healthy, frankly.
And that brings us to the challenge: does the Navy realize why it exists? Comnaring the reading lists indicates that the Navy has come to think of itself as a business, not a lighting service. And the words and deeds of Navy leadership over the last 15 years or so support that conclusion. In today's Navy, "strategy" is usually preceded by "business," not "war."
The Navy needs to go back to basics and study the great works of naval strategy. There, we will find the answers we need-to both "Why the Navy exists" and "Why the nation should support a strong Fleet."
Because the business of the Navy is not business.
Lieutenant Commander Mark R. Condeno, Philippine Coast Guard Auxiliary-My congratulations to Proceedings for publishing the Warlord Loop Reading List and my thanks to Colonel Collins and his colleagues tor sharing titles of hooks that have helped shaped their professional perspectives. This again strengthens the importance of reading in our professional development.
"FRSS Teams: A Good Idea Whose Time Has Passed"
(See J. Rappold, pp. 22-23, February 2007 Proceedings)
Captain Kermit R. Booher, Medical Corps, U.S. Navy-FRSS2 arrived at Al Qaim, Iraq in early March 2004 and remained in support of 3d Battalion/7th Marines until relieved in late August. The ten-person FRSS2 team had spent the month of January 2004 training together at Los Angeles County Hospital with the Naval Trauma Training Center (NTTC) immediately preceding deployment to Iraq. Living, working, and training together at NTTC resulted in a cohesive team that was ready to deliver the necessary emergency medical support to the Marines of 3/7.
Less than 36 hours after initial setup of our combined FRSS2/STP4, the team cared for a severely injured Marine who had sustained a through-and-through thigh wound with an associated fracture of the femoral shaft caused by an IED. He was resuscitated, his wounds debrided, and his fracture stabilized for transport with an external pin fixator. His primary surgical care was initiated less than one hour from the time of his injury, and made his 200-mile trip to the nearest Level III facility safer and considerably more comfortable.
Furthermore, the inherent dangers associated with air transport in that region, including weather-induced zero-visibility conditions and hostile fire, could easily have led to significant delay in his evacuation to a Level III facility. In such a situation, temporizing provided by an FRSS may be life and/or limb saving.
The surgical caseload for our team was sporadic over a six-month period, but became quite heavy on several occasions, including one instance of receiving over ten severely injured Marines in less than one hour. In addition, several limbs were potentially salvaged by emergency shunting of severed major blood vessels. One of these Marines had complete loss of circuhition to an arm when his brachial artery was destroyed by a high-velocity rifle round. Blood flow to the extremity was restored by an emergency synthetic blood vessel graft and faseiotomies were performed to prevent further muscle damage in the arm. His life was undoubtedly saved by the Navy Corpsmen who treated him in the field and the Army medics who continued that care during the relatively short helicopter trip to our facility. Even so, it is doubtful that his arm function would have been regained if surgical intervention had been delayed until arrival at the nearest Level III facility. 200 miles away. That Marine later returned to full duty and made a second OIF deployment with his unit.
The recounting of such events is anecdotal and fails to provide the type of critical data analysis called for in Commander Ruppold's article. However, it is difficult to dismiss the positive effect on morale that our team's support brought to the unit we were serving in the "mature combat theater" referred to by Commander Rappold. The surgical care rendered by our team was not "complex," and our surgeons were not working "in every foxhole." I agree with Commander Rappold's recognition of the challenges faced by Navy Medicine regarding the most efficient distribution of its surgical assets. I also agree with the importance of every team training together prior to deployment, as our team did at NTTC. I do not believe that we can expect an indefinite duration of a "mature combat theater." The FRSS still provides an important element of flexibility in our ability to support our warriors.
"The DOD Travel Card Must Go"
(See C. Davis, pg. 67. February 2007 Proceedings)
Colonel James M. Mutter, U.S. Marine Corpx (Retired)-Oohrahl! Commander Davis has hit the nail on the head. For far too long we have been putting our military families at economic risk with this ludicrous and unsatisfactorily unresponsive loan system our Mil Pers is forced to provide to DFAS. A good focus group and software team could figure out how to rectify this injustice. The problem is that it apparently doesn't adversely affect those beyond pay grades E-8 and 0-6. Most of their nests are firm, the kids have all but flown, and they usually get special attention or it would have been changed a long time ago.
"Use the Naval Academy to Educate Sailors, Too"
(See M. Butler, pp. 54-56, Februan 2007 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Commander Joseph A. Drake, U.S. Navy-I agree with the discussion about the great unrealized potential of Naval Academy resources, but toward the end of the essay was a statement to which I must take exception. Command Master Chief Butler states that "it should be the commission that separates officers from enlisted and not the source of their education." I think George Washington put il best when he said, ". . . remember that it is the actions and not the commission that make the officer and that there is more expected of him than the title." If you don't understand what George Washington meant, then you probably aren't officer material. Just as chief petty officers are held to higher standards than other enlisted personnel, officers have more expected of them as well; it is a distinction that should never be overlooked.
"We Don't Need Another Academy"
(See J. Murphy, pp. 50-53. February 2007; J. Orem, D. Horvath, pp.81-82, March 2007 Proceedings)
Rear Admiral Rowland G. Freeman III, U.S. Navy (Retired)-I was astonished by the article regarding the move to establish a CPU Academy. The current process for initialing new CPOs has worked extremely well since the establishment of the Navy, and it has been modified over the years. First, there is already a Senior Enlisted Academy, recently opened to new CPOs, with the intent to expand it. There is also a new Prospective Chief Petty Officer Indoctrination course, as well as guidance on indoctrination of new chiefs. Master Chief Petty Officer of the Navy Joe Campa appears to have the training of chief petty officers well in hand. In his words chiefs are "the backbone of the Navy, first and foremost, as deck plate leaders."
MCPON Campa further states in regard to the goals for chiefs. "This is not a philosophy. It's a course of action. The success of our Navy hinges on the effectiveness of the chief on the deck plate. We've developed a strategy to incorporate the mission, vision and guiding principles in everything we do."
Lets not try again to "fix something that ain't broke." The senior chiefs, led by MCPON Campa, seem to have the training/education of chiefs well in hand. Let them do the job.
Senior Chief Intelligence Specialist Louise C. Senatore, U.S. Navy Ke.verve (Retired)-I couldn't agree more with Senior Chief James Murphy on not needing another academy to replace the current training of selectees by the CPO Mess. I made chief petty officer in 1991 and was trained and initiated at Naval Air Station Alameda. California. I was notified that I was a selectee in early July, which gave plenty of time for chief training before initiation on 16 September. The formal classroom training was one full weekend with my next two week annual training required to be CPO Leadership School.
The Alameda Chiefs' Mess performed in an outstanding manner in the daily training of 30 selectees. Core values, team building, and leadership components were all taught by the best. What I remember the most is that "you always take care of your people." Heaven knows that being a chief isn't easy-you learn how to multitask, put out "fires'" before they get too big, and go without lunch. I learned to delegate responsibility to my E-6s because there was too much for me to do by myself.
Chief initiation should not he shorter in duration and should he accomplished by the local Chiefs' Mess. Trust them, they know what they are doing. This is the time-honored way of training new chiefs and it has always worked-don't try to fix what isn't broken. Add a CPO Academy later, if it is thought to be necessary, but do not change the way the Chiefs' Mess trains its new chiefs.
San Francisco Torpedoes JROTC
(See C. T. Hall, pp. 56-60, March 2007 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Harry Sponder, U.S. Coast Guard (Retired)-I read the article on JROTC in the March 2007 edition and could not let it go without correcting some misconceptions. As a Senior Naval Science Instructor in one of the largest inner school districts I must add a few facts.
I have never taken any action for or against gays. I follow school policy. I do not discriminate on any level. We have had openly gay individuals in positions of great responsibility and of very high rank.
We have never had any incident of hazing or group ostracism. It is not only against school policy but also against Navy policy. As such, why would anyone want to jeopardize his or her job by doing something against policy'?
Some critics claim that youngsters are coerced into the program. In truth, some parents demand their children be in the program. Some guidance counselors also place students into the program. The reason is that parents, teachers, and guidance counselors see the program as very positive. However, I realize that some students got into the program because of outside pressure. I solve this problem by allowing anyone to opt out with no penalty during the first two weeks of any school year.
The author also indicates that JROTC instructors earn a higher salary than a regular teacher. One must remember that the JROTC instructors are senior military officers or non-commissioned officers. When one considers their experience anil the fact that the government covers a portion of their pay. they are a bargain to any school system.
In response to the statement that JROTC instructors may not have teaching credentials or degrees. I point out that, other than the 20-plus years of experience, to my knowledge there are no credentials for JROTC instructors other than those provided by each service. At my school, of the four instructors, three have master's degrees, one has a Ph.D., and one is working toward his BS.
The reader must understand the additional responsibilities JROTC instructors have:
* Planning and attending field trips, honor guards, parades, open houses, report card night, parents' night, escorts, ami many other activities.
* Working early and late by supervising the cadets practicing drill team routines. This is done without compensation most of the time.
* Handling various money accounts for the Navy and the school.
* JROTC instructors become the fathers, uncles, and big brothers to all of the cadets. Unlike other teachers. JROTC instructors work with cadets for four years.
* JROTC instructors are responsible to the school authorities like any other teacher hut unlike other teachers, they are also responsible to the military branch they represent.
Is JROTC a conduit to military service? Absolutely not! Each year we have about five percent who enter the military. About 85 percent go on to college. We do graduate more than 95 percent of our seniors. We assist anyone who wishes ID learn more about opportunities in the military.
How can the San Francisco Board of Education disband a program that teaches its children respect, honor, responsibility, and leadership to name but a few qualities? How can they disband a program that graduates such a high percentage of its students? How can they disband a program that keeps their children out of gangs? Is the Board of Education making a political statement at the expense of all 1,600 members of this program? Do they really care about the children or are they more concerned about making a political statement regardless of who gets hurt? Is this bravery or stupidity?
"More Nuclear-Powered Ships?"
(See N. Polmar, pp. 86-87. February 2007 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Commander William T. Gray IV, U.S. Navy Reserve (Retired)-As a naval officer I was fortunate enough to serve as a nuclear engineer on Admiral Hyman G. Rickover's staff from 1963 to 1967. Thus, 1 read with avid interest Mr. Polmar's article on the possibility of more nuclear-powered surface ship construction.
I was fascinated by the fact that some of the anti-nuclear-power arguments are the same now as they were 40 years ago, and some of the same considerations are left out of the arguments. The initial procurement cost of a nuclear-powered surface ship is surely greater than that of a similar-sized conventionally-powered surface ship. The initial cost of a nuclear-powered ship includes many years' worth of nuclear fuel. Fuel costs are left out of the cost analysis for conventionally powered ships if only initial cost is considered. In order to make a fair cost comparison. the cost analysis should cover the anticipated lifetime of the ship, not just the initial cost. The cost of fuel to he purchased for the conventional ship should he included in its lifetime cost.
This fuel cost should include not only the price of the fuel, but also the cost of providing, maintaining, and manning the oilers needed to deliver the fuel to the ship. Manning cost for the oilers should include the dollars for the salary, training, and benefits for all on board. Looked at in this way, the conventional fuel cost becomes more significant.
A further issue, of course, is the operational capability of the proposed ship. A nuclear-powered carrier has greater freedom of operation than its conventional counterpart. It has almost unlimited range without the constraints and hassle of making rendezvous with an oiler and transferring fuel-even though less frec|uent rendezvous for aviation fuel might still be necessary. This increased operational capability and flexibility is greatly reduced, or even eliminated, if the carrier's escorts are not nuclear-powered. The carrier can operate only at the capability level of the most limited member of its task force.
Even in a cost analysis over the lifetime of the ship, a nuclear-powered ship may well turn out to be more expensive than a conventionally-powered ship. I do believe, however, that such a cost analysis would be a fairer comparison than an initial cost analysis. But in the long run. it's not all about cost. Operational capability matters a great deal. After all, if it were all about cost, sailing ships are cheaper to build and their "fuel" is free.
"The Navy Needs a Culture of Fitness"
See J. Kurtz, pg. 12, March 2007 Proceedings)
Commander Gene V. Milowicki, U.S. Navy-Physical fitness is a mindset and a culture to which senior Navy leadership must commit in order to ensure the safety, health, and wellness of our Sailors and their families. As Sailors continue to be called on to serve in individual augmentation assignments for Soldiers and Marines in Iraq and Afghanistan, the essential nature of physical fitness has never been more apparent. In many cases, our Sailors have not been up to the task, and that is unacceptable. Building a culture of fitness will promote individual self-esteem and unit esprit-de-corps that will ripple through every command's organization.
In order to do it right throughout the entire Navy, this culture of fitness must be led from the top. and that means from the CNO. A standard Navy uniform for unit level physical training is needed. Group PT should not be an excuse for an impromptu fashion show on the pier in the morning. The Navy should make the boot camp PT uniform of shorts, T-shirt, sweatpants, and sweatshirt mandatory for every officer and enlisted Sailor in the Fleet. It should be mandatory for all group PT sessions and should be a mandatory part of every Sailor's sea bag.
The CNO should also establish clear incentives and disincentives to give the Navy's physical fitness program teeth. Those who achieve "outstanding" or "excellent" on the Physical Fitness Assessment (PFA) should receive appropriate recognition and awards, and such performance should clearly show in their evaluations and fitness reports. For example, in order to achieve a grade of 5.0 in military bearing, a Sailor should be required to achieve at least a score of "excellent" on the PFA. While the system was initially put in place with this provision, it was relaxed over time, thereby permitting inevitable grade inflation. We should revert to the original policy.
As a clear disincentive, those who are not within standards should be given an honest grade on their fitness reports for military bearing. Unless we write these standards into the system, and abide by them Navy-wide, we will continue to see unfit officers, chiefs, and enlisted Sailors in our ranks. Commanding officers must be held accountable to ensure accurate reporting. Leaders must set the example for fitness and establish it in their individual command cultures. There can be no double standards for officers and chiefs. Those charged and privileged with the responsibility of leading must be held accountable.
The overall goal in establishing a strong physical fitness program is to ensure the readiness of our Navy. A Sailor who is physically fit is a Sailor who is inherently safer, healthier, and better equipped in all respects to deal with the stresses of life both on and off duty. We must establish and maintain uncompromisingly high standards of fitness for our Sailors. Doing so will benefit our Sailors and their families and ensure that the U.S. Navy remains the finest in the historv of the world.