Sidebar: Halsey Alfa at the Naval War College, Warfighter-in-the-Loop Analysis
The president of the Naval War College discusses a reshaping of the school's curriculum designed to reclaim the "lost art of command and control."
Four years ago, in the October 2002 Proceedings, Admiral Bob Willard, then commanding the U.S. Seventh Fleet, observed that "Command and control is a lost operational art that has been swept into cyberspace by a whirlwind of technologies, made less significant by weak doctrine and misunderstood terms, and put off by future visions of every warfighter possessing relevant information." He concluded, "We must rediscover the lost art of command and control with priority on schooling our commanders in what they must know, where to access that information, and how to act on it once they have it to guide the operation more effectively."
Admiral Willard's observations harkened to a past when naval commanders were the masters of operational art. Go back with me to July 1944 at a strategic crossroads in the Pacific campaign of World War II. Both Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, Commander-in-Chief Pacific Ocean Areas (CINCPOA), and General Douglas MacArthur, Commander-in-Chief Southwest Pacific Area (CINCSWPA) had made such progress in their respective theaters that the next proposed campaign moves would lead to Japan's unconditional surrender and included the prospect of merging their theaters of operations.1
President Franklin D. Roosevelt's top military advisers, Army Chief of Staff General George C. Marshall and Admiral Ernest J. King, Chief of Naval Operations, believed China should be given arms and other assistance for its massive army to go on the offensive and tie down Japanese troops that otherwise could be sent against U.S. forces. King also argued for an assault against Formosa that would guarantee U.S. domination of the sea-lanes to Japan and from which the Japanese homeland could be starved—thus eliminating the need for a final allied assault against the Japanese mainland. General Henry H. "Hap" Arnold, who wanted the Marianas for his new B-29 Superfortress bombers to strike the Japanese homeland, supported King. (After ineffectual efforts flying B-29s from China, the Army Air Forces needed the Marianas—1,500 miles east of the Philippines and an equal distance from Japan—to carry out their plans.) MacArthur rejected this strategy, focusing instead on the need to liberate the Philippines with an attack through Luzon. In March 1942 he had promised, "I shall return," and that was what he was going to do.
President Roosevelt convened a council of war in Hawaii with his two Pacific commanders to resolve the differing recommendations of theater and national military leadership. Only Admiral William Leahy, Chief of Staff to the Commander-in-Chief, accompanied Roosevelt to Pearl Harbor that July of 1944. When the President, MacArthur, Nimitz, and Leahy finished dining at a private Waikiki mansion, they moved to an adjacent room and gathered before several huge wall maps of the Pacific. Both Nimitz and MacArthur comprehensively and persuasively discussed the reasons for their differing recommendations.
It is not important for us today to analyze the ultimate outcome of the meeting, influenced as it was by outside events; rather, we need to understand how these officers—and the key senior advisers on their respective staffs—had gained sufficient mastery of the strategic and operational levels of war to make their case. What was it that enabled each to create coherent arguments from the blizzard of operational detail and Byzantine diplomatic and political issues—each affecting final outcomes in ways not even knowable, much less calculable?
Both leaders understood well the need for strategically focused, critical thinking and sharply honed operational and analytical skills for what today is called "joint" and "combined" warfighting. Both men, moreover, had been the beneficiaries of advanced military education programs—Nimitz at the Naval War College in 1922-1923, and MacArthur as faculty at the Engineering School of Application in 1906-1908.
Here let us focus on the Navy leaders who were the principal subordinate commanders. Admirals William Halsey and Raymond Spruance were also senior service college graduates, as was Admiral Thomas Kinkaid, MacArthur's Navy commander. Like these four-star commanders, their senior staff officers had also been comprehensively educated in the operational art. With only a single exception, every Navy flag officer in the Pacific theater had graduated from the U.S. Naval War College in Newport, where the curriculum stressed operational and strategic-level perspectives, processes, risk-assessment, decision-making, and leadership in peace, policy, and war.
Now, fast forward to the Cold War years. The vast majority of Navy flag officers had no senior service college education, with an attendant slow drift from the operational toward the tactical—and toward the margins of leadership in joint operations. Today, 20 percent of the Navy's flag officers have graduated from residential programs at a senior service college, nearly double the number of just three years ago, and this tide is rising with each selection board.2
Education alone is not sufficient for success in command at the operational level. However, successful military commanders such as those at that pivotal 1944 Pearl Harbor conference not only have demonstrated a mastery of analytic skills, but also an ability to make timely, sound decisions. The latter skill reflected a highly developed intuitive judgment—a sixth sense built over years of experience—combined with deliberate study and preparation for command. "Every operation of war is unique," Winston Churchill wrote:
"What is wanted is a profound appreciation of the actual event. . . . The success of a commander does not arise from following rules or models. It consists in an absolutely new comprehension of the dominant facts of the situation at the time, and all the forces at work."
A New Era for the Navy
"We live on the cusp of a new era," Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Mike Mullen explained in his Guidance for 2006. "It is an era plagued by uncertainty and change and unrestricted warfare, an era of shifting global threats and challenging new opportunities. It is an era," he continued, "that calls for new skill sets, deeper partnerships, and mutual understanding."3
A vital need in this new era is for 21st-century leaders who can continue to transform, recapitalize, and modernize the Navy—and who can support and lead as full partners in the joint operational arena. If the Navy is to function smoothly in joint operational planning and contribute effectively to the execution of joint and combined campaigns, it must develop flag officers who are strategically minded, capable of critical thinking, and highly skilled in naval and—of paramount importance—joint and coalition warfare. Navy leaders must be able to envision, articulate, and integrate the capabilities of the maritime component in the planning and execution of joint, inter-agency, and multinational efforts.
Unlike World War II, which was a massive conventional force-on-force conflict, today's campaigns are murkier conflicts that require the integration of both military and non-military components of national power. Competence at the operational level of war today is more than thinking jointly; it is long-range thinking and sophisticated analysis of the combined effects of a host of diverse actors. Maritime commanders must possess a high degree of confidence with concepts, systems, language, and processes to employ maritime forces effectively—in both supported and supporting roles—in a broad range of operational environments, from humanitarian responses and natural disasters to precision counterterrorist strikes and major combat operations.
Clearly, the future of U.S. national and international security lies in broad interoperability and cooperation among the five armed services (including the Coast Guard) and the other elements of U.S. national power, together with those of our international partners. That said, the Navy will be "only as good as the contributions we make to the overall effort."4 For that contribution to be robust and reliable, rather than episodic or ad hoc, the Navy must generate and sustain a pool of flag officers fully schooled and prepared for joint/combined command and staff responsibilities. To attain that goal, we need educated and skilled flag officers who have not only mastered the platforms, processes, and systems unique to their warfighting communities, but can also work effectively on the same plane as their counterparts from the other services as well as our interagency, international, and non-governmental partners.
2006: A Watershed Year
No one understood this need better than Admiral Mullen when, during his turnover briefs prior to becoming CNO, he tasked the Chief of Naval Personnel and the president of the Naval War College to "Tell me what we need to do—year, by year, by year—to push the Navy down a Path to Jointness from which we cannot retreat."5
It was not as if the light had just come on for Admiral Mullen. Two years earlier, as VCNO, he had worked with his predecessor, Admiral Vern Clark, to encourage legislation allowing the senior service colleges to offer Phase II of Joint Professional Military Education beginning in 2006.6 This effectively drove the Navy to completely restructure its War College's formerly single, or unitary curriculum. Since the curricula for both the former intermediate (O-3/O-4) and senior (O-5/O-6) courses were virtually identical, it followed that it fully satisfied neither set of requirements. No surprise that it produced senior students not sufficiently schooled at the strategic and operational levels of conflict and junior, pre-command students left with strong grand strategy background in their kits—at the expense of joint operational expertise.7
Establishing two distinct curricula has now aligned content to utilization and demand: The new intermediate course has begun to create a cadre of mid-grade leaders well-versed in joint operational planning, while the new senior course prepares our potential flag officers to function as full partners in high level planning and policy positions in Washington or on regional combatant commander staffs around the world.
Navy leadership recognizes that Professional Military Education (PME), combined with operational experience, must accrue across an entire career to provide Navy flag officers who, like Nimitz in July 1944, can conceive and articulate options for effective maritime component employment in joint and multinational operations. The policy objectives responsive to the CNO's tasking mentioned above combine a mix of Navy-specific and Joint PME, naval and joint experience, and individual training—conceived and delivered within a career-integrated continuum.8 Successful completion of both intermediate (JPME I) and senior (JPME II) programs will be critical prerequisites for career milestone assignment and promotion.
JFMCC: A Catalyst for Commitment
At the top of end of the continuum, we have established the Joint Force Maritime Component Commanders Course (JFMCC) designed to prepare future three-star flag and general officers to serve effectively as a JFMCC9 (or a CFMCC10). This senior Sea Service commander must be able to drive collaborative planning with other organizations and provide clear analysis and recommendations regarding the use of maritime forces to accomplish the Joint Force Commander's desired effects. An effective JFMCC significantly increases the contribution of maritime forces in joint or combined operation.
In recent years with our nation's focus on Iraq, the Air Force and the Army have developed joint operational concepts—shared tactics, techniques, and procedures—for fighting the land battle. In the same time frame, we in the Navy have been slow to develop similar joint operational concepts for the JFMCC. In fact, maritime dominance has been largely a given; there was no premium placed on the extensive, comprehensive planning behind the maritime element in the joint campaign. Concurrently, the primary role of the Navy moved increasingly toward force provider and supporting organization. The net result has been to deprive the joint commander of a reliably robust maritime voice at the operational level of war. This is a particularly acute problem given the potentially linchpin contribution that naval forces are expected to make to several key theater challenges as well as the unique attributes maritime forces bring to the challenges of global security.
Globally Netted Headquarters
While standing up the JFMCC course has helped contribute to a stronger, more educated naval voice at the operational level of war, it also served to generate fresh thinking about how to focus scarce resources and to better organize the maritime component. Commander, Fleet Forces Command, directed Second and Third Fleet Commanders to establish an Operational Advisory Group (OAG) to thoroughly review the resource requirements—maritime headquarters functions, and the doctrine, systems, and competencies needed to execute them.11 Developing the structure for a globally netted maritime headquarters is a huge task. Nevertheless, the OAG has already effectively established the lanes of responsibility to achieve this key command and control objective.
The initial focus has been on developing expertise. We must define clearly both individual and organizational competencies to support the maritime headquarters (with maritime operations center) and execute the mission essential tasks falling to the JFMCC (and the naval component
commander). 12 We are even now working to establish those competency requirements. We are also fielding experts to assist naval operational commanders to achieve regional combatant commander certification. Finally, the Navy has established additional control grade billets at the Naval War College to constitute "assist and assess teams" that will provide routine, direct support to naval operational commanders, and a continuous "best-practices/lessons learned" feedback loop between the operational forces and the college's curricula.13
Building Foundation Expertise
An en route training approach cannot deliver the depth and range of skills and instincts required for a headquarters staff to function with confidence, effectiveness, and efficiency at all levels within the joint, multinational, and multi-agency environment. This level of competency must be bred in—systematically developed. Key steps have been taken since 2005 to do this. Beyond the restructured intermediate course at the Naval War College discussed earlier, the Navy has significantly expanded and upgraded its Operational Planners Course and throughput. It has also established the JFMCC Senior Officer and Staff Operator's Courses, along with a deployable capability to assess and assist naval commanders in the development of their operational level staffs. Another key contributor to operational expertise is the Halsey Alfa Group. This continuous analytic collaboration between students and forward commanders (see accompanying article by Professor James R. Fitzsimonds), provides analysis in direct support to the operational commander. A final key initiative is the Senior Mentor Program, created to effectively leverage the wealth of experience that resides in the retired flag community to assist in building Navy command expertise at the operational level.
Putting on Turns
Admirals Nimitz, Halsey, and Spruance spent the prewar years in preparation for the Pacific conflict. The Navy had recognized that the looming war with Japan was also a "cusp of a new era" and would be unlike any previous maritime conflict. During the interwar years, the Navy grew to understand the security challenges of the new era, through exercises, experiments and, most of all, education. Today our Navy recognizes that its 21st-century leaders must be strategically minded, capable of critical thinking, and skilled in naval, joint, and coalition warfare. To meet this challenge, the Navy is moving down the new PME continuum to a path that will systematically and comprehensively develop Navy flag officers experienced, schooled, and ready to lead maritime forces in the complex, joint multinational operations that characterize the new security environment.
"The Navy is a service focused at the operational level of war." This is the primary proposition that emerged from 2006 conferences of the Navy's senior operational leadership held in San Diego (5-6 January) and Little Creek (12-13 August).14 The foundations are now in place to turn these words from a proposition into a statement of fact.
Rear Admiral Shuford assumed the helm as the 51st president of the U.S. Naval War College in August 2004.
1. In 1942, U.S. leadership had divided operational control of its military forces between the commands known as Pacific Ocean Areas (POA) under Nimitz, the Southwest Pacific Area (SWPA) under MacArthur, and the China Burma India Theater (CBI) under LT GEN "Vinegar Joe" Stillwell. back to article
2. From PERS 4 data, as of 24 January 2007. This is up from 12 percent in 2004. back to article
3. Mike Mullen, "CNO Guiding Principles", U.S. Department of Defense, Department of the Navy, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, CNO Guidance for 2006: Meeting the Challenge of a New Era. October 2006, p. 2. back to article
4. Ibid. back to article
5. These instructions were intended to put in place, once and for all, the policy objectives and management mechanisms to ensure the Navy would systematically and comprehensively produce joint leaders. Key elements the continuum have been established as requirements for assignment and promotion. back to article
6. Title 10 U.S.Code formerly allowed Phase II of the mandated three-phased approach to Joint Professional Military Education to be taught in residence only at the Joint Forces Staff College, National War College, and the Industrial College of the Armed Forces. back to article
7. This was the feedback the War College received from a series of conversations with fleet leadership during 2005. back to article
8. The Navy's PME Continuum provides a succession of educational opportunities designed to prepare each individual for challenges at the tactical, operational, and then strategic levels of war. It is designed primarily to develop logic, reasoning, and analysis and broaden each Sailor's perspective to prepare them for increasingly complex duties. The continuum's key elements of PME are leadership, professionalism, military studies including naval and joint warfare, and national, maritime, and global security. back to article
9. The JFMCC is that senior sea-service officer at the operational level of war, designated by the Joint Force Commander, who is charged with command and control within the maritime domain. This can entail command relationships over significant non-US Navy forces required to achieve objectives assigned to the JFMCC. Force aggregations are potentially much larger and more complex than either an expeditionary or aircraft carrier strike group, or even multiple strike groups. With the support of a broad range of capabilities resident in our evolving maritime headquarters and operating centers, the JFMCC is the Joint Force Commander's maritime warfighter who reports to and advises the Joint Force Commander on the maritime elements of his plans and the proper and effective employment of maritime forces. Additionally, the JFMCC exercises command and control of the maritime elements of a joint operation by organizing, integrating, and synchronizing the efforts of subordinate tactical commands as well as those of assigned, attached, or supporting land, air and special warfare components. back to article
10. CFMCC is the Combined Force Maritime Component Commander. back to article
11. Maritime Headquarters with Maritime Operations Center (MHQ w/MOC) Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel and Facilities (DOTMLPF) Change Recommendation (DCR)—The DCR identifies approaches across the DOTMLPF spectrum that, when implemented, will equip the Navy to address today's operational-level challenges and command and control integrated maritime operations worldwide. It consolidated both new and existing programs of record into one collective effort to deliver MHQ w/MOC capability to the fleet and the joint community, and has already resulted in some of its recommendations being funded to expedite this development. back to article
12. The Secretary of Defense memo dated 4 February 2005 requires combatant commanders to "certify and report the readiness of assigned headquarters staffs designated to perform as a JTF or functional component headquarters staff." back to article
13. Control grade billets are those from O-4 to O-6. The Naval War College received funding for 28 new control grade billets in POM 08 to build the assist and assess Team. back to article
14. These two conferences, referred to as "CNO Maritime Security Conferences", brought together the senior operational leadership of the Navy to consider its most pressing operational issues.
Rear Admiral Shuford assumed the helm as the 51st president of the U.S. Naval War College in August 2004. back to article
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Halsey Alfa at the Naval War College
Warfighter-in-the-Loop Analysis
Captain James R. Fitzsimonds, U.S. Navy (Retired)
Over the past three years, successive groups of joint officer students at the Naval War College have been working together with members of the research faculty on the detailed analysis of very specific near-term, real-world, operational challenges to U.S. maritime supremacy. Dubbed the "Halsey Alfa" group, its goals are threefold: to develop a better understanding of modern combat operations, to derive insights and recommendations of near-term operational relevance to Fleet operators, and to educate officers in the complexities of joint force employment at the theater level of warfare.
The central focus of the Halsey Alfa work is a continuing series of free-play war games employing a range of operational approaches within a common baseline scenario. Using all-source intelligence, the Halsey Alfa teams develop the competing orders of battle for Blue and Red, along with specific platforms, sensors, weapons, and command and control characteristics. For operational assessment, the groups have built a full range of tools—including spreadsheet models, lookup tables, and probability charts—derived from detailed operations analysis and observed system performance in exercises and operations. Competing courses of action are then produced, and pitted against one another in a series of free-play war games, with Halsey members comprising both the player and control cells.
A typical Halsey Alfa game features Red and Blue teams operating in isolation and interacting through a central Control (or White) cell that feeds them intelligence and adjudicates force interaction outcomes using the Halsey-developed assessment tools. A basic assumption of the Halsey Alfa work is that the devil is in the details—understanding theater-level operations requires a mastery of all of the constituent tactical interactions. The overall pace of a Halsey Alfa game is driven by the pace of the assessment process, which might require a day, or more, to determine the outcome of as little as 30 minutes of theater-level game time activity. A game that runs through 12 hours of combat might take six or more weeks to play (a time commitment that is clearly beyond the capacity of the typical fleet planning staff).
For critical insights, the entire group digests the results of a game. Assumptions are revisited, assessment templates are adjusted as necessary, new operational approaches are developed by both sides to improve their prospects for success, and the game is replayed. To date, the Halsey Alfa group has replayed a single operational problem more than a dozen times, and generated significant insights into relevant tactical, operational, and strategic issues for a specific theater-level contingency.
Although there was no explicit intent to replicate the War Plan Orange gaming conducted at the Naval War College in the interwar years, the similarities are unmistakable:
- Objectivity. Halsey Alfa has no interest in predetermined outcomes, and relies on quantitative analysis rather than subjective opinions in deriving its combat assessments. Blue forces often suffer heavy losses on the Halsey game boards.
- Transparency. A hallmark of the Halsey Alfa approach is a fully transparent methodology of documented rules and assumptions so that all of the participants can fully understand not only what happens, but why.
- An established learning curve. The Halsey Alfa approach seeks to standardize and capture both the methodology and results of a long series of analysis and gaming efforts so that institutional thinking can evolve through captured "lessons learned." By continually building on, and documenting, a growing body of analysis, the group is breaking the cycle of relearning the same lessons over and over.
- Warfighter-in-the-Loop. Halsey Alfa has put the human back in the center of all of the tedious details of planning, movement, and assessment. Actual joint warfighters, destined to return to the operating forces, are determining the rules of the game, applying those rules, and learning from the visceral experience of simulated war.
Captain Fitzsimonds is a research professor on the faculty of the Naval War College. He is currently the director of the Halsey Alfa Group.
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