The U.S. Navy's shipbuilding program is in shoal waters despite an increase in ship construction funds in the Fiscal Year 2008 budget recently sent to Congress. That budget plan-approved by Secretary of the Navy Donald Winter on 2 February-asks Congress for $12.5 billion for shipbuilding, a ten percent increase over the FY 2007 amount.
The FY 2008 budget request provides for seven new ships, the same number in the previous year.1 To reach the Navy's goal of 313 ships by about 2016 some 12 new ships must be constructed each year. The long-range shipbuilding plan does provide for 11 ships in FY 2009 and an average of 12 ships per year for the next few years (see Table 1).
Meanwhile, several of the ongoing ship construction programs are in trouble. The latest ship type to burst into the headlines is the littoral combat ship, the LCS. The ships of both designs-the Lockheed Martin Freedom (LCS-1) and the General Dynamics/Austal Independence (LCS-2)-are reported to be over their cost caps.2 Reportedly, the first Lockheed Martin ship was to cost $220 million but is now said to cost up to $411 million.
This situation led to Rear Admiral Charles Hamilton, the Naval Sea Systems Command's Program Executive Officer for ships, being unexpectedly reassigned outside of NAVSEA. Secretary Winter then, on 12 January, issued a 90-day stop work order to Lockheed Martin for the firm's second ship, the LCS-3. Next, on 29 January, the LCS project manager in NAVSEA, Captain Donald Babcock, was relieved of his duties.
The LCS problems are particularly troubling as that program, with 55 ships planned for construction through FY 2018, is expected to provide about one-sixth of the 313-ship fleet.3 Further, the payload modules for the LCS platforms would provide the Fleet's principal mine countermeasures, antismall craft, and antisubmarine assets in littoral areas. Mission modules are being considered for special forces, shore bombardment, and other operations. The costs for the LCS do not include the specialized mission packages.
The LCS problems follow the major controversy over the amphibious ship San Antonio (LPD-17), the lead ship of a new amphib class. The ship, placed in commission on 14 January 2006, took twice as long to build as was scheduled, and cost twice as much as planned. That situation caused many observers-in and out of the Department of Defense-to believe that some people changes were needed at that time in NAVSEA and/or at the shipbuilder. Such action, it was postulated, would be a warning to all parties that such performance would not be tolerated.
The San Antonio class is now planned to be terminated in FY 2008 with the ninth ship of the class. The Navy had originally planned to buy 12 of the LPDs. However, a tenth ship leads the Navy's list of how it would spend additional funds for shipbuilding.
Beyond the current ship problems, discussion over the next-generation destroyer, the DDG-1000, is beginning to heat up. The first two ships of the class-with the lead ship named Zumwalt-were authorized in FY 2007. Their cost is estimated by the Navy to be $3.3 billion per ship for the first two and about $2.5 billion for follow-on ships. The latter cost is almost twice as much per ship as the last of the 62 ships of the Arleigh Burke (DDG-51) class, which was authorized in FY 2005.
But the Congressional Budget Office has estimated that the first DDG-1000 will cost $4.7 billion and follow-on ships will cost $3.6 billion each.3 The DDG-1000 situation is exacerbated by the program being cut from the originally planned 30 ships to a current program goal of seven. Some observers believe that the DDG-1000 program could be truncated to perhaps two or three ships.
If that occurs, the Navy would be well advised to accelerate development of the follow-on large-surface combatant, the CG(X). That ship is currently intended to have a primary mission of ballistic missile defense. The design would be based in large part on the DDG-1000.
The lead CG(X) is planned for authorization in FY 2011 at a cost of $3.2 billion, the second ship in FY 2013, with mostly two ships per year planned for the next decade.
The one other program that is now in the headlines is the Virginia (SSN-774) class. The Navy has been procuring one attack submarine per year, with a one-year exception, beginning with the FY 1998 program. Under current planning the SSN buy will increase to two per year in FY 2012. This has long been the goal for the submarine community, as a one-per-year rate will lead to an eventual SSN force of 30-some submarines.
Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Mike Mullen has said he would support two SSNs per year when the unit cost was brought down to $2 billion per submarine. Interestingly, the Navy's longrange plan shows an average cost of $2.4 billion per boat in FY 2012-2013. Even adjusting for inflation and a then-year dollar cap, the cost is significantly more than $2 billion per submarine. It is worth noting that the last SSN completed, the Hawaii (SSN-776), was delivered on cost and on time.
Beyond warships, the Navy will build one replenishment ship (AKE) in the next few years. The shipbuilding budget will also pay for several maritime prepositioning ships-future (MPS[F]) as well as three joint high-speed vessels (JHSV) for the Navy. The MPS ships will include a modified LHA-type helicopter carrier of almost 50,000 tons.
Meanwhile, several members of Congress, especially Representatives John Murtha (D-PA), Ike Skelton (D-MO), and Gene Taylor (D-MS), are advocating a significant increase in Navy shipbuilding. They want to add five ships to the Navy's FY 2008 request-one attack submarine, two Burke-class destroyers, one San Antonio LPD, and a fifth ship, possibly another LCS.5
Asked if Congress would seek to add money in the FY 2008 budget for the five ships, Representative Murtha said, "This is money we'll rearrange, but we'll add some money to the request."
He added, "One of the things that has come up is whether we shift the aircraft carrier, that kind of stuff. We're looking at the alternatives."6
The five additional ships might cost $6 to $8 billion. Such a move appears to be a highly unrealistic: An add-on to the budget would be opposed by the administration because of Afghanistan-Iraq war costs, the Army-Marine Corps buildup, recent reductions in aircraft procurement, etc.; "rearranging" ship construction could invoke the ire of fellow legislators representing districts where ships are built, and would undoubtedly be opposed by the Navy's leadership as impacting on the 313-ship fleet plan (see Table 2).
Indeed, Admiral Mullen has been quoted as opposing additional Burkeclass destroyers, saying, "I have enough DDG-51s."7
The shipbuilding issues, very complex in the current budget environment, will not be easily resolved. The Navy must realistically address shipbuilding costs and schedules, including developing a more realistic approach to estimating ship costs. Failure to do so will only lead to reductions in the number of ships built in the coming years. And, more rationale will be needed to justify certain ships, especially the truncated DDG-1000 program and the proposal to build a second SSN every year.
Finally, the Navy and its supporters must make the Congress and administration understand that after the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Afghanistan and Iraq the nation will be very reluctant to put "boots on the ground" in large numbers for many years. Rather, special forces and naval forces-Navy ships and Marines-will be the weapon of choice for crises and limited conflicts in the foreseeable future.
1 Some Department of Defense documents cite an eighth ship request in FY 2008. that being the first of five Joint High-Speed Vessels (JHSV) being built by the Army. The Navy is scheduled to procure three similar craft in the FY 2009-2011 budgets.
2 The Navy officially considers the radically different Freedom and Independence design to be of the same class, another manifestation of the Navy's totally inane attitude toward ship classes and designations. See N. Polmar, "U.S. Navy: Perverting the System," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings (July 2006). pp. 88-89.
3 Some Navy documents cite 56 LCS-type ships. The Navy's 30-year shipbuilding program presented to Congress in February 2007 shows 55 ships until FY 2032 and then 56 ships; this is most likely a typographical error.
4 J. Michael Gilmore and Eric J. Labs, Potential Costs of the Navy's 2006 Shipbuilding Plan (Washington, DC: Congressional Budget Office, 30 March 2006), p. 9.
5 See Christopher P. Cavas, "Congress: Fixing LCS Problems Is Key To More Ships for USN," Defense News (19 February 2007).
6 Cavas.
7 Cavas.