Defense Secretary Robert Gates recently approved a substantial increase in the Army and Marine Corps. The Corps was authorized to expand from 175,000 to 202,000 Marines. Likewise, the Army was authorized to grow to 547,000 Soldiers. This overrides the illogic of the last Quadrennial Defense Review, which cut both services despite the evident strain that multiple tours in two ongoing campaigns created. It also, in effect, reverses the Pentagon's transformation agenda. Illusions about short, bloodless wars were dismissed.
The addition of 27,000 Marines sets out a new goal that exceeds a Cold War high of 196,700. For the Army, however, this is a modest hike far short of its peak of 780,000. The total cost for these 92,000 troops is $112 billion across the next five years. The Fiscal Year 2007 Supplemental and Fiscal Year 2008 Defense budget asks for $17 billion to start the ramp-up.
But the scope of the expansion raises serious strategic questions. What is this increase designed to achieve and can it be sustained over time? Is this the most important shortfall in our country's security posture?
Some point to Iraq and strenuously argue that Operation Iraqi Freedom or the subsequent insurgency "proves" we need more ground forces. No, actually it does not. We do not need more forces so we can repeat the sins of OIF. What OIF "proves" is that failure and protracted costs are likely if you conduct a "regime change" campaign with:
- Poor intelligence
- Limited grasp of the enemy and their population
- Myopic focus on battles rather than achieving desired political end state
- Overemphasis on firepower
- Inappropriate political decisions
- Inadequate language and cultural intelligence
- Lack of post-conflict and insurgency doctrine.
We have made some progress in the intelligence community. Most significantly the Army and Marine Corps have partnered to update our counterinsurgency doctrine and training programs. Those were the most obvious lessons. Just having more forces, without the right operating framework, would not have materially improved events in Iraq in 2003 or 2004. It would not have prevented the looting or the insurgency from arising. Nor do we need to significantly increase our ground forces to offset the crisis in personnel tempo. The public rationale is to establish a deployment/training ratio of two months at home for every month deployed. This is a very compelling reason, but it's irrelevant to Iraq. Our "dwell time" ratio will not be improved soon enough, unless we assume we maintain significant forces in Iraq out to 2012. The 2006 election is evidence that this is unlikely. In sum, the increase may be absolutely critical, but it is not related to Iraq.
Nor does the Long War really offer supporting rationale. It is inherently an ideological contest or the spillover of a civil war within Islam. The enemy constitutes some tens of thousands of potential opponents, distributed in 60 countries. There is no mass for our new formations to attack. We face an essentially disaggregated enemy of networked cells, for which intelligence, law enforcement, public diplomacy, special operations forces, and our moral standing as a free society are our best tools. Yet, the Long War is being largely fought by the military—and we're losing it. In the face of a cellular and religiously inspired adversary, we should not gauge success in terms of how many infantry brigades can be deployed or rotated.
The real issue, what can be called the $112 billion question, is what kind of land force do we build? Mr. Gates has not provided the strategic guidance to ensure we are building forces for the 21st century—instead of merely a larger image of a pre-Iraq military. The Army is inclined to continue its current transformation program, centered on the Future Combat Systems program—a suite of ground vehicles, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), and sensors. The Marines are comfortable serving as the nation's shock troops for conventional conflicts and operations "from the sea." Neither institutional vision shapes unique capabilities for dealing with asymmetric and protean adversaries. Do we need tank battalions and fighter squadrons or more dedicated military training teams, UAV units, and human intelligence teams?
Mr. Gates' decision is commendable. Now both the Office of the Secretary of Defense and Congress must ensure we build up the military for tomorrow's more likely threats, not yesterday's. Without this guidance, and a sustained commitment of resources, this welcomed force expansion will be a Pyrrhic victory.
Lieutenant Colonel Hoffman is a retired Marine infantryman and Washington-based national security analyst.