Rear Admiral Alan B. Hicks' article in the January Proceedings, "Extending the Navy's Shield: Sea-Based Missile Defense," forcefully argues for a robust Navy ballistic-missile defense (BMD) capability. But his most important point may be his final one. The statement, "Much needs to be done because much lies in the balance,"1 could not be more true. Despite the successes to date, the future of the capability in the Navy is far from assured. The Navy is at a crossroads and as an institution must either embrace ballistic missile defense or cede this mission to the other services and the Missile Defense Agency (MDA). Either way, what the Navy does in the next year will have lasting ramifications.
It is not that the concept of sea basing is unpopular. Most in the Navy would agree that such a capability is desirable. But it is a whole different ballgame to acknowledge that a capability is desirable in the abstract and actually defining BMD as a mission area and committing scarce funding and personnel to it. Placing this mission on par with undersea or strike warfare would mean that the Navy would have to expend resources on a warfare area that many are not sure falls in the Navy's purview.
The costs of embracing this mission will be significant. Even if the MDA pays for system upgrades and some of the missiles, the Navy will have to supply the bulk of the interceptor inventory, the people, the training, the ships, and the supporting infrastructure. All this would come at a time when enthusiasm is low for new investments as we pay for past under-funding of shipbuilding accounts and respond to bills emanating from operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.
The threat is certainly real, as demonstrated in the 1991 Gulf War and again in Operation Iraqi Freedom. Concern is also growing over the ballistic-missile inventories of North Korea, Iran, Syria, and China. Arguably, both ballistic and cruise missiles pose the greatest threat today to the ability of the United States to project power and control the seas.
Currently, the status of Navy missile defense is mixed. Navy destroyers stand ready to defend the nation against intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). A mid-course capability is emerging, a rudimentary terminal-phase capability is being fielded, and several successor proposals to fill the niche intended for the now-defunct Navy Area Defense have at least reached PowerPoint briefing stage. On the surface it may appear that the Navy is on the cusp of realizing a formidable sea-based missile-defense capability.
The reality is somewhat less rosy, and it is worthwhile to look at where the Navy is today, as opposed to where it anticipated being as recently as five years ago. The Navy Area Defense program was cancelled in 2001, and four years later no decision has been reached on a permanent replacement. Even the near-term engagement capabilities are less than they might seem. The interim Sea Based Terminal (SBT) system, based on modifying existing surface-to-air missiles, promises, in the words of the MDA, "a near-term, limited emergency capability."2 And any eventual terminals and midcourse systems will be limited if MDA and the Navy do not procure sufficient interceptors to pace the threat.
Missile Defense in the Joint World
While the Navy ponders its decision, in the joint world the U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM) has been charged with "planning, integrating, and coordinating global ballistic-missile defense operations" and is extending its grasp over all such efforts. Its actions range from establishing missile-defense acquisition priorities to monitoring operations. The Strategic Command has also recently formed a Joint Functional Component Command for Integrated Missile Defense headed by a lieutenant general. While this role is evolving, it will likely be a major player, with significant impact on future Navy missile defense.
The Navy's future in this mission is not threatened just by the joint commands. The Army's Space and Missile Defense Command has committed literally thousands of personnel to fielding Army ballistic-missile defense systems. The Army has recently formed its third deployable BMD planning and execution nodes, known as Army Air and Missile Defense Commands. Finally, hundreds of Patriot Advanced Capability (PAC-3) missiles have been fielded, and the Terminal High Altitude Air Defense (THAAD) system is due for early deployment in the next few years.
A Navy BMD Requirement?
There would not be anything intrinsically wrong with ceding ballistic-missile defense to joint commanders and the other services—provided the needs of the nation were met and a failure to play a leading role did not entail undue institutional risk to the Navy. Neither, unfortunately, is the case, and if the Navy fails to embrace missile defense and to make the requisite investment of people and funds, it will entail risk to both the nation and the Navy.
In addition to a potential ICBM attack by North Korea or by some rogue element in China or Russia, there are at least four potential scenarios where ballistic missiles could be employed against U.S. interests:
- North Korea against South Korea and probably Japan
- China against Taiwan
- Iran against the Arab nations in the Arabian Gulf
- Iran and perhaps Syria against Israel
Each of these scenarios features extensive numbers of short- and medium-range ballistic missiles that cannot be engaged by ground-based interceptors in the United States. In each scenario, the Navy could fill a major role. In the case of China-Taiwan or a North Korean launch at targets in Japan, the Navy would be expected to perform the primary role. There is also the issue of protecting the sea base against future ballistic-missile threats. This would clearly be a Navy mission.
The requirement for sea-based missile defense does not diminish the role of the Patriot or, in the future, THAAD and the Medium Extended Air Defense System (MEADS). The capabilities are complementary. The Navy cannot hope to match the missile inventory brought to the fight by the Army, but neither can the Army match the Navy's mobility, flexibility, and tactical agility. The Navy protects the sea base, kicks the door down, and provides coverage while the Army Air Defense Artillery moves ashore. At this point the mission can be turned over to the Army, though sea-based forces could be pulsed to augment Army forces ashore during periods of increased threat or increased vulnerability.
The Risk of Turning Away
If the operational need for Navy missile defense appears clear, the risks of turning away from this mission are no less so. Ballistic-missile defense is a priority of the current administration, and Navy BMD in particular has had strong congressional support. Notwithstanding current budget pressure, the Missile Defense Agency continues to enjoy generous funding. Running afoul of this administration and congressional proponents of Navy BMD carries risk.
There are also inadvertent risks posed by the STRATCOM, the Missile Defense Agency, and others. These commands expect the Navy to contribute while they develop concepts of operation and war plans; unless the Navy participates, Aegis BMD ships will be employed without appropriate Navy input. To date, Navy participation in the daunting number of conferences, exercises, and tests supporting concept of operation and war plan development has been uneven in both the number of events attended and the experience of those who attend. This is not the fault of the Navy staff, the Aegis BMD program office, or the fleet commanders. The required personnel simply do not exist and, although the BMD specialty program is a start, it is a modest one.
The other component of risk is the potential opportunity to access Missile Defense Agency money and influence system development. In January 2002, then-Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld cancelled all existing missile defense operational requirements documents, fundamentally restructuring how the MDA would develop and acquire systems.3 This permits spiral development where systems are continually being updated, even when they are operational. One murky aspect of acquisition reform, however, was the transition of the systems back to the services. In other words, when does the Missile Defense Agency stop training the crews and buying the missiles under the guise of research and development and transfer the functions, and the bills, to the services? If the Navy were to turn away from BMD, it is entirely possible that we would get systems we do not want or could not use but still would have to pay for them.
A Road Ahead
The question is, where do we go from here? All concerned should understand that whatever course is chosen, Navy missile defense cannot entail the commitment of substantial Navy funding or an increase in end strength. This is the hard part. Navy BMD will have to develop within a fiscally constrained environment. What acquisition funding is available will have to flow from the Missile Defense Agency or from Congress, and the ships and personnel we have today will form the heart of what we will fight with in the immediate future.
Since throwing Navy money at the problem is not an option, the Navy should throw brainpower at it. The necessary first steps are in progress. These consist of articulating a vision for Navy BMD and continuing to update the accompanying Maritime Ballistic Missile Defense concept of operations. Together, these should articulate the Navy role in joint missile defense today, a vision for the future, and a roadmap that lays out how the Navy intends to realize the vision. These documents are the key linkages between the today's limited capability and a potential future. They should include a hardheaded assessment of the present status, near- and far-term risks, consideration of the impact that BMD will have on Navy force structure, and acknowledgement that the Navy faces significant hurdles and hard truths.
Since the Navy cannot buy everything it needs, it should focus on what it absolutely needs. This includes pushing the MDA to develop a strong sea-based terminal capability and procuring sufficient interceptors to make a difference in potential conflict scenarios. The Navy should also focus on organizational changes, training, and doctrine development. What the service should strive for is to create trained personnel to lead the joint world in organizational innovation and the development of joint concepts, operational plans, and doctrine development.
Navy missile defense also needs someone in charge. In addition to providing a focus for the joint world and an advocate within the Navy, the service needs someone to ensure that milestones are being met. Fleet and carrier strike group commanders should provide guidance and establish operational requirements, but they are too committed to be the focal point for Navy ballistic-missile defense. Nor is the Aegis BMD program office the answer; it is there to develop systems, and it has done this magnificently. It should not be expected to develop tactics, write doctrine, or manage the Navy BMD community. That it is attempting to do this today speaks volumes on its commitment, but it cannot be viewed as a long-term answer.
What the Navy needs now is a missile defense—or perhaps air and missile defense—center of excellence. Headed by a flag officer, this organization would be the focus of Navy BMD and would work in concert with the Chief of Naval Operations' staff, Fleet Forces Command, program offices, fleet commanders, the Navy Warfare Development Command, and others with a vested interest in Navy ballistic-missile defense. A Navy Missile Defense Command could be the center for the development of training, doctrine, and tactics while coordinating developments with other agencies.
Any decision to embrace BMD will cause additional pain at a time when the Navy is already under extreme budgetary pressure and when there is certainly no under-employed group of personnel to call on. Yet the threat posed by increasingly sophisticated ballistic missiles and the institutional risk posed by resisting this mission area leave the Navy little option. As Admiral Hicks concluded: "Much needs to be done, because much lies in the balance."4
Commander James is a retired surface warfare officer with more than a decade of experience in Navy missile defense. He is currently a consultant with DMG Associates and is an occasional contributor to Proceedings.
1. RAdm Alan B. Hicks, USN, "Extending the Navy's Shield: Sea-Based Ballistic-Missile Defense," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, January 2007, pp. 56-59. back to article
2. Missile Defense Agency, For Your Information, "First at-Sea Demonstration of Sea Based Terminal Capability Successfully Completed," 24 May 2006. back to article
3. "Missile Defense Program Direction," Secretary of Defense Memorandum, 2 January 2002. back to article
4. Hicks, "Extending the Navy's Shield," Proceedings, January 2007. back to article