"What I Learned in Command at Sea"
(See C. M. Gaouette, pp. 32-36, January 2007 Proceedings)
Command Master Chief Petty Officer R. Mark Cummings, U.S. Navy-I thoroughly enjoyed reading Captain Gaouette's article. His remarks were well thought out and accurate in my experience relating In commanding officers at sea. I only noticed one omission that troubled me and that was the lack of mention of the important relationship between the commanding officer and the command master chief.
The CO/CMC leg of the command triad is critical to functional command operation just as is the CO/XO leg and the XO/ CMC leg. If dysfunction exists in any of these relationships, command effectiveness will suffer. Recognizing this fact, the Navy places special emphasis on the CO/XO/CMC relationship through dedicated training time during the prospective CO/XO/CMC courses in Newport, Rhode Island. Stress is placed on the critical significance of this three-way association as it applies to overall command leadership.
New or veteran commanding officers should never forget that the command master chief not only provides the vital leadership link to the Chiefs' Mess hut also keeps his or her fingers on the pulse of the crew, able to provide invaluable advice regarding morale and Sailor matters as they pertain to operational readiness. Any commanding officer who wants to fully succeed during command at sea would be making a fatal error by not fully using the command master chief and recognizing him or her us an essential partner in command leadership. This point should he considered with the other outstanding advice presented in the article.
"LCS: A Step, Not an End"
(See W. J. Holland, pp. 50-54, January 2007 Proceedings)
Craig Hooper-If Mark Twain is any guide, it seems Rear Admiral W. J. Holland Jr. holds the same "mortal hatred" for "small-fry craft" that Mississippi River steamboat captains once reserved for rafts and barges!
If, as Rear Admiral Holland claims, small World War II-era escorts were so fragile that all were retired after a few years of operation, why, then, did some remain in active service for decades? A handful of tiny 850-ton patrol craft escorts, 1,400 ton Buckley-class destroyer escorts, and the Rudderow destroyer escort/Crosley-class high-speed transport conversions served throughout World War II, Korea, and Vietnam, enjoying a longer life than many 8,000-ton Spruance-class destroyers. Just as funding shortfalls made the bulky Spruance class redundant, economics, rather than structural defect, forced the wholesale retirement of small craft after World War II.
Displacement is no cure-all. How many modern warships, after a hard hit, are able to retain their status us a combat asset? The USS Princeton (CG-59), after striking Iraqi mines, had to be towed out of the minefield and, ultimately, dragged off to Bahrain. Though the vessel retained some combat capability, the disabled Princeton was a battlefield liability, forcing a reallocation of combat assets (HMCS Athabaskan among others) and endangering the vessels required for rescue, USS Admit (MSO-509) and USS Beaufort (ATS-2). Nobody at the time considered the battered Princeton a true combat asset.
Though the information from the USS America (CV-66) sinking exercise remains classified, the structural resiliency of large ships in the face of present-day weaponry appears to leave something to be desired. Even the commanding officer of the USS Tripoli (LPH-10), in the U.S. Naval Institute's own treatment of the Persian Gulf War (Shield and Sword by Marolda and Schneller, p. 265), believed that, had the seas been rougher, the Tripoli, a robustly constructed, 19,000-ton product of 1950s shipbuilding technology, would likely have sunk.
Readiness does much more for a ship than displacement. The 4,100-ton HMS Sheffield, sunk by an Exocet missile, was unprepared and allowed the missile to hit vital areas. In contrast, the 6,200-ton HMS Glamorgan survived an Exocet strike, but fast maneuvering minimized the missile's impact. In this case, displacement had nothing to do with survival, and, in fact, the extra bulk likely made the hit unavoidable. A prepared small ship, the 3,600-ton Type 21 frigate HMS Avenger, armed with nothing more than guts, good weapons intelligence, and a ready crew, was able to out-maneuver and completely avoid a seemingly inevitable hit by a locked-on Exocet.
Displacement, no matter how strongly argued, will not change the fact that modern, thin-skinned warships are fragile things. Good seamanship, when coupled with imaginative and ready officers, contributes far more to ship survivability than the capacity inherent in a few thousand added tons. Rather than become indignant over the prospect of "small-fry" naval assets, it is time to devote serious thought to the idea that extra weight may make warships more vulnerable, both in terms of perceived value and in actual fact.
Robert A. Lynch-Rear Admiral Holland reminds us of proven design factors that limit the utility of small Navy ships. However, one major feature could salvage the LCS concept. Air availability is a major concern for most operations. If this capability must be provided by a carrier task force to support an LCS. the reduced cost goals of the vessel suddenly disappear.
The LCS is designed to carry an H-60 helicopter for self-contained support, but sending a manned helicopter to survey a land target for ships' guns or missiles could he a suicide mission. The LCS is an ideal platform for an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV). This would not be an overgrown model airplane (hand-launched), an unmanned helicopter, or a jet fighter with the pilot seat removed. The UAV system would use a vehicle resembling the size and capability of the U.S. Air Force's Predator. Such a vehicle is technically available. This system would have a major impact on LCS requirements and capabilities.
The unnecessary requirement lor a maximum speed of 40 knots seems to drive the design in many regards. The LCS could launch a UAV up to 500 nautical miles from the area of interest and reach it at a speed of 500 knots. The fact that the ship could make 40 knots is not significant. If that speed is required to escape a threat. Rear Admiral Holland points out that the relative closing speed of missile and ship would not he much different at any ship speed. Increased standoff range provided by the UAV would be more valuable.
The article points out that the current littoral combat ships are limited in the aperture size of antennas, limiting data and communication performance. Relay from UAV-carried antennas orbiting continuously over the ship at 10,000 feet would tend to eliminate this restriction.
The UAV can increase the ship's weapon payload compared to ship-launched weapons. A 500-pound warhead does not need a long-range booster when it is delivered by a reusable UAV. True, the UAV system takes up space but probably no more than the H-60 helicopters, which could then be eliminated.
Operating a UAV, including automated safe launch and recovery from a small ship day and night and in high sea state, is technically achievable and concepts have been suggested to the Navy and ship contractors.
The size and displacement of the Oliver Hazard Perry-class frigate with a robust UAV system may he the LCS we are seeking. Admiral Holland points out that the size of the ship structure is not the major cost driver. A larger ship, with a reduced speed requirement, might solve the transit and sea-keeping requirements while not seriously affecting cost.
"Extending the Navy's Shield: SeaBased Ballistic-Missile Defense"
(See A. B. Hicks. pp. 56-59, January 2007 Proceedings)
Commander James M. Nagent, U.S. Navy Reserve (Retired)-Sea-based strategic ballistic missile defense (BMD) is a losing proposition and a waste of money. Rear Admiral Hicks raises concerns regarding weapons of mass destruction in the hands of hostile regimes and terrorist groups, and expresses a lack of faith in traditional tools and concepts of deterrence, all of which serve as justification for sea-based strategic BMD.
First, there's no evidence to support the notion that a country hostile to the United States would not be deterred by a threat of assured nuclear annihilation, and il it were otherwise so suicidal Ii wouldn't opl to squander an opportunity to attack us by placing a nuclear warhead on the tip of an easily tracked ballistic missile.
Second, the thought that any terrorist group would obtain ballistic missiles or be concerned about SM-3-laden Aegis deI'enders is an extraordinary stretch boardering on the unreal. That said, this is not to say that nuclear threats to the United States don't exist, but that sea-based BMI) would not be a deterrent to this threat. The far more realistic threat is one that would likely enter our ports, a much more viable and feasible option than easily tracked, expensive, and hard-to-develop and deploy ICBMs.
Efforts to secure our ports post-9/l I are nowhere near what they should be. Overall port security upgrades are far behind schedule. The Coast Guard is hamstrung with problems in its Deepwater initiatives that have resulted in ships coming out of service instead of being upgraded. Ami it has received far less than the needed funding to support its Maritime Domain Awareness project, which is intended to vastly increase port security. None of these programs is particularly sexy or likely to make it into a Hollywood thriller, yet they mean more to our homeland defense than an unrealistic and easily deterred seabased strategic BMD program.
Killing sea-based strategic BMD wouldn't necessarily or even likely shift money to these other programs, hut the point is more that strategic HMD. seahased or otherwise, reflects a pervasive technological hubris in the Department of Defense that is increasingly out of step with the threat and how to properly deal with it. Hitting a bullet with a supercomputer is all well and good, but a bit beside the point when the more likely threat is sitting in the bilges, a container, or God knows where in the holds of a 15 knot freighter or the baggage compartment of a non-ballistic airliner.
"The Coalition of Enlightened States"
(See R. H. Scales and R. Killebrew, pp. 14-19 January 2007 Proceedings)
James Heimer-Major General Robert H. Scales and Colonel Robert Killebrew make an extensive argument that the United States should exercise its military power against radical Muslim organizations by means of its "traditional" supporting role in partnership with nations threatened by ideological attack. This is opposed to unilateral conventional operations as a first choice.
Surprisingly, however, the bulk of the "The Coalition of Enlightened States" describes missions for the various armed forces of the United States that are not specifically tied to acting in a coalition. In fact, in reading these descriptions, one is also hard-pressed to associate them with a supporting role, either. One wonders. then, what exactly is the authors' thesis and must conclude that the objective is to sell the concept of the coalition in and of itself.
This of course is a popular theme With opponents of the war in Iraq, but it is exactly that conflict that illustrates the failure of placing the formation of a coalition to address the terrorist threat over acting first in the national interests of the United States. As illustrated in the deliberations that led up to the Iraq war, there was widespread agreement expressed in numerous UN resolutions lhal the regime in Iraq posed a threat to the stability of the Middle East, was supporting terrorist activities by supplying training and a sate haven, and (even if based on faulty intelligence) had weapons of mass destruction and a demonstrated willingness to use them. It ever there were an overriding reason for "enlightened" states to coalesce around a cause, it would seem to have been Iraq. Yet with a few exceptions, such a coalition could not be assembled.
Imagine then the problem tor the United States it it were to adopt the authors' thesis as policy and place the formation of an enlightened coalition over the primacy to act unilaterally with conventional forces, even it realigned to match the authors' mission descriptions. As was evident in Iraq and has been demonstrated in Madrid and London, even direct terrorist attacks on civilian targets ("social atrocities" in the authors' terminology) were insufficient to mobilize regional and local governments to isolate, pursue, and ruthlessly attack. Only the United States, responding to 9/11, Russia responding to Chechen terrorists, and very recently Ethiopia responding to radical Islamic incursions into adjacent Sudan have taken such action and in doing so acted iinilaterally.
The concepts of coalitions, restraint so as not to InIIaIUC passions, empathy, and a "sublimated sense of global superiority" serve not to buy time while waiting for the natural currents of history to cool the flames of religious zealotry, but instead provide precisely the interval needed to recruit, train, and equip jihadist armies, regular or irregular. We can ill afford any course of action but one that places our national interest and survival first. On the basis of the evidence, building coalitions is not a dependable part of that course of action.
"We Must Reconnect with Our Sailors"
(See M. McCartney, p. 66 January 2007 Proceedings)
Owene Hall Weber-I read with interest Commander McCartney's article about the problem that has ironically arisen as a result of the greatly enhanced communications between Sailors and their families because of advances in electronic capacities. Today sailors no longer rely on each other for companionship.
My father, Lieutenant (j.g.) Nicholas Dawson Hall, USNR, was the Armed Guard officer with a gunnery detachment of some 18 to 20 sailors on the merchant ship SS Fisher Ames during World War II. I have his letters to my mother between November 1944 and June 1945. My father's first letter was written in November; my mother received it in January; her response reached him in February. Meanwhile, in hope and faith, they each wrote the other every day. My father hail been promised a phone call as soon as they reached land; neither in New Guinea nor anywhere else in the South Pacific were phones available for men on ships.
The letters reveal not only the anxiety and love my parents experienced, hut the strong bond among the men and with their commanding officer. This was at least in pail owing to the scarcity of mail and the desperate need for human companionship during those days at sea, on a little ship traveling without benefit of convoy, carrying tons of ammunition for the liberation of the Philippines while the crew watched in amazement and disbelief the first kamikaze planes dive all around them.
I smile when I hear young wives say they could not survive a husband's deployment without e-mail.
"Recipe for a Quarantine"
(See U. M. Giangreco. p. 12, December 2006; M. Warren, pp. 75-76. January 2007 Proceedings)
Remo Salta-It is surprising that whenever the U.S. Navy is short of warships, someone always wants to bring back the battleships. These ships are literally museum pieces, with the USS New Jersey (BB-62) and the USS Missouri (BB-63) already having been converted into floating museums. 1 don't know how much of a deterrent a 60-plus-year-old warship would be. especially in an era of land-based cruise missiles, missile-armed fastattack craft, stealthy diesel-electric submarines, and supersonic jets. What's next? Do we bring back the USS Olympia and strap some Harpoon missiles on her"
The remaining two battleships, the USS IDWU (BB-61 ) and the USS Wisconsin (BB-64). pictured right, are basically large artillery platforms with cruisemissile capability. They have no antisubmarine capability, and it is very doubtful that they would use their enormous guns against other ships (with the lust major ship-to-ship gun duel taking place in 1944). Therefore, unless we use these behemoths to bombard the North Korean mainland with guns or missiles, it seems that they would be useless for blockade duty. These ships Viould. however, make great targets. Remember, the General Belgraiio. another World War II-era warship, didn't fare too well when it was being stalked by a modern submarine.
A blockade of North Korea would require both ships and aircru ft. preferably missile-armed helicopters. Helicopters would be critical for reconnaissance duties and antisubmarine and untiship warfare. So why not use the ships we already have and convert them into innovative minihelicopter carriers'? The USS Vuwennes (CG-49) was decommissioned in 2005. The ship was only 20 years old (being commissioned in 1985) and was a modern Ticontlemgaclass cruiser. If the Vincennes had her aft Mk 26 missile launcher and Mk 45 5-inch gun removed, then her existing helicopter deck and hangar could be lengthened, allowing the ship to accommodate at least lour, and perhaps five SH-60 Sea Hawk helicopters. A thorough Service Life Extension Program (SLEP) for the Vincennes could easily add another ten years to her life at a fraction of the cost of a new warship.
In addition, with a crew of approximately 400, she would he much more economical to run than a battleship. A modified Vincennes would also be a modern warship capable of defending herself with her remaining Mk 26 missile launcher, 5-inch gun. Harpoon missiles, Mk 46 torpedoes, and Phalanx close-in weapon system. It would also add four or more badly needed and heavily armed helicopters to a blockade mission.
The USS Spruance (DD-963) and the USS O'Bannon (DD-987) were also decommissioned in 2005 and could be similarly modified. Although these ships are older, they are still half the age of the Iowa or the Wisconsin. The bottom line is that we can get much more mileage out of the ships we already have by using some creative and innovative SLEPs. These reconditioned ships would also be much more modern and. therefore, much more intimidating, than some relic from Work! War II.
"Laying the Keel for a New Maritime Strategy"
(See A. Pine, pp. 32-34. December 20(16 Proceedings)
Captain Charles H. Brown, U.S. Navy (Retired)-Mr. Pine's review of the process creating Admiral Mullen's new "maritime strategy" clearly shows that what is being created is not a new strategy comparable to the one defined by Alfred T. Mahan. but a rationalization of the need for an acceptable level of funding to maintain the Navy.
In the late 19th century Mahan proposed a maritime strategy for the United Slates. In contrast to Halford Mackinder's continental strategy, which ignored the need for sea power, Mahan's view stressed that the United States must maintain a strong battle fleet, with bases around the world, to control the oceans and close the enemies' sea ports. Mahan wanted to alert the leaders of his country to the necessity of creating and maintaining the naval forces needed to develop the United States' potential as a world power.
Mahan's maritime strategy was accepted. The United States built and deployed a fleet that gained lull control of the seas by the time World War II ended. Inside of a decade, however, the Soviet Union challenged the United States for world dominance, beginning the Cold War. Following Mahan's strategy, the Navy neutrali/.ed the Soviets' attempts to threaten our shores from the seas near the Soviet land mass.
Currently, the naval service is fully committed in support of land battles in Iraq and Afghanistan, blocking the threat from terrorist groups, and protecting U.S. interests in the oil-rich Middle East. However, none of our opponents has a significant naval force. Does that mean that the U.S. Navy should no longer follow Mahan's maritime strategy? No.
The U.S. battle fleet ensures that merchant ships of all flags move without interference. Nations such as China, Russia. and India have the inherent capacity to oppose the interests of the United States. How long would it take one or more of those nations to rebuild a strong fleet? It the United States fails to maintain its Fleet, bases, and the sea-going skills of the Navy, it is possible that Pearl Harbor could be repeated.
Naval leaders today have a formidable task, but with no existing deep-water threats, in their haste to build an argument for funds, they may have forgotten the purpose of Mahan's maritime strategy. Our Navy's leaders should ignore the advice of analysts who wish to further "embrace the struggle ashore" and confront only the terrorist threat. That is not the naval service's role. Mahan's maritime strategy, built on an effective, sea-going battle fleet, has allowed the United States to exploit its power globally. That strategy should not be discarded in the heat of today's political wars.
"The Failure of the All-Volunteer Force"
(See J. Byron, p. 12. October 2006; H. Patterson, H. Sacks, J. Roherty, J. Hasik, T. Meyer, pp.6-7, 74. November 2006; V. Krulak, C. Cooper, p. 6, December 2006; J. Coogan, M. Canciun, p. 79. January 2007 Proceedings)
John Byron-My commentary sparked argument-the Forum at work-and that's good to see. Ten responses, two-to-one against me. but my chosen ground is less lonely with Unite Krulak on my side (and thanks to Commander Coogan for his intelligent restatement of my arguments in January I.
Several see patriotism driving the All Volunteer Force, a point well taken. Patriotism motivates my two grandsons in uniform (one in Iraq), as it did me. But the draftees I served beside did not lack for loyalty, nor those who helped raise the flag atop Mount Suribachi in 1945. Two draftees and four volunteers were in that part) not a had mix for a future force representing the democracy it serves.
Most responses favoring the AVF flowed from military efficiency, a narrow point hut superficially valid: "the AVF works well." My response: Oh yeah? What planet do you guys live on? President Bush concedes that "we're not winning" in Iraq: Colin Powell says we're "losing." It's worse than that: Iraq is lost. The vaunted AVF could not prevail. We only debate the circumstances of our retreat.
And just how efficient is a force with a $60 billion deficiency to regain basic readiness, its stateside brigades stripped hare and its Guard and Reserve equipment unusable in the future? How effective is one that-longer on the ground than World War II-still cannot decide its basic Iraq strategy nor field the right force composition to execute the better choices? And fight elsewhere? Forget about it. If this be success, failure must be truly dreadful.
The deeper point, illustrated by the tone of the military chauvinists arguing against a draft, is the unavoidable conflict between the concept of a xuinding armv inherent in the AVF and the patriotic history of this country. In the debate around the framing of the Constitution, a standing army was repeatedly decried as "dangerous," "improvident." "destructive of liberty." and an "evil to be feared." And why? Because "[a] standing army . . . would afford a strong temptation to some ambitious man." But the framers also recognized that "[a] people cannot long retain their freedom, whose government is incapable of protecting them," and so we have constitutional backing for a protective force ready to respond to defensive needs.
Congress did authorize the "ambitious man" living in the White House to deal with Iraq, basically signing a blank check. But that was a painless vote, the Republicans free to back their President and the Democrats able to stand strong for defense, neither having to confront voters who. with a draft, would be instantly brought to face war in a direct and personal way. The pain has come later, with 3,000 military dead, 20,000 wounded, an estimated 100,000 Iraq citizens slaughtered, at least a halt-trillion dollars thrown away, chaos in the Middle East, and American prestige lost around the world.
Our democracy needs the shared sacrifice of the draft, to rein in ambitious men in the future.
"Crossing Swords: 'Let Us Pray'"
See G. J. klingenschmitt and S. L. Smith, pp. 20-23, January 2007 Pmceeilings)
Ken Harmon-I read both articles debating the issue of using the name of Jesus in public prayer with great interest. Once again. Proceedings has demonstrated its willingness to give voice to the men and women in uniform even when the senior leadership would like nothing better than silence. This is an essential service you provide to our armed forces.
I must admit to a strong conviction that lieutenant Klingenschmitt is correct: historically, morally, and from the perspective of freedom. You cannot protect anyone from hearing something offensive without disenfranchising another from the freedom of speech. This particular freedom of speech (religious) is given prominence and special treatment in the U.S. Constitution, which every officer is sworn to uphold and protect. To suppress Klingenschmitt is a violation of that oath.
The men and the women of the armed services need chaplains who are passionate. Passion needs to be attached to their care for those under (heir ministry us well as to their religious convictions. Those who lack either one of these should look for another vocation. A chaplain who is not an advocate for his particular denomination or belief system is no chaplain at all.
"Chaplains, Censorship, and the First Amendment"
See S. R. Uteri, pp. 22-24, December 2006: D. Winters, p. 74-75, January 2007 Proceedings)
Captain Paul S. Grossgold, U.S. Navy (Retired)-Working with our chaplains was among the highlights of my base command tour. They perform an invaluable service to Sailors and families. Beyond delivering prayer at religious and non-religious events, chaplains also play an important role in counseling and mentoring Sailors. In the aftermath of Abu Ghraib, we ignore at great risk the importance of the ethical and moral development of Sailors, for which chaplains are uniquely positioned to assist. In the difficult casualty assistance calls officer role, they selflessly provide comfort and strength to grieving families.
Still, chaplains don't come trained. The development and maturation of junior chaplains requires leadership and guidance from both line commanders and senior chaplains. On those lew occasions when our junior chaplains "got out of their box." I turned first to our senior base chaplain to apply the appropriate course correction. On one or two occasions I tell compelled to intervene personally, hut I helieve the chaplain corps must self-regulate, with guidance from line command.
As pointed out in lieutenant Obert's excellent article, a delicate balance must be struck between the role of chaplain and the role of minister, both embodied in the same person. One who answers the calling of the cloth i|iute naturally feels strongly in the doctrines and belief systems of his or her particular religion. We ask much of our chaplains when we expect-in fact demand-that they be pluralistic when dealing with the spiritual needs of Sailors who don't share their beliefs.
Furthermore, the Navy is not resourced to provide chaplains of every denominution at every installalion and command in the Fleet. As a malter of practicality, chaplains must he inclusive. How about this litmus test: Does a chaplain have the right to refuse ministry to a dying Marine on the battlefield hecause their religions differ? Not a chance.
On rare occasions, the inner conflict between chaplain and minister cannot be reconciled. Such seems to he the case with Chaplain Klingenschmitt. This officer obviously holds deep convictions, and has made his choice. The minister is unwilling to be the chaplain. There is no room in the Navy for a zealot minister hut reluclant chaplain.