Distributed Operations in the Marine Corps is a success story in the making. They are the essence of maneuver warfare, which is the Commandant's intent.
"Just as the Marine Corps pioneered a new amphibious warfare doctrine that proved decisive in World War II, today the Corps is introducing an approach to battle based on fluid 'distributed operations' that has similar war-winning potential. It seems clear that the quality of our human capital will prove decisive in distributed operations, as the concept implies a move away from traditional command and control to something far more flexible and decentralized." - Professor John Arquilla, Defense Analyst, U.S. Naval Postgraduate School
In January 2005, Commandant of the Marine Corps General Michael Hagee directed execution of a plan aimed at enhancing the Corps' infantry battalions for future operations on the irregular battlefield. His intent was clear: Develop an initial distributed operations (DO) capability in 2006 and begin implementation Marine Corps-wide the following year. Establishment of such capabilities became a formal priority task. Less than two years later, the Corps has swiftly and successfully pursued aggressive guidance.
The Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory (MCWL) was designated as the lead agency in developing a fully integrated DO capability. To do so, the lab established a Distributed Operations Implementation Working Group that attacked the problem in accordance with the Commandant's Title 10 responsibility to "train, man, and equip" Marines. The effort required the combined forces of the Marine Corps Training and Education Command, the Marine Corps Systems Command, and Manpower and Reserve Affairs. The result was a program that is redefining how tactical units prepare for and conduct the full range of military operations required in today's war on terrorism.
From its inception, distributed operations were intended to be a supplementary capability that would not compromise the fundamental requirement for Marine infantry units to accomplish traditional missions. Substantial upgrades to formal training and an infusion of a broad range of improved equipment for infantry units would significantly increase their overall combat effectiveness and allow them to decentralize their operations more effectively.
In a nutshell, distributed operations are the product of scrupulously close attention to brilliance in the basics, which then opens the door to a higher level of ground combat excellence and moves the Corps' conventional capabilities closer to those usually associated with the special-operations community. The lab adhered to the Commandant's intent to measurably improve the ability of Marines to "locate, close with, and destroy the enemy."
Aggressive live experimentation was conducted concurrent with the working group's efforts. Just a year after that initial meeting with the Commandant, the first "DO platoon" went to war. and came home with very high grades. The platoon belonged to "B" Company, 1st Battalion, 3d Marines (Bravo, 1/3), and reports of its combat operations in northeastern Afghanistan validated the distributed operations concepts and underscored the critical importance of individual and small-unit training. The platoon's accomplishments made an equally strong case for complementing enhanced training with the right equipment in the right numbers. A major take-away from these operations was that infantry small units trained and equipped to this new standard could exert influence far out of proportion to their relative sizes.
The working group's tasks intersected with the performance of the first DO platoon. After the Deputy Commandant for Combat Development and Integration, Lieutenant General James F. Amos, received a formally articulated brief on the clearly defined requirement for institutional improvements in training, staffing, and equipping, the stage was set to ensure that future Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF) commanders have the ability to exert their influence over much larger areas than before without increasing the size of their tactical units.1
Distributed Operations Primer
At their core, distributed operations seek to drive the ethos of maneuver warfare to the lowest tactical levels. Small, highly capable squads and platoons maneuvering across a large operational area will create the spatial and temporal advantage ground forces have historically sought. Infantry small units will sense an expanded battle space, identify surfaces and gaps, and use close combat, supporting arms-including joint air-delivered fires and non-lethal means-to accomplish assigned missions. They will do so by exercising tactical initiative and creativity based on their commander's intent and rapidly changing rules of engagement.
These units will create and benefit from a punishing tactical tempo. Continuing the trend toward decentralization of authority, a hallmark of Marine Corps combat leadership, decision-making will be delegated to junior leaders directly engaged in the fight. Pushing authority downward will dramatically quicken speed of command. Distribution of authority among seasoned, well-trained junior leaders will result in the type of fast-paced actions the irregular battlefield demands. Distributed operations units will capitalize on these advantages to focus on critical vulnerabilities, exploit fleeting opportunities, and achieve the tactical successes that result in decisive outcomes at the operational and even strategic levels of war.
When commanders choose to employ distributed operations, infantry battalions will function effectively, with companies, platoons, and squads dispersed beyond the line of sight and range of organic direct fires but linked by a powerful command-and-control network. All infantry battalions will be trained and equipped to fight and win on the distributed battlefield. They will employ dispersion when it is to their advantage to do so, whether to reduce vulnerability to enemy observation and fire or simply to exert physical influence over a large operating area. Concurrently, they will have the requisite training and mobility to conduct medium- and high-intensity combined-arms warfare, either from dispersed or more traditional formations.
In the final analysis, distributed operations are more mindset than tactic. By training, equipping, and empowering small-unit leaders, Marines can realize the full potential of the air-ground task force on any battlefield. The war on terrorism has no easy answers-certainly none that technology alone can solve. But distributed operations can make contributions to both the kinetic and "hearts-and-minds" components of the irregular battlefield with well-trained small-unit leaders who are expert in the basics and confident enough in their advanced capabilities to take the initiative as situations warrant.
Implementation of this initiative throughout the Corps will ensure that Marines are trained and educated to meet and defeat the distributed threats our military forces face every day. To complement that crucial first step, they will receive the best equipment available. The operational accomplishments of the first experimental unit dramatically established that, once the packaging of training, manning, and equipping is complete, Marines will redefine the role of conventional forces on the modern battlefield.
Enduring Requirement for Training Excellence
During the summer of 2005, Bravo 1/3's 1st Platoon participated in a program called Small Unit Enhancement Training at Fort Hunter Liggett and Twentynine Palms in California. The MCWL and Training and Education Command, augmented by British Royal Marines and Australian soldiers, conducted the training jointly. The training refreshed the Marines (just returned from Iraq) on infantry basics and then systematically raised the bar to higher levels of instruction and practical application in land navigation, mounted and dismounted patrolling, combat shooting, tactical vehicle operation, communications, and the use of supporting arms-including introduction of a Joint Terminal Attack Controller capability at the squad level. On conclusion of training, the platoon conducted a limited-objective experiment to assess the training and equipment received and its ability to employ what it learned against a well-trained and numerically superior opposing force. The outcome was impressive.
The Training and Education Command quickly began to make changes that included creation of a Tactical Small Unit Leader's course and a formal "train the trainer" regimen. The Infantry Unit Leader's course (i.e., Platoon Sergeant's course) was quickly aligned with the Infantry Officer's course for lieutenants. Simultaneously, Manpower and Reserve Affairs instituted a pilot program that ordered staff sergeants on independent duty (e.g., drill instructor and recruiting) to the Platoon Sergeant's course while en route to infantry battalions. On the distributed battlefield, the platoon sergeant is second in command; his level of training is no less important than the platoon commander's.
Despite the fact that a follow-on experiment was planned, no one saw reason to delay implementation of the lessons emerging from the initial test. Enemies of the United States do not wait for signed after-action reports. Making rapid adjustments based on operational lessons is as much a hallmark of the Corps as the seasoned and steady noncommissioned officer seeks to capitalize on.
From Experimentation to Combat
The DO platoon returned to Kaneohe, Hawaii, joined the battalion's Afghanistan pre-deployment training, and embedded a seasoned Vietnam-veteran reserve gunnery sergeant from the Warfighting Lab. The sergeant was the lab's (and the Corps') directed telescope.
Reports made it clear that training is essential, but it is only part of the equation. The Marine rifle platoon table of equipment has changed little since Vietnam. Although weapons are arguably better, other improvements have been at the margins-especially in the area of communications, where the venerable VHF radio is still the platoon's communications backbone.
To compensate for deficiencies, infantry battalions typically receive additional equipment and communications gear when they arrive in theater, and 1st Battalion, 3d Marines was no exception. When the battalion arrived in Afghanistan early in 2006, it received communications assets that, for the most part, were new to Marines at the company and platoon levels. Thus, the DO platoon trained their fellow Marines on the radios.
The platoon also demonstrated its combat mettle. This has been amply captured in numerous open-source publications; most important, it was validated by the battalion commander during the course of a Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned interview and subsequent report.2 The DO platoon's training and powerful communications suite allowed the battalion commander, in some instances, to employ it as a separate maneuver element within its own designated operating area. In such cases, the DO platoon received combat orders along with the maneuver companies of the battalion. Throughout the deployment, the platoon demonstrated mastery of all manner of supporting arms, from U.S. Army artillery to B-52 missions that effectively employed Joint Direct Attack Munitions. In one situation, the DO platoon communications capability helped the battalion commander to "pass" air to the platoon for support of a friendly convoy that was under heavy attack and unable to establish communications with higher headquarters.
Nothing New Under the Sun?
Infantry lieutenants are trained to employ supporting arms, and Marine noncommissioned officers have historically demonstrated proficiency in providing terminal guidance (and more) to close air support aircraft.
3 In actuality, most commanders in the operating forces teach employment of supporting arms to small unit leaders.In discussions of the distributed operations concept, therefore, the "we already do that" argument is often heard. However valid, this view ignores the requirement for certification, without which pilots will not deliver ordnance.4 It also ignores the fact that post-entry-level training is currently not standardized in the infantry community. If a terminal attack control capability at the squad level is to become a Marine Corps requirement, the system that produces the capability must be standardized. To this end, the Warfighting Lab is conducting experiments to determine the skills required at the squad and platoon levels, as well as the training required to achieve and sustain those skills.5
Toward a Sustainable Capability
Given enough time, people, and money, previous limited-objective experiments have proved that any unit's combat capability can be improved substantially. Because, however, all three of these vital assets are in short supply, the Marine Corps conducts live-force experimentation and institutionalizes the results. A platoon was chosen as the base unit of experimentation because the operating forces were (and remain) busy, and this option permitted the lab and the Training and Education Command to focus sharply on excellence at the individual- and small-unit level.
Both commands invested heavily in a process that produced a superbly trained and equipped rifle platoon. If that investment results in systemic changes that lead to highly skilled infantrymen and the fielding of combat-essential equipment to every Marine in the infantry battalion, DO will have set the stage for accomplishing something long overdue: Tangible recognition that the most difficult job on the battlefield sits squarely on the shoulder of the infantry noncommissioned officer and the lieutenant he works for.
In September, the DO Implementation Working Group passed the baton to a DO Transition Task Force operating under the aegis of the Deputy Commandant lieutenant General Amos. This task force is taking DO to the next level, basing its initial efforts largely on the Infantry Battalion Enhancement Period Program (IBEPP), which uses real-world deployment schedules to drive the training, manning, and equipping of infantry battalions. The Staffing, Equipping and Training Team is at the program's core. Coordinated by lieutenant General Amos, the team is sourced by the appropriate Marine component commander (Marine Forces Command or Marine Forces Pacific). Its goal is to ensure that infantry battalions are fully trained, manned, and equipped prior to commencement of unit predeployment training. The Marine Corps will deploy the first IBEPP battalion in 2007, when achievement of the Commandant's intent will be realized.
And the program will not stop there. At this moment, the Warfighting Lab is partnering with III Marine Expeditionary Force and 31 st Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable) to take distributed operations to yet another level: employment, sustainment, and command and control of distributed forces from the sea base. The implications of DO on other elements of the air-ground task force are potentially numerous and complex. This capstone advanced-warfighting experiment will be the first step in identifying and assessing these implications.
Finally, in 2007, the lab will begin a two-year program that continues to examine fires, sustainment, and command and control of distributed forces. The effort will lean heavily on combat lessons learned and experimentation-and the all-important experiences of a single rifle platoon from 1st Battalion, 3d Marines.
Does DO Equal Transformation?
Transformation might well be the most hackneyed word in the Department of Defense lexicon. Even so, Marines can be sure their enemies are not waiting for the U.S. military to reinvent itself. They can be equally certain that small units and small-unit leaders shoulder the load in the war on terrorism and will continue to do so for the immediate future. Elusive insurgents are much harder to find and fix than the conventional forces for which the Pentagon has outfitted and trained the force. The DO program puts substance to the Corps' view of future military operations. It focuses the endeavor on superbly trained and properly equipped small units to conduct wide-ranging operations across the entire scope of tactical warfare.
Considering the number of Defense Department programs that will cost millions, even billions, of dollars for single weapon systems that may never see combat, DO-trained and -equipped infantry battalions represent a modest commitment that will yield an extraordinarily high payoff on the irregular battlefield.6 Perhaps it is inherently transformational to define the true challenge and put effort and money where they do the most good. Distributed Operations is not only here to stay; it is the right thing to do.
1 DO experimentation is conducted with units manned according the approved Table of Organization (T/O). At the time of this writing, the implications of increasing the infantry battalion T/O in selected non-infantry military occupational specialties are being examined by the CMC-chartered Capabilities Assessment Group.
2 "Distributed Operations in Afghanistan: 1st Battalion, 3d Marines," MCCLL (www.mccll.usmc.mil), September 2006. The author spent several hours discussing the DO platoon with the battalion commander.
3 Col William Dabney, USMC (Ret), "Hill 881S and the Super Gaggle," Marine Corps Gazette, April 2006, provides a superb example of a noncommissioned officer stepping up to the plate after his forward air controller (FAC) was wounded.
4 Sometimes even certified FACs can be denied close air support. "Counterinsurgency Operations in Afghanistan: 2d Battalion, 3d Marines," MCCLL (www.mccll. usmc.mil), April 2006, cites an example of a CAS air crew refusing to deliver ordnance because it questioned the assessment of a certified FAC on the ground.
5 MCWL is currently conducting a limited objective experiment that will better define the operational and training requirements for a terminal attack capability at the squad and platoon levels. It will include an exhaustive examination of the role of simulation in reducing the required number of "live controls" that JTAC certification requires.
6 The cost of equipping a DO-capable infantry battalion is approximately $19M. The cost of a single F-22 or DDX provides a useful comparison.
Colonel Goulding heads Sea Viking Division at the Marine Corps War-fighting Laboratory, Quantico, Virginia.