Sidebar: We Build, We Fight
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The United States has had a task force stationed on the Horn of Africa for nearly four years. What has it been up to?
On a C-130 flight bound for Mombasa, Kenya, the pilot suddenly banks low. "There's going to be a little bit of turbulence," he announces, "but look out the windows. You might see some animals and stuff." Flying low over the African savannah, herds of gazelles and wildebeests graze on acacia trees amidst brown rivers along the southern Kenyan coast.
"Is there a SAM threat in Kenya?" asks a reporter, referring to surface-to-air missiles. He was accustomed to the jostling maneuver from C-130 flights in Iraq.
The dozen other passengers stare. Colonel Tirmet, a garrulous 28-year veteran of the Kenyan army with a paternal manner, puts down his novel and laughs at the question. "There is no war here." The pilot was cruising below the radar just to enjoy the impromptu safari.
In one sense, Colonel Tirmet is right. Improvised explosive devices (IEDs) are not exploding on the Horn, nor are suicide bombers plying their vile trade. However, the area still remains, in the view of the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), dangerous enough to classify as one of three combat zones within the combatant command"s realm (the others are Iraq and Afghanistan). Although American forces have never been fired on in the region, the sense of urgency prevalent in a wartime mission applies to what has become primarily a civil-affairs operation.
The Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa, or CJTF-HOA, as the task force is known, entered the Horn in 2002 with a mandate to detect and defeat transnational terrorism. Over the past four years, the mission has evolved into a two-pronged effort: humanitarian operations and military instruction. Although Soldiers, Marines, and Sailors teach military skills, and civilian diplomats are valuable in building foreign government partnerships, CJTF-HOA's primary frontline troops are doctors, nurses, veterinarians, civil engineers, and Seabees engaged in humanitarian projects.
The underlying philosophy behind the task force's strategy is that nations with stable, secure environments where people have opportunities for education and good jobs are less likely to harbor terrorists. "We want to dry up the al Qaeda recruiting pool," said Major General Timothy Ghormley, USMC, who commanded CJTF-HOA until April 2006, when Rear Admiral Richard Hunt, USN, assumed the helm. Admiral Hunt's tenure marks one of the U.S. Navy's first shore-based joint commands.
The task force has had four commanding generals in four years. All were Marines, and all built the foundations of strategy from Small Wars Manual, the classic treatise on counterinsurgency warfare that was written in 1940 by veterans of the Banana Wars and dusted off again for the hearts-and-minds campaign in Iraq. Since 2002, CJTF-HOA has built 52 schools, 6 hospitals, and 21 medical clinics; dug 23 village wells; and vaccinated thousands of people—and the animals that support their livelihood—against disease. In January 2006, when a decrepit, inhabited four-story building collapsed in Nairobi, Kenya, the task force assisted with the recovery efforts.
In countries that have stable governments, CJTF-HOA also provides training for local military forces in skills that will enhance their abilities to prevent terror attacks. Over the past four years, military forces in four HOA nations—Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, and Yemen—have been trained in skills including map reading, maritime security, motor-transport maintenance, and martial arts. Not bad for a crew numbering just over 1,500 personnel.
"Fortunately, we're not getting shot at or blown up here," General Ghormley said. "That's because somebody saw the wisdom in getting (to the Horn) for Phase Zero," which is jargon for a war that has not yet happened, but potentially could. In other words, the general sees the opportunity to prevent the need for combat by continuing the process of, as he put it, "waging peace as aggressively as I can."
"Terrorists will want to come to Africa because there is so much ungoverned space," General Ghormley warned. "Those areas are perfect for al Qaeda. They can operate with impunity, train, and get their recruits." The terrorists will not become operational, however, if the hearts and minds of potential recruits are not open to extremism. Efforts on the Horn are centered on winning over the vulnerable elements of the populace.
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Back at the motor transport maintenance class in Arta, the Djiboutian soldiers removed the hood of the truck so everyone could see Petty Officer McClanahan's instructions. "Before we came here, they thought the only way to get it started was to run and pop the clutch," he said. As two soldiers pushed on the distributor cap, another pointed at the spark plug and traced his fingers around the engine, completing an imaginary circuit. He hollered in Somali at his classmates. Suddenly, they all cheered.
"We got it!" Petty Officer McClanahan clapped as well, and pointed with them at the engine. He grinned at his Djiboutian charges. "These guys are locked on!"
A Quiet Campaign
CJTF-HOA's quiet campaign has been underway for almost four years. Although the idea for a presence on the Horn was conceived soon after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the unit did not take shape for another year. In October 2002, with the world's attention focused on the threat of war in Iraq, the HOA task force was established at Camp Lejeune, with then-Major General John F. Sattler commanding. According to a February 2006 interview with General Sattler, General Tommy Franks wanted him to establish a small joint task force that could address threats to American interests on the Horn. General Franks thought American forces might be flushing members of al Qaeda from Afghanistan into safe havens in Africa. CJTF-HOA's job was to prevent that from happening. So far, they have succeeded.
Lacking a camp to move into on shore, in December 2002 the nascent CJTF-HOA planted its flag on the USS Mount Whitney (LCC-20), which was docked at the port of Djibouti.1 CJTF-HOA's area of responsibility and interest would grow to include the humid African littorals of Djibouti and Eritrea, the bazaars of Yemen, the deserts of Sudan and Somalia, and the highlands and plains of Ethiopia, Kenya, and Uganda.2 Altogether, the Horn, which juts out from east Africa like a rhinoceros tusk, comprises seven nations and Somalia—a homogenous, chaotic ethnic region. The area is more than five times the size of Iraq and Afghanistan combined. Approximately half of the 167 million inhabitants are Muslim.
As Saddam's statue was being toppled in Iraq, final plans were completed to move CJTF-HOA ashore. The detachment was located adjacent to the French Foreign Legion outpost of Camp Lemonier. At the same time that the French government was opposing U.S.-led military action in Iraq, it committed to a partnership on the Horn. "There may have been some tension in high places, but not in CJTF-HOA," Sattler said. "It was a collegial relationship on our part."
Formerly known as French Somaliland, Djibouti blends the humidity of South Carolina with the rugged coastal beauty of southern California. The terrain alternates between mountain and desert; much of the ground is as sandy as Baghdad. High temperatures in the summertime are a sticky 130°.
The Rock Star
As CJTF-HOA moved from ship to shore, Sattler leaned heavily on then-Colonel Richard Lake to develop a plan of attack. A Marine intelligence and foreign area officer who had tours with the State Department and CIA, Colonel Lake's fluency with both French and diplomatic courtesies became invaluable as CJTF-HOA worked to build bilateral relationships among the region's leaders. "We sort of had to make our own way," Lake said, meaning that it was up to the CJTF-HOA staff to determine how to implement America's counterterrorism strategy in the region. With a vague mandate from their higher headquarters and a paucity of resources, Lake began leveraging Sattler's gregarious personality to CJTF-HOA's operational advantage. "We decided to make him a rock star," Lake said, referring to his boss.
The strategic decision to use what Colonel Lake called the general's "relentless optimism" for diplomatic gain forced the French linguist into the role of stage manager for General Sattler's Horn of Africa Tour. Lake flew from embassy to embassy, making house calls on skeptical foreign governments and surprised American ambassadors. The general's follow-on appearance as the main event at dinners and diplomatic events made an impression throughout the region, said Lake. "General Sattler has a very outgoing personality. He is relentlessly positive. Many of the leaders in the region respected a man with military experience. My job was to set the stage with U.S. embassies and country teams."
According to Don Yamamoto, who was then the ambassador to Djibouti, much of the groundwork for the task force's future success resulted from General Sattler's charisma and his trusted subordinate's facility with French and diplomacy. Brigadier General Richard Lake now serves as the Director of Intelligence, Headquarters, Marine Corps. "General Lake served as a liaison between the Djiboutians and the French. He knew how to handle political issues very well," Mr. Yamamoto said. "Every general who has commanded CJTF-HOA has been a diplomat-warrior, but that all started with Sattler."
The United States is not new to the Horn of Africa. A plateau in Eritrea possesses extraordinary reception properties for sending and receiving radio signals. Beginning in April 1943, the U.S. Army had maintained a signaling and communications site near the 7,600-foot high Eritrean capital of Asmara. The listening post had proved vital to Allied success in World War II. Axis radio transmissions were intercepted and decoded on the plateau. The post became known as Kagnew Station, and was maintained throughout most of the Cold War. In 1977, satellite technology, a coup in Ethiopia, and an ongoing civil war removed the need for the Eritrean base. Kagnew Station was closed and all American forces moved out of the region.3
Other than famine relief during the 1984-85 drought that devastated Ethiopia, American involvement on the Horn was virtually nonexistent throughout the next two decades, reemerging in 1992 with Operation Restore Hope in Somalia. After the collapse of Mogadishu, American forces again withdrew from the Horn. Al Qaeda, who claimed that their attacks caused the withdrawal, established terrorist training camps in and around Sudan. Forces from these camps used car bombs to attack the American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998. Four years later, the surface-to-air missile that was shot at an Israeli airliner in Mombasa was transported from Somalia on a dhow, a single-sailed vessel commonly used for both trading and piracy on the Horn.4
A Small Team
As a land-based command, CJTF-HOA is not responsible for American anti-piracy operations in the waters and shoals of the Red Sea and Indian Ocean—that duty falls to the U.S. Navy, Central Command (NAVCENT). What commanders and staff in CJTF-HOA are focused on is addressing the poverty and lack of education in areas most likely to be seized by Islamic fundamentalists. With such a small team of Soldiers, Sailors, Marines, Airmen, and civilians, General Ghormley had to be efficient with his resources.
This efficiency, say CJTF-HOA staff officers, is being touted as the future model for the Global War on Terrorism. General Ghormley implemented a concept called "distributed operations," a decentralized approach to combat that has been widely discussed by Marine officers in relation to the Iraq war. Although the staff of the Marine Corps Combat Development Command has had a series of conferences about this concept in Quantico, the idea in CJTF-HOA has evolved well beyond a PowerPoint presentation. "I have units that are 400 miles away. It's two hours, from launch to land, to bring them any type of relief. It's four and a half hours to the only medical facility in the area," General Ghormley said, describing CJTF-HOA's implementation of distributed operations. "This isn't something that we're experimenting with. I don't have a lab to work this thing out. I'm doing it."
Challenges remain. For CJTF-HOA to carry out its strategy in the Horn, it must be permitted access to a country by the national government and the State Department. Eritrea does not allow Coalition forces, and the Yemeni government restricts humanitarian assistance and military training to a lower level than CJTF-HOA would like. The government of Sudan also has not granted access to the American military.
And significantly, CJTF-HOA is not allowed into Somalia. With no central government and no borders—the eastern boundary in Ethiopia's Ogaden Desert is called a Provisional Administrative Line—the lawless land is, according to CJTF-HOA, ripe for the spread of fundamentalism. However, the State Department, which is the lead organization on developing Somalia policy, restricts CJTF-HOA from officially operating in the region.5 "Somehow or another," General Ghormley said, "I have to affect what's going on in there. Because I am not allowed into Somalia, the best I can do is to surround it with U.S. forces."
The difference is that General Ghormley is flanking and enveloping with the combat power of veterinarians, host nation military partnerships, and new village wells. And they've made gains. CJTF-HOA's original vaccination program treated 50 people and 250 animals; the last effort involved 3,400 people and 24,000 animals. The increase in numbers also reflected different livestock. "We knew we were progressing when they brought us camels instead of goats," General Ghormley said. Nomadic Somalis view their camels as their most valuable property; giving permission for CJTF-HOA's veterinarians to handle these animals was like trusting a financial planner with a full asset portfolio.
Women and Children
When CJTF-HOA takes a project into a village, it makes a conscious effort to focus on the women and children. "Women are the heart of the village," said General Ghormley. "They do all the work and understand the politics. They can steer much of what we're doing in the right direction." Their children, he said, represent the hope and the future—the subjects of CJTF-HOA's long-term efforts. "We have to improve that child's future prospects so that 25 years from now they don't think we're the Great Satan," the general said. "The longer we are here, the deeper the impression becomes."
And remember they do. "I know the Marines," said Isaac, 19, a skinny Kenyan living in the village of Githurai, a ghetto on the outskirts of Nairobi. "They eat nyama choma and drink beer."6 No uniformed American had ever set foot in the slum. The teenager had encountered a pair of Marines who were guards at the Nairobi embassy. They were playing basketball on liberty at a park, and invited the boy to join them. Afterwards, they all ate Kenyan food and drank a few pints of Tusker, the local brew. The actions of friendly lance corporals on liberty can be as effective in deterring fundamentalism in some parts of the Horn as new wells or animal vaccinations in others.
In addition to humanitarian operations and liberty calls, CJTF-HOA also has naval forces in a partnership with the Kenyan government. At Camp Simba, an American camp inside a Kenyan military base located near Manda Bay on the northern coast, an American special boat unit has trained a core group of Kenyan sailors in special operations tactics. U.S. Navy Lieutenant Freeman, who asked that his first name not be used for security reasons, said, "we are giving the Kenyans tools for securing their littoral regions." With the camp located just south of the Somali border, the most likely threat to the Kenyan coastline comes from Somali pirates.
Which is what the Sailors at Manda Bay are training the Kenyans to deal with. The tactics, techniques, and procedures involve the Rigid-hull Inflatable Boat (RIB), the standard U.S. Navy platform for small boat special operations. Although the specifics remain classified, a reporter observed Kenyan sailors learning detainee-handling procedures, small boat handling, and conducting heavy special forces-style physical training.
"(Kenyan sailors) are already capable mariners," says Freeman, "not to mention that they can run like the wind. But now, they are more capable at certain missions." Since most of the American Sailors at Manda Bay have at least two tours in Iraq or Afghanistan under their belt—one was on his fourth combat deployment in as many years—they say that training the Kenyans for these missions has been a satisfying break from their work in more violent locales.
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Recommended Reading
Headed to Camp Lemonier and already seen Blackhawk Down? These seven books offer valuable insights into the Horn of Africa.
Surrender or Starve: Travels in Ethiopia, Sudan, Somalia, and Eritrea, Robert D. Kaplan. New York: Random House, 1988, 2003.
Originally published in 1988, Kaplan's first book was based on his travels in the Horn from 1984-1987. His reporting from two decades ago stands the test of time, particularly his dissection of the Ethiopian famine that Western aid tried to address (communist agricultural policies played a significant role), and his analysis of the despotic regime in power. Kaplan"s December 2002 postscript from Eritrea complements other works with his insight into the mind of President Isaias Afewerki.
I Didn't Do It For You: How the World Betrayed a Small African Nation, Michela Wrong. New York: Harper Collins, 2005.
Based on a series of trips into Eritrea, an Africa correspondent for the London-based Financial Times looks at how a series of colonial occupations-Italian, British, and Ethiopian-precipitated the Eritrean war for independence. She also examines how betrayals from both Cold War superpowers created a psyche of national isolation. In a fascinating, lewd chapter, Wrong interviews veterans of the U.S. Army's Kagnew Station, a Cold War listening post in Eritrea. Her narrative of the "Gross Guys" antics on liberty might even make veterans of Thailand's Pattaya Beach blush.
The Law of the Somalis: A Stable Foundation for Economic Development in the Horn of Africa, Michael van Notten. Trenton, NJ: Red Sea Press, 2005.
The most important book about Somalia that you've never heard of. Van Notten, a Dutch attorney and libertarian who was fluent in eight languages (including two Somali dialects), married into the Samaron clan and lived in Awdal, near Hargesia, for ten years. After van Notten died of heart failure in 2002, a colleague edited his notes into this book. His most controversial and compelling claim is that the clan-based system of justice, what he calls "kritarchy," is both unsuitable for democracy and perfect for the modern free-market economy.
Battling Terrorism in the Horn of Africa, edited by Robert L. Rotberg. Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution, 2005.
Rotberg's collection of seven essays on the regions and nation-states that comprise the Horn outlines the foundation for much of CJTF-HOA's current strategic vision. For speed-readers, the four best are on Somalia, Djibouti, Ethiopia, and Sudan. Of least significance is the essay on Eritrea, where the works previously cited provide stronger background and insight.
The Life of My Choice, Wilfred Thesiger. Glasgow: William Collins, 1987.
Two decades after T. E. Lawrence, Wilfred Thesiger captured the imaginations of a new generation of Britons with his writings and photojournalism from Arabia, and elsewhere in Asia, and Africa. Thesiger's works blend essay, travelogue and memoir with some of the best photography of 20th century Africa that exists. His books are out of print and hard to find, making his firsthand observations of life and travels on the Horn from pre-World War I to 1960 all the more enticing.
The Fate of Africa: From the Hopes of Freedom to the Heart of Despair, Martin Meredith. New York: Perseus, 2005.
Meredith's magnum opus chronicles the movement of the African continent from post-World War II to the present day. The author takes readers from Algeria to Pretoria, and everywhere in between. Lucid and readable, this book tells the story of the Horn, particularly Kenya, in the context of Africa's development over the past 50 years.
Where Soldiers Fear to Tread: A Relief Worker's Tale of Survival, John Burnett. New York: Bantam, 2005.
The next time someone chides you about the U.S. military's cultural ignorance, hand them a copy of this book. Burnett exposes the dark side of the aid industry in this searing memoir of U.N. incompetence when heavy rains flooded the Horn in 1997-1998. This book demonstrates why the U.S. military must remain prepared for humanitarian missions for decades to come. Young Sailors and Marines emerge, comparatively, as Ph.D.-level anthropologists.
—David J. Danelo
Plan Working
The plan in the Horn appears to be working. As of April 2006, no American military unit has been attacked in the field while conducting humanitarian assistance. Not only that, but Somalis, according to Ghormley, have heard about the services CJTF-HOA provides. "We're getting phone calls. We've met with government officials. They're all asking us to come in there, provide wells, build schools, and treat (their) people."
"The task force is still evolving," said former Ambassador Yamamoto, who is now the Assistant Secretary of State for African affairs. "With the Navy in command, it will take on a different character, although Admiral Hunt will continue the work others have begun." That includes the State Department. "CJTF-HOA has changed how we look at foreign relations and also relations among U.S. agencies," says Secretary Yamamoto. "In the past, embassies focused on bilateral issues. CJTF-HOA brought our ambassadors together to discuss regional issues and broadened our perspective."7
"If we think we'll be in here for three years, build some wells, and then leave, we have lost sight of what it is we are trying to do," General Ghormley said, summarizing his thoughts on the command. "This is a generational war. If we are patient and slow, with the right resources, we can provide hope." And perhaps prevent the ideology of terror from infecting the Horn's inhabitants.
Mr. Danelo, a frequent contributor to Proceedings, is a free lance writer and consultant. He graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy in 1998 and was commissioned in the U.S. Marine Corps. He is a combat veteran of Operation Iraqi Freedom. His first book, Blood Stripes: The Grunt's View of the War in Iraq, was published last month by Stackpole Books.
1. Dubai Ports International, the same conglomerate that caused a stir over its intention to acquire American assets, owns the Port of Djibouti. back to article
2. Information according to "Fast Facts: CJTF-HOA" distributed by the Public Affairs Office, March 2006. According to conversations with staff officers, both Uganda and the Seychelles were classified as CJTF-HOA's Area of Interest. back to article
3. Wrong, Michela. I Didn"t Do It For You: How the World Betrayed a Small African Nation. (New York: Harper Collins, 2005), p. 276. back to article
4. A Washington Post reporter and a freelance writer living in Africa reported this anecdote. back to article
5. Special forces and other government agencies are rumored to be working in Somalia, but those reports could not be confirmed. back to article
6. Nyama choma is a traditional Kenyan method of preparing chicken, mutton, or beef. back to article
7. For more on the significance of this level of coordination for counterterrorism, see "Interagency Operations: The Marine Specialty of the Century," Col Matthew F. Bogdanos, Marine Corps Gazette, March 2006, pp. 60-65. back to article