Just over 100 years ago, a middle-age geographer conceived the "heartland" theory that drove most of the strategy of the 1920s and 1930s. Applying his theory to the "new geography" of modern economic-military competition could provide new insights into the importance of the sea in the current struggles that dominate the international landscape. Faced with facts that dare not be ignored, the value of the sea base takes on new meaning, even as modern expeditionary strike groups (ESGs) expand the definition of presence in critical regions of the world.
On the evening of 25 January 1904, Halford J. Mackinder, fellow of the Royal Geographical Society, delivered a seminal paper, titled "The Geographical Pivot of History." Later published in the April 1905 issue of the society's journal, its thesis was that the geographical isolation of central Asia and its vast, untapped resources promised to raise it as the pivot point on which the next historical age would turn. Mackinder spoke directly about the economic commodities of his day-"population, wheat, cotton, fuel, and metals so incalculably great"-and tied these resources to the move by the Russian Empire to provide access to these resources by building a railroad across the continent. This first single strand of track, Mackinder felt, would inevitably be followed by another, and another until this heartland realized its true potential.1
While he served as a member of the British Parliament a decade and a half later, Mackinder expanded on his original paper in a book, Democratic Ideas and Reality. Contained within was a strategic observation that excited little interest in Mackinder"s native England. "Who rules East Europe commands the Heartland. Who rules the Heartland commands the World-Island. Who rules the World-Island commands the world." Unfortunately, in post-World War I Germany this idea served as the focus of a whole generation of strategists and resulted in Adolf Hitler's ill-fated campaign into Russia in search of space for his expanding Third Reich.
Following World War II, with the advent of the ideological struggle between capitalism and Marxism, as well as the introduction of intercontinental ballistic missiles topped with thermonuclear warheads, Mackinder's ideas seemed outdated. Thus they faded into memory, doomed to be cited only by diplomatic historians driven by a mad rage against the past evils of imperialism. However, when viewed not just from the perspective of geography, but also from Mackinder's other economic vantage points, old ideas take on new importance.
The New Heartland
Mackinder wrote in his original paper that the central Asian pivot area occupied "the central strategical position . . . she can strike on all sides and be struck from all sides . . . ."2 Today, Southwest Asia occupies the "central strategical position" internationally. But instead of drawing that importance from its geographic position, it finds itself pushed to the fore by its abundant energy reserves. Southwest Asia exports only about 25% of the world's energy needs, but it has about 75% of the world's energy reserves.3
Over the next ten years, as Asian powers such as India and China continue to improve the standard of living for their people, automobiles will become increasingly common. With larger population bases, this movement will in turn drive energy demand to the point where the oil beneath the sands of this strategic region will increasingly attract the interest of all global powers.4 One report predicts energy consumption will increase by 50% over the next two decades, a sharp rise over the 34% increase that occurred over the past 20 years.5 China alone is projected to see its energy consumption rise by 150%, while India is expected to double its energy demand. Energy will dominate these two nations' foreign-policy calculations in the years ahead.6
The United States, with its multitude of energy sources at home, in Canada, and in Latin America, will be able to survive without Southwest Asia's supplies. But Asia cannot. Located along the bridge that connects three great continents, Southwest Asia is fated to become the "strategical center" of the planet; the new economic heartland. It is chilling to consider that these arguments do not even begin to factor in the nuances of religious differences among the various peoples and nations of the region.
Recognizing that energy is a large component of political power, the energy-rich nations of Southwest Asia have demonstrated in the past that they are not above sharply curtailing production to accentuate their positions and resolve. But the rise of competitors in Europe, Central America, and South America has brought this tactic into question. Shutting down the supply raises the price of energy. If it gets too high, consumers such as the United States begin to use technology to develop new sources of energy, thus reducing the customer base. It is a fine line, carefully walked.
Hence, the United States finds itself with growing interests, in a region half a world away, that seem to require its full and ongoing attention. It has been a long argument over whether the nation's interests follow its presence or vice-versa. Regardless of the path, the result is a need for U.S. forces in the region to protect its growing long-term interests there.
From the 1970s until the dawn of the 21st century, the United States spent billions of dollars to establish military bridgeheads in Iran, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan.7 With the surging tide of Islamic fanaticism and the accompanying unease of political instability, however, the United States lost each of these bases at key moments when they were needed most.8
Probably the cruelest and most expensive blow came from the kingdom of Saudi Arabia, which agreed to base Central Command's (CentCom's) forward headquarters and hundreds of aircraft at Prince Sultan Airbase at a cost of billions of dollars to the American taxpayer, only to have the kingdom deny CentCom commander General Tommy Franks the ability to use these facilities during the Iraq war for fear of destabilizing the Saudi government.9 General Franks was forced to set up an ad-hoc command-and-control center in an abandoned warehouse in Qatar at a cost of "a couple of hundred million dollars . . . ."10 The bases are gone, the money is spent, but the national interests remain.
It is not in the nature of the United States to conquer and retain territory. But with subterranean fires still burning at Ground Zero in New York City, President George W. Bush signaled on the evening of 11 September 2001 a dramatic departure from previous defense postures when he announced that the United States would "make no distinction between the terrorists who committed these acts and those who harbor them." Nations that sponsored or supported terrorists would henceforth share the fate of their surrogates.
Nine months later, the President served public notice during a speech at West Point that the United States would no longer accept the first blow, but instead would take "preemptive action when necessary to defend our liberty and to defend our lives." This policy was formally codified on the first anniversary of the 9/11 terrorists attacks in the Bush administration's first iteration of a National Security Strategy.
Central to this new strategy was a requirement to procure "transformed maneuver and expeditionary forces." The major theme that ran throughout the document was that "military capabilities must ensure access to distant theaters." The distant theater most on his mind was and still is the Southwest Asian economic heartland.
A New Pivot Point
Present circumstances do not suggest the United States will be invited or allowed to establish and maintain a sustained, land-based military force in the region as it did in Germany, Japan, and South Korea following armed conflicts in those nations. The United States' actions against Afghanistan and Iraq, and resulting coverage in the Arab press, have convinced a substantial portion of the region's populace that the United States is a nation bent on domination.11
Prejudices against Western military and political influence are simply too great to allow a liberal democracy to fully bloom in Iraq while U.S. troops stand on Iraqi soil. Any government convened under such circumstances opens itself to charges of puppetry and cultural betrayal, undermining its legitimacy as well as any political reforms it would attempt. Hence, current circumstances suggest that the United States cannot make its pivot on the land. Therefore, it must look to the sea.
Operations in Afghanistan gave the Navy's current leadership the first real look at the full potential of sea-based operations. When commercial aircraft flew into the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, aircraft carrier commanders operating in the region had the common sense to put the wheel over and make best speed toward the approaches to central Asia.
Other commanders in the special operations realm had similar thoughts and sent requests for the Navy to embark Army special-forces personnel and equipment on board Navy vessels. The Japan-based carrier USS Kitty Hawk (CV-63) got the nod and secretly embarked special-forces helicopters. Arriving off the coast of Pakistan on 16 October 2001, these helicopters immediately began transporting elements of the 75th Ranger regiment and the secret Delta Force to their forward positions in southern Afghanistan. Kitty Hawk was able to make its offload quickly, return to Japan, onload its regular carrier air wing, and arrive back on station in early November to take part in the subsequent campaign.12
Paralleling this operation was a unique operation in the history of the Marine Corps. Around 30 October, CentCom commander General Franks ordered Marine Brigadier General James Mattis to form Task Force 58. Eventually comprised of elements of the USS Peleliu (LHA-5) and USS Bataan (LHD-5) amphibious ready groups (ARGs) and their associated 15th and 26th Marine expeditionary units (special operations capable) (MEU [SOC]), Task Force 58 was ordered to begin planning an amphibious raid that would disperse its ground force 400 miles from its support ships. Relying on the ground troops' abilities to break themselves into small, yet highly effective combat units and to sustain themselves under combat conditions for extended periods of time, Mattis' force of Marines made the leap inland on 25 November and established forward operating base Rhino some 95 miles from Kandahar, the spiritual center of the Taliban.13
The effectiveness of Task Force 58's subsequent operations, along with the Kitty Hawk's partnership with elements of the special operations command, convinced long-range naval planners that sustained, sea-based operations could have a decisive effect in the Central and Southwest Asian regions. In June 2002, then-Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Vern Clark announced a strategy he called Sea Power 21. Comprised of three principle legs-Sea-Strike, Sea-Shield, and Sea-Basing-this construct was intended to guide broad strategic discussions as well as align procurement priorities.14
On Sea-Basing
Sea-Basing, in the visions of Admiral Clark and then-Marine Corps Commandant General James Jones, sought to take maximum advantage of the vast maneuver space afforded to sea-borne forces.15 While Sea-Basing was originally presented within the narrow confines of naval strategy, other authors soon commented on the enormous strategic implications of the sea-base within the Joint and geo-political arenas.16 What was needed, however, to make a sea-based strategy work, was an effective organizational model that could interact effectively with the rest of the joint force. The first attempts at such an organization were the establishment of expeditionary strike groups.
These groups are an evolutionary advancement of the traditional lash-up that had carried the amphibious Navy forward since the late 1970s. During blue-water operations, the old construct was commanded by the amphibious squadron commodore. Control shifted to the Marine colonel when a preponderance of the Marine force was established ashore. The new construct builds on this base by providing an additional staff layer on top of these two commanders, headed by a Navy rear admiral or, in the case of ESG-3, a Marine brigadier general. This staff and star are intended to first make more efficient use of the forces assigned, and second to create a more effective tie-in to the joint staffs of regional combatant commanders.
The concept of the ESG comes with more than just another layer of staff and a flag officer. It also brings additional defensive and offensive striking power. On the defensive side, the new construct's naval component has been enhanced beyond the amphibious ready group core of three amphibious ships to include a cruiser, destroyer, frigate, and a nuclear-powered fast-attack submarine.
These four platforms are fewer in number than the forces assigned to support carrier strike groups, but they provide the expeditionary strike group with strong capabilities across the entire blue-water purview of air, surface, and undersea warfare. In addition, the cruiser and submarine also deploy with Tomahawk cruise missiles, providing the group and theater commanders with a lethal potential for offensive strike. However, anyone who has worked closely with ESGs will tell you that when it comes to strike, the most effective weapon in the group's arsenal is its complement of Marines.
Marines have long claimed an ability to fight a "three-block war," fighting full-out urban warfare in one block, conducting peacekeeping operations in the next, and providing humanitarian assistance in yet another. Mixed with an ability to rapidly plan and execute operations from squad to multi-company-size operations, the Marine expeditionary unit deploys with a flexibility unlike any other large ground combat force in the U.S. military. But that is not its most distinctive attribute. What really makes these units stand out is their tactical ability to generate and insert the proper mix of forces to create tailored tactical and strategic effects on the field. It is an ability that proponents of air power have long sought, but never quite achieved.
Recent history has shown that only through introduction of boots on the ground is the seriousness of a nation's intention made known.17 The fact that the Marine Corps has inculcated its entire force with the doctrine of effects-based warfare has led at least one modern strategist to label Marines as the closest thing our global society has to a "system-administrator" force.18
Air Power Falls Short
Air power, however, remains the Achilles heel of the expeditionary strike group. While suited to the low-end scale of conflict, the group's air combat element lacks the capability to mount a sustained offensive or defensive air campaign. Carrier strike groups, on the other hand, come to the fight with the capability to provide sustained air operations. But they lack the ability to effect real change on the strategic battlefield.
Built to establish and maintain control of the seas under the conditions envisioned during the Cold War, carrier strike groups (or, as they were previously known, carrier battle groups) were shaped to take on Soviet battle groups attempting to penetrate the Atlantic to cut off the United States from its NATO allies. Now, the new environment brought forth by the post-9/11 world-beset as it is by asymmetric threats and ill-defined enemies-requires new thinking, new strategies, and new alignments in force structure. This environment will increasingly push ESGs and their flexible-response force to the fore, even as strategists reassess the future use of the super-carrier. That will best be found by realigning the force to place the carriers, with their ample deckloads of strike aircraft, in support of the expeditionary strike group commander. These aircraft, when employed alongside new technologies such as the MV-22 Osprey and the vertical short takeoff and landing joint strike fighter, will be a strike force with unprecedented potential in every arena of conflict. It would be the first alignment in nearly a century to effectively merge the full potentials of both the Navy and the Marine Corps.
Conclusion
Halford Mackinder's proposition that whoever controlled Eastern Europe would control the world turned out to be false. Both Hitler and Josef Stalin made their attempts, and both ultimately failed. The world today, however, is governed by tenets of globalization. Energy and the economics of energy have achieved positions of strategic importance once limited to oceanic choke-points and industrial production. Control is no longer part of the international lexicon, but influence is. And a position of influence is what we should seek. Southwest Asia, with its huge reserves of petroleum, is the most affordable and desirable energy source for developing economies. And it is and will increasingly be a center of international friction. The United States must be present to establish and maintain equilibrium beneficial to our national interests.
However, current events and certain cultural and religious trends combine to suggest that creating and maintaining a fixed land base of operations in the region may be at best problematic, and at worst impossible. The sea, the last international commons on the planet, provides ample room for maneuver and defense, and it is an arena in which the capabilities of the United States, in the form of its Navy, are unmatched. When combined with the strike capability of its sister service, the U.S. Marine Corps, the resulting expeditionary strike group provides ample capability to continue to influence the direction of the new economic heartland in Southwest Asia for years to come.
The United States is not an empire, nor will it wish to become one. Imperialism is anathema to American notions of liberty, self-determination, and democracy. However, the United States does have a long-term interest in peace and stability in the region that surrounds the Arabian Gulf. We do not intend to secure this new heartland, but we should state openly that we intend to continue to provide security for it. The Sea-Base, in its current form of the expeditionary strike group, supported from time to time by an adjacent carrier strike group, provides the means for this end and will serve as the new pivot point of history. Let us move quickly to put it at the center of our future strategy. Let the new strategic catch-phrase be, "The power that can control the sea can influence the heartland. The power that can influence the heartland can stabilize the World." In a region that has long cried out for stability, let that stability come from the sea. History will have to take care of the rest.
Commander Hendrix is the executive officer of Tactical Air Control Squadron 11 and is assigned as the officer in charge of Detachment 4 deployed on board USS Peleliu (LHA-5) in support of ESG-3. He is also the Naval Historical Center's Rear Admiral John D. Hayes Pre-doctoral Fellow, and the Marine Corps Heritage Foundation's General Lemuel Shepherd Memorial Dissertation Fellow. Commander Hendrix is a prior member of the U.S. Naval Institute's Board of Directors and its Editorial Board, the latter of which he still serves as an ex-officio member.
1. Halford J. Mackinder, "The Geographical Pivot of History." The Geographical Journal, vol. 23, no. 4 (Apr. 1904), 421-443. back to article
2. Mackinder, "The Geographical Pivot of History," 436. back to article
3. Thomas P. M. Barnett, The Pentagon's New Map. (New York: G. P. Putnam, 2004), 219-221. back to article
4. Global Trends 2015 (National Intelligence Council, 2000), 28-30. back to article
5. Mapping the Global Future (National Intelligence Council, 2004), 59. back to article
6. Mapping the Global Future, 62. back to article
7. Niall Feruson, Colossus, The Price of America's Empire (New York: Penguin Press, 2004), 132-166. back to article
8. Alexander Cooley, "Base Politics," Foreign Affairs, vol. 84, no. 6 (Nov/Dev 2005), 79-92. back to article
9. Tommy Franks, American Soldier (New York: Harper Collins, 2004), 233. back to article
10. Bob Woodward, Plan of Attack. (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2004), 59. back to article
11. Mapping the Global Future, 63. back to article
12. Norman Friedman, Terrorism, Afghanistan, and America's New Way of War, (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2003) 161, 189. back to article
13. Friedman, Terrorism, Afghanistan, and America's New Way of War, 189-195. back to article
14. Adm Vern Clark, USN, "Projecting Decisive Joint Capabilities," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings (October 2002). back to article
15. Charles W. Moore and Edward Hanlon, "Sea Basing: Operational Independence for a New Century," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings (January 2003). back to article
16. Cdr Henry J. Hendrix, USN, "Exploit Sea-Basing." U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings (Aug. 2003). John Klein and Rich Morales, "Sea Basing Isn't Just about the Sea." U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings (January 2004). back to article
17. The long air campaign against Yugoslavia demonstrated that a determined enemy could withstand continual bombardment. Other forces in the so-called unstable "Gap" region, such as the Taliban in Afghanistan, had only rudimentary system "nodes" and hence were not and are not likely to be induced to alter their strategic aims by air power alone. back to article
18. Thomas P. M. Barnett, Blueprint for Action. (New York: Putnam, 2005) 38. back to article