Deputy Secretary of Defense Gordon England recently directed the Joint Staff to conduct a study aimed at integrating special operations forces (SOF) with the new littoral combat ship (LCS). This ship, as evidenced in its class name, will spend the majority of its service life in the littorals, that is, beachfront approaches to potentially hostile land masses. One of the primary tools for fighting in the littoral-in addition to mine and antisubmarine warfare-will be SOF, most likely Naval Special Warfare (NSW) SEAL and Special Boat Teams, which represent the maritime arm of the U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCom), headquartered in Tampa, Florida.
The command was formed by Congress in 1986 to address the systemic weakness in special operations capabilities. Today, it consists of Army Rangers, Special Forces, Civic Affairs, and Psychological Warfare forces; SEALs, SEAL Delivery Vehicle (SDV), and Special Boat Teams; and Air Force Special Operations Wings. A newly-established Marine Corps Special Operations Command (MarSOC) will stand up in the near future. The overall lash-up amounts to more than 50,000 personnel. Moreover, SOCom has been redesignated as a "supported commander," previously having only supplied forces to the regional commanders. Finally, the 2005 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) has stipulated, among other things, a 15% growth in the command.
Getting ready for littoral warfare should be of foremost concern within Naval Special Warfare circles. The community is already involved-in submarines, combat rubber raiding craft (CRRC), rigid hull inflatable boats (RHIB), SEAL delivery vehicles, SCUBA, and swim fins. SEALs are assigned to every amphibious deployment.
Naval Special Warfare forces can look forward to operating from the the LCS by the summer of 2007 if all goes well. Looking at how SOF can integrate with the LCS is necessary. Unfortunately, the ink is dry on LCS blueprints and construction is already proceeding on schedule. Have any SOF adaptations been included? For example, for diving operations, has any provision been made for a recompression chamber?
Here are several other SOF missions that the LCS can expect:
Boat Support. SEALs and Special Boat Teams use a variety of combatant craft. The workhorses are the aforementioned rubber raiding craft and inflatable boats. In addition, the MK V high-speed vessel-an 82-foot, mid-range craft capable of 50 knots-is probably too large to ride in the LCS, but its support in a nest is a possibility. Other, smaller high-speed craft are in service; these, too, may be too large to embark inside the ship. SEAL delivery vehicles are a sure thing for LCS deployment.
One consideration with these vehicles is the safe elimination of noxious gases during battery recharging. Launching and recovering SDVs pose unique problems. There will need to be a robust overhanging crane system. Recovering CRRC and RHIB from the extending stern ramp appears routine; however, one problem has been observed when the CRRC stern sheets enter the open water, swamping the boat as the bow stem elevates up the ramp. Also, should a CRRC arrive back at the LCS with wounded on board, off-loading casualties will present a problem. Moving the craft inside the ship is another issue.
Communications. SOF normally brings along its own "comm suites." Naval Special Warfare maintains several command-and-control-communications (C^sup 3^) vans, a capability that was initially developed in the mid-1970s. Where do they plug in for power when embarked? Where will the antenna arrays be hosted? Or will SOF-NSW communications teams piggyback on LCS communications? This could be done if some forethought were given to the idea in the design phase, i.e., did any of the ship's designers liaise with Special Operations Command for SOF requirements? Standard shipboard "radio shacks" may not be compatible with joint communications requirements. Remember, Army and Navy communicate differently: Naval Telecommunications Command is not the Signal Corps.
Diving operations. These cover SDV combat operations as well as potential administrative diving, hull inspections, etc. Explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) diving operations will be included. Recharging SCUBA bottles has inherent dangers. SEAL team pure oxygen canisters are highly inflammable. High- and low-pressure air recharging is needed. All aspects require engineering attention as well as personnel procedures spelled out in ship's bills.
Foreign National Support. Special operations is a joint endeavor. Many operations are combined in nature. That is, SOF operates with foreign nationals more than other service branches. This includes a SEAL team's foreign counterparts who can be expected to operate off of the LCS. We need to plan for this.
Helicopters. The LCS can embark two HH-60 helicopters. The Naval Air Systems Command will ensure procedures are in place to cover joint air operations. A joint air operations plan should be drafted to cover all SOF-unique rotary-wing aircraft expected to operate from the ship.
Other potential plans to integrate SOF could cover the following mission areas: intelligence support, medical support, noncombatant evacuation support, ordnance support, riverine operations, unmanned vehicle support, weapons support.
Strategic reconnaissance is a primary SOF mission and the LCS could be tasked for this. Collection and dissemination could be performed by SOF in embarked vans. The old "Beachjumper" lash-ups come to mind; they were employed during Cold War Black Sea transits.
Medical support will be a primary concern if the LCS is to perform as an off-shore casualty collection point. SOF has mobile operating rooms that will need oxygen support. Another consideration is disposal of bandages and operating residue.
Riverine operations could be lumped with boat support. It has reemerged via the QDR as a burgeoning requirement. Nesting of riverine craft in an estuary could be a required LCS mission. It happened in Vietnam and could happen again in, say, Latin America. The Navy and Marine Corps did a massive riverine study a dozen years ago at the Naval Special Warfare Command in Coronado. Perhaps it should be dusted off for potential LCS review?
Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) are seeing massive employment in the Global War on Terror. Operating them from the sea makes perfect sense in a littoral environment. The LCS must provide support throughout launch, recovery, and direction.
Firearms security during craft launch and recovery is a significant safety consideration, in addition to routine stowage on board. While embarked units will normally be responsible for their own personnel, the LCS should facilitate stowage of weapons and provide spaces for normal weapon maintenance.
All these elements need to be incorporated in the LCS to ensure the ship is fully capable of supporting special operations forces. Is it too late to initiate a study to this end? Should it have been started at "Milestone O?" Will the surface Navy accept it? (The CNO has stated a requirement for 55 LCS by 2018.) This will entail more than the historic lash-up supporting Marines.
Special operations are sensitive and usually dangerous. Beyond the Global War on Terror, which SEALs are fighting at 10,000 feet in the mountains of Afghanistan and in the festering neighborhoods of Iraq, future conflict will force SOF and the LCS into a long-term marriage. Incorporating SOF operational requirements into various LCS configurations is not too late. But it must be done while the ship is still under construction, and certainly before she arrives in San Diego next year. Engineering Change Orders are almost always more expensive after the fact.
Finally, the only other experience the Navy has with integrating SOF with ships is in the submarine force. The dry deck shelter (DDS) and Advanced SEAL Delivery System (ASDS) have been accommodated very professionally. Submarine conversions have been expertly accomplished and have a documented engineering history. Cross-walking troop accommodations, diving, and weapons support are all matters of service record and should be made available if germane. Proper integration of SOF with the LCS will afford the country a significant improvement in littoral combat capabilities across the board.
Rear Admiral Worthington is a 1961 graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy and a veteran of Naval Special Warfare. He deployed twice to Vietnam with Underwater Demolition Team 11, spent a year tour with Naval Special Warfare Group (Vietnam), and finally served as naval attache in Phnom Penh, Cambodia, in 1975. He retired as commander of Naval Special Warfare Command in 1992 and currently consults on littoral warfare issues.