"Martian Alert!"
(See M. Brilakis, pp. 37-40, January 2006 Proceedings)
Commander Dick White, SC, U.S. Naval Reserve (Retired)-Colonel Brilakis conveys a position I admire-start with good enough, keep it good enough, and use it until it is not good enough. This approach controls initial cost, extends replacement cycles, and provides near-term operational effectiveness. However, there are other considerations.
First, our industrial base must be maintained, exercised, and upgraded if we are to enjoy continued military success. Engineers must dream and shipyards must build continuously and to the newest standards.
Second, our requirements are reduced if our allies can meet threats with indigenous force, so we support allies and others with still-viable systems, as in the transfer of Kidd-class destroyers to Taiwan. We lower our total defense costs by transferring significant remaining useful life to others, while introducing new systems for our own use. These systems are expensive but can offer reduced life-cycle costs, sometimes offsetting increased acquisition cost, while adding combat capability and potentially permitting lower force levels.
Finally, systems such as the F-15 and Abrams tank are effective because they were exorbitant, superior, upgradeable widgets when introduced. An upgraded F-4 and M60 would have prevailed (with more losses) in 1991 and 2003. Following the colonel's prescription of acquisition to counter current threats, is it too early today to spend the money to field the Abrams and F-15 in quantity? To have "good enough" in the future, we must commit to excellence in the present.
Colonel Brilakis is right on about wanting a more disciplined needs assessment, focused on the warfighter. We cannot afford everything, and some programs will be capped or scrapped. However, we also cannot afford to meet future threats with only legacy systems, or to leave allies poorly equipped while denying U.S. forces access to improved systems.
HMCS/FMF Darryl E. Wahler, U.S. Navy (Retired)-One suspects that nothing will change and poor Colonel Brilakis will probably never rise above his present rank, but his article should be required reading by every congressman, general, admiral, secretary of Defense, and President. 1 am making copies to send to my federally-elected officials and have referred the article to numerous others. Thank you, Colonel Brilakis, for having the guts to say what needs to be said-but too often isn't.
"Navy Medicine in Critical Condition"
(See J. Rappold, pp. 25-27, December 2005; J. Mateczun. p. 6, January 2006 Proceedings)
John L. Brodhead, Sr.-I doubt that anyone can quarrel with Commander Joseph Rappold's critique of Navy Medicine. It was instructive, informative, and quite disturbing.
I would, however, like to address his recommendation to decommission the hospital ships. Though USNS Mercy (T-AH-19) and Comfort (T-AH-20) are deemed obsolete, are poorly used, and are a huge drain on scarce resources, they are not worthless. Quite the contrary. They are floating medical centers capable of delivering quality medical services to people in faraway lands who lack access to even the most rudimentary care.
Rather than decommissioning these nautical angels of mercy, keep them in the Navy's active inventory but in a special "detached service" status. You then make them available to the private sector: individuals and corporations, the United Nations, multiple philanthropic and religious organizations, etc., who would pay the costs associated with equipping, operating, and maintaining the ships and paying the medical personnel and crew who would staff them. The Navy would provide the crew, on-board security, and arrange the logistical support.
Should the private sector indicate no interest in the ships, the Navy can always mothball them and let them rust away in some backwater tributary. What a waste that would be.
Dr. Lee D. Hieb-I read Commander Rappold's article with interest. Every ten years another generation of commanders outlines the same or similar problems. I recommended in 1987 that the hospital ships be decommissioned, specifically noting the target of opportunity these oxygen tank-laden ships present to terrorists. Commander Rappold does not specifically address (although he alludes to it) the reason for the administrative problems that continue to plague Navy Medicine. Being specific would result in a quick death to one's career. I no longer have that concern.
Many administrative leadership roles in Navy Medicine tend to be filled by people who either are not physicians, or if they are physicians, have left the practice of clinical medicine. Most people in charge of organizing, funding, and leading trauma units, and Navy Medicine in general, are not the accomplished trauma surgeons. They are not groomed for these jobs and in any case usually do not wish to give up their specialty to take on these administrative tasks. There are exceptions, and I note that Commander Rappold is himself a respected trauma surgeon.
In the current system, a very fine pediatrician may reach the rank of admiral, but he will never understand the needs of a trauma unit the way a trauma surgeon would. Many of these doctors and MSC officers perform admirably as officers, but they cannot truly lead those trauma surgeons doing the job-especially considering that they may never have set foot in an operating room themselves. Even in the civilian community, where there are non-physician hospital administrators, basic decisions about how trauma is done, how emergency rooms and operating rooms are organized and function, are usually done by those in active clinical practice.
It must also be said that some problems cannot be solved within the Navy itself. The Navy fields fewer physicians per population than any other service. Congress dictates the number of officer billets allotted to the service, and every doctor means one less ship driver. This results in a chronic shortage of physicians so that every surgeon is fully employed doing surgery, and few are available to do the required logistics.
Navy Medicine is many things to many people. But if the priority for Navy Medicine is combat support for the current war on terror and future conflicts, the organization must fight and train in similar ways. Navy Medicine needs to be headed by people who engage in trauma care on a daily basis. In both civilian and military communities this means general surgeons and orthopedic surgeons. These surgeons need to continue in active practice as long as they can, to continue to practice while in leadership roles, and not to move into exclusively administrative roles in midcareer.
Captain Robin I. Davidson, MC, U.S. Navy (Retired)-I would like to voice some disagreement with Commander Rappold's critique of Navy Medicine in the assault phase of Iraqi Freedom and with Navy Medicine in general. He has stated that Navy Medicine fails to adapt to the medical needs of asymmetric warfare. I believe that in Desert Storm and in the assault phase of Iraqi Freedom, conflict could be characterized more as conventional desert and urban warfare as opposed to the guerilla warfare and terrorist tactics (asymmetric conflict) used currently by our enemy, and that all medical assets in those periods were planned, set up, integrated, and used well.
Commander Rappold's statement that the "casualty receiving platforms and Marine Corps medical support were not utilized in a stepwise and thoughtful fashion" was not my experience. The surgical companies of the 1 st FSSG and FH3 were trained, set up and deployed with foresight and skill. The combatant commands did use their medical resources, and used them well. Commander Rappold's broadly sketched suggestions to correct his perceived problems in Navy Medicine seem top-heavy and in all likelihood would lead to the development of further unwieldy bureaucratic oversight systems and not produce the desired changes. Inter-service communication is vital, needed, and to date, less than satisfactory. Training military surgeons by integrating them into civilian trauma systems is underway, and should be an effective model, both at the level of residency and for attending surgeons. Integrated "purple" medical capabilities might offer an effective answer to extant problems in field environments.
The Navy must be able to provide primary and specialty care unique to its warfighting missions. Marine, surface, undersea, and air commands will continue to have their own requirements based on their military specialties and operational environments. The Navy's responsibilities to the Marine Corps in the field have been answered by the ladder of field provider systems but this can be enhanced. There is, however, still a need for a forward facility that can provide specialty care.
The Navy's current system for providing specialty care behind the battlefront also continues to be less than satisfactory: transportation and communication-related issues must be enhanced. What constitutes adequate basic care by specialists needs to be determined by warfare experienced practitioners of their specialties and no one else. Full integration with Army field hospitals and CSHs is vital, or a major doctrinal change could be enacted, with the Army caring for all land-deployed Marine and Navy combat elements, regardless of the service of origin.
"Reading for Readiness"
(See A. Mortimer, pp. 32-36. January 2006 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Commander David S. Kemp, U.S. Navy-I could not agree more with lieutenant Mortimer's description of the literacy challenge facing the U.S. Navy. As a former carrier training officer on board USS John F. Kennedy (CV-67), we recognized a literacy issue while revamping and strengthening the command's maintenance and material management (3M) program in early 2003.
While investigating why young sailors were failing 3M spot-checks, we discovered that they were having trouble reading the maintenance cards word-for-word and understanding the card. The local Navy College Office in Mayport, Florida was the first place we called. With their help, we started testing every E1-E3 who reported aboard as part of the indoctrination process. We were shocked to find out in our unofficial study that more than 60% of those tested had less than an 8th grade level in either reading or math. Again, working with the Navy College Office, we instituted a mandatory Academic Skills program during our overhaul period. Rear Admiral Ron Henderson, the commanding officer at the time, felt so strongly about addressing this issue that he authorized running this program during working hours for the participants. The Navy College Office assigned a Program for Afloat College Education (PACE) instructor to live on board full-time and a classroom was dedicated solely for this purpose. All who completed the program were again tested at the conclusion. On average, participants saw a gain of three grade levels as a result of their participation.
Strong chain of command support and the superb assistance of the local Navy College Office were key in addressing this issue on board "Big John." A Navy-wide investment in this type of program would reap immeasurable benefits.
"Deconstructing War"
(See J. Stavridis, pp. 42-45, December 2005 Proceedings')
Lieutenant Commander Chris Davis, U.S. Navy-Vice Admiral Stavridis is correct about the accelerating rate of change growing at a pace that is extremely disturbing. If one uses the number of active scientists as a benchmark, we can expect over the next 25 years the same rate of change and innovation that occurred between 1900-2000. If one assumes that today's connectivity and computational power will increase that by an exponent of two, the situation becomes even more alarming. It is as if we were military planners in 1740 making the procurement and training plans for World War II.
However, it is dangerous to assume that because one of the areas of great change is biology that we are exclusively in a biological age as the article implies. Recent breakthroughs in nano-technologies may well revolutionize transportation, energy, and material fields. Likewise, quantum computing may well fuel a new level of information age innovations.
Are we really at the end of nation-on-nation fighting? I doubt it. However, like Vice Admiral Stavridis, I tend to think that most of our conflicts in the next century will not be traditional force-on-force combat. The growing urbanization of the third world will probably be a key shaper in future conflict. This may result in fighting a "... people armed and numerous . . ." but more along the lines of Mogadishu than Lexington.
In the end, the tool set is not as important as the people. We will need a military that breaks down stovepipes in training, career paths, and culture. The current rate of change means that officers may be leading people using equipment and tactics that they themselves have no first hand experience with. Thus, analytical capability, knowledge, self-control, and creativity are vastly more important than any set of perishable skills or experiences.
"Needed: A Code of Conduct for the War on Terror"
(See H. Ullman, p. 10, January 2006 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Commander James L. Hall, U.S. Naval Reserve (Retired)-As a fellow Vietnam veteran and retired governmental lawyer, I read Dr. Ullman's hand-wringing with some concern. It reminded me of one of the legal profession's most useful tactics; vigorously put forth a terrible and heinous condition and suggest that only a new legal remedy can fix the problem. Dr. Ullman puts forth a scenario of lawlessness in both the military and civilian departments of the federal government and then pleads for a desperately needed Code of Conduct.
Of course, in the drafting and enacting of any such code, lawyers will ultimately determine the final wording of the "explicit statements" of that code. Further, when it is put into effect by statute and regulation, lawyers in their role of federal judges will have the final say as to what those "explicit statements" actually mean.
I ask you ladies and gentlemen of the military, do you really want lawyers writing and enforcing legally binding regulations called a Code of Conduct that will be enforced in the federal courts, the logical result of Dr. Ullman's suggestions? If so, then be forewarned, we civilian lawyers, with the power of criminal prosecution, will be sitting in judgment of your command decisions.
"Controlling the Rivers"
(See P. Donahoe and L. McCabc, pp. 26-30, January 2006 Proceedings)
Remo Salta-Since the Navy does not want to allocate scarce funds and manpower to the riverine mission, why not make it the primary military responsibility of the U.S. Coast Guard? The Coast Guard has a vast amount of experience in riverine and coastal warfare and has one of the largest, if not the largest, inventory of small patrol boats in the world. In Vietnam the 82-foot Point-class patrol boats made a signification contribution to coastal interdiction operations and, more recently, 25-foot Guardian transportable port security boat units are regularly deployed in the Middle East for port security missions.
The Coast Guard also has a wide array of cutters and patrol boats that could be adapted for riverine operations, from various rigid hull inflatables and 25-foot Boston Whalers up to the 87-foot Marine Protector-class or the 110-foot Island-class cutters now on duty. Obviously, the type of boat that would be used for riverine operations would depend on the waterway that needed to be patrolled, so, as in Vietnam, the appropriate boat or cutter could be rushed into service whenever the need arose.
Coast Guard crews would only need minimal retraining for riverine operations since they already have a solid background in small-boat operations and, when these crews are not needed during wartime, they can be used for domestic homeland security patrol boat duties right here in the United States. In addition, since the Coast Guard regularly operates with Navy units, integration of Coast Guard units into the Navy during wartime would be seamless and immediate.
Serious consideration should be given to making a permanent riverine force a unit within the U.S. Coast Guard. We should take advantage of the experience and equipment that is already in service rather than create a whole new unit from scratch.
CWO2 Thomas R. Dorsher, U.S. Navy (Retired)-The article by Lieutenant Colonel Donahoe and Commander McCabe was long overdue. It is apparent that the Navy has ignored and shirked its duties in the riverine environment each time the immediate need was past.
If the Army and the Marine Corps are not interested in this theater of warfare, it may be time to create a naval infantry supported by heavy river assault boats and the next generation of river patrol boat (PBR), not to mention the establishment of a naval militia in each state to support riverine operations.
Finally it would be refreshing to see in the Proceedings pictures of riverine craft manned by Navy sailors, rather than reading about the sister services taking up the Navy's slack. You are either willing to take on the enemy eye-to-eye with boats in the water or sit out at sea sipping coffee.
"How Fast is Fast Enough?"
(See S. Surko, pp. 73-74, December 2005 Proceedings)
Captain A. G. A. Watts, Royal New Zealand Navy-While I found Commander Surko's article well constructed and thought-provoking, I take issue with his emphasis on operating profiles as templates against which to assess the value of speed. During my 2003 Operation Enduring Freedom deployment, a very high proportion of our time on station was taken up with high value unit (HVU) escort through the Straits of Hormuz. We were often assigned as consort to another unit for such operations, particularly where two or more units where to be escorted, but usually we carried out these operations independently. Proper stationing was essential to effective escort, and speed was absolutely essential to proper stationing. The lowest HVU speed of advance was 15 knots, but 20-22 knots was far more typical. Gaining, maintaining, and regaining station after contact investigation or flight operations often required prolonged periods at full power. In addition, shortage of escort assets often necessitated prolonged sprints to re-position for the next operation. Commander Surko draws a distinction between wartime and peacetime underway profiles; perhaps it might be useful to investigate on-station profiles, and compare them to passage transit profiles. This analysis could be made yet more useful by identifying the tactical circumstances in which high speeds were required, thus enabling the true value of speed to be assessed.
"Our Lady Queen of Class"
(See T. Cutler, p. 47. January 2006 Proceedings)
Captain James L. Conn, U.S. Naval Reserve (Retired)-I would like to express my gratitude to Tom Cutler for this exceptional article. He has captured perfectly the essence of what is good about service academy sports programs and by contrast, what is wrong with professional and most other collegiate programs. For years I have watched with regret the trends toward "in your face" celebrations of each and every play in football or other sports. Two things come to mind immediately when I think of the recent Army-Navy game, the lack of penalties and the lack of these obnoxious celebrations. When coach Paul Johnson chastised a player a couple of years ago after sacking the Army quarterback and then taunting him briefly, I was incredibly pleased. The guy was just doing what he was supposed to do. The fact that he was successful at it was great, but not in and of itself worthy of a taunt. The same is true when a back crosses the goal line for a touchdown. That is his job. Mr. Cutler has verbalized my thoughts and feelings wonderfully. Thanks.
Edward G. Webb-I want Tom Cutler to know he was not alone in his demonstrative reaction at the end of the game. I was similarly affected. We both share a common background from a time when this great country forgot about those who were doing their best and giving so much, sometimes giving their all.
Having attended a football game at Notre Dame Stadium a few years ago gave me a perspective to envision what happened that day and it leaves me in awe. Commander Cutler has it right: it's all about class, patriotism, and sportsmanship. I would also add it is about one other thing: respect. It was demonstrated in copius amounts at Notre Dame on 12 November 2005 and all those participating in the events that day are to be congratulated.
"What Hath BRAC Wrought?"
(See J. Carrier, p. 72. November 2005 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Commander Jim Ertner, U.S. Navy (Retired)-I hate to nitpick, but Lieutenant Commander Carrier referred to the "Portsmouth, Maine, naval shipyard" in his commentary. He got the Maine part (not the main part!) right, but Portsmouth is in New Hampshire-while the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard is actually in Kittery, Maine. But I guess it's just a bridge over BRACkish waters!