Do unto others before they do unto you.
The Golden Rule of Preemption
—Apocryphal
President George W. Bush on 1 June 2002 articulated U.S. preemptive war policies with these forceful words: "The war on terror will not be won on the defensive. We must take the battle to the enemy, disrupt his plans, and confront the worst threats before they emerge.” Then he warned all Americans "to be ready for preemptive action when necessary to defend our liberty and to defend our lives.” JCS Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Operations, an unclassified draft dated 15 March 2005, additionally proposes the preemptive use of nuclear weapons against hostile nations and transnational terrorists who wield weapons of mass destruction.
Preemptive/Preventive Wars Differentiated
DoD makes important distinctions between preemptive and preventive wars: preemptive strikes occur after enemy attacks seem imminent, whereas preventive operations occur before perceived threats mature. U.S. forces, for example, invaded Afghanistan only when it became crystal clear that transnational terrorists prepared for and intended to launch attacks from that sanctuary, whereas the preventive invasion of Iraq preceded clear indications that Saddam Hussein planned to attack anybody, anywhere, any time soon. Observers consequently view those two conflicts through different prisms.
Passionate Debates
Beating opponents to the punch appeals to warriors in every U.S. military service who believe that preemptive strikes not only would benefit from surprise but foster freedom of action, put teeth in counterproliferation programs, and perpetuate long-standing U.S. preference for fighting wars “over there” rather than “over here.” Delays, they contend, might unacceptably magnify risks.
Practical applications nevertheless remain highly controversial for political, economic, military, legal, and moral reasons. Article 51 of the U.N. Charter, for example, recognizes “the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.” Even so, many patriots believe that so-called “anticipatory self defense” is merely a euphemism for aggression. President Franklin D. Roosevelt surely concurred in his 8 December 1941 Date of Infamy speech, which branded the Japanese sneak attack on Pearl Harbor a “form of treachery.”
The Law of Diminishing Returns furthermore applies because force limitations and monetary costs make priorities mandatory whenever provocative candidates number more than one. President Bush's 20 January 2002 State of the Union speech, for example, declared that North Korea, Iran, Iraq, and their terrorist allies, in that order, “constitute an axis of evil, arming to threaten the peace of the world. By seeking weapons of mass destruction, these regimes pose a grave and growing danger.”
Critics, accordingly, wonder why bellicose North Korea, rather than Iraq, wasn"t first in line for preemption since its possession of nuclear weapons was well known and Kim Jong Il's actions are unpredictable. At least two explanations appear plausible: (a) Even a few “primitive” North Korean nukes possess great deterrent power, and (b) Fallout from botched U.S. attacks could endanger innocent civilians far from target areas. Pentagon planners in the early 1990s feared that direct hits on the five-megawatt reactor at Yongbyon, 60 miles north of Pyongyang, could cover Seoul with radioactive fallout within a few hours and endanger southern Japan the next day. Technologically advanced mini nukes and bunker-busting conventional weapons deployed during the last decade reduce such probabilities, but nagging uncertainties remain.
Meticulous planners are well advised to investigate several optional moves and outcomes on politico-military chessboards before they act because essential public support invariably sags when preemptive or preventive operations create more problems than they solve. Approval for operations against transnational terrorists and Taliban abettors in Afghanistan has been easy to sustain because threats to U.S. security remain clear while casualties, force requirements, and budgetary costs remain minuscule compared with those in Iraq. The advisability of a first strike to unseat quiescent Saddam conversely has been called into serious question ever since conventional armed combat ceased and unanticipated insurgency began to escalate.
School Solution
There is no school solution, because every case is unique. The president must consider each preemptive/preventive option individually, then decide whether “doing others before they do us” is the best way to safeguard this nation"s security.
The author steers the Warlord Loop, an email net who members examine national security issues from every perspective.