"A Unified Command Plan for a New Era"
(See K. Houlgate, pp. 30-32, September 2005 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Commander Dru Blanc, U.S. Navy-The publication timing for Major Houlgate's article was amazing. I read his recommendations while recovery efforts in New Orleans were still being directed by Northern Command. His suggestion for a Humanitarian Assistance Command would have alleviated the apparent lack of immediate and localized federal leadership of emergency and non-governmental organization efforts in the days following Hurricane Katrina. Confusion in the southern Gulf Coast states was noticeably diminished when the military assumed command and control functions.
I agree with the recommendation to move unified or centralized commands away from being geographically oriented to more functionally oriented joint task force and joint interagency task forces. Our military can benefit from the training and procurement streamlining this proposed change would produce. Adopting his recommendations would bring the military closer to the strategic goal of a single-service defense force.
Colonel Gordon D. Batcheller, U.S. Marine Corps (Retired)-I don't know what bothers me most about Major Houlgate's "A Unified Command Plan for a New Era"-what it says, or that it won first place. It is good that officers think and write about such matters, but simply saying something doesn't make it so, and the proponent of change bears the burden of persuasion. Three pages isn't sufficient space to establish the problems with the current plan, let alone analyze and compare various solutions. Even so, the author goes on to reinvent Title 10 as well.
A few years ago only the credibility of Proceedings and the contest judges would be in danger, but now the audience is a generation of officers accustomed to hearing their politically correct seniors enthusiastically endorse and echo the nonsense that comprises civilian direction: GoIdwater-Nichols saved the military from itself; the services are parochial, selfish, and obstructive; "jointness" is more important than functional competence; transformation need not be explained, justified, or understood-just done; civilian chief executive officers are the role models for flag officers, Wal Mart for the military; warfare is just another application of software.
To this audience, Major Houlgate offers assertions and opinions that persuade one only that he doesn't understand the subject. He never establishes how the current arrangements have failed, so he can't possibly persuade readers that his arrangements are better.
His UCP revision boils down to replacing an arrangement that provides regional focus (something he advocates for other federal actors), theater expertise, and unity of command with a fistful of global layers of command organized and employed based on the intensity of combat. He would establish a command to fight big wars, a command to fight little wars, a command to fight "not wars" or "almost wars," and a command to clean up "after wars." Such an arrangement, he assures us, is better.
Houlgate falsely claims we base our military on geographic boundaries, and cheerfully informs us that "geography no longer constrains operational commanders." He sees geography and "function" as opponents. He seems to believe that "capabilities based planning," "functional capabilities," and a global strike command (CinCWorld) are new, cutting-edge ideas. He sides with those who see the services as obstacles to military effectiveness, and implies that once we work up our courage we will eliminate the individual services and replace soldiers, sailors, and Marines with, presumably, big warriors, little warriors, and working parties. There is not a hint that he understands how Title 10 provides for military competence, nor a hint as to how he would provide for it in the absence of Title 10. Even as he calls for rigorous thought in his penultimate sentence, he has established himself as one of a growing group of military innovators who seek change for its own sake, see no reason to understand the status quo, and refuse to be bound by geography, human nature, or the laws of physics as they perfect our world. Reader warning labels are in order.
"The Virginia SSN: Right for the Times"
(See C. Munns, pp. 28-29, September 2005 Proceedings)
Edward V. Blackmore-I applaud the many thought provoking articles in Proceedings, but question the "how great we are" article on the Virginia. I realize the need to cover new additions to the fleet, but enough is enough. I continue to think your letters section is great, but would like to see it run completely before the articles. The current split gives the appearance of caving in to critics. Please continue to reject the politically correct approach.
"Amphibious Force: Quo Vadis?"
(See N. Polmar, pp. 85-86, September 2005 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Colonel John C. Berry, Jr. U.S. Marine Corps (Retired)-Norman Polmar offers some interesting arguments on the relative merits of the USS San Antonio (LPD-17) versus larger amphibious assault (LH series) ships, but surprisingly devalues the significance of any amphibious capability in the first place. While acknowledging that the ability to project forces ashore is important, he implies its actual employment is unlikely because we haven't made an opposed landing in more than half a century. His inference is clear: amphibious ships are not a prudent investment. Neither the comment nor the inference is substantiated by doctrine, history, or the National Defense Strategy.
According to Joint Amphibious Operations (JP 3-02) there are five types of amphibious operations: ". . . assaults, withdrawals, demonstrations, raids, and other operations in a permissive, uncertain, or hostile environment." The "other" category recognizes that ". . . amphibious forces may be especially suited to conduct other types of operations, such as noncombatant evacuation operations and foreign humanitarian assistance." In recent years the Navy-Marine Corps team has executed every type of amphibious operation listed in JP 3-02. It has also done so with increasing frequency. The Marine Corps History and Museums Division Yearly Chronologies reveal a growth from 15 distinct commitments in the 1980s to 41 in the 1990s. The Congressional Budget Office Report, The Future of the Navy's Amphibious and Maritime Prepositioning Forces produced an even higher tally, declaring that amphibious ships ". . . took part in at least 55 operations" during the 1990s. The Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments calculated that during the 1990s amphibious ships participated in operations at a rate three times greater than aircraft carriers. Thus far in the current decade amphibious commitments are occurring at a pace even greater than that of the 1990s.
That pace appears to substantiate the National Defense Strategy and the changed security environment described therein. The strategy calls for more widely dispersed forces that can: disrupt threats early and far from the United States; provide forward presence and security cooperation to assure partners, deter aggression; promptly respond to crises; swiftly defeat adversaries; and conduct lesser contingencies such as strikes, raids, peace operations, humanitarian missions and non-combatant evacuations. It identifies the requirement for eight key operational capabilities, including the ability to "operate in and from the global commons" and to "project and sustain our forces in distant anti-access environments."
Amphibious forces will not merely "continue to be important" in this new security environment, they will have a major role in pursuing the national strategy-but only if naval advocates recognize that reality and do a better job explaining the utility and benefit of those forces to the nation.
"Who Dares Wins!"
(See C. Michel, p. 96. August 2005 Proceedings)
Captain Richard S. Zeisel, U.S. Navy (Retired)-There is a Naval Warfare Publication that deals with planning. Mr. Michel should read it since it covers risk assessment as it applies to operational planning. The last thing I would want in my squadron is a "free-lancer" who believes his way of doing things is not only clever and innovative, but will foster the concept of improved methods of doing business.
As Mr. Michel points out, "the military is not the entertainment industry" yet all of his examples are from that industry and civilian business. Where are the examples of Naval entrepreneurship? Or have we so successfully muzzled our officer corps as to negate their collective thinking caps?
I think not, and the point that Mr. Michel misses, and so many others as well, is that there is a proper road to creative thinking and innovation in the Navy, but a lot of people want to circumvent it for a variety of reasons, not the least of which is ego. I remember a fairly large number of junior officers whose criteria for applying their methods to the task at hand sprang from the concept that their abilities far outweighed the average skills of contemporaries. We have VX squadrons that are commissioned to examine the proper, and sometimes better, way to employ weapons systems. Does this mean that nobody outside of these organizations should dare to think? No. The fleet is always submitting new ideas for evaluation, and many find their way into doctrine and equipment changes. And it isn't always the officer corps doing the creative thinking. For example, the young enlisted man who started using hand-held computers to augment low-capability on board computers in solving complex tactical decisions opened up a whole new way of thinking.
When all is said and done, when the proposals have been submitted and discussed, the risks assessed, and the decision made to proceed, whether it embodies your ideas or not, we must salute smartly with an "aye, aye" and carry out the task. Without this, you will have a rag-tag group of innovative "rebels" (Mr. Michel's word, not mine) whose hooligan reactions to orders will only further confuse a complex situation.
As for me, give me the thinkers and innovators, but let's not have them outnumber the reliable producers.
"Transforming Coast Guard Reserve Boat Crew Readiness"
(See C. Lanz, pp. 75-77, September 2005 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Commander David L. Teska, U.S. Coast Guard Reserve-I echo Ensign's Lanz's argument regarding the need to revamp boat crew readiness and training within the Coast Guard Reserve. During my mobilization to the Eighth Coast Guard District in mid-2003 during Operation Liberty Shield, our district experienced a severe disconnect with inland boat crews qualified on non-standard boats such as the 19- and 21-foot models being mobilized to coastal units in Texas that used the standard 41-foot utility boat. Another issue he mentions, however, requires some clarification. He is correct in his recap of how the Coast Guard decommissioned the bulk of its reserve units in 1995 and reassigned most reservists to active duty units as sort of a reserve augmentation resource.
He is slightly incorrect in stating that "the exceptions to this rule are the Coast Guard's port security units." Yes, the eight port security units in the Coast Guard are reserve commanded (a commander) and crewed. Yet, they are not the only reserve units in the Coast Guard. The Coast Guard has a significant presence at three Department of Defense (DoD) unified or joint commands: Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM), Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM), and Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM). In the near future it is hoped that a fourth reserve unit will stand up at Northern Command (USNORTHCOM). The Coast Guard Element at USTRANSCOM, commanded by a Coast Guard captain, has been a part of the command's Joint Transportation Reserve Unit (JTRU) since 1994. Its officers and enlisted members are assigned to various directorates, with most assigned to J2 (Intelligence) and J3 (Operations). With more than 10 years of history at USTRANSCOM, the Coast Guard Reserve is a fully accepted member of the "purple" crew that makes the command a success. Its members have deployed overseas in support of Operations Enduring Freedom, Iraqi Freedom, and various exercises such as Rolling Thunder, RSOI, and Ulchi Focus Lens.
Command opportunities for offices was the biggest and most obvious loss to the Coast Guard Reserve when it integrated ten years ago; officers should aspire to lead and command and that chance has been reduced to less than a dozen (all at the commander and captain level). Yet personnel assigned to USTRANSCOM find it an exciting, challenging, and rewarding reserve assignment.
Captain Joseph F. Manfreda, U.S. Coast Guard Reserve (Retired)-Ensign Lanz's thoughtful article should be required reading for all Naval reservists. At first glance it may appear to be a "tempest in a tea pot." However to those with a discriminating reservist's eye the issues should raise a storm warning for what can happen to a military reserve system when individual augmentation/integration becomes the main activity vs. readiness based on a thoughtful threat analysis.
The current Coast Guard Reserve training conflict described by Ensign Lanz goes back to the early 1970s, when Reserve boat crew training was conducted at active duty Search and Rescue (SAR) stations. The port security mission that the Reserve was supposed to be training for was downgraded in favor of augmentation. Before 1970, Reserve units had never been issued appropriate equipment due to the lack of both finances and interest on the part of the regulars. The Coast Guard did not want to make Reserve units into entities that could truly mobilize.
In 1992 the Coast Guard further downgraded its port security readiness by downsizing Reserve personnel. This continued until the shock of 9/11. Now the port security mission has become a priority for the regulars though not for the Reserve. Instead, the Reserve's mission of integration remains the focus as exemplified by the Coast Guard's refusal to create Reserve Marine Safety and Security Teams (MSSTs). Ensign Lanz clearly demonstrates the root cause of the boat crew training problem: trying to have Reservists serve two distinct and different missions.
The solutions to the current training dilemma offered by Ensign Lanz, while helpful and innovative, will not solve the basic conflicting priorities within the Coast Guard Reserve, nor will they help senior Reservists achieve leadership experience. As for the Naval Reserve, the situation will become much worse when the Navy destroys its reserve military units in order to achieve "cost effective" reserve augmentation by individuals into the regular Navy. The loss of military units will be very traumatic for Naval Reservists as they face their own readiness challenges in much larger bodies of water.
"A Gunboat Navy for the 21st Century"
(See E. Kimura, pp. 44-46, July 2005 Proceedings)
Craig Hooper-Mr. Kimura did a good job of dressing his big ship advocacy in the historical record. However, a closer look at history suggests that cheap and maneuverable smaller craft can, when well led, serve effectively as strategic instruments of sea power.
In the Baltic Sea, during the 18th century Russo-Sweden conflict, Russia defied convention by deploying shallow-draft oar-driven galleys to wage a successful littoral campaign along the coast of Finland. The "superior" Swedish Navy, overweighted toward conventional deep-draft ships, could do little as Russian forces seized the port of Helsinki and other facilities necessary for sustaining Swedish naval operations in the Gulf of Finland. In the summer of 1714, unsupported Russian galleys trapped and seized a division of larger Swedish ships at the Battle of Gangut (or Hango), clearing the way for uncontested Russian littoral operations throughout the entire upper Baltic.
The war-burdened Swedish government lacked the financial resources to build a balanced fleet. Ultimately, Russia's littoral success translated into blue water dominance of the Gulf of Bothnia and the seizure of the strategically important Aland Islands.
A century later, during the War of 1812, British military planners focused on their fleet of large ships-of-the-line. Subsequently, they overlooked the strategic importance of the Great Lakes-a small ship, "brown water" theater-and the British failure to construct a viable naval deterrent on the lakes gave America an opening to seize control of the crucial northern frontier.
Naval competitors are learning the correct lessons from America's experience with Jeffersonian-era gunboats, and using small ship commands as a means to introduce the more audacious aspects of American naval leadership to their officer corps. The new Chinese fleet of high-speed catamarans and the small "patrol boat" navies of Southeast Asia serve as both strategic assets and as incubators, grooming a cadre of sophisticated military leaders for future blue water operations.
History has a nasty habit of repeating itself. If successful small ship projects are smothered to protect gold-plated conventional vessels, America risks ceding local blue-water superiority to adroit littoral forces surrounding the vital-and increasingly contested-island nations of Southeast Asia and the South Pacific.
America needs a truly balanced fleet. Sea control is critical, but in the immediate future, American national security strategy rests on America's ability to influence events through the innovative application of littoral power. In the post 9/11 world, bigger is not always better-just as conflict isn't always settled by gunfire.
"RAF Proposes Nimrod Modification"
(See N. Friedman, pp. 88-89, August 2005 Proceedings)
Dr. Andrew Dorman, Senior Lecturer, King's College London-Norman Friedman's column on the proposed equipping of Nimrod aircraft with a variant of the Storm Shadow missile incorrectly identifies this as a threat to the proposed acquisition of two new aircraft carriers by the United Kingdom.
The proposal, if accepted, might actually facilitate the acquisition of these ships because the idea is not an alternative to aircraft carriers but rather a cheaper alternative to the acquisition of the next generation of strategic deterrent, the ballistic missile submarine. If an airbased deterrent costs less, it would free resources for other areas of defense, such as the acquisition of new carriers. The issue of whether and/or how to replace Britain's existing Trident force poses the greatest threat to the Royal Navy's carrier force, not the modification of a few Nimrod aircraft. Past rivalries may still exist but they should not be overstated. Within the modern Ministry of Defence, the most valid criteria is effect.
"Hard to Believe"
(See N. Friedman, pp. 120-122, May 2005 Proceedings)
Commander William E. Brooks, Jr., U.S. Naval Reserve (Retired)-Your magazine noted on the decommissioning of the USS Vincennes (CG-49) that the name will be "forever" associated with the shoot-down of the Iranian Airbus.
Does that mean the name Vincennes no longer will be connected to the first ship of the U.S. Navy to circumnavigate the globe as flagship of the Great Exploring Expedition; the ship which proved Antarctica is a continent; the ship which brought back a collection of artifacts and plants which led directly to creation of the Smithsonian Institution and the U.S. Botanic Garden; the ship which provided charts of Tarawa to Marines who assaulted that island a century after the Vincennes completed her original mission?
Will the name Vincennes no longer be recalled as the heavy cruiser (CA-44) lost in the Battle of Savo Island, that turned back a Japanese force bent on destroying Marine transports and supply ships before they could land at Guadalcanal?
Are the hundreds of men who served efficiently and well on the light cruiser Vincennes (CL-64) during the remainder of World War II less honored for their duty and devotion?
Finally, are the sailors who served on CG-49 before and after the Iranian Airbus shoot-down somehow tainted by association with less than a "good name?"
Lost in that casual condemnation is the fact that no enemy government or terrorist group has been willing to test the Aegis missile system since the Airbus shoot-down. No other U.S. Navy ship in recent history has been engaged with both active surface forces and a potential aerial attack.
The names Roberts and Cole testify to outcomes when threats are treated as unlikely.
"Get the Investigation Monkey Off the Commander's Back"
(See C. Jones, p. 54-57, November 2005 Proceedings)
Chief Michael J. Keane, U.S. Coast Guard Reserve (Retired)-Colonel Jones' winning essay was a great read and I fully support his recommendations. An investigation commenced at the local command level is fraught with pit falls from the start. Besides peer pressure on the assigned local level member, he/she must joust with the over-the-shoulder glare of superiors, often those who complete the officer's evaluation. A full review of the event cannot be boxed-in to a report. The event must be investigated, and this can only be accomplished by personnel trained in this field and assigned elsewhere.
A report can be technically written regarding the known facts: date, time, weather, individuals concerned, assets damaged but it won't stand up to review in a court martial proceeding. An investigation must show, who, what, when, where and how, coupled with statements of facts and supported with technical laboratory results if items were submitted for analysis. No investigation should be prejudged as minor in nature because the results will fit this narrow thought. The event investigated as major at the start will show the completeness of the case without partiality to anyone.
An investigator cannot learn his/her craft overnight. Each case brings to light new approaches and this builds upon the basic schools he/she has attended.
"Anchoring Sea Enterprise"
(See J. McCarthy and D. Nystrom, pp. 24-28, October 2005 Proceedings)
Vice Admiral Peter M. Hekman, Jr., U.S. Navy (Retired)-On page 28 of their article, the authors insert a table containing their opinion of the old and new expectations of leaders.
I am not sure where the authors got their listings of expectations. Certainly their list of old expectations contains certain qualifiable expectations but only a very small fraction of what past leadership has been all about, and certainly not the only, or even the primary expectations of the past. On the other hand, their list of new expectations contains nothing new at all. They were just as applicable to the army of Alexander the Great and other forces of history as they are to our forces in modern times, and have nothing to do with the "post industrial age," as asserted by the authors or, indeed, any other age. These expectations remain universal. Moreover, the article's implication that these new expectations are lacking in today's armed forces and must somehow be generated is simply wrong, and a slur on today's troops and their leaders. If the authors would only look outside the management and leadership books, they would find these historic leadership expectations being employed by today's leaders, and personnel empowerment greater in today's forces than ever before in history. So what's to change?
The bottom line definition of good leadership has never changed. It is simply getting people to do the things that need doing, as well as those that don't need doing, without needing to ask or demand they be done. I for one entrust our force personnel with that definition and I believe that, provided with the best tools and the best training, they will meet the nation's expectations without having to define or follow a leadership expectations list.
"Whataman!"
(See T. Cutler, p. 63, August 2005 Proceedings)
Mrs. Harry Lindauer-I'm reminiscing about my good friend and former neighbor, Slade Cutter. Not the football hero who made the winning touchdown for Navy in the famous 1934 Army-Navy Game; not the World War II submarine hero, not about the champion boxer, and all-around giant of a man. No, this is about a neighbor who loomed in my doorway when I moved into Ginger Cove, an Annapolis retirement community, some four years ago.
I answered the doorbell amidst the chaos of half-empty boxes. At the door stood this tall, gaunt man with a wide grin on his broad, genial face. At his side stood a petite, white-haired beauty who reminded me of the impeccably dressed models of maturity found in all the glossy culture and fashion magazines.
"Didn't come to visit," he said, "just to say welcome to the neighborhood. My name is Slade Cutter, and this is my wife, Ruthie." From somewhere came the smell of freshly baked bread, and as I looked down, I saw two huge hands holding two miniature loaves wrapped in a blue-and-white checkered napkin. "Love to bake bread," he said.
The moment reminded me of an equally warm welcome, halfway around the world, many years ago, that came when I desperately needed it.
I was in Japan, where I had traveled to meet my husband, Harry, coming out of Korea and the war there. I was quartered in what looked like a concentration camp, barbed wire and all, in Sendai, Japan, waiting for housing. My mood was anything but pleasant, when a knock on the door produced a smiling, young major and a grinning Japanese houseboy, holding two loaves of bread and a dish of salt. This was one of the post chaplains, welcoming me to my new home. Since then, bread and salt have always stood for hospitality in my mind particularly in a moment of desperate need.
And so it was now, in the midst of this chaotic unpacking. I was unpacking a box of cookbooks, and holding one I had compiled for the Navy Wives Club some years before. One of the sections in the book contained recipes from the Midshipmen's mess. This section was headed by a recipe quaintly called: "A Reesapee for Bred: Navy Stile." It starts off by taking five handfuls of sugar and three "helmits" of flour. Then all sorts of ingredients are added, mixed, to become "Delishes Bred."
I showed it to Slade, and he immediately asked to copy it, no doubt to add to his list of triumphs. Unfortunately, Slade moved to the Health Center soon afterwards, without baking this special treat. But I have a consoling memory: When I was a child and saw a pink-red winter sky in the evening, I used to think it was Santa baking Christmas gingerbread. Now, I like to believe it's Slade Cutter baking his special "Navy Bred" with an extra heapin' of sugar for a nice, rich, friendly taste of hospitality. God Bless Him.
"The Battleship: Phoenix or Museum Piece?"
(See N. Polmar, pp. 84-85, August 2005; C.P. Hall II, W. Stearman, pp. 66-67, September 2005 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Colonel Robert P. Kingsbury, U.S. Army Reserve (Retired)- I am probably one of the few readers of Proceedings who has been shot at in any serious way by 155-mm (or thereabouts) shells. I was an infantryman in World War II and came under fire from 150-mm, point-detonating, high-explosive, German howitzer shells.
At a distance, exploding 155-mm shells look awesome. I can say from personal experience, however, that being on the receiving end a 155-mm shell is a sort of "so what" kind of shell (unless it's a direct hit). It is worth shooting, but not decisively effective. In one instance, the edge of a 150-mm shell crater was four feet from the edge of my foxhole. The shelling was a preliminary barrage for a German attack. It was a so-what kind of experience because so few of us had been disabled that none of the German attackers even reached our lines.
During the Normandy invasion, in contrast, a near miss by a 14-inch shell from a British battleship turned a German Tiger tank upside down. Shell size does make a difference.
The DD(X) is to have two 155-ram guns that will fire rounds more lethal than those from traditional 5-inch guns, we are told. Personally, I would take battleship gunfire support (nine 16-inch guns plus twenty 5-inch guns) over destroyer gunfire support every time, even if our nation actually built enough of the new destroyers to adequately support one invasion beach. Let us give our Marines at least enough naval gunfire support to handle the jobs that they are currently being given.
Commander Rick Denny, U.S. Naval Reserve-Mr. Polmar seems to have missed the point in his discussion of the two remaining Iowa-class battleships. He is likely right that there is no advocate in the Navy leadership for their reactivation. What he overlooks is the advocacy within the Marines and Army for an effective naval surface fire support (NSFS) platform. The Iowa-class battleships were the last of these. There are those with mud on their boots who realize the time will come again when we have to conduct a withdrawal from a hostile beach as we did in Hungnam, when we will lack a cooperative bordering nation and have to seize a hostile beach as we did at Pusan, or when a sub-Saharan nation suddenly goes south and a coastal version of Dragon Rouge must be conducted.
It is the 16-inch guns, coupled with the antique 5-inch guns of the Iowa-class that made these ships valuable. The problem is that the Navy cannot afford the cost of getting these assets to the fight, not that they lack value. There is a solution and the British recognized it in both World Wars: a class of big gun monitors. By taking individual 16-inch turrets and mounting them on a relatively small, modern, minimal crew series of ships, the Navy could create the quintessential NSFS platform and meet its neglected commitment to the Marines and Army.
The British built a series of monitors, the last of which were the HMS Roberts and HMS Abercrombie, mounting 15-inch turrets in an Arleigh Burke-size hull. Should the Navy build a six to ten-ship class of monitors (using the six turrets on the two Navy hulls and one or two from existing museum pieces) that mount one 16-inch turret and a number of triple barreled 155-mm turrets, it would meet its naval surface fire support commitment. Using technology developed by Dr. Geraid Bull in the 1960's, lightweight barrel extensions could dramatically extend the range of the 16-inch guns to that envisioned for the 5-inch or 155-mm guns planned for the DD(X). Updating existing plans for guided projectiles and sub-munitions rounds, the 16-inch guns would be able to address almost any situation.
The value of a true NSFS platform is the ability to stand off the beach and provide support when most desperately needed. A stealthy DD(X) over the horizon cannot provide effective counter-battery fire to the Marines pushing in or pulling off a hostile beach during an opposed noncombatant evacuation. Keep what made the Iowa-class valuable and make the rest into a museum piece.
"Can Ships Do Without Helmsmen?"
(See M. Fargues, R. Gottfried, and D. Tamez, pp. 77-79, February 2005; D. Crestin, p. 20, March 2005 Proceedings)
Chief Warrant Officer H.R. Jeter, U.S. Navy (Retired), Professional Engineer-The Navy is strong on tradition, a trait that I liked during my time at sea on both surface ships and submarines. It gave me a sense of stability and security in an environment of proven practices and procedures.
This adherence to tradition, however, also prevented innovation and adoption of new techniques. After leaving active duty, I worked as a mechanical/marine engineer and tried to interest people in improving ship maneuvering equipment and procedures. The only time I ever saw a ship's captain really take control of a destroyer in a way that gave him a feel for what was happening was during a 15-knot transit through the Cape Cod Canal. He put his favorite helmsman on the helm and stationed himself out on the wing of the bridge. His commands quickly changed from "steer course zero two three" to "a little more right rudder, a tad more, ease off now." He never relaxed his personal control and feel of the helm through the hands of the helmsman, even when his cap blew overboard. Control of the old diesel submarines was a little like that.
I have watched good ship handlers try to walk an old destroyer's stern away from the pier and have the propeller directions and rudder position fighting one another. Moored port side to, they would have one forward line still secured, order starboard ahead two thirds, then port back one third to walk the screws along the bottom to starboard while the one line countered the thrust imbalance, and then order right starboard rudder instead of left. What he needed was a system that allowed the conning officer to simply tell the helmsman to "walk the stern out," to which the helmsman would move a control or push a button that was labeled "walk stern to starboard," or some such label. The movement of that control would automatically position the rudders, engine rpm, fuel flow, and direction properly.
Too many ship handlers don't understand that going from one third ahead to flank in one step does not give the fastest acceleration, nor does ordering right full rudder produce the quickest turn. The proper actions can be programmed into the control system such that the best acceleration and turn rates are achieved. Such features can be especially important in submarines where cavitation is critical. Some of these features are currently in use on merchant ships and Coast Guard vessels.
"Smarter Security for Smaller Budgets"
(See B. Stubbs, pp. 37-41, August 2005 Proceedings)
R. G. Hubbard-The author has done a good job advocating the Coast Guard recommendation for suitable Homeland Security ships. The Navy's recommendation is complicated and expensive.
The Navy, unlike the Coast Guard, has adopted our American misconception that change is always improvement. Further, the Navy has lost its own ship design capability. It must rely on contractors and consultants. It has developed hull designs such as DD(X) that don't appear seaworthy. To an extent, the Navy invites excessive complication by relying too much on companies whose incentive price is driven up by complication of the design.
The huge overruns of the 1970s were caused by those same factors and in the 1990s the Seawolf-class submarines suffered a similar fate. We didn't realize that we as a nation simply could not afford such a submarine. The class was cut to three submarines, further increasing the unit cost.
It appears that the Coast Guard is satisfied that their planned cutters will be capable enough to handle the sea-based Homeland Security role. The littoral combat ship (LCS) option proposed by the Navy for the function is not needed.
"Do's and Don'ts for the New Flag Aide"
(See S. Carroll & E. Klco, pp. 42-45, August 2005 Proceedings)
Robert M. Rosenthal-Being the aide to an admiral is exactly the same as being the personal assistant to a celebrity. Although the suggestions in the article were excellent, having dealt with more celebrities than I want to recall, I thought I'd add a few comments:
* Have a bag ready to go! Two clean shirts, two sets of underwear and socks, extra fully equipped hygiene kit. Keep it at the ready in your car or office. You never know when you will be told that you're leaving in an hour. Convince the admiral to so the same.
* Always carry $150.00 in fives and tens. Put an envelope with the same amount in that bag that's ready to go. You never know when you'll arrive at an airport with no transportation and have to take a cab. Admirals never carry cash, at least not enough cash.
* Always carry two Sharpies, one blue and one black. That way you're prepared when the admiral is asked to sign a poster, a get-well card, or a picture. Doing so in ballpoint looks childish. With a Sharpie it looks big and presentable.
* Always make sure that the official portraits you are supplying and carrying show the admiral in the correct seasonal uniform. When you go to that symposium in Florida in August and they want a picture for the program, the admiral will look foolish if his picture is in winter blues when all the other participants are in summer whites. Don't depend on Public Affairs to have that much common sense.
* When you get orders assigning you as an aide, immediately go to the library and get two books on psychology so that you can get a grounding in both ego and id. Also read a book on celebrity personal assistants, you'll need it!
A final comment: Once you have been appointed the aide to an admiral, your career goals should change. Like it or not, you're probably staff from then on. So why not start looking towards the future? An individual who has been an aide to a flag officer is the perfect candidate for a civilian job of personal assistant at about twice the military pay you'll be receiving upon retirement.