China's Party Struggles to Maintain Rule
China recently conducted a joint military exercise with the Russians, the ostensible scenario being an attack against a terrorist base. Skeptical Russian commentators observed that these were unusually well-armed terrorists, since the exercise involved thousands of conventional troops, heavy Backfire bombers (which the Chinese reportedly want to buy), and amphibious ships. They wondered whether it was really another move in the war of nerves with Taiwan and, more importantly, whether the Chinese were trying to drag the Russians into the dispute. They feared that Russia was being used to deter the United States from some future intervention. Furthermore, should that deterrence fail, would Russia would be subject to a U.S. attack, perhaps including nuclear attack?
From the Russian point of view, it may well be that friendship with the United States has not brought the expected rewards. Drawing closer to the Chinese might be intended to show that the United States must compete for Russia's favors. It may also reflect fear of American incursions into the independent republics of what used to be Soviet Central Asia.
The Russian situation appears somewhat uncomfortable. The Russian economy is still highly militarized in that most high-technology exports are still military products. After 15 years of vigorous attempts to enter the world arms market, their two main customers are still China and India-which are long-time rivals. Both are trying to build domestic high-technology arms industries (success in this effort would squeeze the Russians out), and both are interested in alternative suppliers (the United States in the Indian case, the Western Europeans in the Chinese case). The current dependence on Chinese purchases would make it very difficult for the Russians to oppose the Chinese.
Meanwhile, there is increasing evidence of unrest inside China. The Chinese government has acknowledged that last year there were 74,000 demonstrations, mostly protests in the countryside against official corruption. Such activities strike a frightening historical chord. At least in its own view, the Chinese Communist Party triumphed over the Kuomintang precisely because the peasants were furious at the latter's gross corruption, as reflected in extortion and rent-gouging. During the lengthy civil war, the Communists worked hard to build a reputation for honesty and incorruptibility.
The Party's reputation was badly damaged by blunders such as the Great Leap Forward, which caused a horrific rural famine, and the Cultural Revolution, which badly dislocated the economy and cost the country a generation of educated people. By the early 1980s the Party was admitting that capitalism was the likeliest way forward, and by implication that its ideological pronunciations had all been flawed. The net effect was to convince many Chinese that the only reason to join and support the Party was for personal advancement-which often meant personal profit. The current problem can thus be traced to a quarter century of single-party rule without any ideological control to temper it.
Modern electronic communications have complicated matters further. The Party is well aware that the Internet offers people alternative sources of news. The Chinese government has issued regulations that attempt to control access to and use of the Internet within China, and it can automatically filter (or detect) the use of key words such as "democracy." However, Internet users seem to be able to get around many such restrictions. Although Internet sites can be monitored and censored, control of chat rooms, which are widely used, is much more difficult. It is even less possible to control text messaging via cell phones, which is now quite prevalent.
These are not theoretical problems. Last year there were mass demonstrations against Japan. It might be imagined that such activity would be welcome support for the Party's official position, which emphasizes Japan's World War II crimes against China. However, the Party wants to be able to decide when and where citizens show any sort of political enthusiasm and to be able to switch that sentiment on and off at will. It alone wants to determine the line the populace should follow. Truly popular sentiment, even if it currently supports the Party, can go elsewhere in the future. Moreover, it cannot easily reverse in response to Party directives.
The Chinese government demonstrated its feeling about popular sentiment when it crushed the demonstrations in Tienanmen Square in 1989. It is currently trying to suppress local anti-corruption demonstrations, while attacking corrupt officials on a piecemeal basis. Its problem is that, having largely abandoned ideology as a justification for its rule, it offers its adherents personal rewards that ultimately mean the financial rewards of patronage and corruption.
The Party may thus feel that control is slipping away. It seems unlikely to abandon power without a fight. That may mean an abrupt shift away from modernization in China, the banning of modern telecommunications and the like, at a very high human cost. Another possibility is to mobilize Chinese nationalism, a potent force given the very widespread feeling that for centuries China was the victim of the West, coupled with intense pride in Chinese civilization. Taiwan may be particularly significant here, because the failure to seize Taiwan was the only military defeat suffered by the Communists during the civil war. Russian seizures of Chinese territory are historical. As much as they may be emphasized to Chinese citizens, the failure in Taiwan is much fresher.
Moreover, Taiwan represents to many Chinese an alternative social and political system. Although it, too, has suffered its share of corruption and scandal, the island republic has been quite successful economically and has developed a democratic political system. Its continued prosperity is thus a reproach to the ruling Party on the mainland.
From the point of view of the Communists, the ideal solution would be for Taiwan to agree to reunification on the Party's terms. At the least, military pressure must be maintained to convince the Taiwanese government that continued resistance will be pointless in the future. Some months ago it was reported that the Chinese high command regularly provides the leadership with its predictions for an attack against Taiwan. Apparently in 2004 it emerged under questioning that about 21,000 deaths were expected in such an attack. Contrary to Western views that China has unlimited manpower and that human life is cheap, the leadership found this figure unacceptable. It may well have feared that casualties on such a scale would have brought its own competence into question. From a Taiwanese point of view, what is interesting (if the report is true) is that Taiwanese forces really do have a deterrent effect on the Chinese Communist leadership.
China Unveils New Antiship Cruise Missile
In September the Chinese displayed a new anti-ship cruise missile, C602, at the British Defence Systems and Equipment International exhibition. The model displayed suggests that it closely resembles the Tomahawk-like Russian 3M54E1 sold to India as part of the Klub system used on board submarines and frigates. The data sheet distributed at the show claimed a range of 280km and a 300kg warhead. The quoted speed of the Chinese missile is Mach 0.6-0.8. Maximum target speed is given as 30 knots. Minimum target range is 40-60km, which suggests that the seeker (40km range) needs time to detect and track the target. The missile can be launched from ships or coast defenses, in each case using canisters at an elevation angle of 20 degrees. The missile cruises at an altitude of about 100 feet, and approaches its target at an altitude of 23-33 feet. C602 may arm the new F22P frigates that China is building for Pakistan. For some time there have been reports of longerrange Chinese land attack cruise missiles, perhaps modeled on Russian weapons such as 3M54 and its air-launched equivalent, Kh-65.
Recently Pakistan test fired its own Babur (Half VII) cruise missile. To the extent that previous Pakistani missiles have shown Chinese parentage, Babur may be closely related to the reported Chinese weapons. The relatively short range quoted for C602 referred to a low-altitude flight path, and in land-attack mode the missile might fly much higher and achieve much longer range. Presumably the Indians will not appreciate it if Pakistan receives much the same missile that they now have, via a back channel.
Compared to the C802 turbojet missile that arms many Chinese surface combatants, C602 offers longer range and a heavier warhead. The last two Chinese missile destroyers have a previously unknown missile canister. It is 1.5m wide and 8-10m long. This is insufficient for a C602 with wings unfolded, and too large for a folded C602. The canister thus probably contains either a previously announced modified version of the Moskit (SS-N-22) supersonic antiship missile or a new missile, as yet unknown outside of China.