In the base realignment and closure (BRAC) world, the Department of Defense proposes and the BRAC Commission disposes. DoD chose to reduce the scope of the 2005 BRAC recommendations to approximately 15% of its facilities, vice the 25% reduction in infrastructure often cited by officials. While jointness was allegedly a driving force, it was not manifest in the operational forces. Many closures or realignments appeared single-service oriented with the Army and Navy leading the way with fairly reasonable recommendations regarding operational forces. The Air Force chose a complex realignment of assets (a computer linear programming model?), which increased unit sizes and eliminated several bases with little regard for readiness and training concerns.
The Navy minimized its Gulf of Mexico presence through nomination of the naval stations at Ingleside, Texas, and Pascagoula, Mississippi, thus leaving only token surface capability at Pensacola, Panama City, and Key West, Florida. It reduced shipyard capacity by closing Portsmouth, Maine, naval shipyard. Excess East Coast submarine basing capacity was reduced with the nomination of New London, Connecticut, for closure (sacred ground!). Several reserve air stations were listed for closure or realignment. Consolidation of numerous training, support, and research activities was also addressed.
BRAC commissions are supposed to be independent and apolitical and have historically proven to be no rubber stamp for DoD's wishes. This year's edition was no exception. This commission made every effort to demonstrate it would go its own way, but given that public image, what really drove its decision process? Military value? Sometimes. Politics? Perhaps. Economic impact? Occasionally. Encroachment? Maybe. This commission embraced no theme. It was independent, illogical, and inconsistent.
In defense, the Gulf base communities, representing similar facilities in capability and military value, argued differently. The Texas delegation emphasized the unique mine warfare capability consolidated at Ingleside. The Pascagoula team played its only viable hand: homeland security concerns. The commissioners debated for some time on Ingleside's homeland security value rather than its mine warfare mission, but still voted to close. Pascagoula was described as a "no brainer" and took three minutes between introduction and vote. It was illuminating that the commission applied the Pascagoula argument to the Ingleside closure debate. This was no isolated occurrence.
The commission expressed concern that closing Portsmouth might reduce, but not eliminate, excess shipyard capacity. This was enough to justify its survival. New London's supporters staged a spirited defense citing strategic value, synergy with Electric Boat in nearby Groton, and the high cost of closure. Perhaps the commission was moved by the number of New London supporters-a constellation of three and four stars plus one ex-president-or perhaps they merely saw that the Northeast would be denuded of military presence if the trend established in previous BRAC rounds continued. New London came off the list.
The most entertaining food fight was reserved for the discussion of Naval Air Station Oceana, Virginia Beach,Virginia. Oceana was a commission addition, but it is likely a lot of lobbying contributed to the outcome. Despite a strong defense by the uniformed military led by Vice Chief of Naval Operations Robert Willard, the commission hung its hat on the increasing encroachment by the city of Virginia Beach upon the air station. In an unprecedented move perhaps exceeding its charter, the commission gave the community six months to enact steps to relieve the encroachment. This required more than simple zoning and regulation. The city would be required to condemn-and thus pay for-all properties within the accident potential zone surrounding Oceana. This is expensive, unlikely, and almost assures that Oceana's missions will be relocated to the proposed alternative site: Cecil Field, Florida.
The commission appeared tone-deaf to community arguments based on significant deviations from DoD closure criterion yet often used such arguments initiated by one community to justify a reversal on another closure proposal. The commission also displayed a curious capacity to debate extensively relatively small realignments regarding some activities and then dismiss multiple facilities with significant operational units in a single vote without comment.
The commission's final report has been approved by the president and awaits congressional action where it will undoubtedly pass into law. The Navy now faces several challenges. While the service achieved some of its infrastructure reduction objectives, it must continue to support a shipyard and a submarine base it doesn't truly need. It must also develop a plan to relocate Oceana's considerable assets without the disruption of readiness, training, and the current high operational tempo. Closure and realignment is always a painful and expensive exercise. This commission made that exercise all the more challenging and difficult to attain for the sea service.
Lieutenant Commander Carrier is a 1969 graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy and earned a MAAS at the George Washington University. A former fighter pilot, he served as a community analyst and consultant during BRAC 91, 93, 95, and 2005.