Marine Corps Essay Contest, 1st Prize Winner
The Marine Corps has few tools to span the gap between "boots-on-the-ground" and its two new high-tech platforms. How will the Corps address those manybut very low-profile-needs?
The Marine Corps has focused much of its future acquisition effort on obtaining advanced, high-technology platforms expected to dominate the battlefield well into the 21st century. The expeditionary fighting vehicle (EFV) and MV-22 Osprey both possess distinctive, state-of-the-art capabilities that will outperform comparable systems potential enemies can field. Developed to support the expeditionary maneuver-warfare-based concepts of operational maneuver from the sea and ship-to objective maneuver that the Corps envisions as its primary future warfighting method, these systems will help Marines strike faster and deeper into enemy territory. By following those warfighting concepts, the two should be more survivable in combat, requiring fewer platforms to accomplish missions traditionally fulfilled by a larger, more conventionally equipped force.
While the new vehicles provide increased capability, their acquisition presents some difficulties. They are not ideal for certain types of missions and are more vulnerable outside their designed scenarios. Their cost prevents them from being fielded in sizable numbers, forcing aging platforms to remain in service longer. Cost also makes replacing losses slow and very expensive, while limiting the Marine Corps' flexibility to purchase other badly needed equipment. A solution is to complement the duo with less expensive systems that can be fielded quickly, are cheaper and easier to replace, and are flexible and capable enough to execute missions not suited to the high-tech vehicles.
The Future Enemy
The face of the likely enemy the Marine Corps will see over the next 25 years is unclear because of the myriad of potential threats. Marines may find themselves in a range of scenarios from large- and small-scale conflicts to peacekeeping and humanitarian aid missions. These actions may occur concurrently or sequentially, requiring a sizeable, highly flexible responsive force.
While identifying future adversaries is difficult, determining their tactics is not. Opponents will attempt to negate U.S. advantages in technology and firepower by generally avoiding large-scale, conventional actions and focusing instead on close-quarter, asymmetric engagements using many of the same low-tech methods currently seen in Iraq. These include the wearing of civilian clothing by combatants; widespread use of mines and improvised explosive devices; replacement of artillery with mobile rockets and mortars; and the use of civilian vehicles as troop transports.
Marines can also expect to see increased use of inexpensive, easily concealed, man-portable weapons such as the rocket-propelled grenade. As Michael O'Hanlon of the Brookings Institute points out, opponents who use them will remain difficult to detect: "It is quite unlikely that in 2020 infantry soldiers holding man-portable antitank weapons would be spotted by satellite, aircraft, or unmanned aerial vehicles. They could generally stay completely out of view in foxholes until U.S. forces approached, particularly if foliage or buildings provided cover. In many cases they would be able to ambush U.S. forces."10'-Hanlon suggests that with a 20% success ratio, an enemy using such weapons could expect to destroy one American combat vehicle for five of its own losses.2 Enemy use of man-portable surface-to-air missiles is also likely to increase.
The 100-hour war of Desert Storm will remain an anomaly, as future opponents try to prolong conflict in order to erode U.S. popular support and resolve. They will also attempt to tie down forces and disrupt the logistics stream by attacking a wide array of targets including rear area installations. Such actions reflect Maoist theory that the longer the war and the wider the distribution of forces in pursuit of an elusive enemy, the weaker the modern industrialized force will become and the more vulnerable it will be.3
Future Force Requirements
While advanced technology characterizes U.S. forces, it is optimized for professional military formations and not well suited for operations such as stability and reconstruction.4 Platforms designed to fight large enemy formations may not be as effective or practicable in other roles or environments. The EFV, for example, may excel at coming ashore and fighting in the desert, yet may be unable to reach or incapable of operating in mountainous regions or narrow urban streets.
The future force must be large enough to support multiple operations while retaining the ability to sustain considerable loss to enemy action and maintenance without suffering a significant decline in capability or major disruption in operations. Because the Marine Corps must anticipate fighting more than one opponent concurrently, it will not have the luxury of massing its entire inventory to support a single operation. It must anticipate suffering significant losses during sustained combat. Although proponents of high-tech platforms point out that countermeasures and modifications will help further reduce the effects of low-tech weapons, potential enemies have begun to upgrade their own inventories with deadlier, more advanced systems.
The force must also be flexible and cost effective. If the Marine Corps continues to invest primarily in platforms like the expeditionary vehicle and Osprey, it will find itself unable to afford other badly needed systems. Thomas Barnett, Assistant for Strategic Futures in the Pentagon's Office of Force Transformation, foresaw this problem. "I was one of those doctors telling the Pentagon to knock it off over the nineties, to no avail. Our message was a simple one: You cannot keep buying these expensive, hightech platforms for some distant future war and expect the military to have enough resources left over to deal with all of today's operations."5
Downsides of Owning the Best
Although the expeditionary vehicle is ideal for conducting amphibious assaults, its adaptability to other missions is limited. Its weight of nearly 38 tons fully loaded makes it difficult to move into areas far from coastal access, in jagged terrain, through narrow streets, and along weightlimited roads and bridges. Missions requiring lengthy road movements will take a heavy maintenance toil on the equipment.
While the vehicle will have a tremendous advantage against enemy forces in open engagements and can absorb impacts from direct fire weapons up to 14.5mm, it will still be vulnerable to rocket-propelled grenades, mines, and other low-tech anti-armor systems. Replacing losses may prove easier than with other high-tech platforms, but at roughly $8.5 million per vehicle (in Fiscal Year 2004 dollars), it will not take long before the monetary effects are felt.
The MV-22 provides tremendous capability in expeditionary scenarios, yet, like the EFV, is less than ideal in other missions. The Osprey's technology will not pievent it from suffering loss or damage when picking up casualties or dropping off reinforcements in landing areas subject to enemy fire, where it becomes as vulnerable as a conventional helicopter. Although recent helicopter operations in Somalia, Afghanistan, and Iraq have been conducted against generally unorganized and poorly trained enemies who lacked an effective integrated air defense, these lightly armed opponents have demonstrated what low-tech adversaries can accomplish by damaging and destroying dozens of platforms.
At originally $40 million (Fiscal Year 1994 dollars) per aircraft, a cost that will undoubtedly continue to increase, the Marine Corps has been forced to extend delivery of the Osprey over a much longer perjod than originally intended. Thus older CH-46E and CH-53D helicopters will need to remain in service well into the future to fulfill medium-lift requirements. These aging aircraft have already been extended beyond their expected service life and are being worn down further by increased use in support of the global war on terrorism.
Unlike cheaper, conventional helicopters, Osprey losses will send shock waves through the budget. The loss of 15 Ospreys, for example, would cost over half a billion dollars to replace. Although the U.S. has been able to avoid such heavy losses in recent conflicts, losing 15 aircraft should not be considered unlikely. Well-trained and equipped opponents could undoubtedly damage or destroy even greater numbers.
The difficulties posed by the high cost of both platforms cannot be overstated. With post-9/11 operational requirements proving extraordinarily costly, the Defense Department has been forced to cut many programs. The Army has lost its Comanche and Crusader programs, the Navy had cuts to its DD(X) and LPD-17 programs, and the Air Force's requested number of F-22s was reduced. For the Marine Corps, the two new platforms routinely absorb the brunt of such cuts. This year alone, 22 Ospreys have been deleted from the 2006 to 2009 budgets and 253 expeditionary vehicles have been trimmed from the 2006 to 2011 period.6 Both programs will likely be targeted for further cuts as the cost to support war on terrorism operations continues to rise.
Obtaining a Balanced, Flexible Force
The Marines must augment its force with less expensive equipment that complements the costly platforms' capabilities to be used where committing the high-tech platforms is neither cost-effective nor feasible.
A less expensive infantry carrier vehicle could augment the EFV by filling the gap between boots-on-the-ground and the expeditionary vehicle, taking on those many missions being handled by less capable Humvees and seven-ton trucks in Iraq. It would be lightweight for aerial delivery, wheeled to provide mobility in developed areas and easier maintenance, and survivable against most small arms, mines, and shrapnel.
Operations in Iraq provide a good example for this need. When armored assault vehicles are unavailable or unable to support missions requiring mobility and protection, Marines often use Humvees or the trucks. Both are thrust into roles for which they were not designed. The addition of armor to a Humvee's frame results in extensive maintenance problems, reduced speed, and shortened service life. The large trucks are difficult to dismount quickly and vulnerable because of their lack of armor and overhead protection.
An ideal solution would be the acquisition of a Stryker-variant infantry carrier. Stryker provides protection against shrapnel and direct fire weapons up to 14.5mm with additional applique armor available for increased survivability against rocket propelled grenades. Weighing nearly 20 tons less than the expeditionary vehicle, it is easily delivered in sizeable numbers to isolated regions via aircraft. Maintenance is a fraction of that of a tracked vehicle, and Stryker can be operated by anyone capable of driving a Humvee. Because it would serve as a personnel carrier, it would not require the expensive, high-tech weapons and systems of the expeditionary vehicle.
Adopting the Stryker would require the Marine Corps to establish a logistics infrastructure to support it, yet with the Army scheduled to purchase more than 2,000 of them and having an established logistics pipeline to tap into, its cost should be reasonable. Research and development expenses would be minimal because the vehicle is combattested and proven. These considerations give Stryker an advantage over other light-armored platforms that could conceivably do the job.
There are concerns about acquiring an additional armored vehicle. Its purchase might cause a stir in Congress, leaving some to second guess the need for the expeditionary vehicle. Congress would likely applaud the Corps for wanting to acquire a similar platform to the Army's if it ultimately reduced cost and enhanced force capability. As for threatening the expeditionary track's future, an infantry carrier is incapable of the missions for which the expeditionary vehicle was specifically designed. Stryker would fit perfectly into the expeditionary maneuver-warfare concept by landing via LCAC and following the expeditionary vehicles. Congress would be reminded that the infantry carrier is intended to replace the poorly armored trucks and Humvees that have provided less than ideal protection in Iraq.
The MV-22 is far too valuable to be used, for non-critical missions such as crossdecking personnel, or in high-risk missions where it will be subjected to heavy enemy fire. Instead, it should primarily be used for long-range missions with a low risk of direct contact with the enemy, using less expensive, conventional platforms for the other missions. The Marine Corps should therefore acquire an additional medium-lift helicopter that is less expensive and readily available.
One option is to increase the number of UH-1Ys purchased. The Marines have ordered 100 UH-1Ys to upgrade its fleet of UH-1Ns. Additional helicopters could be acquired either through this production program or a less expensive upgrade program for UH-1 models. The upgrade allows the helicopter to carry 125% more payload, travel 50% faster at a longer range, with enhanced night capability over that of the UH-1N.7 UH-1 logistics and pilot training programs are well established, and both the UH-1Y and AH-1Z share 80% commonality of parts.8 The UH-1Ys scheduled for acquisition cost, on average, about $16.5 million per copy9; far less than that of many newer helicopters or the Osprey.
Although the UH-1Y cannot carry an entire squad of Marines or lift as much as the CH-46E and CH-53D it would help replace, it can perform many of their missions. Once the Osprey is fielded, the UH-1Y would continue to help fulfill medium-lift requirements and short-range, high-risk missions.
Osprey supporters tend to react unfavorably toward the idea of acquiring another platform that might threaten or disrupt its future acquisition. The UH-1Y, however, cannot match the Osprey's unique capabilities that are vital for expeditionary operations.
Making the Right Choice
The Marine Corps' future force may not be able to effectively meet the many challenges of both high- and low-intensity contingencies involving well-trained and equipped enemies using asymmetric tactics. Although it will possess tremendous capability, the force will be constrained both financially and operationally by high-tech platforms, which take longer to field in sizeable numbers, are expensive, harder to replace, and poorly suited for many types of missions. Although the high-tech platforms are clearly an essential part of the future force and must be acquired, less expensive, readily available, and easily replaceable equipment such as the Stryker and UH-IY should also be fielded. They would replace aging platforms in the short term while remaining in service to complement the capabilities of the EFV and MV-22 well into the future. If the Marine Corps continues to believe that "one size fits all" and expects to commit its precious few high-tech platforms to every future contingency, it will find itself running out of these resources from attrition, the enormous costs to reconstitute the force, and the longer wait for replacements. It will ultimately become incapable of conducting continuous operations at a time when its nation needs it the most.
1 Michael O'Hanlon, Technological Change and the Future of Warfare. (Washington: Brookings Institute Press, 2000), p. 127.
2 O 'Hanlon, p. 128.
3 Colonel Lloyd J. Matthews, U.S. Army (Retired). Challenging the United States Symmetrically and Asymmetrically: Can America be Defeated? (Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania: U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, 1998), p. 89.
4 Hans Binnedkijk and Stuart E, Johnson. Transforming for Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations. (Washington: National Defense University Press, 2004), p. 105.
5 Thomas P. M. Barnett. The Pentagon's New Map. (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 2004), p. 98.
6 Christopher P. Cavas. "Equipment Cuts Loom." Marine Corps Times. January 17, 2005, p. 18.
7 Bell Helicopter. "UH-1Y: Utility Without Futility" at http://www.bellhelicopter. textron.com/en/aircraft/military/bellUH-1Y.cfm
8 Megan Scully. "Rebuild or Buy New?" Armed Forces Journal. January, 2005, p. 31.
9 Sandra I. Erwin. "Marines Allocate Nearly $7 Billion for Helicopter Upgrades," National Defense Magazine at http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/issues/2003/ Jun/Marines_Allocate.htm, p. 1.
Major Wonson is an infantry officer and recent graduate of both the Marine Corps Command and Staff College and School of Advanced Warfighting. He is currently serving as an action officer in the G-3 Future Operations Section, I Marine Expeditionary Force.