The Small Wars Manual, which largely reflects the Corps' experience in Central America and the Caribbean after World War I, could have been written for current operations in Iraq, where the high-intensity, conventional fight for Fallujah in November 2004 is the exception that proves the rule. Most fighting is of lower intensity, where the challenges are harder to identify, results come more slowly, and the environment requires an understanding beyond what our typical training and education can deliver.
The pitfalls presented by a different culture and an ill-defined, poorly functioning (or non-existent) local judicial, administrative, and political system are enormous. In high-intensity conflict, we can dictate the tempo of operations and hold the initiative; in low-intensity operations, we de facto cede the tactical initiative to the enemy while we must work within the parameters of Western law, ideals, and ethics—concepts often used against us. We assume the mantle of protecting the local population, the same population that the enemy uses as its cover and base of operations. Maneuver and combined arms doctrine remain relevant in this low-intensity conflict, but the techniques and weapons employed differ significantly from those employed in the high-intensity fight. Understanding the relationships, differences, and constraints is daunting.
United States policy dictates minimum force. Once again, the Small Wars Manual distills the essence of the U.S. political-military mission:
It is not at war with the neighboring state; it proposes no aggression or seizure of territory; its purpose is friendly and it wishes to accomplish its objectives with as little military display as possible with a view to gaining the lasting friendship of the inhabitants of the country. Thus our Government is observed endeavoring to accomplish its end with the minimum of troops, in fact, with nothing more than a demonstration of force if that is all that is necessary and reasonably sufficient. This policy is carried on throughout the campaign and reinforcements are added by "driblets," so many companies, or a battalion, or a regiment at a time, until the force is large enough to accomplish its mission or until its peacetime limitations in personnel have been reached.
Today's mission in Iraq breaks down into three distinct areas: combat operations, civil affairs, and development of Iraqi security forces (ISF).
The tactical situation can vary greatly. One community may see the frequent or continuous use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs), while another nearby may be free of any anti-coalition activity for long periods. A more aggressive approach may prove suitable for the restive community, but that approach won't work in a town seemingly at peace. Thus, the manner in which the coalition approaches such different communities is important.
Of course, the peaceful town could be serving as a command node for the insurgents lying low (hence the lack of overt activity); it could be genuinely friendly—or just desire to be left alone by both sides; or it could have been reduced to the point of frustration and cooperation by coalition operations. Even after the requirement for high-tempo offensive operations ends in a particular community, the local command must continue to be involved. Done correctly, this can yield far-reaching gains; done haphazardly, it could lead to more violence. What is crucial is that we engage both kinds of communities.
Commander's Engagement
In Iraq, civil affairs is generally associated with all non-tactical operations that affect the local populace. What is not commonly addressed is the requirement for engagement on all tactical levels, particularly at the battalion-commander level. Given the existing cultural and religious barriers between Western forces and Iraqi nationals, the battalion commander must play a central role in bridging the gap.
Pundits debate the identity of Iraq's power base. What is rarely debated, however, is that coalition forces can influence this aspect of dominance significantly. On the sub-provincial level, two entities typically exert influence: imams and tribal sheiks. Imams influence through speech and interpretation of the Qu'ran, while sheiks hold the traditional power through tribal-clan-family lines. Core Iraqi loyalties in order of priority are: the family, the clan, the tribe, and then religion. This hierarchy puts power solidly in the hands of the tribal sheik.
It is important that we prevent the influence of the imams from growing to the point of dominance. The war on terror, in general, targets Muslim extremists, not necessarily Iraqi or Afghan nationalist extremists. While not discounting the power and influence of an imam and his impact on his congregation, it is important to recognize that the extremist sects of Wahabis and Salafists are outgrowths of religion, not tribal society. Fortunately, coalition elements have an opportunity to reinforce the position of the sheiks, which by default can reduce the influence of the imam.
Goat-Grab Diplomacy
A meeting with a sheik will likely begin over food. A man grabbing a piece of lamb on the bone and putting it in front of you takes some getting used to, but this is the beginning of any relationship. What follows the meal is discussion—discussion that will likely weave in and out of issues related to the mission, although, at least initially, it may not delve into anything that seems relevant. Throughout, however, the commander's goal must be to begin building a relationship. At some point, usually dictated by the sheik, the discussion will likely shift to requests for detainee releases, a halt to tactical operations in the area, a request for some sort of civil affairs initiative, or any of a number of local issues. This is the opportunity for a commander to initiate a give-and-take discussion. Throughout, it is important to maintain a position of authority and integrity to reinforce the commander's position in the eyes of the sheik and his followers. All promises must be fulfilled. The sheik is likely to do the same, as it will become a matter of honor. He must recognize that everything that you do comes at a cost, so for him to reaffirm his position, he will have to deliver as well. An agreement to stop tactical operations in a particular area as long as insurgent activity stops in the same area is a good example. It is important that the sheik be the one who delivers any agreement, as it reinforces and increases his stock with his people, which will enable him to continue dealing with coalition elements.
In from the Cold
Agreeing with the sheik not to arrest an insurgent who comes "in from the cold," to paraphrase author John Le Carré, in exchange for information is a start. A particular challenge, however, may be that the chain-of-command believes strongly that these men should be brought to justice, even though Iraqi judges often impose lenient penalties unless there is massive documentation. (In the long term, there is the distinct possibility that once the Iraqi civil court and judicial system is solidly established, many of the insurgents will be brought to trial for their crimes against the new Iraq and its people.)
Once the insurgents find that the Marines are honoring the agreement—sanctuary in exchange for information—it is likely that more will follow. Many insurgents likely continue fighting because they feel stuck in their position; if given the opportunity, many will change allegiance as they recognize that the insurgency is failing. It is also a very real possibility that the insurgents see that the only way to affect their own future is to get involved in the state political process that is taking hold.
There is no simple answer; each case must be evaluated on its own merits. It is certain, however, that without this quid pro quo, many insurgents would remain at large. Looking at it from a practical perspective, letting the insurgents come forward under the protection of their sheik at least gets them off the street.
It must be made clear to all involved that if the insurgent does not provide useful information on other insurgent or terrorist cells that he has broken his end of the bargain and will be subject to incarceration. The influence of the tribe and sheik and the loyalty of the Iraqi to his family can be used to compromise any loyalty that a former insurgent might have with a fellow insurgent or, in particular, a foreign terrorist. The motivational gap between insurgent and terrorist provides opportunity; the terrorist is in Iraq to kill Americans and is not particularly concerned about the Iraqi citizenry; the insurgent is looking toward an established place in the future and is concerned about (at least) his family. This seam can be exploited by gaining access to the Iraqis through their established tribal affiliation.
Tribal Law
In the absence of any credibly enforced civil law, Iraqi tribal law controlled by the tribal sheiks can re-establish and strengthen local area security significantly. Such law has a strong precedent, with an aggressively guarded autonomy. It can operate in parallel with civil law and often has been the only law in regions beyond the governmental influence. Commanders should do all they can to influence the sheiks to reinvigorate hereditary rights and exercise strong moral control.
Friend or Foe?
The coalition faces a particular challenge in identifying legitimate, coalition-friendly local officials, because countless Iraqis, including insurgents and terrorists, have come forward to claim title to civil positions. One position, however, is unlikely to be usurped—that of the tribal head sheik. These personages are well known and will not brook other claimants; they generally have solid backing and possess the authority to speak on behalf of their people. Their power base is the people of the tribe, who look to their sheik to remedy problems and settle disputes, and who will hold him accountable should he fail to respond.
There is one problem: the 'false' sheiks, often appointed by Saddam Hussein. While they have no hereditary legitimacy, they can compete with the legitimate tribal sheiks. They generally held their power through their ability to distribute money, which worked under the Saddam regime. With the money gone, their influence is diminishing, and so they seek coalition recognition as a means of gaining legitimacy. Tribal sheiks will oppose this on many lines, from hereditary right to concern for their people, which is in stark contrast to the false sheik's chief motivation of personal gain. The tribal sheik, with his civil motivations and concern for his constituents, is the man we must encourage into the fold.
Developing the Micro-Democratic Process
Getting the influential head sheiks engaged in the political process is the way to bring a legitimate voice to fledgling local councils and government organizations because of their vested interest in the local people. Given tribal rivalries, it will be difficult for one to gain a dominant position over the others as long as the sheiks are brought into discussions together. Competing interests between the tribes create a form of checks and balances. Over time, the local democracies can establish themselves using this bottom-up approach based on representatives who espouse the tenets of democracy and have a mandate from the sheiks and their people. At a minimum, they will represent the local population, and will not be self-appointed leaders who happened to have the means to engage the coalition at an advantageous opportunity—for themselves.
This process will require patience because it depends on the involvement of the local sheiks, but the end product is what the mission requires.
Neighboring Jordan is certainly a nation-state with many different challenges and concerns from Iraq, but there are also numerous historical, ethnic, and religious parallels that lend significant commonality between the two countries as they progress through the trials of democratic reform. Citizen involvement is a common thread. In a recent interview with the Washington Post, King Abdullah of Jordan said: " . . . In January [2005], I started [a] committee for complete decentralization. . . . What this will do is create grass-roots support for the political system. We have tried pushing democratic reform from the top down and that is sluggish. By doing it this way, we are now moving from the bottom up."
Changing Impressions
Until the coalition attacked Iraq in 2003, the population of Iraq (not to mention much of the Muslim world) was inundated with anti-Western rhetoric, propaganda, and thought. These notions and fears of the infidel run deep in the Muslim psyche and demand respect.
We can trace the means by which these fears and hatred were constructed. Emmanuel Sivan began [Islam], his seminal work on the Muslim 'counter-Crusade,' by pointing to distinct but parallel elements in the creation of this ideology: existing attitudes, which were in place before the pressure of events and of propaganda, and created attitudes formed (or exploited) as a result of events or propaganda. These functioned as reinforcement for the existing attitudes.1
To defeat the notion that Americans are "grotesquely unappealing infidels,"2 we must maintain a truthful and up-front relationship with the Iraqi people. We must display genuine concern for their plight while respecting their culture and religion. This good will, when passed from the leadership of a tribe, has the ability to expand throughout a region and becomes an information operations message in and of itself. Of significant benefit, it has an uncommon credibility—the source of the message is the tribal sheik. Current messages are pushed from coalition forces and have little if any local endorsement. While they may be accurate, they are still perceived as "words of the Americans" and may or may not be automatically disregarded because of the source. While we conduct information operations in response to events or insurgent propaganda, we struggle in getting our message heard and accepted. The human information chain that exists in any community is the target, and coalition elements are at a disadvantage in every way in breaking into it. Having our message introduced by accepted authorities allows us to influence that venue. Given time, a positive impression and message of the coalition can take root, and destroy or at least reduce the effect of enemy propaganda.
The understanding of Arab culture and Islam must go beyond drinking chai and keeping your feet flat on the floor when seated. While simple cultural differences should be respected, the topics of women and religion are particularly sensitive. They are rarely an issue, however, in dealing with a sheik, unless a Marine in the command has transgressed. A basic cultural awareness keeps most religio-cultural issues off the discussion list.
Perception
Of overarching cultural concern is the message sent by the command and its Marines. When we extend a benevolent hand to the Iraqis it is critical that we not over-extend our tolerance and good faith. If that happens, some Iraqis will take advantage and we will lose credibility, thus emboldening our adversaries. When the 1st Marine Division arrived in theater in February 2004, there was well-founded concern about being too aggressive and damaging already tenuous relations with the civilian population. In an attempt to show the people of Al Anbar province that we were their friends and only insurgents and terrorists had reason to fear us, we advertised the division motto "No better friend, no worse enemy" as well as the operational mantra: "First, do no harm." As the Marines carried out the no-harm policy, the insurgents became emboldened by our disciplined approach, going so far as to refer to the Marines as "soft as cake." The Marines were doing their best not to harm the innocent, but, in the process, the insurgents and terrorists lost their fear of the Marines—which they later regained when they actually engaged with Marines in combat.
This has less to do with the response of the insurgents and terrorists, and more with the civilians; if they understand or even perceive on any level, local or national, that we are not as strong as the insurgency, we will lose support. The insurgents will use this angle in their own propaganda and intimidation efforts, further dividing the coalition from the citizenry and adding to an already strained relationship. Arab culture is much more familiar capital punishment and brutality than is the West. While we must not take a heavy-handed approach, we cannot afford even the perception that we are "soft as cake." Success in the appropriate application of force will depend upon the judgment of the Marines.
While the commander may be successful in negotiating the course of cultural aspects, a minor transgression by one of the Marines in his command can change the commander/sheik relationship in the favor of the sheik; whereas there is little that the sheik and the Iraqis can do in reverse. A "cultural violation" puts the sheik in a position that allows him to push for the commander to make amends for whatever happened; it becomes a negotiating point. We are bound to their cultural sensitivities; they are not bound to ours. They can also violate some of their own cultural standards and say: "In sha'Allah [It is the will of Allah]."
Civil Affairs
Civil affairs can include virtually all non-tactical operations. A major focus involves the allocation of money on the Iraqi battlefield. Whether it is compensation for battle damage to a home, solatia to a family for a member killed, or the building of a water treatment plant, school or medical clinic, it is clear that money has a major role. Allocating money to certain spots enables a commander to influence his area of operation positively; not many insurgents are making a concerted effort to build schools and medical facilities. Clean water in a community as a direct result of its compliance with the initiatives of the local coalition battalion may serve as an incentive to another more resistant community.
There are other aspects. Work contracts should be awarded to local contractors and laborers in accordance with the greater intent of stimulating the Iraqi economy and alleviating unemployment. It is well known that many explosive devices are placed by unemployed men who simply need money. Employing working age males draws them away from being an important tool of our enemy. Fewer men emplacing the devices means fewer devices—as simple and intuitive as that is. The concern comes with the potential for insurgents or their supporters to get the contracts and then siphon money to support their cause. There is thus an absolute need for strict control and oversight of the distribution of contracts and compensation funds to well-vetted individuals and companies.
Funds available and responsive to the needs of the commander are an absolute requirement of any successful civil affairs program. Positive on-scene action will serve as proof to uncooperative neighbors that the coalition is not here as an aggressive occupier, but as a benevolent rebuilder.
Iraqi Security Forces
Native troops, supported by Marines, are increasingly employed as early as practicable in order that these native agencies may assume their proper responsibility for restoring law and order in their own country as an agency of their government. —U.S. Marine Corps Small Wars Manual, 1940
Given limited numbers of coalition troops, effective employment of Iraqi Security Forces is mandatory. While not on a tactical par with Marine forces, they bring several distinct skills and abilities that we cannot hope to match. Their language, culture, and religion have a significant depth that we will never understand completely.
Iraqi troops are familiar with the environment and are much quicker than Marines to recognize when things are out of order, an ability that has led to the discovery of numerous arms caches that Marines missed. They are comfortable working within cultural limits, which is particularly helpful when women or religious places are part of the equation.
Without the Iraqi forces, the coalition would be severely restrained in its operational reach throughout the country. As in any insurgency, local troops play a pivotal role in supporting the foreign element.
Tactical Operations
Tactical Operations are the most obvious and visible aspect of our involvement in Iraq. Every enemy that we kill or capture is one less that we have to engage in the future. It also serves to raise the price of conducting operations against the coalition. Because many of the insurgents are fighting strictly for money or with only limited motivation for the insurgent cause, the lethality of our forces sends a discouraging message that insurgent propaganda can counter for only so long. Any time the enemy faces us in a stand-up fight we crush him, so he prefers to engage in the manner that exposes him least. This renders him only marginally successful at causing any damage to coalition forces; he is completely incapable of affecting our operational capability. With our clear dominance of the physical battlefield he has shifted his focus to terror and propaganda.
He attempts to destabilize and derail progress in Iraq with sensational attacks against Iraqi targets, civilian and government, and maximizes the effect through media exploitation; he tortures and murders those who would act, or speak, against him in any community, maintaining a veil of terror over local citizenry. While his attempts against American combat elements are usually ineffective, the goal is not to destroy U.S. forces in combat, but to undermine resolve at home by retarding Iraqi development and stability while coupling it with continued U.S. casualties.
Thus, we find ourselves with unquestioned military dominance in a hunt for an elusive enemy, who hides among those he would often just as soon kill, or those who would cover for him out of loyalty or fear. Knowing that it is the rare occasion that we can decisively engage more than a handful of the enemy, we must consider other gains that tactical operations can bring us, such as significant leverage to negotiations with the local population. By using tactical forces to conduct raids that eliminate specific enemy agents, conduct comprehensive area sweeps looking for known agents and weapons caches, and apply constant pressure through patrolling and checkpoints, the commander can gain an edge on the local sheik.
These actions may cause the sheik to come forward in an attempt to halt operations, which can be perceived as harassment by tribal members who look to their sheik to stop the coalition from interrupting their lives. If he is unable to deliver, his position and authority are eroded. We can counter this initiative by pushing the sheik to make promises of local security as well as to bring forward influential insurgents residing within his realm of influence.
"While curbing the passions of the people, courtesy, friendliness, justice, and firmness should be exhibited," the Small Wars Manual advises. While tactical operations can be used to coerce a sheik into discussion with coalition forces, they can also damage the effort. If they are conducted in a haphazard or culturally insensitive manner, they may work to incite the local population against the U.S. and force the sheik to distance himself from our efforts at negotiation.
All Marines must understand the potentially adverse cultural impacts of actions that in the U.S. would be taken as standard. These cultural nuances (dealing with women and religion, respect towards elders and sheiks) have the power to nullify any other efforts that the command may be making.
Integration & Going Forward
The application of purely military measures may not, by itself restore peace and orderly government because the fundamental causes of the condition of unrest may be economic, political or social. —U.S. Marine Corps Small Wars Manual, 1940
The importance of integrating commander's engagement, tactical operations, civil affairs, and Iraqi security forces cannot be overstated. While the tactical operations work to destroy the insurgency and terrorists by wearing down their forces and destroying their weapons capabilities, the other elements are far more subtle. Combined, they can be decisive in defeating the enemy by destroying his support and operating bases. If one of the elements is disregarded, it will prove all the harder to set the conditions for local control of the region.
By putting large focus on the local tribal leadership the local commander can gain an ally who may be considered a force multiplier. He is also a force detractor for the insurgency, because he can remove the base the insurgency depends on. Either way, if the sheik can reduce or eliminate enemy activity in his area, then we will likely suffer fewer casualties and be able to reduce the size of forces in the area.
No template exists that will "solve Iraq." Leaders must adapt when dealing with the myriad tasks that are put before them; maximum flexibility in all aspects of the mission is necessary for success. For every initiative that goes forward, there will be another that fails for any number of reasons, controllable or not. Patience in the process is an absolute requirement. American culture is one partially defined by deliberate action and aggressive progress; Arab culture is not. Recognizing that slow progress is still progress is important. It is also critical to understand that the only way for the United States to extract itself from Iraq is to ensure that there is a safe, stable and functioning democracy in place. With the conditions set for American exit, it up to us to get Iraq prepared for that eventuality.
T.E. Lawrence understood that western influence was just that, influence. While it could be definitive and be the impetus for change in Arab society, he recognized that the best way, and only lasting and effective way, was to act as a coach while the Arabs took actions themselves.
Do not try to do too much with your own hands. Better the Arabs do it tolerably than that you do it perfectly. It is their war, and you are to help them, not to win it for them. Actually, also, under the very odd conditions of Arabia, your practical work will not be as good as, perhaps, you think it is.3
Major Zeman is the executive officer of 3d Battalion, 4th Marines, presently at Twentynine Palms, California. He wrote this while with the battalion in Iraq, where he has completed two tours serving in Operation Iraqi Freedom.
Sources
1.Andrew Wheatcroft, Infidels (New York: Random House, 2004), p. 189. back to article
2.Wheatcroft, Infidels, p. 189. back to article
3.T.E. Lawrence, The 27 Articles of T.E. Lawrence from The Arab Bulletin, 20 August 1917. back to article