The recent, highly critical Navy Board of Inspection and Survey report on the amphibious transport dock San Antonio (LPD-17), and the subsequent news stories and the questions raised in Congress, may cause a reevaluation of the future of the U.S. amphibious force. The San Antonio is the first of a planned class of up to 12 large amphibious ships, intended to help compensate for reductions in the amphibious ship numbers by her size and capabilities.1
The inspection report was highly critical of the ship, noting numerous deficiencies and poor workmanship in scores of areas. Still, a senior naval officer, familiar with the LPD program, has observed that the report "was better than most for lead ships," and said that the San Antonio "performed well on her sea trials." The San Antonio and the previous LPD class as well as the latest dock landing ship (LSD) and amphibious assault ship (LHD) classes are compared in Table 1. The San Antonio provides considerably more capability than the LPD-4, albeit at a much greater displacement—and at relatively greater cost.
On a tonnage-versus-capability basis, at first look the LPD-17 is comparable in total capabilities with the latest LSD design, the Harpers Ferry (LSD-49). True, such features as the advanced enclosed mast/sensor (AEM/S) structures in place of conventional masts, and her larger flight deck and hangar are major advances in the San Antonio. However, the two-year-plus construction delay and the $400-plus million cost overrun for the San Antonio have raised questions about the viability of the entire future amphibious force.
The U.S. Navy-Marine Corps team has not carried out an opposed landing in more than half a century. For several reasons, it is highly unlikely that an assault landing will be made across the beach in the foreseeable future. In this context, the role of the LPD-17 class as well as other amphibious tools, such as the expeditionary fighting vehicle (EFV)-the modern LVT/AAV "amtrac"—must be questioned.
Two alternative force postures immediately present themselves. First, the substitution of large deck amphibious assault ships (LHA/LHD/LHA(R)) in place of future LPD construction. These large ships, displacing just over 40,000 tons full load, are twice the size of the LPDs but cost less per ton. The large flight and hangar decks of the LH-type ships provide far more aviation capability, including the ability to operate the F-35/Joint Strike Fighter, a vital factor in future littoral operations as well as amphibious campaigns. Their troop berthing and cargo spaces are also more than twice that of the LPD-17. (The follow-on LHD-8 and LHA(R) designs will have smaller manning requirements with their other features enhanced.)
A final consideration for the LH-series ships is the inherent flexibility of full-deck ships. In 1994 the Dwight D. Elsenhower (CVN-69) carried 1,800 troops of the Army's 10th Mountain Division and their helicopters to Haiti, and in 2001 the Kitty Hawk (CV-63) carried the Army's 160th Special Operations Regiment with MH-47, MH-53, and MH-60 helicopters, and a total of some 1,000 special operations personnel to support operations in Afghanistan.
LH-series ships could have performed those tasks. Similarly, in April 1999, the theater commander requested 24 U.S. Army AH-64A Apache helicopter gunships for attacking Serbian tanks and other armored vehicles in the Yugoslav conflict. The Apache helicopter battalion, with 12 OH-58D Kiowa Warrior helicopters to spot targets, and more than 2,500 personnel with all of their equipment, had to be flown from the United States to Albania. An LHA/LHD could have transported most of that force to the coast of Albania in less time, and operated them for a sustained period without the massive ground footprint that had to be established ashore.
Second, the Department of Defense and the Navy are committed to the sea base concept. This envisions groups of ships-amphibious and maritime prepositioning force (future) or MPF(F) ships-operating more than 100 miles offshore as a mobile base for combat operations ashore. That distance is considered the minimum necessary because of the threat of land-based antiship cruise missiles. While there is some discussion of amphibious ships making a run-at 20+ knots—toward the beach at night to unload their assault vehicles and air cushion landing craft, darkness provides little concealment in view of the wide availability of advanced sensors and weapons.
The MPF(F) ships at this point may be a better investment than additional LPDs. Now being designed, the MPF(F) ships will have enhanced aviation capabilities, especially important for the MV-22 Osprey aircraft, the heavy-lift CH-53E Super Stallion helicopter and the planned Heavy Lift Replacement, and the proposed quad-rotor heavy-lift aircraft. Further, the LH-series ships can operate as part of the sea base as well as independently (with escort) or in multiamphibious expeditionary strike groups.
Five ships, the LPD-17 through LPD21, should be completed. Work on the later ships, which have not yet been laid down, could be delayed while a design review is undertaken to ascertain the value and feasibility of completing one or more ships as joint/fleet command ships. The Navy has long employed the converted LPDs La Salle (AGF-3) and Coronado (AGF-11) in that role. There is a real and almost acute need for command ships (LCC/AGF types). No additional ships should be completed as LPDs.
The need to project forces ashore—to help allies, rescue friends and diplomats, and for combat, when necessary—will continue to be important to U.S. national interests. The Navy is short of ships and short of funds. Such problem-plagued ships as the LPD-17 must be reconsidered, especially when more transformational concepts are available and useful for future amphibious/sea-basing operations.
1 The LPD-17 through LPD-21 are under contract; the LPD-22 was funded is fiscal 2004 and the LPD-23 is budgeted in fiscal 2006. The Navy staff is currently planning for nine ships of the original program of 12, but that could change either way.