Over the next few months, the Department of Defense (DoD) will conduct an internal review of defense strategy and planning. Aircraft carriers are often scrutinized during these reviews, especially when resources are tight. Despite the extra attention, carriers have done quite well of late; since 1994, when the current force of 12 ships was reached, the rest of the fleet has fallen from 391 to 295 vessels. The reason is simple: when subjected to rigorous assessment, decision-makers recognize that the aircraft carrier is among the most effective and flexible tools in the nation's arsenal.
With the U.S. confronting the twin challenges of access to overseas bases and an ever-widening array of threats, the role of carriers would appear more significant than ever. However DoD does not seem to be waiting for the review's completion before making critical decisions that will impact the nation's security for many years to come. In late 2004 they announced plans to eliminate another aircraft carrier. Congress, insisting that such dramatic shifts in policy must be grounded in strategy, is not supporting this planned reduction.
Given these circumstances, the long familiar debate between carrier advocates and critics is certain to resume both in public and behind closed doors. The arguments employed by critics are not new, and typically revolve around the issues of cost-effectiveness and vulnerability. Do critics of the aircraft carrier really have a case?
Firepower and Mobility
It is undeniable that the aircraft carrier is expensive-not only in terms of acquisition, but also with respect to the operating costs of the ship and its aviation component. Some argue that the aircraft carrier does not deliver enough firepower; that the carrier's air power is devoted primarily to self defense, and those aircraft that can be devoted to land attack have questionable "first day of the war" qualities due to their lack of stealth characteristics.
Though these arguments may once have had merit, critics employing this reasoning today would be overlooking a radical change in carrier effectiveness in recent years. Aegis-equipped escorts now handle the lion's share of the battle group's defense, allowing more sorties to be devoted to strike missions. More importantly, the widespread application of precision guided munitions has made each strike sortie much more capable. Today's carrier air wing can hit more than four times (693) as many aim-points per day as it could in 1989 (162). In just a few more years, incorporation of the F-35 into the air wing will not only further increase this number, but will finally bring stealth to the fleet. In addition to its reduced total ownership costs, CVN-21 will also generate more sorties per day than the Mmte-class carriers-160 vs. 120 on a sustained basis and 270 vs. 190 in surge operations.
But improved firepower is only one component of effectiveness. The nature of the post-Cold War environment-and the Global War on Terror in particularplaces an even greater premium on the carrier group's mobility. It is this fundamental quality that allows the U.S. to hold adversaries at risk anywhere in the world (within reach of the sea) without concern for local basing.
Perhaps even more importantly, the U.S. can act without the blessing of regional allies, who-as recent experience has reminded us-are perhaps only reluctant partners in many regards. Further, the carrier group's mere presence provides a deterrent without having to fly a single sortie. Though difficult to quantify, effectiveness discussions must take into consideration both of these qualities.
Carriers or Bombers?
The aircraft carrier's combination of firepower and mobility is unique, which makes it very difficult to compare to other power projection options. The systems most commonly cited as alternatives to the carrier are the Air Force's long-range bombers. Indeed, the debate between carrier advocates and critics has often degenerated into an argument over carrier and bomber firepower. The long-range bomber is very efficient. In terms of pure strike capability the carrier cannot equal the mass tonnage that the bomber can deliver on a daily basis. Yet this is merely a single measure of effectiveness.
The diversity of missions that the aircraft carrier is capable of executing, and which the bomber force is entirely unsuited for, must also be taken into account. In addition to strike missions, the carrier's air wing and escorting vessels bring air superiority, electronic warfare, sea-control, anti-submarine warfare, aerial refueling, and combat search and rescue capabilities wherever the battle group travels. Aircraft carriers also include their own intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities-as well as a fully functional command and control network. Finally, carriers are well suited to the full spectrum of conflict-capable of waging high-intensity war on one day, and providing humanitarian relief the next.
Although the cost-effectiveness argument against aircraft carriers is relatively weak, critics also argue that the carrier battle group is becoming increasingly vulnerable. Ironically, the same technologies that have enabled carrier air wings to become so devastating-surveillance and targeting systems, communications, and precision weapons-are also the source of the carrier's growing vulnerability. While it may appear to the casual observer that the U.S. has a monopoly on these capabilities, nothing could be further from the truth. Advanced technologies are available from many sources, and perhaps most troubling, they are cheap in both an absolute and relative sense.
This concern has grown in recent years as the Navy increasingly finds itself operating in littoral waters, as required by a shift in strategy from sea control to power projection ashore. Carrier operations in the littoral zones during the early stages of conflict will be riskier in the future than they have been in recent years. The favored approach to mitigating this issue seems to be for the carrier to stand off from these threats, to stay in blue water where its mobility and escorts-as well as the ocean itself-afford it greatest protection.
Although this approach would succeed in increasing the battle group's security, unfortunately it also limits the amount of territory the carrier air wing can hold at risk. With potential adversaries already exploiting their strategic depth to their advantage, a stand-off approach that grants the adversary an interior sanctuary is an imperfect solution. Fortunately there are other options.
Future Carrier Aviation Assets
At its heart, the carrier vulnerability issue is one that has little to do with the carrier itself, and a lot to do with the limited range of existing carrier aviation-itself a consequence of the canceled A-12 program. In the coming defense review it is critical that decision makers understand the difference. Rather than reducing the force, attention should be given to making investments that leverage the carrier's unique qualities.
Among possible enhancements, none is likely to offer more capability-and do more to fix the misperceived "vulnerability" issue-than the incorporation of long ranged unmanned combat aircraft systems (UCAS) into the carrier's air wing. The DARPA/Air Force/Navy Joint Unmanned Combat Aircraft System (JUCAS) Concept Demonstration Program is designed to establish the option for the Navy (and Air Force) to acquire UCAS systems in the next decade. Unmanned systems extend the reach of the battle group by breaking free of the endurance constraints associated with having a human in the cockpit. UCAS will not only permit the battle group to stand off when circumstances dictate, but in permissive environments the air wing will be able to hold at risk targets across the entire depth and breadth of the battlefield-including those now unreachable from the sea. The endurance potential of unmanned vehicles will be fully realized when combined with aerial refueling, and at least two industry groups are working this issue for a variety of government sponsors. The progress on this front is encouraging.
Perhaps the greatest issue left unanswered is whether UCAS can be made to withstand the rigors of life on the carrier-and the early signs are that they can. Already testing relevant sub-systems through the use of surrogate air vehicles, the Navy is on schedule to demonstrate the first carrier "trap" of its X-47B design in 2010. Deck handling is also critical, and significant attention is being devoted to ensuring that UCAS will be capable of seamless integration into flight deck operations.
Given the recent changes to the strategic environment, the unique capabilities of carrier-based naval aviation have never been in greater demand or of greater utility. In the course of its defense review DoD would do well to consider how these assets could be even better leveraged in the future. To make the carrier relevant in all environments requires that the Navy continue to incorporate cutting edge technologies. Sixty years ago this meant preparing for the jet age; for today's carriers this means capitalizing on and integrating revolutionary technologies such as unmanned aircraft.
Mr. Logan is a senior defense analyst with Northrop Grumman Corporation's X-47 program in Rancho Bernardo, California.