Among the increasing array of threats that will confront U.S. naval forces in the future will be antiship ballistic missiles. China intends to develop such weapons using conventional warheads, according to the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI).1 "The current TBM [theater ballistic missile] force would be modified by changing some of the current missiles' ballistic reentry vehicles (RVs) to maneuvering reentry vehicles (MaRVs) with radar or IR (infrared) seekers to provide the accuracy needed to attack ships at sea," says an ONI description of the new weapon.
Such land-launched ballistic missiles would have good defense penetration capabilities because of their high reentry speed and maneuverability. The RV could deliver a single unitary warhead or terminally-guided submunitions. Obviously, a surface warship—and especially an aircraft carrier—is considered a "soft" target because of its unarmored superstructure and large array of radar and communications antennas. An aircraft carrier with a flight deck filled with aircraft is even more vulnerable to a "mission kill."
The CSS-6 and CSS-7 are relatively short-range, land-launched, theater ballistic missiles now operational in the Chinese arsenal.2 The CSS-6 is publicly reported to carry a 1,325-pound warhead to a distance of some 375 miles; the CSS-7 carries a 1,765- to 1,325-pound warhead to estimated distances of some 175 to 330 miles, respectively.
No operational date for the antiship weapons has been published by Chinese or U.S. sources. Significantly, an antiship ballistic missile became operational 30 years ago-in the Soviet Navy. That weapon was the SS-NX-13, given the Soviet designation R-27K.3
In 1962 the Soviet government approved the development of submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) for use against surface ships, especially U.S. aircraft carriers that threatened nuclear strikes against the Soviet Union. At that time the SS-N-6 SLBM (Soviet R-27) was under development and the decision was made to provide the nuclear-armed missile with terminal guidance for the antiship role-the R-27K. The R-27 and R-27K missiles were identical in their size and external appearance.
After preliminary research, the TsKB-16 (Volna) submarine design bureau was directed to develop a suitable platform—Project 605—based on the reconstruction of a Project 629/Golf-class diesel-electric submarine (SSB) to test R-27K missiles. The Navy did not approve the design until October 1968 and the following month the submarine K-102 entered the Zvezdochka shipyard at Sverodvinsk in the Arctic. There the submarine was refitted with four launch tubes, interchangeable for the R27 and R-27K missiles. To accommodate the missiles, improved fire-control, sonar, and satellite link equipment was added, the K-102 was lengthened to 380 ½ feet, an increase of 56 feet, and her submerged displacement was increased to 3,642 tons (i.e., almost 100 tons added).
Submarine trials began on 9 December 1970, but were curtailed on the 18th because the "Record-2" control system had not yet been delivered. Other aspects of the K-102 trials continued. Even after the control system was installed there were several malfunctions that delayed completion of the missile-firing trials. From 11 September to 4 December 1973 the K-102 belatedly carried out test firings of the R-27K missile, using both the Record-2 and the Kasatka B-605 target acquisition system, which used satellite tracking data.
Trials of the weapon system continued with the submarine firing R-27 strategic (land-attack) as well as R-27K antiship missiles. The submarine and missile system were accepted for service on 15 August 1975.
The R-27K/SS-NX-13 would be targeted prior to launch with data provided from an aircraft or satellites tracking U.S. and British aircraft carriers and other surface ships. Western intelligence credited the missile with a range of 350 to 400 nautical miles and a terminal homing warhead that sought out specific radar emissions. Warheads of 500 kilotons to one megaton could be fitted.
The weapons system, capable of striking land or sea targets, was to be fitted in the later Project 667 A/Yankee missile submarines. And, in 1974, Sergei N. Kovalev of the TsKB-18 (Rubin) design bureau began work on submarine Project 687, a modified Project 105/Alfa high-speed submarine to carry the R-27K.
The R-27K missile did not enter the fleet, however, because the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) agreements of the 1970s would count every SLBM tube as a strategic missile regardless of whether it held a land-attack or antiship (tactical) missile.4 Some Western analysts postulated that the missile might also be employed as an antisubmarine weapon.5 This evaluation fit with the U.S. shift of sea-based strategic strike forces from carrier-based aircraft to missile-armed submarines, and the related shift in the Soviet Navy's emphasis from anti-carrier warfare to anti-submarine warfare (ASW) in the 1960s. Kovalev would say only that ASW calculations for the R-27K were made.6 (When discussing the use of land-based ballistic missiles against submarines, he called that proposal "science fiction" although, he observed, "very serious people believed in this [role for ICBMs].") In the event, the R-27K was not deployed. The Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff observed:
The SS-NX-13 is a tactical ballistic antiship missile. It may have been intended for deployment in Yankee-class SSBNs. It has not been tested since November 1973 and is not operational. However, the advanced technology displayed by the weapon is significant and the project could be resurrected.7
The Soviets did not resurrect the SS-NX-13. But today the Chinese armed forces are developing an antiship ballistic missile.
1 Office of Naval Intelligence, Worldwide Maritime Challenges 2004 (Washington, D.C., 2005) p. 22.
2 CSS is a U.S. designation, indicating a Chinese surface-to-surface missile.
3 The NATO designation was SS-NX-13, indicating surface-to-surface naval experimental missile: The U.S. intelligence community initially used the designation KY-9, the prefix KY indicating the Kapustin Yar test facility. The Soviet system is described in N. Polmar and Kenneth J. Moore, Cold War Submarines: The Design and Construction of U.S. and Soviet Submarines. (Dulles, Virginia: Brassey's, 2004), pp. 179-181; and V.I. Zharkov, "Submarine Project 629," Taifun, No. 3, 2002, pp. 14-16.
4 Igor D. Spassky, head of the Rubin design bureau, discussion with N. Polmar. Arlington, Virginia, 25 October 1993.
5 See, for example. K.J. Moore. "Antisubmarine Warfare," in Soviet Naval Influence. (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1977), pp. 196-198; also mentioned in "Industry Observer," Aviation Week & Space Technology, 21 July, 1975, p. 11.
6 S.N. Kovalev discussion with N. Polmar, St. Petersburg, 6 May 1997.
7 General George S. Brown, U.S. Air Force, United States Military Posture for FY [Fiscal Year] 1978, (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 20 January, 1977), p. 16.