From their earliest days, the littoral nations of the Indian Ocean-even India, arguably the most capable maritime power in the region-have focused on their land frontiers. The maritime dimensions of security, therefore, have not figured adequately in this region's consciousness. This must change, because in the emerging global security environment, maritime power will play an important role in the region's security calculations.
The New Security Environment
The focus of global strategic concerns has shifted from Europe to the Asia-Pacific. The United States has established capabilities here that are neither temporary nor transient. With China identified as its only potential major competitor by 2025, the United States must be a dominant player in Asia, politically, militarily, and economically. Control over the region's energy-from production levels and prices to distribution-is essential to this dominance, and the "democratization" of Iraq must be seen in this context, as well. The war on terrorism also is related to this region, as a large number of radical Islamic terrorist groups are located here and draw sustenance from formal and informal institutions.
The Indian Ocean is perhaps the major theater of Asia. The strategic aims of the United States are inextricably linked to this vast stretch of water. The countries of relevance occupy its littorals, the nonstate actors are largely recruited and sponsored in this region, vast energy resources are to be found here, and the movement of this energy to several major economies depends on the safety of Indian Ocean sea lanes.
The Indian Ocean
Nearly half the world's seaborne commerce is moved across the Indian Ocean. Of this, as much as 20% is oil and gas. About 75% of seaborne trade in the Indian Ocean is consigned to and from countries external to the region. Their involvement in this water space cannot, therefore, be wished away, In fact, it is going to increase, as countries such as China have become customers of oil from the Gulf region and their imports will grow in years to come. The littorals account for 65% of the world's oil reserves and 35% of its gas, and these figures are likely to rise with sustained exploration. There also are resources yet to be discovered below the seabed. These assets lend considerable strategic significance to these waters. The fact that all its sea lanes are hostage to narrow passages that can become choke points makes its security as difficult as it is important.
Almost all the countries of the region have been nation-states for less than 50 years. They suffer from several vulnerabilities. Ethnic and religious discord are widespread. Societies, especially in the oil-rich Gulf countries, are authoritarian and fragile. Economies revolve around just one resource-oil-and fluctuations in that sector can cause havoc. As the largest and perhaps most stable country, democratic India has to be seen as a credible power and be able to safeguard its own interests from regional turmoil.
India has some unique concerns. There are large Indian-origin populations in almost every littoral country-as many as 3.5 million Indian workers are located in the Gulf countries alone-contributing nearly $10 billion to India annually. National interests require that the area remain stable so these workers and their remittances can flourish. India's large Muslim population has many interfaces with the region, be it "haj" pilgrimages, the funding of schools and madrassas in India, or connectivity between radical terrorist movements. It is inconceivable that developments in the region will have no impact in India.
Another vital interest concerns India's dependence on oil imports from the Gulf, which supplies 65% of its needs today and perhaps more than 75% by 2015. India shares maritime boundaries with seven countries. It is easier to work out boundary agreements when resources have not been discovered, but once they are, it is almost certain that conflict potential will increase.
Finally, piracy and the hijacking of ships increasingly are being used for the smuggling of narcotics, and in turn, this supplies money for arms and explosives that then are used for terrorism. Much of this activity takes place in the Indian Ocean area, which is not surprising considering the two major drug-producing areas of the world, the Golden Triangle and the Golden Crescent, are located on either side of our country.
India has major security concerns in the region that require interfaces with countries both external to the area and littoral to it. Maritime power must be an essential ingredient of these interfaces, in peacetime as much as in times of conflict.
External Powers
The United States, clearly, is the region's most important external player. On one plane, India shares many U.S. concerns, including the fight against terrorism, operations against piracy, and safety of sea lanes. The Americans also need friends in the region, and India, as the largest and most stable power and a democracy, must be at the top of that list. Our attractiveness is largely underestimated, and we do not exploit it to the extent we should. But there also are some negatives. U.S. pressures on some Islamic countries in pursuit of the war on terrorism and, indeed, the continuing U.S. military presence could have an undesirable impact on India's Muslim population. The nuclear policies of the United States also are not in synergy with our own. Finally, U.S. military capabilities in the region cannot be ignored. The bulk of these are either at sea or capable of being directed from the sea, but it would be unwise to gloss over capabilities that have greater permanence.
Another important country with interests in this region is China. It already is a consumer of Gulf oil, and its imports will increase as its economy expands. China has strategic interests in Asia-Pacific. Its military assistance programs in the region are well know. It is helping develop ports in Myanmar in the Bay of Bengal and at Gwadar, in Pakistan, in proximity to the Strait of Hormuz, a key choke point controlling entry to and exit from the Persian Gulf. It has military capabilities that can threaten India. These have been supplemented with the purchase of destroyers and submarines from Russia, and more are on order. A growing Chinese naval presence in the Indian Ocean is likely in the years to come. While China's aims in the foreseeable future predicate stable and tranquil relations with India, there is cause to be watchful.
Two other important external players with interests in the Indian Ocean region are Russia and Japan. After a hiatus of more than ten years, the Russian Navy again has deployed in these waters, and such movements are likely to be repeated. India and Russia have a long history of cooperation, including naval collaboration, but remarkably, no history of exercising jointly at sea. The recent exercises between the two navies are a step in the right direction. Japan also has extensive interests in the region, primarily because of its energy dependence, but also in its economic interactions. India and Japan share many common concerns and should expand their strategic interface, leading to greater interaction between their two navies.
The Indian Navy also must continue joint naval programs with Britain, Australia, and France. These facilitate our overall interfaces with other major powers and establish the legitimacy of India's maritime power in this part of the world.
The Neighborhood
Both in the Gulf and in the Indian Ocean region, India has important interests that should be strengthened through naval relationships, including joint exercises, port visits, personnel exchange programs, and information sharing relevant to counterpiracy operations. Visits and interactions with the Iranian Navy are especially important. As the largest nation in the Gulf region and sharing several strategic interests with India, Iran must figure more actively in our calculations. There are signs of some thaw, however marginal, in the relations between Iran and the United States, and this would facilitate regional cooperative arrangements at sea.
There has been considerable militarization in the region in the past decade, especially at sea. Iran and Singapore now operate submarines, and Malaysia will soon join this list. The ships operated by these navies are now larger and more sophisticated. Antiship missiles such as the Exocet and Harpoon are available in many navies, including some smaller ones, and aircraft such as the F-16 and F-18 and Mirage are in some inventories. Recognizing this all-'round qualitative enhancement in capabilities, India must increase the level of its peacetime interactions, focusing on the many common concerns at sea in search and rescue, countering of piracy, operating procedures, and so on.
India has not yet finalized maritime boundaries with Pakistan and Bangladesh. It should be possible to work out suitable arrangements with the latter, as nothing really substantial is involved. Relations with other neighbors are quite manageable, despite some areas of dissonance. India now has Free Trade Area agreements with Sri Lanka, Nepal, and Bhutan, and a regional economic grouping termed BIMSTEC (Bangladesh, India, Myanmar, Sri Lanka, and Thailand) has taken form. To this have now been added Nepal and Bhutan. Defense cooperation and understanding with Sri Lanka have improved greatly, particularly at sea, and must be further strengthened.
As for Pakistan, despite recent developments that have lowered the threshold of discord, it is unlikely that its hostility with India will disappear, as its causes are quite fundamental. Given a continuing confrontationist posture, it is essential that Indian military capability maintain a decisive edge. This will not, of course, neutralize the militancy ongoing in Kashmir; however, in the new environment in which Pakistan has to answer for indiscretions from aiding terrorism to proliferating nuclear technology, it is unlikely that it will be allowed a free rein. Here, the Indo-U.S. relationship has a part to play to ensure Pakistan's role in the sponsorship of insurgency is restricted, if not ended.
Support of National Policy
India's economy currently is forecast to figure among the half dozen largest of the world by 2020 and among the three largest by 2050. As we move toward these goals, a broad range of interfaces are necessary to ensure that progress is not hindered or retarded. In this scenario, the Navy must be exploited much more actively in peace. Mere visits to friendly countries will not be enough. There has to be an overall strategy linked with diplomacy in which visits, discussions, gatherings, exchanges of personnel, exercises, and patrols are integrated.
As the only regional navy with integral air capability and credible Indian Ocean presence, India needs to play a leadership role in attending to the common concerns at sea in cooperation and coordination with other countries of the region. Indian naval ships were the first vessels to bring relief to Galle and Maldives, 600 and 800 miles away, in the aftermath of the December 2004 tsunami disaster. Along with Japan and Australia, India was in the fournation core group formed by the United States to drive the first, immediate response.
The Navy also must be used much more actively in the pursuit of antipiracy and policing measures, along with the Coast Guard. The traditional concept that navies should have nothing to do with such mundane activities must be thrown out. The hijackers of today are hard-core terrorists. Countries such as Australia and France already have included peacetime policing of their waters as a prime function for their navies.
India's long coastline is even more vulnerable than its land borders; the explosives for the terrible Mumbai blasts in 1993 all were brought in by sea. Safety of the sea lanes and offshore assets and resources is critical. A credible conventional capability at sea that is seen as reassuring by friends and deterring by adversaries is essential.
The Indian Navy, in short, must be able to counter any regional threat decisively and be a sufficiently powerful threshold against intervention by a more versatile power. This does not require that we match resources ship-for-ship, but only that we possess an ability that is seen to be credible. An important part of this force will be submarines, with their near invulnerability to detection.
Conclusion
The Indian Ocean region has assumed strategic and security overtones it did not have in earlier years. The ability to interface in peace with other powers, both those external to the region and those integral to it, has become important, and sea power must be exploited as an essential ingredient in such engagement. In the years to come, as India seeks to assume its rightful place on the international stage, the ability to safeguard and further its interests at sea will be even more important than concerns on its land frontiers.
Vice Admiral Das retired from the Indian Navy in 1998 as Commander-in-Chief of its Eastern Naval Command. He is a graduate of the Naval War College, a regular writer on international security affairs, and a visiting speaker at several colleges of the armed forces and universities in India and abroad.