In the midst of the debate over sea basing, an alternative—or supplement—should be considered: lily pads that would combine the ability to project power from a base such as exists at Guam with the ability to draw on stockpiles of materiel prepositioned at bases such as Diego Garcia.
Ongoing U.S. military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as the presence of U.S. troops in the Horn of Africa and throughout Central Asia, highlight the shift of U.S. security concerns from Europe to the loosely defined "arc of instability."1 Protecting the United States against threats originating in this region has tremendous implications with respect to the structure of U.S. forces and the location of bases abroad, but national policy toward rebasing and development of a new U.S. footprint has been approached in different ways by combatant commanders and Navy leaders. The concept of forward operating bases—or "lily pads"—appears to be in opposition with the naval doctrine of sea basing. The former argues for an aggressive rebasing of troops closer to conflict zones, while the latter presupposes limited access to overseas bases.2 In truth, the two concepts are not as divergent as they appear at first. Each has at its core a desire to fulfill a fundamental military objective: the quick response of forces to areas of the world where the United States does not have ease of access.
Sea basing alone falls short of being a complete solution for the requirements of expeditionary warfare. Some of its shortcomings have been addressed in the debate that accompanied the unveiling of "Sea Power 21."3 The arguments in this debate, however, did not challenge the central assumptions of sea basing or offer an image of what future overseas naval bases should look like.
Alfred Thayer Mahan wrote that overseas posts are a logistical necessity, that "resting-places for [warships], where they can coal and repair, would be one of the first duties of a government proposing to itself the development of the power of the nation at sea."4 Although naval vessels' motive power has changed in the past century, the basic concept behind "coaling stations" endures in that overseas bases are pivotal to the sustainability and support of expeditionary forces. For the concept of sea basing to be truly effective, the United States must establish a global network and secure forward-operating bases ashore. Only with these naval lily pads can the logistical problems associated with sea basing be overcome, decisive strength in theater be guaranteed, and U.S. diplomatic flexibility be ensured.
In March 2003, Commander, U.S. European Command, General James Jones proposed the creation of forward-operating bases throughout Eastern Europe and North Africa as a response to the shift in U.S. security concerns.5 The proposed lily pads differ from previous basing models in their structure and size. Permanent forces located at the lily pads would be small, composed mostly of security and supply ratings charged with defending the base against terrorists and maintaining custody of large prepositioned supply stocks. When required by global events, arriving troops would join with the prepositioned hardware and supplies and jump from the lily pad to the scene of conflict. Through lily pads, the need for a large infrastructure committed to servicing permanently stationed troops would be eliminated. Likewise, traditional problems of military transportation would be mitigated by lessening the requirement for massive air- and sealift to the region should a conflict break out.6
A central assumption of sea basing is that the United States will have only limited access to overseas bases.7 This is in disagreement with the concept of force redistribution and rebasing advocated by General Jones. The access dilemma described in so many modern military planning documents really is a problem of access to traditional overseas bases, not of a total loss of access to the world. To some extent, assuming limited access to overseas bases is a parochial response by a Navy seeking to redefine itself and justify investment in the technologies outlined in sea basing documents, even while promising a dominant role in future joint military operations. In truth, the Navy has no need to be parochial. The investments in new technologies and naval construction implied in sea basing are intelligent choices regardless of rebasing initiatives. No other service can match the Navy's ability to maintain a forward presence and rapid-response forces in close proximity to a theater of operations, but the overstatement of the Navy's role hinders consideration and development of supplements and alternatives.
The Case for Lily Pads
Establishing naval lily pads would dramatically increase the amount of equipment, supplies, and troops that could be massed near a conflict zone.8 Sea-based forces alone would be adequate and decisive in company-to battalion-level actions for low-level counterinsurgencies or noncombat evacuation operations. Even an expeditionary brigade at sea and its successful insertion into a region could not create a decisive result for anything beyond a small regional crisis. Employment in a major war, as demonstrated in Iraq, still would require massive airlift from either the United States or current military strongholds in Europe, Japan, or Korea. Locating naval lily pads throughout the world not only would create ready reserve emplacements for materiel, but also could be leveraged politically for the intermediate build up of forces that would be perceived as demonstrative of U.S. resolve in a crisis-yet they would not be as threatening as a sea-based force a short distance off the coast. In a situation where the United States loses command of the sea, the lily pads would be critical in placing assets in theater under conditions of reduced vulnerability.
The political advantages of a lily pad would extend far beyond demonstrating an intermediate response. A U.S. base is a status symbol, enhancing the host's perception of its strategic importance. Sea bases alone would abrogate the U.S. diplomatic capital bases would provide.9 In addition, the presence of a U.S. naval base could enhance the internal stability both of a nation and its government, particularly in the developing world, and could allow the United States to exercise all aspects of national power. Given the growing U.S. interest in regions adjoining the Indian Ocean, commitment to Africa should grow, both as an access point for the Middle East and as a buttress to the development of liberal governments in the region.
The economic advantages of a U.S. naval base, particularly to an African host nation, would be significant, even on the small scale a naval lily pad would provide. Diplomatically, the naval lily pad could be leveraged as a jump point for U.S. and international foreign aid operations, security operations, infrastructure development, and humanitarian relief. Culturally, U.S. sailors and Marines assigned to overseas posts serve the important function of acting as informal ambassadors for the United States. In many nations, the local populace has images of Americans provided only by cultural icons or news sources of questionable credibility and objectivity. A presence demonstrating who Americans are and what the nation stands for is highly desirable.
Given the increased role Sea Swap likely will take in the future, where multiple crews relieve forward-deployed vessels on station, naval lily pads would allow for greater repair and refit facilities available to deployed vessels. So far, the Sea Swap experiment has been successful, with the Higgins (DDG-76) returning to San Diego in April 2004 after two crew swaps and a 16-month deployment. On her cruise, the Higgins experienced no major maintenance issues and provided an additional 116 days of operational flexibility beyond that of three traditional singleship deployments. A similar success was achieved by the Fletcher (DD-992), which returned in June after two years in theater and on her fourth crew. Early concerns that Sea Swap would result in large-scale maintenance nightmares were not realized on either ship.10
The success of Sea Swap, however, should not lead immediately to the conclusion the Navy can overlook maintenance concerns overseas. Ships and systems break with use and can be damaged in combat, but when deployed they must be repaired quickly to maintain operational flexibility. That neither experimental platform experienced mission-ending maintenance problems is a testament to the skill and professionalism of their crews-but these factors should not be taken for granted. The ability of a naval lily pad to accept detachments of rotational maintenance and technical experts, along with associated equipment and prepositioned spare parts specifically dedicated to assets in theater, would increase dramatically the sustainability and effectiveness of a deployed force.
The addition of the littoral combat ship to the Navy also must be considered a significant development for the consideration of lily pads. Objectives of the program call for the vessels to participate with the fleet, in combination with each other, or singly in pursuit of low-level missions. In only one of these objectives would the littoral combat ship be able to exploit the replenishment facilities inherent in a sea-based force. Acting in groups or alone on the fringes of a conflict zone, the littoral combat ship would require an operational base where its modular mission packages could be changed and fuel and supplies loaded.
Structure and Potential Locations
The advantages of a lily pad are linked to both the structure of the base and its geographic location. The United States should not and cannot force its presence on nations whose people popularly oppose it, even if the government would welcome a U.S. presence. Geographically, given future U.S. strategic concerns, new lily pad bases make sense on both coasts of Africa, in Australia, and in Southeast Asia.
One model of a U.S. lily pad suggests itself by collocating U.S. forces and prepositioned assets at sites controlled by the Royal Australian Navy. In Australia, there is a large base at Darwin, on the northern coast. In this model, the political fallout of a separate U.S. facility would be minimized, and the lily pad would not appreciably increase the population of the base, as the assets emplaced primarily would be prepositioned materiel. The facilities organic to the base, however, would allow for repair and refit, and even temporary assignment of ships. Darwin as a strategic port grants access to antipiracy efforts in the Strait of Malacca and in the Indonesian archipelago, which witnessed 121 attacks in 2003." Antipiracy would be a tailor-made mission for the littoral combat ship as it enters active service, and U.S. participation in these activities could significantly improve relations with Southeast Asian nations.
Lily pads in other nations could follow the Australian model of collocation, but the model must change when the political and economic environment of the host nation does not support collocation, or where the necessary infrastructure does not exist already. This would be most applicable to Africa, where several nations could host potential lily pads, including the Cape Verde Islands, Kenya, and Djibouti. These nations have relatively stable governments and are ideally located strategically. In the African model, lily pads would be small and purchased by the United States to both preposition assets and exercise diplomatic and regional security operations. A permanent U.S. base in either of the East African nations of Kenya or Djibouti would serve as a joint platform from which to build on current efforts in the region, specifically the Combined Joint Task Force for the Horn of Africa.
Politically, establishing bases in most Southeast Asian nations might be ill advised and infeasible, even if strategically desirable. The United States does have, however, a significant strategic asset in Guam, and the military presence and supply nodes have been increased there. Given the forthcoming reduction in U.S. personnel in South Korea and potential reductions in Japan, Guam must become the first true naval lily pad. In the Philippines as well, the United States has a potential access point to diversify East Asian and Southeast Asian operations. While it is not feasible to believe in a return to the Subie Bay-type of presence in the Philippines, a small prepositioned base could be negotiated and located on former U.S. facilities.
When a sea-based force is combined with the demonstrated logistical, diplomatic, economic, and geographic benefits of a network of naval lily pads, a picture emerges of a U.S. military able to meet any commitment on the global stage with significant expeditionary forces backed by contiguous supply points. The lily pads themselves also would create tremendous second-order benefits not only to the U.S. military and State Department, but also to the regions in which they are located. Given current U.S. efforts in support of the Regional Maritime security Initiative in Southeast Asia and ongoing talks with Australia concerning training facilities, consideration of further basing options is relevant. Pressing forward on both sea basing and a more diverse naval footprint overseas is both desirable and necessary.
1 Kurt M. Campbell and Celeste Johnson Ward, "New Battle Stations?" Foreign Affairs, September/October 2003; Gen. James Jones, USMC, "Testimony before the House Armed Services Committee," 24 March 2004.
2 Thomas Donnelly, "Realignment of Foreign Basing of U.S. Troops," American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, www.aei.org; VAdm. Charles Moore Jr., USN, and LGen. Edward Hanlon, USMC, "Sea Power 21 Series-Part II: Sea Basing-Operational Independence for a New Century," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, January 2003, pp. 80-85.
3 LCdr. John J. Klein, USN, and Maj. Rich Morales, USA, "Sea Basing Isn't Just About the Sea," U.S. Naval institute Proceedings, January 2004, pp. 32-35; LCdr. Henry J. Hendrix, USN, "Exploit Sea Basing," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, August 2003, pp. 61-63.
4 Alfred Thayer Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power upon History, J 660-1783 (New York: Dover Publications, 1987 [189O]), p. 83.
5 First indication of rebasing initiatives announced by Chairman Duncan Hunter (R-CA) at the House Armed Services Committee, "Full Committee Hearing on Future U.S. Military Force Structure in Europe," 26 February 2003.
6 Gen. James Jones, USMC, Brief at Pentagon for Pentagon staff, 10 October 2003.
7 Moore and Hanlon, "Sea Basing."
8 Klein and Morales, "Sea Basing."
9 Klein and Morales, "Sea Basing."
10 Otto Kreisher, "Navy Sea Swap Leaves Ship in Really Good Shape," San Diego Tribune, 30 March 2004.
11 International Chamber of Commerce Commercial Crime Services Report, "Piracy Takes Higher Toll of Seamen's Lives," www.iccwbo.org/ccs/news_archives, 28 January 2004.
Lieutenant Halvorsen, a surface warfare officer, currently is a student at the Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island.