"Damn the Bagpipes!"
(See M. K. Fitzgerald and M. J. Fitzgerald, p. 73, November 2004 Proceedings}
Colonel John G. Miller, U.S. Marine Corps (Retired)-Ow! As one of "those bloody Campbells" (my great-grandmother was Susan Eddaline Campbell Miller), 1 must respond. For Fitzgeralds to be downgrading pipes and drums is disconcerting in itself. (I'll have to review our respective clan histories to see what kind of dust-ups we may have had along the way.) And I can appreciate why a talented harpist might have her teeth set on edge by the pipes. But those pipes and drums put steel in a warrior's spine. I'll never forget the newsreel images of British Tommies (with short trousers, Tin Kelly helmets, and fixed bayonets) advancing ahead of the pipes and drums to wipe out Rommel's Afrika Corps in World War II.
Today, the Campbells live on in the regiment they founded-the Black Watch-now serving in Iraq and taking casualties. James Webb has written eloquently of the Scots-Irish in America in his recent book, Born Fighting. Tradition is there, and we must honor it.
James Heimer-Having piped the brigade of midshipmen to breakfast during the spring set of 1967 (the year I graduated from the Naval Academy), I suppose I should be offended by this piece. However, the article was so delightfully written that one could hardly take exception to the sentiments expressed by the Fitzgeralds. Besides, as a plebe I was required to memorize the first paragraph of John Walter Wayland's "The True Gentleman." In light of subsequent piping proliferation, it is perhaps regrettable that the second paragraph was not also required plebe knowledge. I believe it states, in part, "The true gentleman may know how to play the bagpipes, but refrains from doing so." I have not touched the pipes since.
"What Are the Parallels of 1914 Germany and 2004 Iran?"
(See N. Fricdman, pp. 4-6, October 2004 Proceedings)
Patrick J. Kelly, Ph.D., Professor of History, Adelphi University-As a German historian who specializes in the pre-1918 period, I found the part of Dr. Friedman's article that detailed Germany's 1914 position not too far off the mark, even though several points that the author seems to take for granted are still the subjects of fierce controversy.
I was flabbergasted, however, to see the forces that drove Germany to war in 1914 compared to those in Iran in 2004. Our war in Iraq has achieved far more for Iran than it could ever have done for itself. Its mortal enemy, Iraq, has, in effect, been demilitarized. "Democracy" in Iraq, if fully developed, would mean a Shiite theocracy there, because Shiites are about 60% of the population. The Shiite ayatollahs in Iran, though Farsi and not Arab, must be quietly leaping for joy, because we have done for them for free what they could not accomplish with a bitter and bloody war in the 1980s. President George H. W. Bush got it right in his memoirs, when he defended his decision not to go to Baghdad because occupation would have led to a messy quagmire for the United States. When we leave Iraq, be it next year or ten years from now, Iran will have become the regional hegemonic power without even lifting a finger, let alone having started a war.
Furthermore, in a way even worse, the obvious overcommitment of our ground forces in Iraq has given Iran (not to mention North Korea) a free pass to develop its nuclear forces. Iran poses a long-term threat to U.S. security, and an even greater threat if it merchandises nuclear devices to terrorists.
"Congress's Deeds Do Not Match Its Words"
(See W. T. Wheeler, p. 2, October 2004 Proceedings')
Lieutenant Commander Richard B. Hacker, U.S. Naval Reserve (Retired)The amendment by Senators Mary L. Landrieu (D-LA) and Olympia J. Snowe (R-ME) to increase the benefits for the survivors of military retirees is neither pork nor irrelevant. Military spouses were part of the military support staff, and as such they should be entitled to 55% of their spouses' retirement pay!
Captain Joseph S. Littleton, III, U.S. Navy (Retired)-Mr. Wheeler suggests that what Congress says is quite different from what Congress does when it comes to defense programs. As evidence, he cites the Senate Armed Services Committee's increased fiscal year (FY) 2005 funding for ' a number of procurement programs while "hiding" countervailing reductions in funding for operating activities, training, depot maintenance, gas, consumables, and civilian pay. He then cites the more than 150 proposed amendments to the proposed National Defense Authorization Act as useless or counterproductive, including member-interest issues associated with , personnel benefits, contracting concerns, ballistic missile defense, and terrorism. He closes with a sharply negative characterization of our elected officials "hatching" plans behind closed doors and being "wolves in sheep's clothing."
That Mr. Wheeler could serve more than 30 years within a part of the government he believes "sabotages U.S. security" and for which he has so little regard is difficult to understand. Further, it is curious that one with his substantial credentials would not even once refer to the appropriations legislation that provides annual funding for defense. Every one of his many observations of this year's process is based on an authorization bill designed to prescribe broad policy direction in many areas for the Department of Defense. But when it comes to the checkbook, the appropriations process reigns as the ultimate authority.
The Defense Authorization Bill, legislatively managed by the House and Senate Armed Services Committees, was designed to be complete before the defense appropriations process at each milestone-House markup, Senate markup, and conference committee. The authorization process should provide guidance to the appropriations process at the macro level-such decisions as the right force level for carriers, whether a new weapon system should move into production, and so forth. This year, for the fourth time in the past five years, the Defense Appro-, priations Bill has preceded the Defense Authorization Bill, mitigating any substantial impact the authorization process was designed to have on appropriations. Many who are familiar or involved in annual defense authorization are starting to openly question the continuing value of the process.
Appropriators in general and specifically defense appropriators, led by Senator Ted Stevens (R-AK) and Representalive Jerry Lewis (R-CA), hold closely to the concept that anything appended or amended to their bill must be germane. Any issue or proposal is fair game in the authorization process; hence the large number of Senate amendments cited by Mr. Wheeler. However, to dismiss the importance of some of these amendments negates the purpose of the process. Many amendments come forward, few are adopted, but all are considered at one level or another. This is part of the public legislative process and gives each member an opportunity to articulate his or her con-, cerns. To suggest that contracting is not a concern in a year that saw a former senior government employee confess to contracting irregularities that could have cost the taxpayer in excess of $8 billion would be very myopic. Congress can and must, exercise its prerogative to oversee the activities of the executive branch.
Finally, Mr. Wheeler laments the fact that Congress fell short by providing only $25 billion of FY 2005 emergency funds to supplement the war efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan, when the bills at the end of FY 2004 were predicted to exceed available funding by $10 billion. Too little, too late according to Mr. Wheeler. Not so. The appropriations ("show me the money") process appropriated the $25 billion of FY 2005 wartime contingency funding, and then in an unusual move allowed, these funds to be available for use on, enactment of the law, which occurred on. 5 August 2004, almost two months before FY 2005 officially started. Also, the appropriators already had enacted an earlier. $87-billion FY 2004 wartime supplemental, of which $65 billion was for defense operations. To connect to an earlier of Mr. Wheelers' concerns, maybe after increas-, ing the FY 2004 defense operations ac-, counts by first a $65 billion supplemental and then effectively an additional $25 billion, Congress felt that moving a billion or two of the President's budget from operating accounts to procurement items would not hinder our conduct of the war. The administration and Congress both have indicated that another FY 2005 wartime supplemental will be required in the spring 2005 timeframe to address the remaining FY 2005 shortfalls alluded to in the commentary.
For a time this spring, the administration appeared to be balking at forwarding what later became the $25 billion sup-, plemental. Concerns for the growing: deficit and the politics of requesting further war funding in an election year were, at the core of the delay. Senior congressional leaders, particularly those associated with defense, were instrumental in publicly calling for the supplemental and encouraging the administration to do what was obviously the right thing. It's hard to find evidence of congressional intent to sabotage national security in aspect of the war funding this past year. I think Congress gets high grades for this one.
In short, if you want to hear a bark, don't listen to a duck. We should be thankful that our representative form of government generally allows priorities and concerns from a wide range of perspectives to find their way to the public square and be heard in turn. Not a bad way to do business, even if it isn't perfect in every person's eyes, every hour of every day.
"Who's Responsible for Losing the Media War in Iraq?"
(See J. Lacey, p. 37-41, October 2004; W. Weiner, p. 10, R. Seamon, pp. 10-12, November 2004 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Colonel Betsy Judge, U.S. Marine Corps (Retired)-Mr. Lacey may have some interesting ideas about military-media relations, but he offers halfbaked solutions based on unfounded generalizations.
His claim to be the only embedded journalist covering the war carrying a military ID card is wrong. I watched daily reports from Iraq with Marine Reserve Major and Fox reporter Greg Kelly. He was embedded with the 2d Brigade of the 3d Infantry, a unit Mr. Lacey wrote about while Greg was there. I would not expect him to research the background of every reporter in Iraq, or expect him to do years of research to write his article. But in both cases, he should have done enough homework to provide a balanced perspective.
Also suspect is his declaration that all the media are intent on painting every U.S. military commitment as an unwinnable quagmire. During my 16 years in public affairs I worked with journalists who clearly had an agenda; however, I worked with far more reporters who simply wanted to write a fair story.
I was also amazed that Mr. Lacey feels no obligation by conscience or ethical standards to correct errors in his stories. The three leading professional associations for journalists all espouse correcting errors promptly.
Training for PAOs emphasizes the necessity for the military to work effectively with the media. I have worked with PAOs from all services and most are true professionals dedicated to assisting the press. We also train military officers about the importance of military-media relations. The Marine Corps begins the process with second lieutenants, and the education continues through flag level. Other services have similar programs, and I believe most of our senior officers follow defense news with a keen sense of interest and can name reporters-if that is important. Despite the effort, there will be officers who do not buy the concept or simply are uncomfortable working with the press.
There is no magic formula for militarymedia relations. Engagement is a critical component, but the military will make mistakes, the press will report them, and relations will be strained. Regardless, it is not the military's responsibility to ensure a story is correct unless the military pro-. vided inaccurate information. The services should embrace maximum disclosure of information; be open and honest; provide all the facts and perspective at hand; and admit mistakes. But the responsibility for an accurate story rests with reporters, editors, and publishers, not the military.
Nurturing relations with reporters is a great and necessary tool, and the military should do it better. However, giving a previously embedded reporter preferred access is a bad precedent, as are "head of the line" privileges. Similarly, a nice article or two should not be a journalist's ticket for special treatment. The military should have solid and fair relations with all credible media, not just selected reporters. Preferential treatment when things are rosy is not only wrong, it likely will come back to haunt the organization when the stakes are much higher. We do not need military officers assigned to media outlets to provide context for stories. That role rightly belongs to whoever is responding to the issue, whether it is a PAO or the secretary of Defense, and no organization should attempt to downplay its own problems by pointing out those of others.
There is plenty of room for improvement in military-media relations, but the military deserves a better score and better solutions than offered by Mr. Lacey.
Commander John D. Alden, U.S. Navy (Retired)-I see the public information problem in Iraq in a much broader sense than "reverse embedding" a few PAOs in the media. Today we must deal with a greatly expanded information system, where the media include not only TV, radio, newspapers, and journals, but also leaflets, billboards, word of mouth from the exhortations of mullahs in the mosques, rumor circulation in the streets, and the Internet. In contest for hearts and minds we seem to have abandoned the field to our enemies. In our espousal of freedom of speech and the press, we make no effort to throttle the purveyors of lies or the preachers of jihad against those: they choose to brand as infidels.
What, if anything, are we telling the Iraqi people to get our own message across and counter the lies and misinformation promulgated by their own media? This is a subject completely ignored by the U.S. press. If we want to win the hearts and minds of those people, we have to do more than expect our soldiers to spread goodwill by patching up schools and passing out candy to children. We should be repeating over and over to Iraq and its Arab neighbors using every available media outlet positive messages such as these:
* America is not the enemy of Islam. We believe in freedom to practice all religions. Thousands of Muslims worship freely in American mosques. We are only opposed to militant extremists who would prevent other people from freely observing their own religions.
* Our objective is to help you establish a stable and responsible government so our soldiers can return to their homes as soon as it is safe to do so. Acts of sabotage and terrorism serve only to delay returning Iraq to its own people.
* Money earned by selling your petroleum is being used to pay for repairing and upgrading your neglected schools, water systems, sewage disposal facilities, and roads. Saboteurs who blow up pipelines are hurting you, not us.
* Suicide and car bombers are killing far more innocent Iraqis than U.S. soldiers, so how can they be considered patriots or good Muslims?
* Kidnapping aid workers who are here to help rebuild your country is stupid and self-destructive. Beheading tied-up, helpless hostages is a tactic of cowards and revulsive to true Muslims.
* Militants who hide out in your mosques or conceal weapons in their homes are cowards hiding behind innocent women and children and exposing them to danger.
* Why do the mullahs who preach jihad and suicide all stay safe in their mosques while they send your sons and daughters to blow themselves up?
Who or what organization is responsible for spreading our message effectively? Surely it is not only the Army's responsibility. In an insurgency, winning the hearts and minds of the people is essential to winning the war. We will not accomplish our objective as long as we relinquish control of the media to our enemies.
"Navy Needs Martial Arts Training"
(See J. Lehmann, pp. 72-73; July 2004 Proceedings)
Commander Jack B. James, U.S. Navy, Navy Warfare Development Command, Doctrine Department, Naval Special Warfare-Although I appreciate lieutenant Lehmann's motivation and aggressive stance on the subject of hand-to-hand combat skills for Navy personnel, Sailors are still Sailors and not combat-trained Marines.
The U.S. Navy does not have the infrastructure to re-create the Modified Marine Corps Martial Arts Program; it just would not be cost effective. We barely can make time for people to pass the existing physical readiness test. Our Navy and the world have been changed and challenged by the bombing of the USS Cole (DDG67) and the attacks on 11 September 2001. Freedom and fear are truly at war. But you can not create a doctrine out of something that was never there. The Navy could, however, capitalize on training programs that are in place. More bang for the buck could be gained from increased small-arms marksmanship training by requiring a 50% increase in the number of rounds fired downrange by each individual at both the recruit training command and officer candidate entry level and in the fleet. The biggest challenge to this idea in the fleet will be to make the increased small arms training readily available to all hands, not just the weapons and deck division.
Even with cutbacks, the Navy's unique forward-deployed engagement requires that Sailors be more observant of their surrounding situation for hostile activities. Both in and outside the continental United States, Sailors already are given basic training to be observant watch standers; simply add the principles of operational risk management as applied to combating terrorism and you have the initial effort at situational awareness training. In addition, no doubt Navy Intelligence and/or the Center for Antiterrorism and Navy security Forces already have situational awareness training packages for their own security forces and shipboard security force training. Training in situational awareness and operational risk management as applied to combating terrorism could help the Navy be more active. I like the Navy recruiting slogan: "Life, liberty, and the pursuit of all who threaten it." But it would be good if we could make this slogan a little more actionable to the individual Sailor.
"Swift Boats: Hard Day on the Bo De"
(See P. Yost, pp. 66-69, October 2004; R. Shirley, pp. 15-16, November 2004 Proceedings')
Virgil Erwin-I am disappointed in Admiral Yost's recount of Silver Mace II and his criticism of then-Captain Roy Huffman. Admiral Yost is correct that Captain Hoffman paid great attention to daily operation reports, but he was a better leader for that. And he always put the fear of God in me, driving all of us to high standards. He once ordered Commander Strulie, Commander of Division 13, and me to fly to Cam Ranh Bay to explain why I had entered the Bo De River without authorization. This was before river operations became our primary function. I have the greatest respect for Captain Hoffman.
I was given an audio tape of the communications from this April 1969 event by one of the Seawolf helicopter pilots, and I have just reviewed a partial copy of that again. As we neared the entrance to the Duong Keo (not the Bo De Yost stated), I was directed on the PCF-67 to move from number three in line to the lead position because I had been in this river before and knew the sandbar locations. I was okay with that because all the' ambushes I knew of hit the third boat, never the lead. We entered the mouth of the Duong Keo at a crawl, making a large S turn to follow the channel. If the Vietcong had been able to train .50s on us at that point, we would all have gone aground trying to get out.
At about one or two clicks up the river and now in deeper water, my boat and four other boats were told to insert our Vietnamese Marines on the left side of the river. It was an open area with not much foliage close to the bank. The rest of the Swifts continued past us. The strategy was to insert a second group of Marines farther upriver and encircle any potential Vietcong from two sides. Gunships would block their retreat from the rear and Swifts would support from the two insertion points.
Then the second group was ambushed. I was still at the first insertion point when we heard the radio report that there was a damaged Swift aground. The 67 boat and the 103 boat immediately got under way and headed upriver. To say we were scared is an understatement, and it's the first time I ever put on flak pants. One, of us radioed we were en route.
Commander Yost then ordered us to return and pick up our Marines and bring them upriver. I should have ignored that order, but I didn't. No one had yet returned to assist the disabled 43 boat. Seawolf 16 reported in to the tactical commander and requested orders. Yost ordered that Seawolf medevac the wounded. Seawolf 16 said he would need to unload his 14 rockets before taking on those wounded in action. Yost directed them to "just unload anywhere north of the river."
The Seawolf gunships passed overhead, and I heard one announce, ".50s, .50s, we're taking .50s, they got quad .50s." The PCF-43 can be faintly heard in the background, repeatedly calling for help.. There was little radio discipline, and it; appeared that it took some time before Yost finally understood he was missing a boat. The Seawolves spotted the 43 boat and began providing cover fire.
Captain Jerry Wages, U.S. Navy (Retired)-I first met the then-Commander, Paul Yost in 1969 when he was Commander, Task Force 115.3, a component of Task Force 115, the Market Time coastal surveillance force. At that time commanded the Rung Sat Special Zone (RSSZ) River Patrol Group (Task Group 116.9) and concurrently was the senior: U.S. advisor in the RSSZ, a one-of-a-kind: Navy billet in the Republic of Vietnam Navy (RVN). Commander Yost was then; based at Vung Tau, and since my area of operation in the Rung Sat swamp bordered his on the coast of the South China Sea, he and I occasionally provided support to each other's operations.
These experiences went smoothly, and it was a pleasure to work with a proven combat leader. After we completed our "in country" tours, our paths crossed again in New Orleans and in Washington, D.C. So I knew Admiral Yost well enough professionally and socially to form the opinion that he is one of the finest military officers I've ever known.
Although I wasn't there for the Sea Lords operation at Duong Keo, I assume that then-Captain Roy Hoffmann (Commander, Task Force 115) had approved the operational plan. If so, why didn't it include a prep of the planned troop insertion area by the USS Westchester County's (LST-1167) Seawolf helicopter fire team (LHFT)? It is basic riverine warfare to always, if available, conduct a supporting arms prep of the planned troop insertion point. The way I read Admiral Yost's oral history, the Seawolf helicopters on the tank landing ship (LST) were only about a 15-minute flight away, but Hoffmann would not release them. It is amazing to me that the request for gunship support by the on-scene commander, Yost, would be denied. That is not the way we did business on Game Warden (Task Force 116) operations!
During my 14 months in command of the RSSZ River Patrol Group, we conducted numerous joint Operations with RVN troops. Some of these operations were up to battalion size and were usually with local Regional Force troops, although on a few occasions we supported either Vietnamese Marines or Mike Force montagnard troops. We certainly had our share of narrow rivers and bayous in the Rung Sat, but never once were we ambushed by the Vietcong.
Since in all likelihood the medical facilities on the World War II-vintage LST Westchester County could have been overwhelmed, I am amazed that the Task Force 115 staff did not liaison with the closest U.S./RVN field hospital to learn if they had an available "dust-off medical evacuation helicopter. In my opinion this would have been a far better option to treat wounded troopers and patrol craft (fast) crewmen.
Using a Seawolf UH-1B gunship for a medical evacuation during a firefight would be very unsound since it would reduce your LHFT gunship support by 50%. As one who has flown more than 20 combat missions in the UH-IB, I can tell you it is a very tight squeeze to embark an extra person, especially if that person had to be attended to medically.
I have no idea of what the friendly losses were at Duong Keo, but I now have a better feel for Admiral Zumwalt's oral history comments concerning Roy Hoffmann's leadership traits and the resulting low morale among his Swift boat skippers. For more details on Hoffmann and the low morale of Swift boat skippers, see pages 523-525 of Admiral Zumwalt's oral history, published in 2003 by the Naval Institute.
Admiral Paul A. Yost, Jr., U.S. Coast Guard (Retired), Commandant, U.S. Coast Guard, 1986-1990-Many thanks to Mr. Shirley for catching the geographical error in my article. He was correct; the action took place on the Duong Keo, not the Bo De. (I commanded Seafloat later on the Bo De.) There were just 8 boats plus the underwater demolition team boat (PF-43) in this operation, not 13 boats as Mr. Shirley says. I have high regard for my old boss, Rear Admiral Hoffman, and the highest regard for all the Swift boat crews. Perhaps Shirley's harsh remarks are colored by the political goals of Swift Boat Veterans for Truth. I conducted my oral history in 2001, with no thought of the 2004 election. The article that was edited from this 600-page history is as accurate as the fog of war will allow 35 years later.
I quote, in part, the U.S. Naval Forces Vietnam Historical Summary for April 1969:
"Eight PCF's [patrol crafts (fast)], with 6th Battalion VNMC [Vietnamese Marine Corps] troops embarked, sailed the Duong Keo River during late afternoon on 12 April for sweep operations in the day's objective area. At 1734, a large scale enemy initiated firefight by an estimated two Viet Cong companies was unleashed as the PCFs in column formation reached a position four miles upstream from the river mouth (VQ 046 544). Detonation of two claymore mines from the northwest bank was immediately followed by intensive B-40 rocket, recoilless rifle [R/R], .30 and .50 caliber machine-gun, riflegrenade and small-arms fire. PCF 43 was hit by R/R and B-40 rounds which disabled her steering gear and fatally wounded the boat skipper, LTJG D. G. DROZ. The boat beached at high speed in the center of the ambush site, as B-40 rockets continued to smash into her. Uninjured crewmen and underwater demolition team personnel aboard set up a hasty perimeter around the boat as PCFs 5 and 31 returned alongside to assist the stricken PCF 43, at the same time maintaining a heavy volume of fire. Seawolves reacted in five minutes and placed heavy machine gun fire in the area."
I note that the "reaction" of the Seawolf helicopters in five minutes is referring to their launch from the deck of the LST, 10 to 15 miles offshore. Their arrival was some 20 minutes later.
The one advantage I have over Mr. Shirley is that I was there.
"Breach of Contract"
(See B. Hayes, p. 80, October 2004 Proceedings)
Stanley Kalemaris-Captain Hayes is correct that there are dangers to the military in contracting with corporations for traditional military functions, starting decades ago with the use of rent-a-cops as gate guards at bases. Unfortunately, recent experience shows that civilians are not the only ones who will refuse dangerous logistics missions.
Captain Hayes ignores the fact that the breach goes both ways. One reason for having a military is to protect civilians from becoming casualties of war. In the incident referred to in the opening of Captain Hayes's submission, he fails to note the military did not come to the aid of the civilians and did not attempt to recover their bodies until well after the event.
"Let Them Eat Democracy"
(See S. Pressfield, p. 30, October 2004; M. Tomlinson, pp. 16-22, November 2004 Proceedings)
Nolan Nelson-Steven Pressfield makes a case for allowing tribalism to continue as the basis for forming national governments. Most often through the millennia, the result has been crushing civil wars and pandemics of disease and starvation leaving survivors exhausted, numb, and apathetic, and willing to accept any government that emerged. The preference for bad rule of their own was a code phrase spoken by the ascendant tribe. Dissenting opinions no longer were heard. Next came years or centuries of repression until the next round of civil wars. A few recent examples are Rwanda, Iraq, Cambodia, and Afghanistan. Before we think this is a problem just for the unenlightened, we should remember our own Dark Ages.
True, the city-state (read tribe) of Athens did not come to power by crushing civil war. Neither did it become an empire by the device of spreading democracy. With the cooperation of the other city-states, the Athenians subverted the common fund of the Confederacy of Delos intended to keep the Persians at bay. Allowing contributions of money instead of troops and ships converted an effort for the common defense into payments of tribute funding Athenian armed forces placed in other city-states. Democracy served the growing empire by forming unified governing coalitions through restrictive enfranchisement. This nonrepresentative government, under a now revered title, neither protected minorities nor allowed representation by the majority.
This fact is demonstrated by the Peloponnesian Wars. These civil wars began because military and political repression gave no meaningful opportunities to settle differences. The area was fractured into tribes that continued to fight each other, that were conquered by Romans, Ottomans, and others, and that finally emerged as Greece in the 19th century.
In the present Muslim world, we cannot wait 1,000 or 2,000 years for representative government to emerge. Tribes energized by Islamic fundamentalism and Wahhabi jihadism continue to hold inordinate power over governments in the Arab world. Within this generation, people trained in those two -isms will earn graduate degrees in chemistry, political science, mechanical engineering, biology, economics, and physics. From benign and/or supportive national environments, they will then be able to target us for repeated cataclysmic attacks, which have often consumed 1% to 5% of a population.
The government we are striving to assist in Iraq is not the tyranny of democracy, but something similar to the bicameral or parliamentary model proven to allow dominant participation by the moderate constituencies so often excluded from Arab governments. The Iraqi interim government of 25 ethnically and religiously divided members produced an extraordinary document to serve as a basis for constitutional government. Provided we keep faith with these people, a government can emerge radically different from ours, and revolutionary for the Arab world. There will be no lasting victory in the war on terror until such successes convince tribes that essential individuality can be preserved within a national structure that none coercively dominate.
Commander John T. Kuehn, U.S. Navy (Retired), Assistant Professor, Military History, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College-I was dismayed to see Mr. Pressfield's use of the convenient historical analogy. Comparing the culture and temperament of the United States to fourth-century B.C. Athens is not only tenuous from a scholarly standpoint but misleading. History provides insight, not formulaic prescriptions. The context for the two cultures is completely different. Cultural comparison across history or cultures is extremely risky.
However, the author-despite his flawed underlying analogy-is almost on target regarding values. The thesis that not all people of this world yearn for democracy nor profit by it in similar ways is important. Perhaps we should stop all this talk of democracy and instead replace it with the term self-determination. This, as the author notes, is perhaps the value trait that is more fundamental across cultures. The only problem for U.S. policy in this regard is that what Iraqis might determine (or not determine as a result of civil war) may be of greater danger to the United States than something the United States and its allies might impose. By way of observation, it is interesting to watch the traditional partisans of liberal and individual freedoms as they argue against such for other peoples and cultures. I think the trait we/they share most with the Athenians is hubris.
Mr. Pressfield, though, spends more time critiquing American democracy than emphasizing the really important point about how hubris can contribute to policy mistakes and missteps. Instead, we are offered the old "new left" version of reality, wherein what the United States really offers is evil "corporate capitalism." This amounts to making the same sort of mistakes and missteps from the other side of the political spectrum. By this diversion, the author comes across as a reflection of Michael Moore after having half digested Thucydides. The readers of Proceedings deserve more thoughtful leftward opinions (as well as those from the right and center) than those offered by the author. Here are a few names from the academic/op ed community that would have served this purpose better, some of whom Proceedings has published in the past and with considerable expertise on the Peloponnesian War: Jeffrey Record, George Will, Robert Kaplan, Robert Kagan, Donald Kagan, John Lynn, and Victor Davis Hanson.
Combat Fleets: HMCS Chicoutimi
(See E. Wertheim, p. 90, November 2004 Proceedings)
Senior Chief Robert F. Marble, U.S. Navy (Retired)-In October, the U.S. Navy submarine support ship SSV Carolyn Chouest joined in the international rescue efforts for the Canadian submarine HMCS Chicoutimi after electrical fires broke out while she was surfaced more than 100 miles northwest of Ireland in the eastern Atlantic.
When requests for assistance came in, the Carolyn Chouest was on a port call in Faslane, Scotland. She arrived on scene and found five British ships assisting the submarine. The British tugboat MV Anglican Prince initially towed the submarine, but the U.S. vessel took over the tow. She has towing monitoring equipment aboard and can tow at a quicker speed than regular tug boats. At Cumbrae Gap, in the Firth of Clyde, an inlet of water near Scotland that provides passage to Faslane, the British tugboats took over and pulled the submarine in.
The U.S. Navy's important part in this rescue, which was overlooked in Mr. Wertheim's article, should be recognized in Proceedings.
"The Value of Electronic Warfare Endures"
(See R. Poore, pp. 36-37. September 2004; D. Goure, pp. 10-12, October 2004 Proceedings)
Commander Paul Bergondy, U.S. Navy (Retired)-I readily identified with Captain Poore's assessment of the Navy's electronic warfare evolution from simple oneon-one jamming into the multimission aircraft that is deployed today.
As a member of the tactical electronic warfare squadron community from 1966 to 1975 I share Captain Poore's concern regarding the limitations of a two-seal EA18G. Here's a little more ammunition to Captain Poore's argument that a two-seater would not be able to effectively manage the tasks of the current EA-6B. In the September 2004 issue of the Journal of Electronic Defense, a blurb stated an add-on contract was issued to BAE for 25 AN/USQ-113 (V)3, bringing total to 124 systems. The purpose of these systems, currently installed on the EA-6B, is to conduct communications analysis and jamming as part of the suppression of enemy air defenses. The one-man crew in the EA18G would be sorely challenged to add this capability to his other demanding electronic warfare tasks.
"Serving a Nation at WarA Campaign Quality Army with Joint and Expeditionary Capabilities"
(See J. Warden, p. 66, September 2004 Proceedings)
Christopher Hileman-I worked as a Defense Intelligence Agency analyst attached to Commander, Joint Task Force 7 in Iraq. Having worked in a joint environment gives me a unique view of Colonel Warden's review of the Army white paper. While has valid points about making our troops more effective than those of their predecessors, his example of Operation Allied Force is flawed. It was proved that while the human cost was low in Operation Allied Force, the cost to fight it was higher, given that many U.S. air combat and reconnaissance systems were defeated by basic battlefield deception techniques. The only way to defeat battlefield deception is to place forces on the ground to visually verify targets and to later hold the ground if need be.
The United States has by far one of the most technologically advanced militaries in history, which means we increasingly depend on that technology for victory. Our enemies are well aware of this weakness as well as our desire and need to win with few casualties, as has been made clear by filming attacks, kidnappings, and murders then distributing the footage to sway public opinion.
This has been a fact that has been proven in Iraq, most notably in the improvised explosive device (IED)/vehicleborne IED campaign, where even the most sophisticated systems are being defeated by something as easy as a few 155mm artillery shells wired to a car alarm or other electronic device and detonated with devastating results. What we also have found is that Iraq and other countries and groups have extensive IED programs designed to defeat even the best technology. The attack on the USS Cole (DDG-67) by an IED-laden boat is another example.
Many solutions to this have been proposed to fight the IED campaign, some involving U.S. air assets to try to mitigate the risk factor. In the end, however, these systems were ineffective, and no U.S. commander wants to put such assets at risk. In this sense, it has created a catch22, where commanders, while not wanting to lose troops, also face the fear of losing a multimillion-dollar and often very limited resource.
What has worked is that the troops on the ground merged with advancing technologies and intelligence. In January, Operation Ghafiqi was launched to go after Iraqi bomb makers. This operation could not have been done in any other form but with ground forces, as air strikes can cost intelligence and also prove fatal to efforts for peace when targets are in residential areas.
It was clear to Iraq and many of our other enemies after the 1991 Gulf War that U.S. air power coupled with U.S. ground forces would have a devastating effect on any force that chose to face us on an open battlefield. It was also clear from that point on that the United States would prefer to rely on technology and not risk the lives of our troops. In light of that, many countries (including Iraq) could not afford advanced systems to counter the U.S. technological advantage, and chose instead to return to tried-and-true tactics of battlefield deception and unconventional warfare.
Many of our enemies are no doubt watching Iraq and Afghanistan and planning how they will create doctrine and fight the United States if necessary. Much of this doctrine will no doubt involve lowlevel technologies that can defeat our systems through either deception or simple and cost-effective attacks. Reliance on technology or one service would be a fatal mistake for U.S. war planners and narrow options for those same planners. At the moment and for the foreseeable future, the U.S. military will lead the world, with the possible exception of China, in technological advances and equipment. Our enemies will have no choice but to develop more simplistic approaches to combat that will exploit our reliance on technology and our desire to keep losses down.
The joint environment can lead to success by drawing on the strengths of all our armed forces and tailoring them to the situation at hand. In the end, however, it will come to holding the ground or having small teams that can provide intelligence and counter the enemy's efforts at every turn. The U.S. military must continue to fight as one team and develop new technologies to better protect our forces, however we must be keenly aware of our reliance on that same technology and how easily it can be defeated. Over the years we have lowered the human toll of warfare and of ground warfare. But in the end we still need the soldier or Marine to take and occupy territory when needed, and no amount of technology will ever replace this fact.
The U.S. military needs to focus on our continued evolution out of Cold War doctrine, developing those technologies that increase battlefield survivability, and at the same time never forgetting to instill in our forces and their leaders lessons and skills that have never changed.
EDITOR'S NOTE: The Army white paper is available on the Naval Institute Web site: http://www.usni.org/proceedings/ Articles04/PRO06ArmyServiceNation.htm
"The Commander Failed at Abu Ghraib"
(See M. Collins, p. 12, August 2004 Proceedings')
James H. Lantelme-Commander Collins cites the USS Hobson (DD-464) as colliding with the USS Wasp. It is true that the Hobson was commissioned as a destroyer in 1942 bearing that designation. However, in late 1944, 23 destroyers were converted into fast destroyer minesweepers, were given DMS designations, and were sent to the Pacific war zone. The Hobson then became DMS-26 and that was the ship that was rammed and sunk by the Wasp.
I am quite familiar with the Hobson (DMS-26) as it was the sister ship to the USS Fitch (DMS-25), on which I served from 1950-1952. I also knew several of the men on board the Hobson, as they had served on the Fitch and were transferred just before the Hobson sailed for a sixmonth deployment with the Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean. All of the crew members of the Hobson went down with their ship.
I hope Commander Collins will be more careful in future writings.
Frank B. Turberville Jr.-I concur completely with Commander Collins about General Janis Karpinski and her command performance at Abu Ghraib. If her complaints are valid, she should have insisted on a clarification of her command orders. Failing that, she should now insist on a court martial to clear her name. Without that, she and the Army stand convicted by the "evidence" as published-all footprints of cover-up, with all the Pentagon media specialists working double-time to prove otherwise.
Lieutenant Commander William J. Tierney, captain of the USS Hohson (DMS-26), was on the bridge conning his ship at 2200 on 26 April 1952, where he died at the time of the collision. I know this because I was in the USS Pawcatuck (AO-108), which had fueled the Hohson earlier that day. The Hohson did not "sink"; she was plowed under by the force of the collision. There is much more to this story. Please see my previous item and that of Captain Albert F. Schaufelberger (Naval History, Summer 1988, pp. 6-7).
"Hobson's choice" is an expression that predates the USS Hobson (DMS-26) by several centuries. It refers to Tobias Hobson, a 17th-century Cambridge, England, innkeeper who made no pretense in respect to the fare available in his inn. It was simply, "This or nothing-take it or leave it!" The message "Hobson's Choice" that Commander Collins reports seeing on many a bulkhead was probably a message from the ship's wardroom mess officer that he was cutting back on the available fare in the wardroom for budget reasons. It's a lot like the World War II rivet inspector's approval message, "Kilroy was here," repeated by G.I.s all over the world.
Lieutenant (junior grade) Lloyd F. KeIeher, U.S. Naval Reserve-I am a survivor of the sinking of the USS Hobson (DMS26). I would have been officer of the deck (OOD) on the next watch. The captain was on the bridge and had the conn at the time of the collision. He had relieved the OOD because the OOD, Bill Hoefer, did not want to make one of the most basic errors in ship handling, reorienting on a turn signal. Hoefer told the captain of his concern and he was relieved. 1 know this from speaking with surviving bridge personnel as well as Bill Hoefer. The captain did not survive.
I have always wondered if I would have had the guts to do what Bill did if it had happened a few hours later.
"Ask the Warriors about Iraq"
(See S. Coerr, p. 2, August 2004; H. Archer, pp. 15-18; J. Mosiuk Jr., p. 18, September 2004; B. Tillman, p. 16, October 2004 Proceedings)
William S. Merrihew-I seriously doubt it is the "worldwide recognition of the lack of foundation for those reasons [to enter into war with Iraq because of suspected weapons of mass destruction or to avenge the 11 September 2001 attacks] that has compromised the virtue of America's cause," as stated by Mr. Archer. I suspect that for France, Germany, and Russia it is more a case of collusion in the oil-for-food program with Iraq, in which bribes were likely in full bloom with the leaders of these countries and probably the United Nations.
"Our Iraq unilateralism was the culmination of a series of arrogant disregards for what others may think of us: renunciation of the antiballistic missile treaty, scorn for the Kyoto Accord, and rejection of the International Criminal Court." Please! Mr. Archer is worried that we have renounced the antiballistic treaty with the Soviet Union? What country is that exactly? How can we violate a treaty with a nonexistent entity? "Scorn for the Kyoto Accord"-come on, this was a treaty liked by only radical environmental groups, such as Earth First! and the Sierra Club, and Third World countries on the prowl for financial gains at America's expense. As I recall, only one or perhaps no senator voted for the Kyoto Accord. "International Criminal Court"-is that the court that would subjugate our courts to some foreign entity? Why would any rational country do that? Why should we await the consent of alien governments before we decide to defend ourselves or decide how to initiate security for ourselves? I know our Supreme Court allegedly has reviewed foreign law to determine how they should decide the legality of a U.S. law, but I don't believe the rest of us should be so corrupted.
I find the arguments presented by Mr. Archer to be among the mindless incantations of the Left.
"Hybrid-Electric Drive Will Eliminate Tactical Shortfalls"
(See F. Wald, p. 73-75, September 2004 Proceedings)
C. Henry Depew-Captain WaId presents a good argument for changes in propulsion systems for some vehicles. To make the system even more useful would be to decrease the battery count/size and use an on-board replenishment system to keep the battery at full charge. Granted, this still involves the supply of bulk fluid. But the fluid is water instead of combustible petrol products.
The hybrid process I am suggesting uses hydrogen (extracted from water) as the fuel. Hydrogen does not need to be stored to power a vehicle. In fact, modifying some of the current hybrid internalcombustion engine/electrical propulsion automobiles makes a hydrogen-powered hybrid possible. One method would be to use a small, internal-combustion engine to spin a generator/alternator to charge the batteries. The engine would use a patented (in 1982 by Francois P. Cornish) hydrogen generation device and carburetor. The hydrogen, generated as needed for the engine, works by immersing an aluminum wire in water and subjecting it to an electrical charge. The water reacts with the charged aluminum wire (18,000 volts at 1 amp) to produce hydrogen gas and an aluminum oxide participate.
This approach gives the Marines a hybrid/electric vehicle without the need for a large, expensive battery and provides a means to charge the battery at a rather low cost. Also, there is no hydrogen storage problem-the hydrogen is consumed as it is created and if not needed, it is not created). I doubt it will be seen on the road any time soon because the concept is not a high-tech solution requiring a large research dollar investment.