In the post-Cold War world, most naval professionals take for granted that investments in platforms, systems, people, and training must be oriented to address asymmetric threats, rapid changes in technology, globalization, and new business realities. These 21st-century warriors live in a world of fast, adaptable, networked forces that must maintain high states of readiness and employ precision weapons with integrated joint and coalition partners. Shifting national demographics, the demands of a more technically oriented force, the high operating tempos of the global war on terrorism, and a tight fiscal environment create new challenges for the way our Navy is manned. Thus, it should surprise no one that Chief of Naval Operations Vern Clark directed our Navy to take a fresh look at the role of the Navy’s Reserve and how it integrates with the active forces to operate in this new environment.
The Navy’s reserve component (RC) was structured for the Cold War and designed around large-scale mobilizations and relatively slow response times enabled by adequate warning timelines. Over the years, the RC experienced “mission creep” by accepting roles not originally envisioned for reserve forces. Meanwhile, the active component (AC) managed its RC largely by benign neglect, because the reserve operating model simply did not fit with how the Navy operated. The global war on terrorism, with its greater emphasis on use of reserve forces in specialty roles and to sustain the overall effort, demands that the Navy have the right reserve capabilities. It became imperative to restructure and reintegrate the Navy’s Reserve into the Navy—to create a properly aligned and integrated total force designed to provide the capabilities outlined in “Sea Power 21” and to support the Fleet Response Plan.
The key step in achieving active-reserve integration is to determine what the AC really needs its RC to do and when the RC needs to do it. Accordingly, last year Admiral Clark tasked Fleet Forces Command to conduct a review of all reserve capabilities required by the AC. This zero-based review laid the groundwork for a more integrated total force in which RC functions directly support “Sea Power 21” missions. Admiral Clark was briefed on the process and product of the review in August 2004.
The zero-bsed review systematically studied gaps in AC capabilities that should be filled by the RC. Cost and risk values were assigned to each validated reserve capability relative to the active-duty mission so senior leaders could make informed decisions on the appropriate levels of investment. The result was a blend of existing and new capabilities, and some were recommended for realignment or divestment. The review acknowledged two essential types of support the AC will receive from the RC: (1) the Navy has needs that are best filled by discrete units that stand up when required to provide a specific capability, and (2) there is a clear need for individuals or portions of units that can augment existing active commands. Nearly every validated capability is designed to increase the warfighting capacity of the active force. The new validation concept is simply what the AC needs to have, not just what is nice to have.
Activities and commands are now coordinating with claimants and resource sponsors to develop a multiyear transition plan to align their manning requirements to these approved RC functions. In addition, Fleet Forces Command will be conducting an analysis of existing and future joint requirements. As the culture change required by active-reserve integration begins to take hold in the AC, new opportunities for integration that truly increase the capacity of the active force will emerge that must be addressed.
The Way Ahead
The next step is to give the active-duty forces the ability to access their reserve forces when they need them, to train them the way they want them to be trained, and to report their readiness.
This means the AC will take ownership of the readiness of the RC, with individual active-duty commanding officers clearly understanding they are responsible for the readiness of their supporting reserve forces. The AC will define what training levels the RC will meet, apply metrics to the required RC readiness levels, and oversee RC training.
Good communication is vital to active-reserve integration. The RC has been very successful over the past year in informing its members about the new obligations this integration brings and the Chief of Naval Operations’ vision for a total force. It will take strong, involved leadership to ensure our active-duty commanders and commanding officers understand and embrace the notion that their supporting reservists are a daily responsibility and force multiplier. Cultural acceptance on the part of the AC will lead to even stronger acceptance on the part of the RC. A fully integrated active and reserve force will exist only when the AC and RC break through many of their paradigms of the past and realize the art of the possible.
We also must adjust the supporting bureaucracy and structure to eliminate impediments that restrict AC access to its RC. The Navy needs to be able to tap the military and civilian skills that reside within the reserve forces, and the RC must demonstrate flexibility to meet the capabilities required by the fleet. This will mean finding new ways to structure and fund how the reserves are tied to the active force. It is clear that the days of drilling 2 days per month and 14 days per year at a reserve center or conducting convenient exercises are over. We are now a surge Navy, which means that when we need the reserve forces, they must be ready. The message for the reservists is that they need to be prepared to mobilize one or more times during a career—or consider finding a different part-time job. Again, effective communication is critical. As long as families and employers of reservists know their serving family members and employees are making a difference in our nation’s security, they will be much more supportive about the reservists deploying. A deployment may be for 30 to 60 days of operational support or it may be for 6 months to 12 months of mobilization.
To support this new construct, RC units requiring tactical skills eventually will be located in the fleet concentration areas. Reserve capabilities in the nation’s heartland will focus on skills that are not perishable or that do not require frequent training with the AC to achieve tactical proficiency. The RC structure in the heartland will fill more of the Navy’s joint requirements to support the Northern Command and the Strategic Command.
There will be cultural obstacles to active-reserve integration, particularly in areas where the most dramatic changes will occur. It may be years before reserve force integration will be routine. However, the long-overdue focus of this integration will transform the Navy’s Reserve into what it was intended all along to be: a valuable force multiplier for our Navy.
Admiral Anderson is Director for Force Integration and Admiral Winnefeld is Director for Warfare Programs and Requirements, Fleet Forces Command.