In winter 2004, the U.S. Central Command committed its theater reserve, the 22d Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable) (MEU[SOC]), into central Afghanistan to serve as the main effort of Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) 180's Operation Mountain Storm. The operation was designed to preempt a long-anticipated Taliban "spring offensive" and help set the conditions for successful voter registration and national-level elections.
The operational concept developed by CJTF-180 planners called for the 22d MEU to enter Afghanistan through the southern airfield of Kandahar in March 2004. The physical and logistical challenges were daunting. Located in southern Afghanistan, Kandahar airfield lies just ten miles southeast of the former Taliban capital, Kandahar City. The ship-to-shore movement to Kandahar airfield required the MEU to traverse southern Pakistan's Baluchistan region, one of the most rugged and remote lands in the world. Avoiding the 8,000-foot ridges with rotary-wing aircraft lengthened the transit to 420 miles.
Difficult Terrain
After force closure at Kandahar, the MEU struck north 80 miles to operate in the Oruzgan Province area. By way of bone-jarring routes leading north from Kandahar City, there are only two main passes that afford operational access to Oruzgan Province. They cut through the 8,000-foot ridgeline that separates Oruzgan from Kandahar Province and were to occupy much of the MEU's attention as it transitioned to Tarin Kowt, the capital of Oruzgan.
At the heart of the MEU's area of operations (AO) was Tarin Kowt, a small town of 17,000. The lush vegetation that follows several watersheds leading down to the town contrasts sharply with the steep, arid mountains that surround it. At the bottom of the Tarin Kowt "bowl" (at 4,400 feet) was an old abandoned dirt airstrip that became the centerpiece of the 22d MEU's air-ground operations.
Mission Analysis
Before forces began to move, MEU planners and subordinate commanders visited Bagram twice to conduct detailed planning with the CJTF-180 staff, the core of which came from the Army's 10th Mountain Division.1 The task force staff incorporated the 22d MEU's staff in all facets of operations plan development. Thus, the MEU clearly understood the joint task force (JTF) commander's intent. Two early decisions by CJTF-180 were key to effective operations: the MEU was to function as a Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF) and was assigned its own AO, with attendant freedom of movement.
Based on analysis of the campaign plan, 22d MEU planners developed a mission statement:
Commencing 25 Apr 04, 22d MEU(SOC) conducts combat operations to defeat anti-coalition militants (ACMs), secure major population areas, and support civil-military operations (CMO) in AO Linebacker to create a secure and stable environment in order to facilitate United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA)-sponsored voter registration and elections.The MEU's primary task was to set the conditions for a safe election process leading to establishment of a secure and stable government in Afghanistan. This entailed finding and defeating anticoalition forces, securing major population areas, and supporting civil-military operations across the MEU's AO—with the emphasis on voter registration.
The MEU commander's intent provided the working framework for mission accomplishment:
- Develop a bottom-to-top intelligence architecture capable of identifying locations of anticoalition leaders and enablers, areas of sanctuary, and infiltration lanes. The intent was to gather and fuse intelligence at the MEU level without being entirely dependent on higher sources. The previous work of Special Forces and other agencies in the AO was most helpful in this regard.
- Provide a visible security environment for voter registration.
- Capitalize on MAGTF flexibility to conduct intelligence-driven combat operations against enemy forces.
- Aggressively link combat and civil-military operations to achieve long-term security.
- Take advantage of existing CJTF-180 capabilities and work closely with higher, adjacent, and supporting units.
- Develop the infrastructure and logistical capability austerely so as to fight the MEU without detracting from support to frontline forces.
- Because the fight will be carried by noncommissioned officers, tailor combat support and combat service support to meet their requirements.
Campaign Planning and Execution
The 22d MEU designed a four-phase operation that capitalized on MAGTF strength while leveraging joint and national assets. Phase I (25 March-24 April) consisted of shaping operations. Based from Kandahar, the MEU executed a series of five, long-range, overt patrols into Oruzgan Province. Moving in high-mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicles (HMMWVs) and locally procured vehicles, the MEU capitalized on support provided by Special Forces teams operating in the area and used its Maritime Special-Purpose Force as the main effort. These initial operations were designed to study the terrain, select a a site for the MEU forward operating base (FOB), begin contacts with the local populace to help identify Taliban leaders, and establish a working relationship with the Oruzgan provincial governor, Jan Mohammed Khan.
The MEU commander accompanied Marines on one of the operations and spent two days with Mohammed at his gubernatorial headquarters in Tarin Kowt. After the initial contact, a Marine field-grade officer equipped with secure communications was assigned to the governor's entourage. The value of these liaison efforts in the subsequent phases of Mountain Storm cannot be overemphasized.
The 22d MEU first gained contact with the enemy during the shaping phase. While moving through the 6,600-foot defile known as Central Pass, a convoy was ambushed by direct fire and a remote-controlled improvised explosive device (IED). A medium tactical vehicle replacement (MTVR) was destroyed by the Italian antitank mine that formed the core of the IED and one Marine was injured severely. (This was the only effective IED attack against the 22d MEU during its seven-month deployment.)
Phase II (25 April-10 May) was devoted to securing the Tarin Kowt bowl. After arriving in the province, the MEU concentrated on establishing its FOB near Tarin Kowt. A strategic imperative of the Taliban was to ensure that Oruzgan Province remained isolated from the rest of Afghanistan, thereby affording safety to Taliban operations and support.
Establishment of the FOB was critical to the MEU's concept of sustainment and combat power projection. Named after Marine Colonel John W. Ripley of Dong Ha fame, the base would feature a 6,000-foot runway, a complete helicopter fueling and rearming point, and 13 helicopter landing pads. The MEU command-and-control center was set up in the middle of the Oruzgan bowl. Until the airstrip became operational, however, all equipment and resupply had to traverse the 85 miles from Kandahar over Route Tiger, a two-day trip on primitive, vehicle-destroying roads ripe with ambush sites.
Two combat operations served as a shield behind which MEU Service Support Group 22 and the command element deployed to FOB Ripley. The MEU air combat element, Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 266 (Reinforced), helilifted two reinforced rifle companies into AOs Georgia and Alabama; a third company was landed in AO North Carolina. The air assaults attacked Taliban elements in areas they viewed as safe and provided cover for movement of the six large convoys that carried the bulk of the MEU's logistical support infrastructure to Ripley.
While these operations netted large weapons caches—especially in AO Georgia—the greater effect was to directly challenge the Taliban's ability to continue to isolate Oruzgan. Establishment of the command-and-control center at FOB Ripley ended Phase II. The 22d MEU had positioned itself right in the Taliban's backyard.
Phase III (11-31 May) featured intelligence-driven operations aimed at facilitating voter registration. Oruzgan Province had long been denied to U.N. voter registration workers because of well-founded concerns about personal safety. To this end, Phase III operations focused on clearing Taliban forces from southern Oruzgan, improving the security environment, and—most important—initiating voter registration.
In early April, the MEU commander and key staff officers met with Southern Region UNAMA officials in Kandahar to discuss the way ahead. There was consensus that the most important step would be to create the visible perception that the security situation would allow voter registration to proceed unmolested. Agreements were reached between the MEU and UNAMA to provide area security for voter registration sites, action plans for countering attacks, and medical evacuation support. An overarching plan was crafted for initiating and expanding voter registration throughout Oruzgan Province.
Hand in hand with voter registration was initiation of a broad array of civil affairs projects designed to show a credible alternative to the negative path offered by the Taliban. Under the MEU's direction, numerous civil affairs projects were initiated in Oruzgan and northern Kandahar Province, and extensive medical and dental outreach programs were initiated.
Underwriting these long-term projects were combat activities. Operations Thunderball in AO Tennessee and Bladerunner I in AO Kentucky were directed against enemy elements operating in southern Oruzgan. These HMMWV- and MTVR-mobile actions were built around heavily reinforced rifle companies and the battalion mobile command post. Contact was light throughout these operations because the enemy chose to withdraw rather than face Battalion Landing Team (BLT) 1/6.
As the MEU progressed through Phase III, it became clear that the threat to Tarin Kowt did not lie in the villages and bottomland of the Oruzgan bowl. Instead, anticoalition elements were concentrated in the distant highlands that ringed the bowl: Dey Chopan to the east and Cehar Cineh to the west. In the narrow valleys and almost completely inaccessible high ground of the two areas, Taliban sanctuary had been persistent and arrogantly self-confident. When voter registration began in earnest in Tarin Kowt and started to spread to he outlying districts, MEU planners focused on the high ground to the east.
Phase IV (1 June-13 July) built on earlier operations that had created the necessary logistical infrastructure, established security for voter registration and civil affairs work, and identified the rough foundation of the Taliban presence. Decisive combat operations against Taliban concentrations and sanctuaries would force the enemy to respond to the MEU's activities in Oruzgan.
On 1 June, BLT 1/6 embarked on Operation Asbury Park to directly target the Taliban stronghold in the Dey Chopan highlands. This proved to be one of the most effective operations in Afghanistan since coalition forces entered the country in October 2001.
For two weeks, moving exclusively in HMMWVs and locally procured Toyota Hi-Luxs and Land Rovers, the BLT engaged Taliban forces eight times. Reinforced with Afghan Militia Forces and accompanied by Governor Jan Mohammed, the Marines employed every available platform for close air support: AC-130s, B-1Bs, A-10s, AV-8Bs, and Marine and Army attack helicopters. During this sustained operation, 85 Taliban were killed; another 40 probably were killed in closed-up caves or inaccessible high ground. The fighting ranged from air strikes to intense close-range infantry engagements. In a testament to the leadership, fighting skills, and tactical acumen of small unit leaders, no Marines were killed and only 14 were wounded.
Based largely on the success of Asbury Park and supporting operations, the combatant commander extended the 22d MEU's Afghanistan deployment by 30 days. On receiving this decision, CJTF-76 put the 2d Battalion, 5th Infantry (2-5) of the Army's 25th Infantry Division (Light) under the tactical control of the MEU. Now with two ground maneuver battalions, the MEU developed a plan to exploit the success of Asbury Park.
Commencing Operation Thunder Road, BLT 1/6 moved quickly into the Cehar Cineh area, accompanied by the governor and Afghani forces. Located in the western part of AO Linebacker, the Taliban had yet to surrender Cehar Cineh to conventional forces. Concurrently, in Operation Asbury Park II, 2-5 Infantry relied extensively on its organic rtillery and mortars and exploited the success of BLT 1/6 in the Dey Chopan area.
Both operations continued to dislodge enemy combatants from sanctuaries. While many weapons caches were uncovered, it soon became apparent that they had no more stomach for fighting. With Taliban authority effectively neutralized, the MEU took advantage of the two battalions' offensives by reinforcing security, accelerating civil-military projects, and initiating voter registration.
Application of MAGTF doctrine and concepts was of prime importance to the MEU. Simultaneously leading two maneuver battalions and as many as five separate company/platoon teams required detailed planning and careful application of resources—especially given highly mobile operations and missions as diverse as providing security for women's health clinics and applying artillery, air, and theater intelligence assets to attack the Taliban. In addition, being weighted as the CJTF's main effort gave the MEU tactical and logistic support that a MAGTF is well equipped to employ.
Results
In the short term, the security environment in Oruzgan Province improved dramatically. Thousands of ordnance systems, weapons, and other combat implements were destroyed. The MEU was in contact 32 times and confirmed 101 enemy killed and another 50 probable kills, including several key Taliban leaders. Attacks against coalition forces declined to nearly zero in Oruzgan and northern Kandahar provinces. Most significantly, attacks also declined to the south in and around Kandahar City and the ring road to Kabul. These were decisive and measurable military effects—but, as with everything in Afghanistan, only time will tell if they have long-term benefits.
Nonetheless, it is clear that improved security permitted the introduction of programs that will have the greatest effect on long-term security. The MEU's operations permitted the introduction of UNAMA voter registration teams; 58,357 Afghan citizens were registered in Oruzgan between 1 May and 10 July. These efforts represented more than 44% of UNAMA's provincial goal and helped overcome the initial hurdle of demonstrating to the populace that safe elections were possible in Afghanistan. Voter registration went hand in hand with 108 civil-affairs projects that provided long-range hope for Afghanistan: for example, well digging, establishment of schools, and road and infrastructure improvement. An aggressive medical and dental outreach program cared for 2,000 patients, many of whom received assistance for the first time.
Conclusions
The early decision by CJTF-180 planners to employ the 22d MEU in accordance with MAGTF doctrine was the foremost reason for the MEU's strong performance. Its high degree of air-ground-logistical integration was of inestimable value to the kind of operations required in Oruzgan Province. (In addition to a full plate of complex tasks, the ACE furnished AV-8B sorties for use in other parts of the CJTF AO.) The MEU's organic firepower and mobility, ability to execute operations rapidly, and the dedicated effort to fuse intelligence from below and above proved decisive.
The grit and determination of the individual rifleman shone in an extremely harsh environment. Marine noncommissioned officers were the most effective weapons in the MEU's arsenal. Small-unit leadership was tested in excessive elevations, heat, and dust—and it passed with flying colors. Marines remain the masters of small-unit actions.
The predeployment training provided to the MEU as part of the standard workup package proved to be a sound basis for operating in Afghanistan. In particular, the rapid response planning training provided by the II Marine Expeditionary Force Special Operations Training Group enabled the MEU to focus on time-sensitive targets with great effect and had a most positive effect on all other decision making and staff operations.
CJTFs-180 and -76 were supportive and eager to employ the MEU. They arranged a true "plug-and-play" joint environment and worked constantly to enhance the considerable intelligence capabilities of the MAGTF. In every way, they were dedicated to the effective application of individual service capabilities. Their leadership and support were essential.
The 22d MEU's deployment to Afghanistan demonstrated the inherent capabilities of the MEU(SOC) program in every measurable category. It traveled inland more than 500 miles to some of the most inhospitable terrain in the world and proved to be an expeditionary and exceptionally lethal force. It used combined arms in intense firefights while concurrently conducting civil-military operations. The MEU's successful integration into a joint command served to reinforce the merits of the Marine air-ground team and demonstrate the value of its integration with a joint force.
Strategic results of the deployment still are being assessed, but recent peaceful elections—even in former Taliban sanctuaries—are nascent signs of long-term success. And, in Oruzgan Province, they result directly from the 22d MEU's determined march into the storm.
Colonel McKenzie is commanding officer of the 22d Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable). Major Shea and Major Phelps are the staff communications officer and intelligence officer, respectively.
1. CJTF-180 would change in mid-April 2004 to the 25th Infantry Division (Light), resulting in a designator change to CJTF-76. back to article
UNITED NATIONS
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