When U.S. forces go on patrol around the world, the decisions of individual Marines and soldiers can have enormous impact. To ensure they make the right decisions, they desperately need cultural training.
A Marine squad is on patrol through a dusty slum. It is midday, and the air is thick with humidity and the smell of garbage. A barefoot little boy watches from a doorstep. Scrawny dogs dart away as the Marines move through the crooked streets. A few locals stare from the shadows, bored.
Things have been quiet for weeks, and it is the Marines' ninth straight day of patrolling in this unrelenting heat.
Suddenly, a rock is thrown. A Marine is hit in the face, and falls writhing in pain. Down the street a figure dashes into an open doorway. . . .
Is this Port-au-Prince in 1919? Tan Phu in 1967? Or Fallujah just a few hours ago? It is any of those times and places, and all of them at once. Marines of an infantry squad are at a point of decision.
Are they ready? The skills they need right now have not changed from the days of the Old Corps. No technology can substitute for them; no modern device makes them obsolete. Will this squad have the cultural and interpersonal skills to advance their unit's mission and their country's goals? Or will they make a mistake that turns civilians against them and adversely affects U.S. foreign policy?
After the initial seconds of confusion, the street is quiet. No more stones, no incoming fire. The Marines are angry, but the squad is disciplined and well trained.
The squad leader directs his Marines and radios his position and situation. A fire team starts to advance on the doorway where the figure disappeared as the others set up security. A corpsman helps the wounded Marine to the shade and gets to work.
The fire team is at the door, and Corporal Jones makes his decision.
This is the moment when the weight of U.S. foreign policy is on the shoulders of one Marine corporal. The long debates in Congress, the speeches about freedom, the allies' pledges of support, the might of the U.S. militaryall have led to this moment of decision as Corporal Jones stands in that doorway.
This situation calls for more than simple marksmanship and fieldcraft. In the next few minutes Corporal Jones will make decisions based on his understanding of who he is, who his enemy is, and what he is expected to do about the situation.
These are not decisions of grand strategy, but the corporal's actions will make a lasting impact in this neighborhood. If there is a TV crew around, these actions might even shape world opinions of the U.S. military.
Corporal Jones might be well-trained militarily, but is he well-trained culturally?
The Need for Cultural Training
When Corporal Jones opens that door, how will he react to what he sees and hears? How will he deal with the people he encounters? Without cultural training, his reaction will be a product of his personal experiences and beliefs. He might have cultural misunderstandings that lead to serious errors in judgment. He might fail in his mission-and he might find himself despised by one poor neighborhood, or by a billion horrified TV viewers.
Cultural knowledge of the battlespace should not be left to on-the-job training. Stories from Vietnam, Afghanistan, and Iraq demonstrate that these lessons often are painfully relearned, time and time again, by each new rotation of troops.
This information must first come through formal training and a cultural orientation to the battlespace, the enemy, and the civilian population. This training will provide the foundation for continuous learning about the enemy, from observations on patrols, tips from friendly locals, and subtle changes in local routine. Marines must use every intelligence source available to them, and every patrol is like a day at the library to those who are culturally literate
Bad things happen when cultural training is ignored:
* "Many in Iraq trace the start of the year-old insurgency in Sunni areas to an incident that had a clear cultural dimension." (Associated Press, 21 May 2004)
* '"Soldiers don't seem to understand the Iraqi custom of not using banks-a lot of people keep fairly substantial sums of money at home,' said Stewart, a coordinator for Christian Peacemaker Teams. 'A soldier from Kentucky or wherever sees that and thinks the person must be up to no good, so he takes it.'" (Reuters, 25 May 2004)
* "House raids have been particularly hurtful to Iraqis who maintain that the practice violates the sanctity of their homes, and exposes their women to strangers. . . . Whenever women have been arrested . . . angry protests have occurred." (Associated Press, 21 May 2004)
* "The participation of female soldiers in security raids or in searching cars at checkpoints is demeaning to Iraqi men who aren't used to taking orders from women." (Fox News, 22 May 2004)
* "Incidents in which U.S. troops enter mosques without taking off their shoes as is custom for Muslims cause deep offence and often lead to accusations that the Americans are crusaders trying to destroy Islam." (Associated Press, 21 May 2004)
* '"American soldiers entered the mosque with their shoes on! And with machine-guns in their hands!' Imam Abdulsatar al-Janabi said." (WSW News, 9 January 2004)
"Marine Corps Strategy 21" discusses the need for continued evolution of the air-ground task force, especially through enhancements in joint/multinational enabling, operational reach, tactical flexibility, and support and sustainment. In each of these areas, cultural training would enhance a task force's warfighting power by improving Marines' abilities to communicate, persuade, interpret information, and make decisions.
In "Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare," former Commandant General J. L. Jones expresses his desire to: produce leaders who have the experience to judge what needs to be done, know how to do it, and exhibit traits of trust, nerve, and restraint; develop leaders who function in an environment of ambiguity and uncertainty and make timely and effective decisions under stress; develop leaders by improving their capacity to recognize patterns, distinguish critical information, and make decisions quickly; and enhance leaders' decision-making skills with investments in education.
There is no better argument for the need for cultural training for Marine leaders. From squad leaders to expeditionary force commanders, this knowledge will make a difference on the battlefield. Cultural training is nothing more than following the words of Sun Tzu, who taught that "if you know your enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred battles."
Know Your Enemy-Know Yourself
To respond appropriately to the rock-throwing incident, Corporal Jones must understand both his unit's mission and his nation's goals. Beyond the rules of engagement, he should understand the context of his presence on that dusty street. Corporal Jones is more than a grunt. He should understand that he is an instrument of U.S. policy, a representative of the United States and its values.
Corporal Jones must know his enemy, and how that enemy thinks. He does not need a degree in political science, but he must know something about his enemy's motivations and beliefs. He needs a lot more than the simpleminded story that the enemy "hates freedom" or is just "the bad guy." He must understand why his enemy risks his life in combat, and why the enemy finds support within the civilian population.
Corporal Jones also must have a grasp of his enemy's capabilities, his tendencies and habits (on the battlefield and off), and his goals. He must know his enemy's weapons, tactics, strengths, and weaknesses. This learning should start in the classroom before deployment, but it will be enhanced by daily observations on the battlefield.
The corporal also must learn something about the local people and their customs. How do they interact with strangers? What courtesies are important to them? What gestures do they find insulting?
Language Training
Language and culture go together, and training in these subjects should be offered concurrently. Nearly every Marine can learn at least 25 basic phrases in a new language, and should be expected to do so before deploying. Teaching Marines to shout "hands up" or "drop the weapon" is not enough. Marines should learn how to greet the locals, to ask basic questions, and to behave properly within the culture.
Many Marines could learn much more than 25 phraseswithout needing to attend a formal school. With motivated instructors and the use of audiotapes and videos, language training can become a regular part of down time on board ship and in garrison. This training will pay huge dividends on the battlefield, building bonds of trust and understanding between Marines and the local population.
The Payoff
"Information operations have always proven applicable across the full range of military operations," writes former Commandant Jones in "Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare." "Information operations will be used to shape the strategic environment or impart a clearer understanding and perception of a specific mission and its purpose. Information operations will be a force multiplier."
With proper cultural orientation to the battlespace, every Marine leader can conduct his own information operations. For Marines trained in the local culture and language, every patrol is an information operation-disseminating this country's message and interpreting the intelligence that always is available on the street. The improvement on the warfighting power of the squad, platoon, and company would be dramatic, especially in that highest of military endeavors: winning battles without needing to fight at all.
* Every war is a war of persuasion. Whether with artillery or leaflets, bullets or bread, we must destroy the enemy's will to fight. We never will kill them all, but we can convince them all to stay home.
* Persuasion always is culturally sensitive. You cannot persuade someone if you do not understand his language, motivations, fears, and desires.
* Cultural training improves battlefield decision making at every level, from the most junior Marine leader up. A Marine leader who is not familiar with the local culture and language is effectively blind to all the intelligence right in front of him.
* Cultural training should be organized and packaged for use at the small-unit level. Pocket guides, videos, and formal classroom instruction must replace trial-and-error cultural training.
* Language and cultural training go together. Language skills should be part of what makes the Marine Corps an elite fighting force. Every unit needs a few trigger-pullers who can communicate with friendly forces and civilians in the local language.
There is nothing difficult or privileged about cultural knowledge of the enemy and the civilian population. This is not the domain of field officers only. It must be taught to leaders at every level, because at any moment the most junior Marine leader might be called on to make decisions that have far-reaching ramifications.
At that moment of truth, a Marine leader should not be making decisions in the dark-he needs basic cultural training to light the way. Cultural understanding will make Marines better war fighters and better instruments of U.S. foreign policy.
Petty Officer Puertas is a corpsman with 23d Marine Regiment in San Bruno, California. He also is a licensed acupuncturist specializing in the treatment of pain. He lives and practices in Oakland, California.