Network-centric warfare, the conceptual framework under which the prosecution of future conflict is envisioned, is aptly called a revolution in military affairs (RMA). Bandwidth and baud rates are the new watchwords for readiness and combat effectiveness, and it is a foregone conclusion that increased connectivity makes for better information to the commander.
Thus far, however, the groundswell of technological innovation and the resultant professional discussion over the use of new battlefield information management systems have tended to focus on increased technological capabilities. What is missing from the dialogue is how network-centric operations (NCO) might affect the development and sustainment of military judgment.
The quality of a military decision depends to a certain degree on the availability of information, but it absolutely depends on the decision-making ability of the commander. Increased connectivity is going to happen—it is happening. What must accompany its implementation is an understanding of its potential misuses within the framework of military decision making. How is the ability to make decisions (the leadership and judgment aspect) going to be influenced by the increased transparency of the decision chain under network-centric operations (the technological aspect)?
Command by Negation
Decisions are made in context. In the military, this involves rules of engagement, chain-of-command dynamics, communication paths, the fog of war, institutional boundaries, geographic circumstance, force disposition, and a variety of other factors. The manifestation of the Western decision-making structure is the concept of "command by negation."
In civilian management terms, command by negation can be likened to employee "empowerment." It is the notion that the on-scene commander at the lowest level of hierarchical authority is entrusted with tactical decisions. Subordinate commanders are expected to take all available action to complete a mission until "reined in" by a senior commander. Such a system encourages aggressiveness, innovation, and initiative. To maintain the fine line between subordinate initiative and chaos, the rule of law and institutionalization of command structure are held sacrosanct at all levels. This system requires motivated and well-trained personnel entrusted to carry out independent action—a hallmark of the U.S. military.
A central tenet of command by negation is that the best information is held at the unit level. A second is that unit-level commanders can be trusted to make sound tactical decisions within the engagement criteria specified by rules of engagement, general guidance, and threat assessments. Implicit in this second foundational concept is the assumption that training and advancement procedures in place are sufficient to "grow" unit-level leaders capable of making sound tactical decisions within the bounds of their engagement criteria using the benefit of immersion knowledge. Immersion knowledge cannot be gained from a network or through a series of briefings. It must come through presence, experience, and judgment, with judgment being the key.1
Command by negation is a decentralized, "loose" control system. In essence, the top of the chain of command understands that the bottom possesses the best information about a given tactical situation and is best situated to respond effectively within their means. General guidelines, overall objectives, and rules of engagement are promulgated at the top and paired with force dispositions. This concept, when compounded through several layers of a chain of command, reinforces flexibility of response and ensures those with the highest quality information make the most rational decisions on a tactical level. Further, this concept is not service specific. Its principles are equally germane from squad leader to joint task force commander.
Hierarchical Control and Centralization
One way to understand a system in which command by negation is the norm is to examine tactical application of its counterpoint—for example, the Russian mismanagement of the conflict in Chechnya. By all measures, this conflict continues to be an unmitigated military and political disaster, in no small part because of a command structure whereby Russian policy was not properly transformed to operational effect.
Centralization of command authority was the hallmark of the Soviet—and now, by default, the Russian—military.2 Consistent with a totalitarian government that has cause to fear its military, decision-making power was held closely by the elite within the large bureaucratic organization that ran the Soviet military machine. Close control of military matters in a "tight" command structure supported this orientation. Command by negation held no pride of place in the "operational art" of the Russian military. Institutional controls were established such that orders came from above without question.
A telling example of the inadequacies of this military command structure is the lack of accurate battlefield assessment data from Chechnya to reach high command. Initial assessments of the military force required to subdue Chechen forces were so small that intelligence officials severely underestimated the impact of known quantities of arms left by departing Russian troops in June 1992. Defense Minister Pavel Grachev stated at a press conference that one regiment of paratroopers could "solve the problem" within two hours.3
The natural observation is that this intelligence failure is inconsistent with a centralized, tight chain of command. The expectation is for stringent information exchange, because only seniors are vested with decision-making authority. In actuality, a highly centralized, vertical chain of command must by necessity filter the upward flow of information. Because decisions are made at the highest levels, the sheer volume of information to be passed up the chain of command must be condensed for efficiency. Brevity trumps substance, with the result that important information is lost.
If experience is to shape future policies, the lessons of Chechnya and other recent nontraditional conflicts in the Russian "near abroad" should ring prominent. The civil war in Tajikistan maintained its momentum largely through weapons smuggled from neighboring Afghanistan. Civil conflicts in Armenia, Azerbaijan, Abkhazia, the two Ossetias, and Georgia bear many similarities to the Chechen conflict—a nontraditional enemy, lack of consensus on objectives, nationalism, and tactics far removed from the great tank battles envisioned in the Central European theater. The dearth of sound tactical decisions in Chechnya can be attributed largely to the limitations of the inherited rigid command structure confronted with a far different battlefield from that for which it was designed.
Russia failed to adapt command structure to its security environment, resulting in military and political failure. The United States has a command structure fundamentally different from Russia's. In its proper application, command by negation is flexible and responsive. While this comparison of the two systems is not entirely rigorous, it highlights an important point.4 The nature of the new security threats facing the United States—nontraditional enemies, lack of consensus on objectives, nationalism, and new battlefields—calls for an adaptive decision-making structure.
Application to Network-Centric Operations
So what do these two greatly differing institutional arrangements of command structure have to do with network-centric operations and the RMA? Everything. Command structure provides the vehicle by which strategic policy is transformed to operational effect. The current composite warfare commander (CWC) concept, in which individual warfare commanders are assigned specific warfare areas in a theater, is a structurally sound—if not brilliant—system.
Simple and flexible, CWC obviates the information overload associated with tactical decision making in a complex, high-speed, technically advanced environment through smart delegation under an overriding command framework. Those with the best information, expertise, or capability are designated as specific warfare area commanders, responsible for promulgating specific guidance complementary to the overarching general tactical guidance (commander's intent). Control from the top is maintained through such structural mechanisms as weapons warning status and readiness postures. Alternate warfare commanders are predesignated. Marching orders are specified through intention messages, so the spirit and not just the letter of the order is understood. It is a bottom-up rather than top-down system. In tactical effect, the CWC concept is effective, flexible, and responsive. It must be, because it has to function when the fog of war has rolled in.
Decision Dynamics of Tactical NCO
Network-centric operations, when their evolution (or engineering) reaches maturity, will provide extreme transparency to the highest levels of the chain of command. The "man in the arena" will now have a larger audience, with the unavoidable consequence that the audience will become overly involved in the decision dynamic. Political considerations will bear greater weight—and the political process has a well-established ability to negate tactical advantage. Structurally, NCO thus has introduced the ability to place a stranglehold on low-level decision making. The interagency process is sound for national policy formation, but not for individual and unit employment.
In addition to the potential for unnecessary oversight there is the very real danger of its corollary: overreliance on guidance from above. Tactical transparency allows the unit-level commander to defer decisions to a superior that rightly should be within the unit-level commander's purview for reasons of expediency and applicability. Deferring decisions up the chain of command may be fine in a world of perfect information and little need for rapid action, but certainly not in the chaos of war, no matter what technological levers are applied.
Modern weapon systems demand rapid response. The strength of our command-by-negation system is that unit-level commanders maintain the deepest immersion in the local tactical situation, have the best understanding of required action, and are properly trained (and trusted) to make decisions exogenous of the need for higher guidance. For risk-averse commanders, tactical transparency can be a welcome crutch, because it offers the ultimate cover.
Another aspect of command by negation is the level of ownership imparted to the shooters. The ability of lower echelon commanders to have a significant say in operational decision making improves morale and buy in. On the other hand, when orders come from above, devoid of amplifying information, the tendency is to follow the letter rather than the spirit of the order, and the commander's ability to motivate troops is frustrated.5 When coupled with military setbacks, as in Chechnya, this can erode the legitimacy of high command decisions on a tactical level.
Leadership: Overcoming Human Tendency
An implicit assumption of network-centric operations is that information management will allow the refinement of copious data to those pieces a commander needs to make intelligent, well-informed decisions—the fog of war will be penetrated by the RMA spotlight. But no spotlight is bright enough to cut through human tendency. Tactical decisions simply are not made in the realm of perfect information. That is the reality of our business. Tactical decisions are made based on experience and judgment, with the best possible use of whatever flawed information is available. Human tendency is to desire complete understanding of facts (the tactical scenario), outcomes (what will happen if I make this decision) and consequences (who can blame me if this goes bad). The keys to breaking through this tendency are not found in technological solutions; they are found in the leadership aspects of decision making.
An example from naval history demonstrates this leadership. As Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, during World War II, Admiral Chester Nimitz by and large left decisions to his on-scene commanders, despite tremendous pressure to take a closer level of involvement. He trusted Admirals Raymond Spruance and William Halsey to develop good plans and to adjust as the battle unfolded. Geographic circumstance and limited communications capability certainly were factors in his relatively "hands off" approach. Yet, the ability to trust subordinates with decisions was his hallmark, and one of the characteristics that made him a great military leader.
Imagine if Admiral Nimitz had maintained the ability to pick up a voice circuit and "chat" with Admiral Spruance on board the Indianapolis (CA-35) while on the gunline at Okinawa. Could any conversation, or other information exchange, truly have communicated the tactical reality of that campaign? Likely not. Spruance was better equipped to call the shots for the simple reason he was there, immersed in the tactical reality of the day. He had "immersion knowledge." Part of Admiral Nimitz's genius was understanding that his commanders had a better view than he did, and exercising the leadership to not interfere or second guess his subordinates once plans were agreed on.
Fast forward to the current security environment. Speaking from both experience and observation, I can say tactical second guessing appears fairly common. Often it takes the form of "sharing the picture" with the upper chain of command, but even that implies oversight. Having sufficient bandwidth to ensure real-time imagery of tactical events is considered a staple of modern combat systems suites. Such tactical transparency in a decision chain mitigates the role of unit-level leadership and panders to the risk averse. Tactical transparency changes the incentive structure of a military commander, particularly one who is averse not only to difficult decisions but also to criticism.
We grow our leaders from an early age to seek responsibility and learn the art of decision making because we understand that the essence of leadership is the ability to act in spite of natural human tendencies.
Stewardship of Judgment
Technology is the vital next step in the evolution of warfare and a powerful enabler. But it will never replace military leadership, particularly at a tactical level. The engineered infrastructure of the RMA must be viewed as another set of tools to complement the more important (but unquantifiable) resource of leadership infrastructure. Used improperly, network-centric operations have the potential to make a casualty of the military judgment of our decision makers. We must continue to grow leaders willing to make decisions regardless of what information has or has not appeared on their computer screens. This implies conscientious stewardship of judgment.
Military decisions must be sound, reasoned, and expedient. When the moment of decisive and violent action is ordered, the commander closest to the shooter has the best view. That commander may not have perfect information, but a baseline of judgment and experience on which to base decisions will carry the day. Leadership is the key to battlefield success, not technology.
Lieutenant Commander LeGree is Executive Officer of the Ashland (LSD-48).
1. See Presidents Forum based on remarks by retired Navy Admiral Arthur Cebrowski in Naval War College Review 54, no. 1. back to article
2. For a discussion of the differences between strategic policymaking in the United States and the Soviet Union, see Derek Leebaert, Soviet Military Thinking, chapter 3; and Richard Kugler, "Enlarging NATO: The Russia Factor," RAND, 1996. back to article
3. Prior to the Russian invasion, Chechen forces numbered 40-50 T-62 and T-72 main battle tanks, 30-40 BMP-1 and BMP-2 armored personnel carriers, nearly 100 anti-tank weapons, more than 150 artillery pieces, and enough ammunition to sustain combat operations for more than six months by 40,000-plus men. Sergia Surozhtzev, "Legendarnaia v. Groznom," Noveo vremia, no 2-3 (January 1995) in Staar. back to article
4. The Russian military has many other factors that affected its Chechan campaign: a system of policymaking devoid of the interagency process, a strategic culture tied closely to a history of conflict in defense of the Motherland, traditional association with geographic circumstance and recent realization by Russian leaders that the third leg of Clausewitz's triangle—the people—applies even to it. back to article
5. Widespread evidence of poor Russian troop morale was rampant in Chechnya. For a further description, see Benjamin S. Lambeth, "Russia's Wounded Military," Foreign Affairs 74, no. 2 (March-April 1995): 86-98; and Michael Specter, "Killed in Chechnya: An Army's Pride," New York Times, 21 May 1995. back to article