The U.S. Navy’s performance in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and subsequent actions—in strike warfare, tactical aviation, and maritime interceptions—was highly successful. I was commanding officer of the San Jacinto (CG-56) during the initial phases of OIF, when all hands had an excellent opportunity to observe the Navy in action.
We began a scheduled deployment in December 2002 as part of the Harry S. Truman (CVN-75) Carrier Strike Group (CSG), expecting our operations in the Mediterranean to be followed by an assignment in the Fifth Fleet. But events in Iraq soon changed our schedule and highlighted several areas—from technology to training—that require improvement.
Establishing Sound Link Architecture
As the group’s air defense commander, our initial challenge was to fully institute a strong link architecture for forwarding the tactical picture to the Sixth Fleet flagship, the LaSalle (AGF-3). Two months before our arrival, the Sixth Fleet dedicated a satellite circuit to the sole use of Satellite Link 16. We were directed to manage a multilink environment in which data from multiple local links were forwarded reliably to the flagship by way of Satellite Link 16. This dynamic architecture provided the structure for a Mediterranean-wide link picture, which would represent a dramatic improvement in situational awareness for the CSG and fleet commanders.
Establishing this picture on the San Jacinto became a major focus of the crew in the combat information center (CIC) and communication spaces. During our deployment, the Link 16 architecture greatly improved the quality of the link picture. Because of data display limitations in the Aegis Display System, however, the San Jacinto was unable to see the complete air picture that was passed to the CSG and fleet commanders. Based on our experience, we concluded that other available tools could be used to further leverage the significant advantages of the Sixth Fleet’s Link 16 capability.
A Joint Range Extension (JRE) was used on the Harry S. Truman to improve the link capabilities resident in her flag watch spaces during OIF. The JRE transmits Link 16 messages through the secret Internet protocol router network (SIPRNet). Thus, it is free of the limitations of satellite coverage and allocation issues associated with ultrahigh frequency Satellite Link 16. When coupled with the Harry S. Truman’s Air Defense Systems Integrator (ADSI)—the link display system in the flag watch center—the JRE’s flexibility expands measurably.
The ADSI displays air defense information in a format that can be used to augment Aegis systems as an additional display for a theater-wide, near-real-time air picture. Combining the JRE with a conventional air search radar in Gibraltar would provide a “24/7” air picture of the area surrounding the entrance to the Mediterranean. If combined with a Link 11 ground station, this system could forward a near-real-time surface picture for NATO combatants that might not be equipped with Satellite Link 16.
The Navy should continue experimenting with—and fielding—systems such as the JRE and ADSI to further enhance Link 16 and integrated link pictures. The Sixth Fleet Mediterranean-wide Link 16 architecture that came on line in October 2002 is a dramatic improvement in situational awareness for the fleet. Designation of the JRE-ADSI combination for cross decking to ships serving as air defense commanders could extend this enhanced situational awareness across theater boundaries and give air defense commanders enhanced situational awareness in the European theater. It would be a valuable tool as the war on terrorism moves U.S. operations to areas where our forces lack the well-defined and developed command-and-control infrastructure found in the Mediterranean and Arabian Gulf.
Air Threats
Although there were few direct Iraqi threats to U.S. naval forces during OIF, the most likely threat was the low, slow-flying terrorist aircraft. The next U.S. ship to be damaged by enemy fire is not likely to be hit by swarms of tactical aircraft that have fought their way through the outer air screen. The U.S. fleet will be hit where it is most vulnerable by an enemy who can take advantage of the uncertainty he creates by hiding among civilian and military traffic to get inside our high-technology defenses and attack with low-technology weapons. Given the remarkable automated capabilities of its air defense systems, the fleet can train to meet the high-volume tactical air threat during in-port exercises. More of the limited at-sea training must be devoted to real-world threats that current air defense watch teams face every day.
While the terrorist low, slow flier does not represent the military capability of the Cold War era, it is far more difficult to ascertain its identification and intent. Determining intent is the predominant dilemma when responding to these situations—one that requires watch standers to be trained fully in responding to the key indicators related to aircraft identification and hostile intent. When one of these situations develops, the process of analyzing the aircraft’s available information is initiated: point of origin, identification of friend or foe, speed, altitude and altitude trend, intercept distance, and response to radio queries. Scenarios that better incorporate the complexity of separating low, slow fliers from high-density civilian air traffic and provide greater exposure to constrained geographical areas should be included in composite training unit exercises (CompTUExs).
Unfortunately, the Navy does not have a surface ship firing exercise that enables it to practice how to successfully engage the low, slow flying threat. By the time intent is determined in such cases, the aircraft will be inside Standard missile minimum range. Coordinating major caliber gun systems with crew-served weapons while maneuvering the ship at high speed is not covered adequately during work ups. We need an aerial target capability that enables ships to correctly ascertain threat intentions, develop the right kind of bridge-CIC coordination, and engage the threat with major guns and manually trained crew-served weapons.
During the work-up cycle and deployment, we found the helicopter to be the optimum platform for intercepting and escorting low, slow fliers operating at less than 150 knots. A fighter-attack aircraft is not efficient at loitering at the low speeds required to shadow a slow-moving propeller aircraft or helicopter. The SH-60 Sea Hawk has the right speed and maneuverability to intercept and escort most single-engine threats, and its machine guns are more than adequate for engaging them if necessary. At speeds greater than 150 knots, the SH-60 intercept envelope becomes extremely small.
The Sea Hawk’s low, slow flier intercept and escort mission should be refined and practiced as a core capability. The rules of engagement for helicopters require examination and upgrading, and air controllers should be trained more extensively in these techniques. There is no formal training that fully integrates the ship-to-helicopter process needed to respond to this threat.
Joint task force and CompTUEx exercise scenarios typically incorporate a few low, slow flier aircraft events. These planes often approach as lone aircraft on vectors that emphasize the “this aircraft is different” mentality. Fleet work ups sometimes overemphasize the current conventional military air threat at the expense of more realistic scenarios. Multiple tactical aircraft attack our naval groups in various profiles. Aegis platforms track and report these targets, and they are engaged with Standard missiles to eradicate the threat. As gratifying as it is to finish an air defense exercise with empty magazines and a sky swept clean of enemy forces, to a degree we are fighting the last war—or what the Cold War might have been had it boiled over into hostilities.
In addition, exercises need to put greater emphasis on operating in extremely constrained air space. In the eastern Mediterranean, where we routinely operated with two carrier air wings, air space violations could have had political ramifications well beyond the narrow question of air space incursion. Consequently, we went to great lengths to prevent violations. For example, we ensured that every aircraft and ship worked from a commonly agreed set of points to define territorial and international air space. Because various systems display coastlines differently, we found it necessary to publish exact latitude and longitude in our intentions message to ensure everyone had a common understanding.
We also adopted calls over voice and chat circuits. Whenever a carrier conducting flight operations closed to within ten miles of national boundaries, the air defense commander advised the carrier over the strike group command radio circuit and supporting tactical radio and chat nets. These efforts proved highly successful—there were no adverse international reactions to the intense pace of flight operations by the Harry S. Truman and the Theodore Roosevelt (CVN-71) before or during OIF. Even so, our CompTUEx and joint exercise training had not concentrated sufficiently on these issues; we were forced to develop techniques as operations evolved.
Information Superiority
Operation Iraqi Freedom reemphasized the fundamental importance of information superiority. The power of the Internet in rapidly sharing time-sensitive knowledge was dramatic and clearly indicated an irreversible trend. Navy junior officers are well versed in monitoring multiple chat room sites simultaneously. When I attended major command school at Newport, Rhode Island, my class unanimously agreed that SIPRNet use for exchange of tactical information was fine, with one stipulation: no orders were to be given. The conflict in Iraq brought home to me that those discussions were pipedreams. Tactical direction and orders are given over the SIPRNet and will occur increasingly. We should structure use of this medium to our advantage.
Although employment of information technologies was successful in the main, there are specific areas where improvements must be made. For example, standardized protocols should be developed to ensure consistent understanding and proper usage. Log-keeping requirements for chat also lack adequate definition. In our experience, mIRC, a recently adopted software upgrade, is a much more capable program than MS Chat. The former has the ability to time stamp transmissions and includes an autolog capability. The Navy should study inclusion of mIRC with IT-21 installations. To prevent watch standers from becoming overburdened by excessive responsibilities, chat room development needs to be funneled through fleet commanders to ensure watch-stander overload does not occur. A coordinated approach to determining chat room assignments is necessary, and part of the solution lies in delegating chat room responsibilities internally.
Conclusions
The Navy’s involvement in Operation Iraqi Freedom was substantial and highly effective. Once again, its forces demonstrated a solid grasp of their core competencies. The fleet was ready and well trained and equipped in all respects.
Nonetheless, commanders and operators detected areas that require improvement. The Navy must focus attention on these areas and promptly adjust pre-deployment training accordingly. From the low, slow flying aircraft threat to refining SIPRNet usage, improvements should be approached as matters of top priority in work-up periods and exercise scenarios. As in Iraqi Freedom, the men and women of the Navy will prove themselves ready and able to tackle the difficult tasks ahead.
Captain MacKercher commanded the San Jacinto (CG-56) for 25 months. He currently is assigned as the chief of staff of the George Washington (CVN-73) Carrier Strike Group.