We Have More to Learn from Iraqi Freedom
Captain John C. MacKercher, U.S. Navy
The U.S. Navy's performance in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and subsequent actions—in strike warfare, tactical aviation, and maritime interceptions—was highly successful. I was commanding officer of the San Jacinto (CG-56) during the initial phases of OIF, when all hands had an excellent opportunity to observe the Navy in action.
We began a scheduled deployment in December 2002 as part of the Harry S. Truman (CVN-75) Carrier Strike Group (CSG), expecting our operations in the Mediterranean to be followed by an assignment in the Fifth Fleet. But events in Iraq soon changed our schedule and highlighted several areas—from technology to training—that require improvement.
Establishing Sound Link Architecture
As the group's air defense commander, our initial challenge was to fully institute a strong link architecture for forwarding the tactical picture to the Sixth Fleet flagship, the LaSalle (AGF-3). Two months before our arrival, the Sixth Fleet dedicated a satellite circuit to the sole use of Satellite Link 16. We were directed to manage a multilink environment in which data from multiple local links were forwarded reliably to the flagship by way of Satellite Link 16. This dynamic archi tecture provided the structure for a Mediterranean-wide link picture, which would represent a dramatic improvement in situational awareness for the CSG and fleet commanders.
Establishing this picture on the San Jacinto became a major focus of the crew in the combat information center (CIC) and communication spaces. During our deployment, the Link 16 archi tecture greatly improved the quality of the link picture. Because of data display limitations in the Aegis Display System, however, the San Jacinto was unable to see the complete air picture that was passed to the CSG and fleet commanders. Based on our experience, we concluded that other available tools could be used to further leverage the significant advantages of the Sixth Fleet's Link 16 capability.
A Joint Range Extension (JRE) was used on the Harry S. Truman to improve the link capabilities resident in her flag watch spaces during OIF. The JRE trans mits Link 16 messages through the secure Internet network (SIPRNET). Thus, it is free of the limitations of satellite cover age and allocation issues associated with ultrahigh frequency Satellite Link 16. When coupled with the Harry S. Truman's Air Defense Systems Integrator (ADSI)—the link display system in the flag watch center—the JRE's flexibility expands measurably.
The ADSI displays air defense information in a format that can be used to augment Aegis systems as an additional display for a theater-wide, near-real-time air picture. Combining the JRE with a conventional air search radar in Gibral tar would provide a "24/7" air picture of the area surrounding the entrance to the Mediterranean. If combined with a Link 11 ground station, this system could forward a near-real-time surface picture for NATO combatants that might not be equipped with Satellite Link 16.
The Navy should continue experimenting with—and fielding—systems such as the JRE and ADSI to further enhance Link 16 and integrated link pictures. The Sixth Fleet Mediterranean-wide Link 16 architecture that came on line in October 2002 is a dramatic improvement in situational awareness for the fleet. Designation of the JRE-ADSI combination for cross decking to ships serving as air defense comman ders could extend this enhanced situational awareness across theater boundaries and give air defense commanders enhanced sit uational awareness in the European the ater. It would be a valuable tool as the war on terrorism moves U.S. operations to areas where our forces lack the well defined and developed command-and-control infrastructure found in the Mediter ranean and Arabian Gulf.
Air Threats
Although there were few direct Iraqi threats to U.S. naval forces during OIF, the most likely threat was the low, slowflying terrorist aircraft. The next U.S. ship to be damaged by enemy fire is not likely to be hit by swarms of tactical aircraft that have fought their way through the outer air screen. The U.S. fleet will be hit where it is most vulnerable by an enemy who can take advantage of the uncertainty he creates by hiding among civilian and military traffic to get inside our high-technology defenses and attack with low-technology weapons. Given the remarkable automated capabilities of its air defense systems, the fleet can train to meet the high-volume tactical air threat during in port exercises. More of the limited atsea training must be devoted to real-world threats that current air defense watch teams face every day.
While the terrorist low, slow flier does not represent the military capability of the Cold War era, it is far more difficult to ascertain its identification and intent. De termining intent is the predominant dilemma when responding to these situations—one that requires watch slanders to be trained fully in responding to the key indicators related to aircraft identification and hostile intent. When one of these situations develops, the process of analyzing the aircraft's available infor mation is initiated: point of origin, iden tification of friend or foe, speed, altitude and altitude trend, intercept distance, and response to radio queries. Scenarios that better incorporate the complexity of sep arating low, slow fliers from high-density civilian air traffic and provide greater ex posure to constrained geographical areas should be included in composite training unit exercises (COMPTUEXs).
Unfortunately, the Navy does not have a surface ship firing exercise that enables it to practice how to successfully engage the low, slow flying threat. By the time intent is determined in such cases, the air craft will be inside Standard missile min imum range. Coordinating major caliber gun systems with crew -served weapons while maneuvering the ship at high speed is not covered adequately during work ups. We need an aerial target capability that enables ships to correctly ascertain threat intentions, develop the right kind of bridge-CIC coordination, and engage the threat with major guns and manually trained crew -served weapons.
During the work -up cycle and de ployment, we found the helicopter to be the optimum platform for intercepting and escorting low, slow fliers operating at less than 150 knots. A fighter-attack aircraft is not efficient at loitering at the low speeds required to shadow a slow-moving propeller aircraft or heli copter. The SH-60 Sea Hawk has the right speed and maneuverability to in tercept and escort most single-engine threats, and its machine guns are more than adequate for engaging them if nec essary. At speeds greater than 150 knots, the SH-60 intercept envelope becomes extremely small.
The Sea Hawk's low, slow flier intercept and escort mission should be refined and practiced as a core capability. The rules of engagement for helicopters re quire examination and upgrading, and air controllers should be trained more exten sively in these techniques. There is no formal training that fully integrates the ship to -helicopter process needed to respond to this threat.
Joint task force and COMPTUEX exercise scenarios typically incorporate a few low, slow flier aircraft events. These planes often approach as lone aircraft on vectors that emphasize the "this aircraft is different" mentality. Fleet work ups sometimes overemphasize the current con ventional military air threat at the expense of more realistic scenarios. Multiple tac tical aircraft attack our naval groups in various profiles. Aegis platforms track and report these targets, and they are engaged with Standard missiles to eradicate the threat. As gratifying as it is to finish an air defense exercise with empty magazines and a sky swept clean of enemy forces, to a degree we are fighting the last waror what the Cold War might have been had it boiled over into hostilities.
In addition, exercises need to put greater emphasis on operating in extremely constrained air space. In the eastern Mediterranean, where we routinely operated with two carrier air wings, air space violations could have had political ramifications well beyond the narrow question of air space incursion. Conse quently, we went to great lengths to prevent violations. For example, we ensured that every aircraft and ship worked from a commonly agreed set of points to de fine territorial and international air space. Because various systems display coast lines differently, we found it necessary to publish exact latitude and longitude in our intentions message to ensure every one had a common understanding.
We also adopted calls over voice and chat circuits. Whenever a carrier conducting flight operations closed to within ten miles of national boundaries, the air defense commander advised the carrier over the strike group command radio circuit and supporting tactical radio and chat nets. These efforts proved highly suc cessful—there were no adverse interna tional reactions to the intense pace of flight operations by the Harry S. Truman and the Theodore Roosevelt before or during OIF. Even so, our COMPTUEX and joint exercise training had not concentrated sufficiently on these issues; we were forced to develop tech niques as operations evolved.
Information Superiority
Operation Iraqi Freedom reemphasized the fundamental importance of information superiority. The power of the Internet in rapidly sharing time-sensitive knowledge was dramatic and clearly in dicated an irreversible trend. Navy junior officers are well versed in monitoring multiple chat room sites simultaneously. When I attended major command school at Newport, Rhode Island, my class unanimously agreed that SIPRNET use for exchange of tactical information was fine, with one stipulation: no orders were to be given. The conflict in Iraq brought home to me that those discussions were pipedreams. Tactical direction and orders are given over the SIPRNET and will occur increasingly. We should structure use of this medium to our advantage.
Although employment of information technologies was successful in the main, there are specific areas where improvements must be made. For example, standardized protocols should be developed to ensure consistent understanding and proper usage. Log-keeping requirements for chat also lack adequate definition. In our experience, MIRC, a recently adopted software upgrade, is a much more capable program than MS Chat. The former has the ability to time stamp transmissions and includes an autolog capability. The Navy should study inclusion of MIRC with IT-21 installations. To prevent watch slanders from becoming overburdened by excessive responsibilities, chat room development needs to be funneled through fleet commanders to ensure watch-stander overload does not occur. A coordinated approach to determining chat room assignments is necessary, and part of the solution lies in delegating chat room responsibilities internally.
Conclusions
The Navy's involvement in Operation Iraqi Freedom was substantial and highly effective. Once again, its forces demonstrated a solid grasp of their core com petencies. The fleet was ready and well trained and equipped in all respects.
Nonetheless, commanders and opera tors detected areas that require improve ment. The Navy must focus attention on these areas and promptly adjust predeployment training accordingly. From the low, slow flying aircraft threat to refining SIPRNET usage, improvements should be approached as matters of top priority in work-up periods and exercise scenarios. As in Iraqi Freedom, the men and women of the Navy will prove them selves ready and able to tackle the difficult tasks ahead.
Captain MacKercher commanded the San Jacinto (CG-56) for 25 months. he currently is assigned as the chief of staff of the George Washington (CVN-73) Carrier Strike Group.
Simulation Is Critical to Joint Strike Fighter Success
Captain Scott D. Schoeman, U.S. Marine Corps
The traditional benchmark of Marine Corps aviation has been its training and readiness. As Marines transition from legacy aircraft to the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF/F-35), however, training and readiness may mistakenly become a drag chute slowing the thrust of advancement. Current operational fighter-attack curriculums use simulators to generate only 15% of the sorties needed for pilot training and readiness.1 This .15-to-1 simulator-to-flight ratio characterizes the traditional training paradigm that has dominated fastmover communities for decades.
To comply with Deputy Commandant for Aviation lieutenant General Michael Hough's mandate for transformation, this methodology must be applied in a capabilities-based, time-and-money competitive environment. Because of the limited operational expenses and the sophisticated tactical missions of tomorrow's JSF, the Marine Corps must rely far more heavily on innovative simulator training to develop and maintain the next generation of combat aviators.
Fiscal Challenges
The F-35 program is constrained visibly by costs and resource shortfalls that will press the Corps to seek a drastic departure from conventional ways of doing business. Owing to budget cuts, the planned number of aircraft to be purchased for the Navy-Marine Corps team was reduced from more than 1,600 to approximately 1,000.2 This number is ex pected to decrease further because of re cent airframe weight overruns. Initially billed as an affordable replacement to today's legacies, the trimmed JSF num bers are inflating costs to almost $50 million per aircraft.3
At the operational level, fewer total aircraft resulted most notably from limiting squadrons to 10 instead of 12 aircraft. In addition, because of the F-35's improved sortie production rate, consideration is being given to increasing the number of pilots per squadron.4 The math is straightforward: more pilots and fewer aircraft result in less flight time per aviator. Of course, the counter here is that higher sortie rates for ten aircraft enable each squadron pilot to maintain the same flight time as with 12 aircraft. This could be true in combat; unfortunately, it cannot be the standard in training evolutions.
Not only are fewer JSF platforms being purchased, but future training flight hours also are under scrutiny. It is common knowledge that the operating costs of a modern aircraft dwarf its purchase price. Retired Navy Captain Ernie Lewis ex plains: "To fly a high-performance aircraft costs about $6000-10,000 per hour. . . . Add to that tactical range operating costs and aircraft wear time, and the cost increases to $13,000-14,000 per hour."5 Even with anticipated advances in JSF reliability, the costs of operating such mod ern, high -technology fighters will continue to escalate.
As reduced numbers of tactical aircraft and flight hours meet financial reality, how can training and readiness be main tained (or increased) in the future? Marine lieutenant Colonel Greg Horton points out that "typically we have done our training in the most expensive train ing medium, which has been the aircraft. We can't afford to do that anymore."6 Transformation of F-35 training clearly must begin by discovering a way to reduce flight hours without harming competency. The only way to effectively achieve readiness for the JSF program will be to "slash costs through massively increased reliance on simulation."7
Mission Complexity
Although money is perhaps the most visible force compelling the transformation of training, the sophisticated missions that F-35 pilots will be required to perform are the prime factors driving de pendence on simulators. Flight aptitude for basic missions certainly can be achieved in local environments and train ing areas, but airspace, training range, and asset constraints will impede JSF training and make complex tasks almost impos sible to imitate in noncombat arenas.
First, it is important to recognize that the JSF is not just another evolutionary fighter-attack aircraft. Leap-ahead digital and information technology put the F-35 light years ahead of current fourth-generation fighters. With these advances, flying the JSF will become much easier—i.e., the stick and throttle skills will require less attention. Thus, while formation flying, basic fighter maneuvering, and bombing will remain fundamental skills, achieving and maintaining proficiency in them will take less time. Flight skills for these core missions will con tinue to be fostered in local flight envi ronments and training areas; they cannot be achieved in more complex training missions.
Although the JSF's technology will simplify flight dexterity, it promises to complicate tactical employment. Mission requirements and systems will call for improved multitasking aptitude and put "greater demands on a pilot's ability to absorb more information in a high-stress environment."8 Many analysts suggest that fighter-attack pilots no longer will Hornet or Harrier drivers—rather, they will be strike-fighter tacticians with a new generation of situational awareness, employment options, and interoperability.
According to General Hough, the JSF will provide situational (or battlespace) awareness exponentially enhanced by advanced electro -optical sensors, data -link capabilities, and electronic warfare func tions.9 Extended range, multispectral, and all-weather forward-looking systems will provide target location, identification, and classification. Data links will unite information between airborne platforms and ground combat elements in theater, and electronic warfare capabilities will detect and thwart surface and air threats. This integrated information will enable pilots to be tacticians rather than sensor monitors.
Even at today's technological level, the strike community is renewing concentra tion on combat decision making. Recent feedback from operational squadrons in dicates that young pilots lack the ability to manage information effectively in a tactical environment.10 If not attended to, this shortcoming will grow as the F-35's capabilities increase. The fact remains that frequent training in a complex multitasking and decision-making scenario will be the only saving grace for war fighters sat urated with information.
The continuing dilemma is that train ing ranges simply are not-and will not become-capable of providing this level of training. Even the few top -caliber mil itary operations areas in Alaska, Arizona, California, Florida, and Nevada are unable to incorporate the advanced combinations of targets, threats, and integration necessary to challenge F-35 pilots. Ad ministrative restraints, environmental con cerns, and inflating costs render them incapable of offering task-loaded flights to adequately develop the situational awareness of tomorrow's aviators.
Unique employment capabilities also will derive from JSF technology. Im proved awareness undoubtedly can lead to more flexible tactics: for example, enlarged zones of responsibility, greater geographic dispersion, and less reliance on visual mutual support. Performance upgrades, such as airspeed and altitude enhancements, will demand larger blocks of airspace. Emerging weapons will continue to expand employment envelopes. Defense planners speculate that wingmen may fly 30-50 nautical miles (nm) apart instead of 1-3 nm. Whatever operating distances become, airspace and range re quirements will demand larger operating areas as concepts of employment drasti cally transfigure conventional tactics. Current training ranges unquestionably will become insufficient for realistic section or division employment.
Interoperability is the final JSF capa bility that will be extremely difficult to incorporate into routine training. Satellite and other communication suites will link Marine tactical aviation (TacAir) to global nets and assimilate a joint and coalition commonality. During a recent speech, Air Force Chief of Staff General John jumper emphasized that much greater effort must be invested in learning to manipulate the matrix of communications. he said that efforts to teach pilots how to network with the Joint Surveillance/Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS) should be nearly equal to those devoted to teaching aircrews how to drop bombs.11
No doubt, interoperable communication is an essential facet of combat oper ations-but training to its demands is problematic. Exercising satellites, tankers, adversaries, the Airborne Warning and Control System, JSTARS, forward air controllers, air coordinators, and other assets in training evolutions is infrequent and incomplete at best. This deficiency often proves to be a central element in the breakdown of combat operations. Current training methods do not offer the assets or opportunities to effectively develop air crew communication proficiency—and this shortfall will expand as the F-35 en ters service.
Simulators Are the Solution
The situational awareness, employment options, and interoperability of the JSF will provide a revolutionary capability to Marine TacAir. In fact, it is so revolutionary that pilots will be unable to comprehensively train to its standards with today's airspace, range, and asset limita tions. The sophisticated missions of to morrow's airborne tacticians will require simulators to fill the gap of realism in their intense preparations to face asym metric and conventional enemies in the fog of war.
Operational expenses and mission com plexity will demand much greater reliance on innovative simulator training. Perhaps, JSF simulator -to -flight ratios should be increased fivefold and pilots should be required to fly two actual flights and five simulator flights per week. Regardless of the equations involved, the U.S. aerospace industry continues to respond by transforming its simulation perfor mance to meet service demands. High-fidelity virtual environments, such as the G-FET II and MTC simulators, promise to offer lifelike, three -dimensional simulation capable of global, real-time net working and deployable training. Marine pilots soon will fly simulator missions simultaneously linked to aircrew and ground units of several U.S. and foreign services located around the world. These scenarios will merge national assets and numerous platforms with variable threats and terrain.
Computer-based instruction obviously will continue to assist with relevant training objectives—for example, normal and emergency flight procedures and tech niques. Even so, the Marine Corps must press ahead to radically increase simula tor flight training. Shrinking budgets and rapidly expanding mission sophistication make it mandatory. Marine aviation must embrace and implement large-scale advanced simulation or face the fact that Joint Strike Fighter readiness will deteriorate as a result of rising costs and diminished training opportunities.
1 LCol. Greg Hoiton, USMC, "Marine Corps Aviation Simulator Master Plan," Pentagon Briefing, Washington, DC, 2 October 2003.
2 Department of Defense "Joint Strike Fighter Capa bilities Overview," Pentagon Briefing, Washington, DC, 5 May 2002.
3 Laura Colarusso, "JSF's Bloated Design Causing Overruns," Marine Corps Times, 19 January 2004, p. 21.
4 LCoI. David Hitchcock, USMC, "JSF Pilot Manning and Training," Pentagon Briefing, Washington, DC, 5 September 2003.
5 Frances Fiorino, "G-Force in a Can; Device Adds New Dimension to Military Pilot Training That Ex isting Simulators Lack," Aviation Week and Space Technology, I December 2003, p. 70.
6 Margaret Roth, "Marine Corps Strives to Consolidate Aviation Training," Sea Power, December 2003, p. 23.
7 David Fulghum, "Joint Strike Fighter Explores Vir tual Reality," Aviation Week and Space Technology, 2 September 1996, p. 101.
8 Michael Sherlock, "Modify the Goshawk and the Pilot Training Syllabus," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, December 2003, p. 72.
9 LGen. Michael Hough, USMC, "Marine Aviation Transformation Roadmap," Pentagon Briefing, Washington, DC, 24 September 2003.
10 Michael Sherlock, "Modify the Goshawk and the Pilot Training Syllabus," p. 72.
11 Gen. John jumper, USAF, Keynote Speech, Marine Corps Aviation Association Dinner, Ft. Myer Offi cers' Club, Washington DC, 9 December 2003.
Captain Schoeman, a recent graduate of Expeditionary Warfare School, won first prize in the Naval Institute's professional writing contest at the school. He is the assistant maintenance officer of Marine Fighter-Attack Squadron 314 in Miramar, California.
Nuclear Ships Can Help Meet U.S. Electrical Needs
Jose Femenia
For the past 20 years, the Department of Defense (DoD) has become increasingly dependent on prepositioned ships and fast-ship transportation for military hardware and supplies. At the same time, the United States has seen its electrical consumption increase without commensurate increases in electrical generation capacity. Further, the nation's reliance on imported oil and gas continues to increase and aggravate an already negative balance of trade.
Although many Americans see the connection between energy imports and the trade imbalance, they do not see a connection between DoD's need for fast ship transportation and the nation's need for electrical power generation. I propose employing the nation's ready reserve naval auxiliary fleet to generate electrical power for the nation while it simultaneously sup ports the national defense. The U.S. government should undertake a coordinated DoD and Department of Energy (DoE) ef fort to build a fleet of large, very fast naval auxiliary vessels powered by mod ern nuclear -electric plants. When not de ployed, these vessels would supply power to the nation's electrical grid.
Large and Fast Ships
To satisfy national security needs in today's uncertain world while most U.S. military weapons, equipment, and troops are stationed on U.S. territory, the nation needs a fast ship -based transportation system. Army leaders suggest the need for 50 - to 70-knot large cargo ships capable of traveling thousand of miles to deliver huge quantities of equipment and supplies wherever needed. Regardless of the hull forms used, large cargo vessels traveling at such high speeds would need power systems that range into the hundreds of thousands of horsepower. The associated fuel requirements would impose restric tions on payload and range, thus limiting the vessels' effectiveness.
For numerous reasons, as the nation's requirement for electrical power grew, the utility industry did not respond with increased generating capacity. As a result, there is a shortage of reserve electrical generation capacity; most of the nation's power comes from old coal, gas, and oil steam power plants. Recent combined cycle (gas turbine and steam) and co-generation plants have higher efficiencies, but they continue to consume gas or oil, and their contributions to national electrical needs are small.
Nuclear-electric naval auxiliary transport ships with sufficient power to travel anywhere in the world at 50 knots or greater, without the need to refuel under way or for the return to home port, would provide a major strategic edge to the U.S. armed forces. Moreover, using their power plants to generate electrical power and supply it to the nation's electrical grid when they are not in military use would be a small (estimated at 300 megawatts per vessel) but significant contribution to U.S. energy needs. Twenty such vessels homeported throughout the nation could supply sufficient electricity to power 3 -4 million homes and save fossil -fuel energy equivalents of more than 85 million barrels of crude oil per year. At $40 per barrel of crude oil, more than $3.4 billion per year could be trimmed from the nation's balance of payments.
Civilian crews typically run naval auxiliary vessels, either by contract or through the Navy's Military Sealift Command. The ships I propose could be operated in the same manner: civilian crews under strict government supervision. In the same way the nuclear -powered Savannah was manned in the 1960s and commercial nuclear power plants are operated today, contractors would supply the crews. From the national defense perspective, one advantage of operating the power plants on board the rapid deployment fleet for 24 hours a day, seven days a week all year is that the vessels would be available for loading and deployment at a moment's notice. The only major requirements for rapid deployment would be to "unplug" a ship's power plant from the electrical grid and muster the additional crew needed to get under way.
Given the correct grid design and proper planning, disconnecting 300 megawatts-or even 6 million megawatts-of power would not be overwhelming and could be mitigated by activating system peaking plants (reserve power) or simply by living with less overall generating reserve. After loading, the ship-generated power would be applied to propulsion; with the appropriate hull, large ships could reach speeds of 50 knots or more.
Technology Is Available
Nuclear power plants in the United States (electrical power generation and naval vessel propulsion) use technology of the 1950s. They convert the nuclear fuel's thermal energy to mechanical and electrical power by using a vapor power cycle. Low-cycle temperatures used by the nuclear vapor cycle power plants yield low thermal efficiencies.
Since the 1950s, technology has advanced to where modern nuclear gas-cycle power plants can operate at efficiencies twice the level of nuclear vapor cycle plants. In addition, because of advances in fuel element design and fabrication, modern gas -cooled reactors, using ceramic pebble bed reactor technology, are safer than the vapor cycle reactors using metal-clad fuel elements. The nuclear-electric naval auxiliary ships envisioned here would be powered by state-of-the-art, modern nuclear-electric generating plants powering advanced high-temperature superconducting motor-driven water-jets.
Beyond satisfying DoD's need for very fast supply ships with infinite range and DoE's desire for more electrical generating capacity, development of a fleet of these large, nuclear -electric ships would help reduce the nation's dependence on imported oil. Further, a fleet of nuclear-electric naval auxiliary ships would serve to reinvigorate a nearly stagnant commercial nuclear power industry, rejuvenate commercial shipbuilding, and develop the infrastructure to support future all-electric naval combatants employing state-of-the-art nuclear power plants. Finally, the auxiliary ships would help reduce generation of greenhouse gases.
Involve the Business Community
Considering that the majority of the proposed fast ships would be homeported in the continental United States and tied up to piers waiting for the next emergency, the utility industry might want to invest in these combined nuclear generating plants and naval auxiliaries. With proper financial safeguards-including catastrophic liability indemnification-the commercial market might well be interested in funding and operating the vessels.
Commercial operation in both the power generation and naval auxiliary mode is another possibility. When generating power, revenue would come from selling electrical energy to the grid at market rates; when serving in the naval role as charter ships, revenue would come from government contracts. Or the government could build the ships and charter them to the commercial market for electrical power generation when they are not deployed for government use. Because their power plants would be active year-round, there would be little need to break out the ships to exercise their propulsion and auxiliary systems-as is the case with some of today's reserve naval support ships. The ships' engineering departments would be trained fully and ready to mobilize at a moment's notice. Developing a system for nuclear -electric naval auxiliaries to support Army, Marine Corps, and Navy missions will require national leadership and the support of several departments in addition to DoD:
* Department of Homeland security (specifically, the Coast Guard) would tackle security issues related to operating commercial ships and protecting them from terrorist attacks and hijackings.
* Department of Energy's role would extend beyond the Nuclear Regulatory Agency's activities to influence modifications to the electrical grid so that appropriately homeported vessels could deliver power to the grid. The department's leadership also would be needed to ensure the appropriate systems and protocols were put in place to permit disconnection of the vessels without jeopardizing the nation's electrical supply and distribution system.
* Department of Transportation, through the efforts of the Maritime Administration, would coordinate shipbuilding efforts and training of merchant mariners if the vessels were to be manned by civilians. The department would be required to establish a nuclear training program similar to that used for the Savannah.
Conclusions
A naval auxiliary fleet-power generation system of this kind would have many benefits. It would give the nation a fleet of high -speed and long -range naval auxiliaries, additional electrical generation capacity, decreased dependence on foreign oil and gas, and lower levels of greenhouse gases.
In addition, the system would revive stagnated and underutilized elements of the nation's industrial base and help reduce its trade imbalance. This innovative approach to several national problems could be funded by the U.S. government, private interests, or a government-commercial joint venture.
Professor Femenia heads the Engineering Department at the U.S. Merchant Marine Academy at King's Point, New York.