Following any conflict, naval aviation collects lessons learned and uses that information to refine its tactics and procedures. Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) will be no different. The result was much to our liking—few combat losses, a short campaign, and confirmation that the U.S. military is both capable and competent. We did well and can be proud of our combat performance. We must be careful, however, not to draw too many conclusions. OIF was fought under unique circumstances, against an enemy of questionable capability and motivation.
Historically speaking, the lessons learned from the U.S. military’s wartime experiences have been far reaching. The tactical innovations in maneuver warfare, amphibious operations, and strategic bombing following World War I were in reaction to the blood bath experienced from 1914 to 1918. Operations in Korea and Vietnam have had a major influence on the tactics naval aviation employs to this day. Collectively, the smaller conflicts beginning in the mid-1980s through Operation Enduring Freedom have further refined those basic tactics. Undeniably, there are similar lessons to be learned from OIF, but perhaps the real takeaway from this conflict is more general. For example, how well is our training continuum preparing our young aviators for the rigors of combat? Is naval aviation fully integrated into joint and coalition operations, and do our operators understand how an air tasking order is developed? Is naval aviation too flexible? Are there areas where we need to focus our training?
As a strike-fighter pilot, my perspective is limited to the experiences we had operating from the Mediterranean Sea. The tactical picture for us was different from what our compatriots operating from the North Arabian Gulf saw. In sum, these are one officer’s views, as experienced from one aircraft carrier.
The Training Continuum
The training continuum a pilot receives in the Strike Fighter Weapons and Tactics (SFWT) syllabus is preparing our “nuggets” for combat quite effectively. The academic foundation, the intense part task training, the emphasis on airborne execution, and thorough and objective debriefing have minimized first-time combat mistakes. To become a combat wingman (SFWT Level II qualified) requires considerable effort on the part of the individual pilot. Done properly, it is not easy. The single most significant factor in the combat effectiveness of an F/A-18 in 2003 as compared to one in 1991 is not a global positioning system-aided inertial navigation system, the latest mission computer software, the proliferation of smart weapons, or any other piece of hardware. It is the training of the pilot in the machine.
This caused some consternation. First, my (along with some other aircrew’s) interpretation of the ATO was lacking. Sometimes it listed the mission as defensive counterair, suppression of enemy air defenses, close air support, or interdiction. By and large, the intention seemed to be to use strike-fighters as GDI platforms. During most missions, strike-fighters were either passed to a forward air controller or given coordinates to deliver ordnance regardless of their ATO-assigned mission or loadout. We often were assigned to totally different geographic areas from what was listed in the ATO, and in some cases, had the wrong ordnance load to execute the mission assigned. As a result of this superficial knowledge of the ATO, we came to the fight not fully knowing what to expect and were not as effective as we could have been.
Second, our mission preparation was less than ideal—there was a gap in the intelligence support to targeting. If the intention was to use our assets primarily in the GDI mission, we needed more information. We needed a detailed ground order of battle, both enemy and friendly. We needed an idea of two or three potential areas where we might be assigned. With that information we could have done some basic target area study and sensor predictions. And we could have been more confident in our airborne collateral damage assessments, as required when tasked to attack targets in the vicinity of friendly forces. Furthermore, target acquisition is still a large part of the attack mission even when delivering Joint Direct Attack Munitions. Some of that information is available prior to flight. We need to align our intelligence support to targeting more closely to the ATO.
Naval aviation prides itself on its flexibility, but can we accept poor preparation in the name of flexibility? By doing so, we may be putting our aviators in peril. Flying a mission that is different from what is interpreted from the ATO, at the mercy of a command-and-control platform to get clearance to drop or even assign a forward air controller, and with gaps in the intelligence picture leads to poor tactical employment. For example, we found ourselves loitering in target areas for long periods in predictable flight paths trying to either acquire the target or ensure no collateral damage concerns. Although flexibility is one of our biggest strengths, we may be taking it too far.
We did not lose any tactical naval aircraft in northern Iraq, and we minimized the risks of friendly fire (sometimes by luck). Not fully understanding our ATO assignments, gaps in the intelligence support to targeting, and flexibility in the extreme caused us to break some of the tried and tested tactical rules. The results easily could have been much worse.
The Way Ahead
We need to be wary of drawing too many conclusions from Iraqi Freedom. One of the success stories of this conflict, however, is the efficacy of our training system. We should continue to hone our skills through a challenging and thorough training syllabus, constantly evaluated and refined, that tests all our strike-fighter skills, both day and night. Just because during OIF we did not have to shoot down aircraft on the way to targets, or attack a lot of targets with general-purpose weapons, does not mean we should not train to some form of those difficult scenarios. It is that training to high task load situations that contributed most to our ability to minimize mistakes under very challenging combat conditions, and that allowed our least experienced pilots to achieve unprecedented success.
Naval aviation should continue to train to the difficult scenarios. In addition, there is a valid argument for establishing training in certain mission areas where we have assumed a multiseat requirement and reestablishing training in other mission areas for which we have determined there no longer is a need, for example:
- We have assumed the forward air controller (airborne) mission can be done only by multiseat aircraft. A single-seat F/A-18 can fill this role under many, if not all, scenarios, and we should consider training the pilots to assume that role.
- We need to focus more on target acquisition and general-purpose weapon attacks in air-to-ground employment. The ability to acquire the target will continue to be important, and may become more so when we adopt the software and hardware that will allow us to operate more autonomously as strike platforms. The capability to accurately deliver a general-purpose weapon within parameters translates easily to smart weapon delivery and is a relatively inexpensive training evolution. However, once we lose this perishable skill, it will take considerable effort and expense to regain it.
- We have allowed our ability to operate in the low-level environment, especially at night, to atrophy. Using high-fidelity simulators and continued low-altitude awareness training, we could maintain a credible capability for potential low-altitude missions.
The SFWT syllabus served us well during Iraqi Freedom. Our junior aviators performed exceptionally. We need to constantly refine the syllabus, as with all our training evolutions, in an objective manner. Although we cannot accurately predict the requirements for naval aviation in a future conflict, we can continue to train to the most challenging mission areas. The skill set that results will reap the greatest successes.
Naval aviation contributes significantly to ongoing air operations, and we have come a long way integrating into the joint and coalition team. We need to take the next step and educate our people, so we can prepare efficiently and execute in a more effective manner.
Commander Lewis, a naval aviator and 1985 graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy, is executive assistant to Commander, Naval Air Force, U.S. Atlantic Fleet. He has combat experience in Desert Storm, Southern Watch, Deny Flight, Enduring Freedom, and Iraqi Freedom.