Operation Iraqi Freedom likely will be remembered as one of the most successful military engagements in U.S. history. A potentially powerful foe was devastated in less than a month, with minimal (although no less tragic) coalition fatalities. Operational planners will study Iraqi Freedom to learn its lessons and apply them to future conflicts. There are others who could benefit as well. In particular, the acquisition community could learn four key lessons:
- Having a backup plan is not wasteful duplication. Early in the war, Army General Tommy Franks took criticism from the press that the "shock and awe" air campaign had not produced a swift surrender. The ground campaign that commenced alongside it, however, eventually achieved coalition goals—and still in remarkable time. While an early surrender would have been preferable, its absence did not impair the achievement of the operation's goals.
This philosophy is in stark contrast to a number of decisions the Navy has made in acquisition. One example was the decision to remove the close-in weapon system on Flight IIA Aegis destroyers prior to the initial operational capability of the Evolved Sea Sparrow missile. The Evolved Sea Sparrow does offer superior performance in short-range antiair warfare, but the program's delay left some ships in need of expensive, out-of-sequence alterations. By prematurely removing the close-in weapon systems, the Navy bet on the "shock and awe" of the Evolved Sea Sparrow without having the tried-and-true "ground war" of the Phalanx system as a backup.
- Just because you don't see movement where you are, don't assume nothing useful is happening. Pundits in the press wailed loudly during the so-called operational pause of late March and early April. When the tanks of the Army's 3rd Infantry Division were not rolling, many were declaring the war a failure and demanding a radical shift in the military plan. Those who understand military operations realized important objectives (such as enemy attrition and friendly resupply) had to be achieved prior to resumption of the armor advance. Today, some who do not see steel being fabricated into ships or aircraft assume the process is broken and in need of drastic intervention. They are every bit as wrong as the war pundits were. Just as aerial preparation and logistics are hidden (yet vital) pieces of maneuver warfare, so are design, manufacturing development, contracting, and program management vital pieces of successful acquisition.
- Not every opinion is unbiased. Vice President Dick Cheney coined the phrase "generals embedded in newsrooms" to describe retired senior officers offering views on the execution of Iraqi Freedom. The opinions of former military officers are highly relevant during wartime, but retired generals such as Wesley Clark and Barry McCaffrey cannot reasonably be said to be unbiased observers. The problem was not their views, however, but the uncritical way in which others accepted them. Retired senior officers hold leadership positions throughout the defense industry; their views cannot be taken as uncolored opinions. Leaders making decisions on how to spend taxpayers' money mentally need to remove the retired title from in front of former colleagues' names and treat their views like anyone else's from industry. Like the embedded generals, their opinions cannot be accepted uncritically.
- Be fast in execution; be deliberate in preparation. It took six months of military build up and diplomatic pressure to position forces to be ready to strike Iraq. Once ready, combat operations were conducted with near blinding speed. Acquisition should work the same way. When spending tens of billions of dollars of taxpayers' money, it is good to take the time to know exactly what the Navy wants to buy and why it wants it. Once the pieces are in place, however, buy what is needed in as large a quantity as possible in as short a time as feasible.
Lieutenant Commander Vandroff works in the Aegis shipbuilding program office.