To provide perspective on Operation Iraqi Freedom, I offer here a brief comparison using the modern principles of war. The U.S. Army published its first list of them in War Department Training Regulations No. 10-5, 1921, and they are explained in current service manuals—including Joint Warfare of the U.S. Armed Forces, a pamphlet published shortly after Operation Desert Storm by then-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Colin Powell.
The U.S. principles of war have been refined into a list of nine elements that form the basis for planning, evaluating, and executing politico-military strategy. Although the principles are not quantitative measures by any means, they serve as a useful guide for initially assessing what has come to be called Gulf War II.
- Objective. All military campaigns should evolve from well-defined political objectives. Prior to and during Operation Iraqi Freedom, President George W. Bush was clear and consistent as to the objective of his administration with regard to Iraq: disarmament and regime change. "We will not stop until Iraq is free." Widespread foreign opposition to his pursuit of this objective, at least initially, made plain that it was well understood. If diplomacy failed to achieve the administration's aims, Secretary of State Colin Powell noted publicly—and in consultations at the United Nations and elsewhere—that military force would be used. Finally, the President's aims were supported by an equally well-defined campaign plan that used all the coalition military force needed to realize them.
- Offensive. From the onset of war, we witnessed the coordinated offensive power of the U.S.-led coalition. There were numerous examples of coalition forces seizing, exploiting, and retaining the initiative: special operations missions to protect key bridges and crossing points; thousands of U.S. and British air sorties launched from land and sea; and the swift, agile maneuver of armored, mechanized, and air mobile forces that covered more than 400 miles of widely varied terrain in a month.
- Mass, Maneuver, and Economy of Force. Debates over force sufficiency continue apace at media networks and our service schools. Speaking from the sidelines, several retired officers thought that the coalition should have had a second infantry division in place to augment the Third Infantry Division and I Marine Expeditionary Force. But it is highly unlikely that General Tommy Franks would have approved—or "caved in" to—a campaign plan that he believed to be lacking in forces. And, from all appearances, he and his U.S. Central Command staff are not averse to asking for resources.
The coalition demonstrated strategic mobility and the ability to concentrate forces at a time and place of its choosing. Select any encounter as it moved quickly from Kuwait through Basra, to Baghdad, to northern Iraq. Iraqi suicide teams and terrorist tactics were minor speed bumps that had little effect on coalition maneuverability. As coalition forces focused on Baghdad, more ground units were assigned to deal with the bypassed enemy units that threatened the long supply lines. When Saddam Hussein's troops came out in the open, coalition air power pounded them relentlessly.
- Unity of Command. Notwithstanding those who saw evidence of Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld's micromanagement behind every bush, General Franks and his headquarters in Qatar appeared to be very much in command. Although many TV generals—myself included—offered differing opinions on a "24/7" basis, operational and tactical decisions showed all signs of having been made without interference from Washington.
The Iraqi Freedom coalition is not nearly as large as that of Desert Storm, but command and staff relationships reflect superb coordination and cooperation. Indeed, planning and execution among our Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, and special operations units show how far we have come in joint operations. (Can anyone forget the debacle of Desert One 23 years ago, when a hastily thrown-together joint force tried to rescue U.S. embassy hostages in Tehran, Iran?) While the American people are notoriously fickle, polls thus far continue to show strong public support for the Commander-in-Chief and his troops.
- Security, Surprise, and Simplicity. The verdict is still out on operational security. The overwhelming majority of reporters embedded with U.S. units performed responsibly; they contributed both to public knowledge and to the war effort. At the same time, I believe the embedding process broadcasts much information about U.S. military capabilities and limitations and tactical techniques that will be used against us eventually. A prime example was the attempt by a Russian firm to pass anti-Global Positioning System devices to the Iraqis. In addition, given the number of combat images presented to the world hourly, it is inescapable that millions of people abroad saw the coalition as the bully beating up a poor, hapless enemy. The various news media and their influence on the war (and postwar reconstruction) promise to be fertile ground for debate for many years to come.
The coalition achieved strategic surprise on the first night of the war by attacking Saddam Hussein's central headquarters. The full effect of this heavy precision-guided munitions strike on Iraqi command, control, and communications has yet to be determined. Launching the ground offensive without the kind of extensive air preparation employed in Desert Storm no doubt afforded the coalition a great measure of operational and tactical surprise. At the working level, coalition forces demonstrated tactical surprise by such actions as finding prohibited weapons caches, uncovering possible evidence of chemical warfare capabilities, and boldly rescuing Army Private First Class Jessica Lynch.
From all we can gather at this mop-up stage of the war, the overall concept of operations for Iraqi Freedom was remarkably simple. When more information is available, I think we will find that its essential simplicity permitted coalition air, ground, naval, and special operations forces to perform extremely complex missions and tasks under an extensive and responsive umbrella of tactical and logistic support.
Conclusions
Military scholars and historians maintain that adherence to the principles of war will lead to victory. While the definition of victory is arguable in strategies that require long-term postwar nation building, the Iraqi Freedom military operation was audacious and eminently successful: movement of 300,000 military and naval personnel to staging areas halfway around the world; maintenance of unparalleled sea and air logistical support for deployed forces; application of precision targeting and munitions to substantially limit collateral damage and civilian casualties; and accomplishment of assigned missions with minimal friendly casualties.
Colonel Schmidt, a former infantry officer, is the Vice President of Student Affairs at Troy State University in Troy, Alabama.