Many articles and several books have been published since 12 August 2000, when the Russian nuclear submarine Kursk, with her crew of 118 officers, petty officers, men, and industry representatives, perished in the Barents Sea approximately 100 miles from Murmansk. In October 2001, the main part of the boat was raised; a number of Russian admirals and senior officers were punished subsequently for their part in the disaster.
In July 2002, the Russian government finally presented the formal results of its investigation and enabled naval experts and analysts to reconstruct the main causes of the Kursk's catastrophe. In the words of Russian historian Vasily Klyutchevsky, "History is not a schoolmistress. She does not teach. She is a prison matron who punishes for unlearned lessons."
The Kursk
The Oscar II (Project 949A)-class nuclear-powered cruise-missile attack submarine (SSGN) Kursk (K-141) was built at the Soviet Severodvinsk shipyard on the White Sea in 1993-1994 and commissioned in 1995. Since 1986, 12 submarines of this class were built in the Severodvinsk yard and commissioned.
The Russian Navy's modern SSGN submarines resulted from the domination of cruise-missile designers in submarine development since the 1960s—primarily the chief designer, Academician V. N. Tchelomei—and the Soviet Navy's desire to build long-range, supersonic, large-caliber, underwater-launched cruise missiles as quickly as possible for the purpose of threatening U.S. aircraft carrier battle groups. The Oscar II SSGN was designed by St. Petersburg's Rubin Design Bureau, which was headed by Academician Igor Spassky when the Kursk accident occurred. The Oscar II's characteristics are:
- Surface displacement of 14,700 tons; 24,000 tons submerged
- Length—154 meters; beam—18.2 meters; test depth—600 meters
- Crew of 108 officers, petty officers, and enlisted men
- Armament: 24 Granite supersonic cruise missiles (range—550 kilometers) placed outside the pressure hull and inclined on a 40°-to-horizontal plane; two 650-mm and four 533-mm bow torpedo tubes with 18 reserve torpedoes or torpedo-sized missiles outside the tubes
- Powered by two pressurized-water reactors, two steam turbines, and two propellers; the nuclear power plant generates 100,000 horsepower and a maximum speed of 33 knots submerged
The Accident
Following the 1999 summer exercises in the Barents Sea, the Kursk ventured into the Mediterranean and simulated an attack on a U.S. aircraft carrier battle group—the first time in at least four years that a Russian submarine had been so bold. Similar exercises in August 2000 set milestones for the number of surface ships and submarines that went to sea together (30) and the variety of ordnance they fired. In addition to the Kursk, the maneuvers included a nuclear-powered ballistic-missile submarine, an aircraft carrier, a huge Kirov-class nuclear-powered cruiser, and several guided-missile cruisers and destroyers.
During what was then the largest Russian naval exercise in recent years, the ships fired cruise missiles, torpedoes, and long-range ballistic missiles. The plan tasked the Kursk to fire cruise missiles and torpedoes. In addition, two Tu-22M Ukrainian supersonic strategic bombers armed with long-range cruise missiles participated in the exercise.
For Captain 1st Rank Gennady Lyatchin and a number of others in the control room of the Kursk, 12 August had to be a day of pride and triumph. His submarine was prepared for a final torpedo run in the fleet exercise. Captain Lyatchin, at 45 one of Russia's most experienced submarine commanding officers, radioed the North Fleet operations center at 0851 (all times, Moscow) and got permission to fire torpedoes. The Kursk was to attack the "enemy" by firing two practice torpedoes from 1130 to 1800.
The Kursk went up to the periscope depth of 19 meters to find the opposing ships, which were to enter the exercise area at about 1100. She slowed to 8 knots and extended her periscopes and antennas. At that time, the opponent was maneuvering approximately 30 nautical miles (nm) northwest of the area where the Kursk was on guard. According to the established rules of the exercise, opponents were not to be attacked before they entered the submarine's area of responsibility.
But instead of the sounds of torpedoes being blown from torpedo tubes, sonar operators on board the USS Memphis (SSN-691) and USS Toledo (SSN-769) heard two explosions: at 1128, one short and sharp blast equaled 200 pounds of trinitrotoluene (TNT); at 1130, a second huge blast equaled one to two tons of TNT. The U.S. submarines were 5-10 nm from the Kursk, monitoring the exercise in concert with the surveillance ship USS Loyal (T-AGOS-22), which was 186 nm west-northwest of the Kursk. (The Norwegian Seismic Institute also recorded the explosions and reported the second blast carried the force of two tons of TNT and registered 3.5 on the Richter scale.)
At about 5 nm from the Kursk, the Memphis first picked up a small mechanical noise—perhaps something like a weapon-handling accident—just before 1128. That was followed by what in all likelihood was the liquid-fuel explosion of the single torpedo; after 2 minutes and 15 seconds came the massive explosion of the remaining weapons in the torpedo room. In that short time, sonar data from the U.S. submarines indicated propeller acceleration, sounds of machinery grinding, and ballast tanks being blown in an effort to bring the Russian boat to the surface. Four minutes after the first blast, the Kursk was heard crashing into the seabed.
The official version of events finally announced by the Russian Government Investigative Commission and General Prosecutor holds that the "guilty" torpedo was waiting to be fired from the number 4 starboard torpedo tube. At 1128, its fuel unexpectedly exploded, which destroyed the torpedo tube and part of the bow structure. The resulting fire in the first compartment lasted until 1130 and led to the blast of some or all reserve torpedoes in that compartment and almost instant flooding of the first six compartments.
Lessons
Now it is known that a 650-mm 65-76A hydrogen-peroxide torpedo—one of the two torpedoes to have been fired that day—exploded inside the number 4 tube. According to the official investigation, the commanding officer and torpedo specialists did not know it could explode. Had they suspected and been made aware of any danger, they could have fired it to save the submarine. If the official version is correct, the most important remedial action is to remove this kind of hydrogen-peroxide torpedo from service.
With all due respect to the official investigation, however, a key question remains: Why did seawater—together with the standard automatic fire-fighting system—fail to extinguish the fire when it flooded the torpedo compartment through the 650-mm torpedo tube for more than two minutes? That is time enough to flood the entire torpedo room and extinguish the fire. Thus, in my opinion, it is possible the defective torpedo exploded in the compartment or while being loaded into the torpedo tube. In that case, the compartment might not have been flooded after the first blast and, absent retardation by seawater, the fire might have spread quickly. Further, there are questions as to the adequacy of the first compartment's fire-fighting system—and its fire sensors, which should have signaled the torpedo's rising temperature.
At the same time, the situation could have correlated with the official version. If the first blast initially destroyed the rear cover of the number 4 torpedo tube, and the forward cover, which was under the seawater pressure of several atmospheres, had not been destroyed, the torpedo tube probably acted as an artillery piece and fired back into the torpedo compartment. In this case, the torpedo room might not have been flooded and the huge fire could have detonated the reserve torpedoes 135 seconds after the first explosion.
Just as on the USS Scorpion (SSN-589), which was lost in the Atlantic Ocean in 1968, the control room on the Kursk is in the second compartment. This naval design was implemented initially in the USS Skipjack (SSN-585), which combined nuclear power with the hull form of the USS Albacore (AGSS-569) to yield higher underwater speed. Russian naval architects copied this design on the Victor 1 (Project 671) and later nuclear-powered submarines. But any unbiased analyst would agree that the speed advantage is bought by reducing survivability in case of a torpedo blast in the first compartment. A most poignant note is that, although it was difficult to put control rooms in the third compartments of the Skipjacks, and the Victor class, it was quite possible to have the control room—and an escape chamber for the crew—in the third or fourth compartment of the Kursk-class SSGNs.
In the torpedo room of current U.S. and Russian nuclear submarines, there are efficient fire-fighting systems that use seawater and chemical foam mixtures. But in some cases, these systems can be inadequate; to prevent a disaster, the torpedo room must be flooded by seawater. Nuclear power plants enable submarines to continue sailing underwater, even with flooded torpedo rooms. And they can stay afloat on the surface (especially Russian boats, with their 30% reserve buoyancy).
Automatic shutdown of nuclear reactors in disaster situations is not always a positive factor. In the case of the Kursk's accident, a functional reactor could have meant a working turbo generator in the stern compartment that might have saved the lives of the 23 sailors who survived the torpedo room explosion.
Who is responsible for introduction of the 650-mm hydrogen-peroxide torpedoes? Soviet Navy leaders, the more than 30-year tenure of fleet commander-in-chief Admiral S. G. Gorshkov, and Gorshkov's torpedo specialists must share the blame. It is understandable that a 650-mm, 12-meter long, 4-ton torpedo might be thought better than the 533-mm, 6 meter-long, 1.5-ton U.S. MK-48 torpedo with similar fuel. The Soviet Navy's leaders and torpedo specialists were impressed by the hydrogen-peroxide torpedo's range of 50 kilometers, speed of 50 knots, and charge weight of 1,400 pounds. At the same time, they neglected their own negative experience with the Project 617 submarine's hydrogen-peroxide power plant and Great Britain's tragic experience with a hydrogen-peroxide torpedo on HMS Sidon in 1955.
Finally, it was against all the rules to embark plant representatives to test a new model of torpedo during an exercise. In 1998 the Kursk's 650-mm torpedo tubes had been modernized for firing torpedoes by means of special gas generators to provide quieter firing. It was done because the 650-mm torpedo tubes had obsolete and noisy pneumatic systems. Such experimental tests should have been done without other combat torpedoes on the submarine.
Conclusions
As a consequence of the Kursk disaster, the 650-mm 65-76A hydrogen-peroxide heavy torpedoes were withdrawn from the Russian Navy's submarine force. The United States followed the Russians in putting eight 26-inch (660-mm) torpedo tubes on the Seawolf (SSN-21)-class submarines, from which they could fire current 21-inch and future 26-inch torpedoes and missiles. On the new Virginia (SSN-774)-class boats, it returned to 21-inch (533-mm) torpedoes and missile tubes. Russia also returned to the 533-mm tube in the Project 885 Severodvinsk submarine now under construction.
To his credit, Russian President Vladimir Putin took personal responsibility for the disaster; he met with the victims' relatives and provided financial assistance. The President punished those responsible for safety violations and shortcomings in the exercise and rescue operation, and decorated the Kursk's commanding officer and her crew posthumously.
As for the future of Project 949A submarines, it appears that boats of that class will be in the Russian fleet for many years. Eventually they will be replaced by the more cost-effective and efficient Project 971and 885 nuclear-powered attack submarines.
Dr. Sviatov, an independent naval analyst, lives in Bethesda, Maryland.