The most radical part of unmanned aerial vehicles is not the technology—it is simply a logical extension of manned aviation—but the application and integration of the platforms into traditional Navy operations.
The idea of unmanned air and surface vehicles conducting hazardous missions while the operators remain safely ensconced in operations centers miles or even continents away is a seductive view of future warfare. But to those grounded in the realities of mission planning, aircraft preflight, takeoffs, and landings, who have invested thousands of hours patrolling skies and delivering ordnance, the notion may connote more science fiction than fact. The array of issues, and the prejudices, surrounding unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) is dizzying. The scope of discussion is growing daily, and the arguments are evolving constantly. One such topic is whether UAVs represent a truly disruptive technological move or merely a logical extension of aeronautical science.
Within naval aviation, UAVs appear to be considered new technology, not yet ready for fleet assimilation. But are they? UAVs are aircraft. They respond to aerodynamic manipulation. The primary difference between the notional unmanned combat aerial vehicle (UCAV) and a manned counterpart is the physical location of the pilots: one will be in the aircraft, the other will operate the vehicle remotely. UAVs are, as a group, a logical extension of the existing trajectory of aviation technology. They use aviation fuel and respond to lift, drag, thrust, and gravity. In short, they fly.
There is a temptation to call the technology radical, and to resist incorporation until sufficient improvements have been made to mitigate risk. This appears prudent, in that safety and system costs should be protected and managed as well as possible. The appellation of "radical technology" is misleading, however, as the truly disruptive aspect of UAVs falls into the doctrine category. The technology is common; it is the application and integration of the systems into traditional Navy architecture that are disruptive, and thus more likely to be resisted.1
Disruptive Technology versus Disruptive Doctrine
Nuclear weaponry is a good example of a disruptive technology. Until August 1945, bombs delivered kinetic effect in relatively direct proportion to their size. Nuclear weapons not only geometrically increased the bomb effect in relation to physical bomb size, but also created a chain of issues (global health and radioactivity, appropriateness of use, etc.) that had to be accounted for in any employment plan. The technology was an unimaginable leap forward, but it still was employed in a fashion consistent with other weapons. The bombs had to be delivered to preplanned targets, so their use could be managed with established strike-planning methodology.
The insertion of such a disruptive technology was acceptable to open-minded service leaders because they could manage its application within an accepted and understandable architecture. UAVs, however, are evolving as the photographic negative of that scenario.
Unmanned aerial vehicles represent a technological evolution based on established aeronautical principles. Aircraft, manned or not, fly according to the restrictions of physics. Doctrinally, however, UAV operations are alien to traditional aviation operations. There are technical hurdles—frequency deconfliction and availability, use of airspace in conjunction with manned aircraft, and other potential hazards. There are training problems—can they be flown only by aviators? And there are operational integration issues—which situations are more appropriate for unmanned craft, and what inefficiencies are we willing to bear to achieve such use? Do the costs of changing operational doctrine outweigh the potential benefits of UAV use?
The long pole issues for UAVs fall squarely into the operational arena. Like the DASH unmanned antisubmarine warfare helicopter of the 1960s—which died a slow death because commanders and operators placed more value on avoiding the safety and career consequences of failure or loss than on the potential benefits of the vehicle—UAVs create risks for those considering their use.
Changing Doctrine
No one has yet thought through how doctrine must change to employ, if not embrace, unmanned aviation. But UCAV is scheduled for arrival in 2015, and the mind-set of gradual incrementalism must change if that deadline is to be met. Risks associated with bringing UAVs into the fray can be mitigated only by UAV employment. Navy policy and resource decisions continue to kick that can down the road—a new, interim vehicle is to be fielded and integrated around 2005, but given the apparent low value the service places on sea-based unmanned aviation, even that may be optimistic.
The notion that the timeline can be compressed (2005-2015 instead of, say, 2002-2015) by using currently available but not the best vehicles for UAV integration appears flawed. If doctrine is the disrupted element of UAV integration, it would be easier, and likely less costly, to begin to ameliorate operating concerns and to mitigate UCAV risks by flying UAVs from ships, operationally, as soon as possible.
The RQ-2 Pioneer, the Navy's sea-based UAV workhorse since 1986, is (rightfully) being retired. The time has arrived to consign it to legacy status and move forward with better systems. The operating doctrines of naval aviation never completely embraced the Pioneer, except during actual conflict (Desert Storm, Noble Anvil, etc.), so we remain in the infancy of UAV integration.
Our corporate architectural knowledge—or doctrine—is built around flying manned aircraft into harm's way. A transition to a mix of manned and unmanned aircraft can be done, and the problems discovered and solved, only through some form of trial and error. Unfortunately, that process cannot begin until there is organizational commitment (resource and doctrinal) to the desired ends. No other nation or enemy has the collective resources available to the U.S. Navy, so the answer to how to make this happen will not come externally.2 The solutions must be developed as soon as possible, using available vehicles and spirally developing operating doctrine and tactics to accommodate the technology (instead of the other way around).
Today's ensigns will be the commanding officers of 2015, and they will be fighting with unmanned platforms. They should not have to fight the systems along with the enemy. It is incumbent on the service to field systems and find answers well before that day arrives. We can buy the technology and the ships and the weapons, but not the necessary time.
Commander Johnson is Deputy N6 (Space, Information Warfare, Command and Control) on the staff of Commander, Cruiser-Destroyer Group Two. He previously served as commanding officer of Fleet Composite Squadron Six.