Amid a host of Allied failures to prevent the Japanese from controlling the southwest Pacific in the three months after the 7 December 1941 attack on Pearl Harbor, Destroyer Division 59’s raid off Balikpapan stood out as an operation Admiral Ernest King called "brilliantly executed."
The U.S. Navy's first surface engagement since 1898 was a destroyer raid against a Japanese landing force off Borneo in January 1942. Its significance largely has been lost to history, but it proved convincingly in little more than an hour that the U.S. Navy intended to fight the enemy, even if outnumbered and outgunned. For the U.S. Asiatic Fleet and the short-lived ABDA (American-- British-Dutch-Australian) Command, the Balikpapan action marked one of only a few positive developments at the time. An otherwise dreary list of negatives began with the destruction of Cavite Navy Yard in December 1941 and continued through the disastrous Battle of the Java Sea in February 1942.
By 11 January 1942, the Japanese had moved into the Dutch East Indies in force, with landings at Menado in the Celebes and at Tarakan in Dutch Borneo. Tarakan was an important oil center, but only one of several in Borneo. The real prize was Balikpapan, about halfway down the Makassar Strait. After seizing Tarakan, the Imperial Navy decided to expedite the invasion of Balikpapan, with Rear Admiral Shoji Nishimura given command of the operation. Nishimura's force, carrying units of the 16th Army, departed Tarakan on the afternoon of 21 January.
The Japanese effort to capture the oil fields at Balikpapan did not come as a surprise. Both Allied submarines and aircraft had tracked the invasion force. On the evening of 23 January, Dutch bombers attacked Nishimura's ships just off Balikpapan, fatally damaging the transport Nana Maru. But by 2130 that evening, the transports had anchored four miles off the coast and begun putting troops ashore. The Dutch authorities at Balikpapan were intent on denying its use to the Japanese and set the oil refining facilities there on fire before departing. At 2300 on 23 January, the Dutch submarine K-14 torpedoed and sank the transport Jukka Maru. In response to that and other suspected Allied submarine activity in the Makassar Strait, Admiral Nishimura took his covering force—his flagship, the light cruiser Naka, and ten destroyers—into the strait to ward off further attacks. That left only three patrol boats, three sub-chasers, and four minesweepers to provide immediate protection for the anchored transports offshore.
In the meantime, Rear Admiral William A. Glassford's Task Force 5, constituting the surface striking power of the Asiatic Fleet, had been preparing a response to the Japanese thrust into the East Indies. Based at Surabaya, Java, Task Force 5 retired to Koepang Bay, Timor, on 18 January to refuel. On 20 January, Glassford's force was alerted to the Japanese intention of landing at Balikpapan. It was the opportunity the Asiatic Fleet had been waiting for, but unfortunately, Glassford was denied use of his cruisers. The heavy cruiser Houston (CA-30) was at that time escorting a convoy to Singapore. Glassford's flagship, the light cruiser Boise (CL-47), hit an uncharted pinnacle rock while transiting Sape Strait on 21 January, tearing a gash in her bottom and putting the ship out of action. Glassford transferred his flag to his other light cruiser, the Marblehead (CL-12), but the ship could make only 15 knots, having lost a turbine. The cruiser was not fast enough to participate in a daring night raid. That left only the four old four-stack destroyers of Commander Paul H. Talbot's Destroyer Division 59 available for action at Balikpapan.
These destroyers were the John D. Ford (DD-228), Talbot's flagship, Pope (DD-225), Parrott (DD-218), and Paul Jones (DD-230). They all were Clemson (DD-186)-class ships commissioned about 1920, each with a complement of 149 and armed with 4-inch guns and 12 torpedoes apiece. After the Boise's grounding on 21 January, the destroyers started taking on fuel from the Marblehead, but at 1500 received instructions from Admiral Thomas C. Hart, commanding the Asiatic Fleet and the naval elements of ABDA, to proceed to a point south of the Postillon Islands and await further orders. Talbot canceled the fueling of his destroyers and moved out into monsoon weather with heavy seas and low visibility. About 0930 on 23 January, Talbot received a dispatch directing him to be off Cape Mandar, Celebes, that evening "for attack on enemy at Balikpapan." Talbot proceeded north at 25 knots and at 1900 issued his battle order and attack plan to the small force:
Primary weapon torpedoes. Primary objective transports .... Endeavor launch torpedoes at close range before being discovered .... Will try to avoid action en route .... Use own discretion in attacking independently when targets located.
Admiral Glassford was more succinct: "Go on in there, and fight!" he signaled Talbot. By the time Talbot's force reached Cape Mandar, the seas had calmed. Talbot ordered an increase in speed to 27 knots as he changed course to the northwest just 180 miles from Balikpapan. He recorded his own thoughts at the time: "In spite of odds against us experienced feeling of exhilaration." Lieutenant William P. Mack, gunnery officer on board the John D. Ford, echoed such sentiments. "My men were spoiling for a fight," he wrote later. "I didn't have to tell them what to do, just when." But Mack added, "I remember running over in my mind the lofty War College comments on the expected life of a destroyer in a night action. I couldn't remember whether it was measured in seconds or minutes, but I knew it wasn't much of either."
Shortly before midnight, Talbot spotted what he thought were Japanese searchlights over the horizon ahead. The glow in the sky might well have been from the burning oil refineries at Balikpapan, however. As the destroyers steamed closer to their objective, Mack noted that "we could smell burning oil 20 miles at sea." In the vicinity of Balikpapan, Talbot recorded, "Night very dark—visibility poor—smoke haze in air."
The poor visibility was a definite advantage for the attackers, as was the lack of expectation by the Japanese that their invasion force would be subjected to a surface raid. At 0245, a division of Japanese destroyers passed within 800 yards of the John D. Ford, crossing from starboard to port in front of the U.S. ships, which approached Balikpapan in column, with the John D. Ford followed in order by the Pope, Parrott, and Paul Jones. Talbot ignored the enemy's recognition signals and moved on without difficulty, succeeding in his aim to avoid a fight before reaching the transports. Within moments he "sighted large number ships ahead [to port]." Those were the anchored transports, in two rows.
After about ten more minutes, the destroyers were within torpedo range of the transports. The Parrott fired three torpedoes at a transport and missed. Two minutes later, she fired five more torpedoes, this time to starboard at 1,000 yards range, at what was thought to be a destroyer or cruiser but turned out to be a minesweeper. The John D. Ford fired one at the same time, and the Paul Jones fired shortly thereafter at the same target, but all of these torpedoes missed.
By 0300 the destroyers were steaming beyond their targets, so Talbot ordered a turn to the south, radioing instructions "to open fire with torpedoes as targets [become] available." Before executing the turn, the Parrott fired three torpedoes at the 3,500-ton transport Sumanoura Maru, which blew up and sank. The flames reached 500 feet into the air. At this point the Japanese still were unsure of what was happening, mistaking the U.S. destroyers for their own and believing the torpedoes were being fired by submarines.
At 0306 several transports began blinking lights as a result of the Sumanoura Maru's explosion, and the Pope fired five torpedoes at a concentration of ships about 4,000 yards to starboard. The Pope's action report noted, "about four minutes later two good sized explosions were seen in this area about thirty seconds apart." The Parrott and Paul Jones had fired torpedoes to starboard shortly after the Pope did, and it is unclear which torpedoes hit what, but at least one struck the Tatsukami Maru, which exploded and sank. Talbot observed, "There is no thrill to compare with battle even when sudden death is momentarily expected."
At 0314 Talbot ordered a 90° turn to starboard as his destroyers, still in column, approached the southern end of the outer row of anchored ships. The Pope and Parrott both fired torpedoes at the patrol boat PC-37 off the port beam, scoring at least two hits and sinking her. But by 0322, the Pope and Parrott had expended all their torpedoes and were directed to open fire with guns at the next available target. The John D. Ford and Paul Jones still had torpedoes, and one hit the 5,000-ton Kuretake Maru, which the Pope also raked with gunfire. The transport blew up and sank as the four-stackers continued to maneuver at high speed. At 0338, having completed a 360 deg turn and proceeding northwest through the center of the outer row of transports, the column "passed around a smoking partly sunken hulk of a large ship. Men, life rafts and small boats were observed in the water." The partly sunken hulk was the Nana Maru, hit hours earlier by Dutch aircraft. By 0340, the John D. Ford had slowed and stopped, believing she was almost upon a mine field, and the Pope turned sharply to port to avoid a collision. At this point the column broke up, as the Parrott, Pope, and Paul Jones peeled off and headed south, firing guns at targets of opportunity. By 0400, those three ships had joined in column, moving at high speed away from the action.
That left the John D. Ford temporarily on her own. Talbot recorded:
Ford headed into melee and approached large transport. Fired last torpedo—hit transport close aboard, blast terrific. Could neither hear nor see. Enemy listed rapidly to port. Opened up with guns on several ships at point blank range. Three salvos in one [target], all hits.
In this final maneuvering of the battle, the John D. Ford's torpedo most likely sank the Tsuruga Maru, then the destroyer executed a 180° turn and headed out to sea in pursuit of the rest of the division. Lieutenant Mack described his gunnery as "draw shooting at its best. As targets loomed out of the dark at ranges of 500 to 1,500 yards we trained on and let go a salvo or two, sights set at their lower limits, using the illumination furnished by burning ships." Shortly after expending her last torpedo, the John D. Ford absorbed the only damage suffered by U.S. ships during the action, as a round fired by one of the transports landed in the after deckhouse, causing a brief fire and wounding four men. Commander Talbot noted, "After one hour and 15 [minutes] enemy now seems aware what is going on. Numerous [enemy] destroyers open fire." These ships may not have been destroyers, but in any event were unable to impede the John D. Ford's retirement from the battle. As the horizon in the east began to turn gray, the ship ran at highest speed southward, hoping to rendezvous with the Marblehead 90 miles south of Balikpapan and join with the other destroyers en route.
It took an hour, but the Ford found the rest of the division steaming down Makassar Strait. The assumption was that the Japanese would give chase. As Commander Talbot described it:
About daybreak situation critical as we were approaching Aru Bank. Rain squall ahead. Must either slow until visibility improves and run chance of being overtaken or take chance on hitting Aru pass. Decided to slow when beacon sighted and it became unnecessary. A lucky break. At about 0730 sighted Marblehead plane and he signaled that [Marblehead] was 50 miles south. About 0815 joined Adm. Glassford in [Marblehead] with [destroyer] Bulmer [DD-222]. Proceeded south at 25 kts, fuel situation critical."
But the Japanese failed to pursue the raiders. The small force arrived at Surabaya on 25 January, with the destroyermen feeling exhausted but victorious. Admiral Hart signaled Talbot, "Well done."
The battle off Balikpapan was unquestionably a tactical victory for the United States. Four Japanese transports and a patrol boat were sunk at the cost of four wounded men aboard the John D. Ford. Unfortunately, however, the Japanese proceeded with the occupation of Balikpapan without meaningful delay. From a strategic point of view, the destroyer raid amounted only to a very temporary diversion of effort for the enemy. The Sakaguchi Detachment of the Imperial Army, constituting the landing force at Balikpapan, reported only 29 men killed or missing as a result of the raid.
Defective torpedoes were a problem. That was undoubtedly one reason only a small fraction of 48 fired found their targets. In addition, as the Office of Naval Intelligence Combat Narrative noted, "The suddenness with which targets presented themselves, the high speed of our ships, the close ranges and shallow water probably explain the small percentage of hits."
Nevertheless, the night action off Balikpapan proved the Imperial Navy was vulnerable. Its performance during the battle was unimpressive. Samuel Eliot Morison summed it up later:
Admiral Nishimura—who, judging from his actions here and at the Battle of Leyte Gulf in 1944, must have been one of the least competent Japanese flag officers—led his destroyer squadron right out into the strait, where he circled aimlessly searching for nonexistent submarines, leaving his transports to the mercy of the Americans.
Ten days after the destroyer raid, a larger Allied striking force, consisting of four cruisers and two destroyer divisions, again steamed toward Balikpapan. But Japanese aircraft spotted the ships and bombed them heavily, causing the operation to be canceled. The oil fields of Dutch Borneo were to remain in Japanese hands until 1945.
The failure of the Allies to prevent the Japanese from overrunning much of the southwest Pacific during the three months following the attack on Pearl Harbor should not cause the gallantry of Destroyer Division 59's effort at Balikpapan to be overlooked. In the words of the Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Fleet at the time, Admiral Ernest J. King, "Whatever the losses sustained by the enemy, the attack ... was brilliantly executed."
Mr. Bernstein is the author of Hurricane at Biak: MacArthur against the Japanese, May-August 1944 (Philadelphia, PA: Xlibris Corporation, 2000). He has written for a variety of historical publications, including Naval History magazine.