"A Quick Look At Millennium Challenge 2002"
(See W. Keman, pp 108-110, March 2003 Proceedings)
Commander Jeff Huber, U.S. Navy (Retired)—I wish General Kernan had directly addressed the controversy surrounding the Millennium Challenge 2002 (MC02) exercise and the transformation movement overall. He chose, instead, to summarily dismiss it.
"At JFCom," he wrote, "we encourage intellectually grounded criticism," implying that none of the criticism of MC02 was intellectually grounded. He further characterized that criticism as "in the words of Shakespeare, `full of sound and fury.'" By inference, "signifying nothing."
The criticism and controversy he alluded to stemmed largely from the words and actions of retired Marine Corps Lieutenant General Paul Van Riper, the MC02 Red Force commander. Post exercise, General Van Riper characterized MC02 as, "an exercise that was almost entirely scripted to ensure a Blue (friendly forces) win," one calculated to validate rather than test favored warfighting concepts and new weapons systems.
Multiple sources reported that at one point in the game, Red Force sank most of the Blue Force fleet. Exercise directors called a "training time out," pulled the Blue fleet off the bottom and resumed the game with severe restrictions placed on Red Force actions that reportedly led General Van Riper to resign.
Rather than refute or explain any of this, General Kernan praised the exercise for having "facilitated exploration of 11 concepts, 27 joint initiatives, 46 service initiatives, and assessed 22 warfighting issues," as if sheer volume of concepts, initiatives, and issues assessed were a suitable measure of effectiveness.
In a blanket condemnation of MC02 and transformation critics, General Kernan wrote, "Transformation and the new concepts that JFCom is developing understandably make people uncomfortable, in part because they dispute cherished service doctrine and practices."
Few question the need for change in the U.S. military, and most will agree that meaningful change can only happen if it's driven at the four-star level. We should find it troubling, however, that the Unified Command in charge of shaping the force of the future rejects any and all criticism of its ideas and methods as unintellectual, insignificant, and products of old-fashioned, parochial thinking. The danger is that JFCom's transformation project will create a new parochialism, one immune from any outside influence that time-tested wisdom may provide.
"Publisher's Page: Anonymity"
(See T. Marfiak, p. 8, February 2003; G. Schultz, W. Morgan, W. Holland, pp. 14-16, March 2003 Proceedings)
Commander Victor G. Addison Jr., U.S. Navy—The suggestion of Admiral Marfiak to grant anonymity in specific cases to authors of Proceedings contributions to "encourage freedom of discussion and criticism" treats the symptom, not the disease. It is astonishing that the U.S. Naval Institute—"an independent forum for the sea services"—must consider resorting to this tactic to address the concern that there is "risk in writing for Proceedings." As naval officers in the greatest democracy in history, we should instead conduct an emergency cultural self-examination and figure out how to end the pervasive hypersensitivity to criticism that stifles the innovative ideas of our junior personnel.
The consequences of allowing this disease to develop may be severe. After a spate of groundings and collisions in the late 1980s, the submarine force determined that junior personnel who recognized indications of impending danger—but were afraid to speak up—could have prevented many of the incidents. The concept of "forceful backup" was developed to create a command climate that would empower all crewmembers to take responsibility for the safe operation of their ship. As warning signs of our apparent relapse, I offer two examples for consideration: the arrogant command climate on the USS Greeneville (SSN-772) prior to her collision with MV Ehime Maru and the declining membership in the Naval Institute. Perhaps we can prevent future occurrences of the former example by addressing the root cause of the latter.
Commander Mike Collins, U.S. Naval Reserve—I was an associate editor for Proceedings in 1996 when an author with whom I was dealing on an article confided to me that he had an anonymous letter to the editor appearing in the next issue of Navy Times. His letter was a nasty attack on the Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Mike Boorda.
I told him that the letter was a bad idea, and that publishing it anonymously was an even worse idea. I argued that an idea not worth signing is an idea not worth publishing. I urged him to withdraw the letter, but it was too late. It appeared, and a few days later, Admiral Boorda committed suicide.
Did this anonymous letter cause Admiral Boorda's death? I don't think so. But in the witch hunt for scapegoats, the editor of Navy Times came under tremendous pressure and failed to protect his anonymous author. As it turned out, the author had been relieved of command for striking a subordinate, and thus had an ax to grind.
There is some precedence in our nation for pseudonyms. For example, the Federalist Papers were a series of high-level letters to the editor in prominent newspapers, written under the pen-name of Publius, designed to sway public opinion to ratifying the Constitution.
But the power of the American Declaration of Independence did not emanate from its timeless words as much as from signatures affixed to it. It took courage for the most prominent citizens of the colonies to dare to risk their lives and fortunes to sign the Declaration of Independence. But in doing so, they put faces and names to the opposition of tyranny, and by doing so, they took what might otherwise have been just another anonymous manifesto and turned it into the bedrock of a nation.
John Adams often is quoted by the Naval Institute as saying "Dare to think and read and speak and write." And we should give power to our thoughts by daring to stand by our words.
Don Richardson—Surely our military seniors would not indiscreetly punish someone for speaking the truth, deny promotion under the umbrella of a secret violation of not keeping it in-house, or abuse someone's privileges for editorial comments regarding any branch of the military even if it may hurt up front to fix the rear.
I believe that an overseeing board would not necessarily screen but would validate any article submitted that would subsequently be published anonymously. I believe the body representing an honorable magazine such as Proceedings is not going to do anything to jeopardize the sanctity of the product. I also believe that articles for print should still encompass the things Proceedings has stood for all these years—honesty, integrity, eye on the ball, and on the heart beat of the Navy/Marine Corps.
I read this magazine because it gives me up-to-date current events and discusses issues that no other publication reaches. It also gathers a wide range of articles submitted from some quite distinguished and former members of the Navy. I don't want to lose that appeal, but by the same token I want the gloves off on some interesting issues that some may feel uneasy posting their name to, even though it may be hot and contentious.
"Naval Rail Guns Are Revolutionary"
(See D. Adams, pp. 34-37, February 2003 Proceedings)
James Chew—Since they were first discussed in science fiction to becoming a Strategic Defense Initiative research-and-development program, the potential warfighting benefits of rail guns have been acknowledged to be quite attractive. In fact, the U.S., French, German, and U.K. armies were seriously studying rail guns for tank applications.
Barrel life, power system, and projectile design issues for these systems continue to be major obstacles. Some benefits from research efforts are making their way to fielded systems, in particular the focus on component miniaturization and electromagnetic and g-load hardening.
Therefore, it is more prudent to develop and focus on naval fire support system technology goals that could allow for a deployable naval rail gun, rather than developing a new acquisition program that would compete for resources in an already crowded naval fire support acquisition effort.
C. P. Hall—I am sincere when I say I found this article both interesting and informative. I also was amused to find the word "revolutionary" attached to this collection of observations and comments.
The thoughts regarding accurate, long-range gunfire—as well as the kinetic energy aspects of various projectiles—were well-covered in the 1940s by Bernard Brodie, who was defending the continuing role of the battleship in the age of aviation and refuting the theories of Alexander P. de Seversky.
If 60 years is not ancient enough, readers might enjoy the drawing of "A Hundred-Mile Electromagnetic Gun" (below). Please note the similarities to the drawing that accompanied the article: the isolated power source, the projectiles in the magazine, and the similar range potential. The drawing dates back to 1918.
I fear there is little that is revolutionary about this concept. Replacing explosive propellants with an electromagnetic alternative is an idea so obvious that it has been on someone's drawing board for the last 90 years. It also is so difficult in execution that it has never been successfully employed in a peaceful or a military application. It will be interesting to see if this idea's time has finally arrived.
"What You Should Know About Attacking Computer Networks"
(See T. Gibson, pp. 48-51, February 2003; J. Pocalyko, pp. 22-23, February 2003 Proceedings)
Glenn Conant—Colonel Gibson classified the types of networks and the importance of targeting of each. He brings up a great point about who should carry out the attack: operational military units or intelligence organizations? These two groups may have conflicting objectives while tasked with the same target.
Overt missions should be jointly implemented, but military units should be the driving organization. Intelligence services should carry out attacks for covert operations and probably should be isolated in this case. One possible solution may be the creation of a joint military/intelligence operational group. This group would need to have close ties to military units for coordination of cyber and conventional attacks, intelligence units for support and information of enemy assets, and be commanded by a high-level military or intelligence officer with close ties to theater commanders or deputy director personnel. A second solution might be to investigate how the drug interdiction operations of U.S. Customs are conducted across multiple organizations.
To answer the question of who should carry out an attack, management and technological standpoints have to be taken into account. Coordination of human and technology resources, damage requirements (mission), compartmentalization, and cost versus benefit all play a factor from the management standpoint. Public networks, operating systems, software and firmware, intrusion detection systems (IDSs), honeynets, and system redundancy are the technological standpoints.
Anyone performing a network attack has to consider the deployment of IDSs at the enemy's network. IDSs generally are categorized as host based or network based. Host-based IDSs monitor a specific network node either by software installed on the host as an agent or a system dedicated as a decoy or honeypot. Installed agents monitor an operating system or logs and notify a management system of malicious activity. Network-based IDSs monitor a particular network segment. A network-based sensor would be placed behind a firewall to determine if any malicious traffic is getting past a point it should not.
Sandbox or honeypot machines are simply targets. They detect, delay, and educate. They can be set up to look attractive to a hacker by making it look like or mirror a production system with obvious misconfigurations. Any traffic on these systems can be tracked to find out exactly what an attacker is doing. Because there should be no legitimate traffic on honeypot systems, someone is up to no good and detection is obtained by activity. The attacker has to determine if the target is worth penetrating by network scanning and if penetrated, how he can use it to his advantage without being caught. Delay is obtained when the hacker identifies a hackable system and decides to attempt a penetration. If the honeypot is configured to be somewhat more insecure than your other systems, the attacker will try to leverage this. He may try to fix the vulnerabilities of the honeypot to prevent others from breaking into "his" system and create a back door for easy access later. He has now educated you to his methods. Honeynets are groups of honeypots or entire network segments that contain only non-production systems.
The tools available to network defenders can make it difficult to penetrate or disable a network provided they are implemented, monitored, and maintained properly. Intelligence services should be involved in most network attack operations as they would more likely have the resources to identify network defenses, personnel, and redundant systems from the inside.
"Another View: The French"
(See E. Smith, p. 18, March 2003 Proceedings)
Ben Parker—I was surprised by the unflattering depiction of the Marquis de Lafayette. I would have thought that his contributions to our war for independence would earn him a degree of respect in a U.S. military journal at least. I also would hope that those in America's military can grasp the notion that the millions in the French, German, and Russian militaries who gave their lives for their countries in the last century earned their countries the right to have their opinions about war.
Hamlin A. Cadwell Jr.—The cartoon is in bad taste considering the many French dead who are memorialized alongside Americans by the Yorktown Battlefield Victory Monument. Of course, France was pursuing its best national interests in 1781 as it is today. France has every right to do so. Cheap-shot cartoons have no place in a professional journal such as Proceedings.
"All Ahead Flank for LCS"
(See H. Mustin, D. Katz, pp. 30-33, February 2003; D. Lewis, pp. 10-14, March 2003 Proceedings)
Vice Admiral Joseph Metcalf III, US. Navy (Retired), former Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Surface Warfare—This superb article addresses what many refer to as serious Navy problems: the design and building of a warship that can fight and win in the littoral environment, and the challenge of breaking the business-as-usual approach to shipbuilding. They might be problems, but are better thought of as challenges, as the authors obviously do.
Both Admirals Mustin and Katz are experts in the subject. Their discussion of the littoral combat ship (LCS) is far superior to that provided by the Navy in the request for proposal for the ship, or anyplace else. The authors point out that the LCS concept is not endorsed by many. This is aggravated by the inability of the Navy to decide on a strong concept of operations. This should not be unexpected—we did not have one for the USS Langley (CV-1) at a similar point in her development. The authors make the point that one of the reasons to build an LCS is to provide a platform from which to develop ways to use it in war fighting. The LCS concept is particularly difficult as we need to learn and understand how to use a new and different type of ship, as well as understand the ways of the littoral battlefield. Our brethren who fight above and below the sea share similar challenges.
The surface warfare challenge is to develop a new type of ship and adjust our thinking to a new way to fight. This article describes the scenario by which our foes use disruption on a Navy they cannot defeat, making it too costly to prevail. The authors' description of a table at which our enemies are discussing asymmetric threats, such as motor boats filled with dynamite, is not unreasonable. It may be useful to think about guerilla warfare going to sea.
The mission of the LCS may not be to fight sea-borne guerillas, but these threats are with us now, and we must be ready to respond. The LCS is not a linear derivative of any ship or system we have today. Neither is the threat straight forward. The modular idea for this type of ship and missions makes sense. We had better get started at all ahead flank.
"`Enemy Combatants' Should Worry Us"
(See G. Solis, p. 2, December 2002; P. Burkett, p. 14, January 2003 Proceedings)
Dr. John W Coe—I have no doubt that the author's points are legally sound, but my concern is that we have a situation in which neither the rules of warfare nor the rules of criminal procedure apply. This is, in the words of Michael A. Ledeen who writes for the American Enterprise Institute, "the triumph of legalism over common sense."
Using a World War II analogy, if a German were wearing the uniform of an SS officer, brandishing a Luger, and threatening the civilian population in downtown Chicago, he would be treated as an enemy soldier and dealt with accordingly. If a U.S. citizen not wearing a uniform were brandishing the same weapon, he would be treated as a criminal and placed under arrest, indicted, and tried with all the protections the Constitution affords him as a citizen.
If a U.S. citizen, dressed in an SS uniform and clearly an enemy soldier, participated in the same activity, his citizenship would not protect him from the rules of war. Unfortunately, the new enemy fits in none of the aforementioned categories.
There are examples of this enemy seeking and obtaining citizenship to secure protections for clandestine activities. For all intent and purposes, this "citizenship" is obtained fraudulently. In the instances cited by Colonel Solis—Yaser Hamdi and Jose Padilla—I do not know whether they were born in this country or are naturalized citizens. It would be instructive to know that.
Our war is not really on terrorism but on militant Islam. Unfortunately, we are unable as a people to make this leap to reality. We cannot, for a host of political and possibly "constitutional" reasons, articulate this entirely appropriate, logical, and true statement. So we have declared war on terrorism, which I think is not an "enemy" but a process. Neither the Geneva Convention nor the U.S. Constitution provide for this reality.
What troubles me is that the new enemy cannot be categorized and treated as either felon or enemy soldier. We appear to be the victims of our own enlightened attempt to bring justice to both criminal law and the rules of combat. The new enemy doesn't wear a uniform, at least while enjoying the protections of American citizenship. The new enemy has no nation and declares no war except by deed. Neither the Geneva Convention nor the U.S. Constitution contemplates such a declaration.
While reasonable people can sit around and identify what it is we are fighting, we cannot identify the legal tools to carry out the fight. I believe that we must have new and effective tools to combat a new and very effective enemy.
As a U.S. citizen, I enjoy unparalleled freedoms of expression and movement. The prospect of losing these freedoms means losing what it means to be an American. Unless my freedoms are somewhat curtailed, however, my largely unfettered rights will be paid for by the lives of thousands of innocent people, an event that already has occurred. Moreover, an attempt to inflict further carnage by an enemy that now enjoys our protections appears to be imminent. This is not an acceptable trade.
If we have no legal tools to successfully fight this enemy, common sense would say that we must acquire these tools, adapt to the new realities, and prosecute this war with every intention of preventing loss of U.S. lives or destruction to our country. The U.S. Constitution contains a phrase in the preamble, which may well serve as a prime directive for additional authority to logically prosecute this war. It says that the purpose for adopting such a constitution is to "establish justice, insure domestic tranquility, provide for the common defense, promote the general welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty." Perhaps new procedures can be developed that draw their authority from this phrase. If we can't adapt, we stand to perish protecting our rules rather than our lives.
At the 2001 U.S. Naval Institute Warfare Exposition and Symposium in Virginia Beach, Virginia, James Webb, the ex-Secretary of the Navy and decorated Marine made the observation that, "We must kill this enemy at a time and place of our choosing." While this may not be "legal," it is imperative.
"The New Arab Way of War"
(See P. Layton, pp. 62-63, March 2003 Proceedings)
Herman Archer—I must object to the title and approach of this article. Hopefully, we all realize that we are not talking about an "Arab" way of war, but rather of an Islamist, terrorist way of war. If indeed your journal and its author think that we have an Arab problem—instead of a problem involving some Arabs and many non-Arabs—then I must fear for that comprehensiveness and competence that I have much admired in Proceedings. That this misdirection of our terrorism focus may exist in a broad mass of our civilian population is a tribute to ignorance and some biased agendas. It has no place, however, in Proceedings.
"Spanish Forces Intercept Scuds"
(See J. Romero, p. 75, February 2003 Proceedings)
First Sergeant Antonio Sanchez Cepero, Spanish Marine Corps—This good article about the Spanish operation to board the So San, a North Korean ship carrying missiles, includes one mistake. The Spanish special forces that took part were Spanish Marines, not naval infantry. Spain has the oldest Marine Corps in the world, dating from 1537 when the Tercios of Emperor Carlos V of Spain were assigned to the Armadas.
"My Friend Hates the Military"
Lieutenant Keith E. Harbaugh, U.S. Navy—My friend Rebecca hates the military. That's why we talk. In my world, it's hard to find anyone who says the defense budget is way too high, or flag-buming is okay, or missile defense is a bad idea. So every few months, I pick up the phone and give Rebecca a call.
Where I see U.S. special forces liberating Afghan villages, she sees sinister agents of capitalism paving the way for a new oil pipeline. Where I see fellow pilots enforcing no-fly zones to keep Saddam Hussein from massacring his own people, she sees U.S. bombs killing innocent Iraqis. As much as might I disagree, it helps me to hear that perspective from a friend. And I think it helps Rebecca to know a military professional who's not the blood-thirsty ogre she once imagined all of us to be.
Among my fellow officers, there is a prevailing sense that the civilian elite completely misunderstands us. In reaction, some of my peers have become increasingly vocal about the "civil-military divide," the perceived gap between our military values and the values of the society we exist to defend.
Rebecca, though she'd disapprove of the label, is among the civilian elite. Often, she does misunderstand the military, and indeed seems to hate it. But she understands me pretty well and that's at least a start. I might question Rebecca's judgment on specific issues, but I don't question her values. I know she cares for this country every bit as much as I do.
The last time we talked, Rebecca had just returned from an antiwar demonstration outside a Navy recruiting office. Several protesters had been arrested trying to shut down the place. It would make sense if I took offense at that. As a Navy pilot, I've risked my life for this nation. But it's Rebecca's country too, and she has risked something I haven't—the wrath of her government. Granted, those who have seen what "wrath of government" means in Iraq or Serbia know that we're damned lucky to be Americans. But Rebecca's right to protest exists for a reason, and I must cherish that. I can never forget that the protester forces me to think.
I once told Rebecca that this was the greatest nation on earth. "So what," she said. Whenever I think that America is "good enough," those two words remind me that we can and should be better.
For that, Rebecca, I give you credit. I will try to explain to you that the military does far more good than harm, in places like Bosnia and East Timor, but you must never let me be content with that. There is so much more to do.
Give me a call some time—let's talk.
"Is Manned Space Flight a Navy Issue?"
(See J. Byron, p. 121, March 2003 Proceedings)
Editor's Note: In this short sidebar feature, we made three mistakes. On 12 April 1961, Russian astronaut Yuri Gagarin in Vostok 1 became the first human in space and to orbit the earth. Alan Shepard (with one "p") was the first American in space in Freedom 7 on 5 May 1961; John Glenn was the first American to orbit the earth in Friendship 7 on 20 February 1962.
"New Roles for Littoral Combat Ships"
(See N. Friedman, pp. 4-6, January 2003 Proceedings)
Commander Jon Vonli, Royal Norwegian Navy (Retired)—Dr. Friedman presents a number of concerns about the use of composite materials in naval ships. These conclusions are open to question.
In the early morning of 19 November 2002, the Royal Norwegian Navy (RNoN) minesweeper Orkla caught fire as a result of an overheated bearing in the aft port lift fan shaft. The shaft failure caused the fracture of pressurized hydraulic lines and the hydraulic fluid ignited. Fire-fighting activities were conducted for six hours until the crew evacuated the ship. The fire lasted over a day as the hull burned to the waterline and capsized. No injuries to the crew were reported. There are several observations I would like to make:
- Composite materials can resist fire damage. The Orkla was designed in the late 1980s, ten years before the International Marine Organization regulations on passive and active fire protection were adopted for composite ship-building materials. The RNoN all-composite Skjold-class littoral combat ship (LCS) meets the International Maritime Organization high-- speed craft regulations for fire protection, and the general arrangements of the Skjold from the standpoint of safety are improved over the Orkla.
- A composite surface effect ship is shock resistant. Because the air cushion supports 70-80% of the weight of the ship, only a small portion of the hull is in the water. This reduces the hull exposure to shock from underwater explosions. The Oksoy-class minehunters have undergone shock testing and have withstood shock loads with no degradation in system function or structural integrity.
- Powerful engines do not represent a fire hazard. The fire on the Orkla did not start in the engine room. The engine rooms in the surface effect ships are protected with automated passive and active fire safety systems.
- High speed is a force multiplier. The Skjold provides an LCS that features offensive and defensive capabilities in some of the most difficult North Atlantic environmental conditions near the coast and far at sea. Rigorous sea trials have proven that the Skjold can operate consistently in weather and sea state conditions that keep all other craft in safe harbor.
In September 2001, at the request of the U.S. Navy, the Skjold transited the North Atlantic route from Norway to the United States unassisted, under difficult sea and icing condition, at an average speed of 48 knots. During the year that the Skjold was deployed in the United States, her high speed allowed versatility in a wide range of battle group missions, including undetected penetration and attack, and rapid deployment and extraction of widely dispersed Navy special forces units.
The LCS program offers the U.S. Navy the opportunity to develop and deploy the next generation surface craft that will allow new operation concepts to address the challenges of the difficult littoral threat environment.
"Enough Marine Air on Carriers Already"
(See S. Garrick, pp. 62-64, August 2002; J. Jogerst, pp. 12-14, September 2002; M. Spence, pp. 20-22, October 2002; D. Goodwin, pp. 18-22. November 2002; M. Elfers, p. 30, March 2003 Proceedings)
"A Leatherneck JSF Is Just Right"
(See A. Tomassetti, pp. 32-35, September 2002; D. Goodwin, pp. 18-22, November 2002; M. Elfers, p. 30, March 2003 Proceedings)
Major General Kenneth W. Weir, U.S. Marine Corps Reserve (Retired)—Major Goodwin is absolutely right in everything he wrote about these two articles. Unfortunately for him and the rest of the Marine Corps, the aviation leadership—dominated by the vertical take-off and landing (VTOL) and short take-off and vertical landing (STOVL) communities—is headed in the wrong direction.
Long ago, there were lots of folks who felt the Marine Corps had gotten too big for its britches. With these F-35Bs (A-35Bs is a more descriptive designation of the Marine variant of the Joint Strike Fighter) and MV-22 tiltrotors, the Marine Corps has ripped its britches to the point of nearly being guilty of indecent exposure. These gold-plated weapon systems are terribly expensive fancy gadgets, luxury items that will never live up to their sales brochures no matter the amount of money spent on them. They are not the best options available and are more dangerous to operate than more conventional aircraft.
The history of the Marine Harriers is a dark and disgraceful chapter. What was envisioned as the Marine Corps' golden bullet has become its cyanide suicide pill. The Marine Corps has little to be proud of or show for all the peacetime misery the Harrier has caused—excessive loss of life, careers wasted because non-believers were tossed overboard, incessant Navy-Marine squabbles over funding competition, and on and on.
Marine STOVL advocates keep carping about the Guadalcanal experience during World War II. They want the Marine Corps to be able to go it alone because the Navy is undependable and close-air support is not a very high priority with the Navy. The problem at Henderson Field was not the size or length of runways on the airfield. The problem was air defense and the lack of Navy combat ships, including carriers, to keep the logistical pipe line open to resupply the much needed ammo, fuel, food, and medical supplies that were required to defend the beachhead. The Navy did not have the assets to prevent nightly Japanese shore bombardment and the like. The admirals lacked the necessary will to risk what few ships and sailors they had left until Admiral Bull Halsey took command and got on with the fight.
The Marines should have learned an important lesson at Midway. The F-2A Brewster Buffalo was not the optimum fighter available for air defense or to achieve and maintain air superiority. The difference in that case was the Marines had no choice shortly after World War II began. The F-2A and a few F-4Fs were it. VMF-221 with its F-2A Buffalos was virtually annihilated by superior Japanese Zero fighters during the defense of Midway. Today the Marines have a choice, and many say they are going with the wrong airplane in order to just be unique, different, and therefore militarily indispensable. The A-35B will be a modern-day Buffalo when it comes to starting the air campaign. Marines have to come to their senses and quickly.
Who is going to provide the Marines with the protection they may need to achieve air superiority before they even get to drop their first bomb? They better hope the enemy has an all-STOVL air force. Good fighters often later become very suitable attack airplanes. Good attack airplanes seldom prevail as fighters at anytime in the air campaign.
The A-35B Buffalo II is not optimized for air-to-air combat. If it were, the Marines would have to stand in line to get it. As it is, only second-rate military powers are likely to procure them—if they can afford them. If the A-35B Buffalo II pilot inadvertently gets into a dog fight with a first-rate enemy fighter, he should consider ejecting. His plane will be carrying thousands of pounds of dead weight in the form of lift fans and associated intake doors, lift doors, reaction controls, drive shafts, clutches and gear boxes. It will not have an internal cannon, but if it were to get lucky it might be able to ram the enemy. Didn't the Marines learn anything from the gunless F-4?
The argument that the Marines need launch sites close to the front lines to a provide a minimum response time of 30 minutes to close-air support requests is spin to ensure the Marine infantry supports this scheme. Marines in combat have done just fine in the past without a VTOL/STOVL capability. Marine air has had few problems of not having an airfield or carrier deck close enough. What engineering unit can be expected to keep moving those STOVL launch-and-recovery sites with all of their logistical support forward to keep close to the advancing troops? The Marines can purchase lots of bulldozers, earth-moving equipment, and matting to use in developing airfields for the cost of all these STOVL warts on the Joint Strike Fighter.
Title 10 of U.S. Code places Marine air in naval aviation. The Marines act as if having to deal with the Navy makes their funding so bad that they have to stand in the bread line just to get a crumb. Marine air is getting more than their traditional share right now. The Marine Corps seems to be trying to form a separate, independently funded fourth service with all this turmoil.
As Major Goodwin put it so succinctly, "you've heard an operators perspective, now listen to it." Publicly admit the Marine Corps has made a serious mistake and fix the problem.