Lieutenant Milciades Then. U.S. Navy— Asa surface warfare officer, I was delighted when I read this piece. I am glad that there are other junior officers who are thinking about how we can improve our proficiency boarding ships, assigning prize crews, and providing security for our own ships. I would go a step further and recommend to the leaders in surface warfare that we must train every sailor to be a warrior and not just a technician.
The Navy needs a major paradigm shift in the way it trains and arms its sailors. Almost three years after the USS Cole (DDG-67) incident, we still have sailors who are not comfortable with firearms, who have fired only once, in boot camp, and who would hesitate to fire if needed. We are fighting an unconventional war in which the enemy can strike either at sea or while we are tied up in home port. Every sailor—from the gunner's mate who cleans and takes care of the weapons to the fireman who stands sounding and security watch—should feel comfortable carrying a firearm and knowing how and when he is entitled to use deadly force to protect hi s ship. We need to train sailors in hand-to-hand combat, so they can defend themselves if someone tries using nonlethal violence.
The M-4 suggested in the article is not a good weapon for boarding because of its high power—the bullets will go through bulkheads. I would suggest the MP-5, used by Special Forces for years.
Sailors also should have better working uniforms that are fire resistant and could be used for duty in port, while standing security watches, or at sea, while standing bridge or engineering watches. The coverall s and utility uniforms sailors are issued are not versatile and durable enough, forcing commands to spend money on extra uniforms such as fire-retardant coveralls for engineering and camouflage uniforms for boarding ships and security.
I agree that we need to foment a warrior culture in which sailors learn how to fight at sea against a blue-water enemy, close to shore against a brown-water enemy, and in port against a saboteur.
(See D. Hackworth, pp. 50-53, December 2002; J. Conlin, pp. 10- 11, January 2003 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Commander Morgan K. Einbinder, U.S. Nava l Reserve— Iremember where I was when I heard about Admiral Mike Boorda's suicide: I was eating lunch in the wardroom of the USS Ticonderoga (CG-47). I was unable to finish my meal.
Colonel Hackworth, highly decorated or not, led an inquisition against Admiral Boorda, who was idolized by many in the surface warfare community. Admiral Boorda made it fun to be a surface warfare officer again! Ship commanding officers followed his positive examples and pushed their people to do their best at everything. Shiphandling, weapons training, operations, and personnel retention became high on the hit list again. Being a junior officer at sea was the best job in the world. Admiral "Mike" was one of the few surface warfare Chiefs of Naval Operations, a post that had been dominated by aviators and submariners.
Colonel Hackworth would have us believe that his only interest was the pursuit of "truth." I would offer that Colonel Hackworth was pursuing only the truth of his own ambitions and attempting to sell magazines. He conveniently blames his bosses at Newsweek for choosing the wrong person to interview Admiral Boorda. Every ensign knows the first lesson of leadership is to accept responsibility for one's actions. Admiral Boorda had taken responsibility for the error of one of his commanding officers in awarding him the Combat "V" and ceased wearing it on hi s Navy Achievement Medal. Colonel Hackworth admits, "We [Newsweek] knew he'd taken the V off for a year." Why was there a need to do the story? This has never been made clear other than that he was a convenient target. I'm sorry Colonel Hackworth experienced "the hardest time of [his] life" after the story broke, but I'm sure Mrs. Boorda was going through a little personal anguish of her own.
As a member of the U.S. Naval Institute for the past 16 years, I am disgusted by the royal treatment afforded Colonel Hackworth. I read this issue while eating dinner, and once again, I was unable to finish my meal.
Lieutenant Commander Park W. Espenschade Jr., U. S. Navy (Retired)— Seldomhave I read a more trenchant analysis of the military establishment or of the Vietnam conundrum than the interview with Colonel Hackworth. It is of the caliber of John Keegan's lecture at Gettysburg College several years ago, which I was privileged to hear. Will we ever surmount the infantilism of "things as we wish them to be" and replace it with the adult reaction of "things as they are"? I only hope that Colonel Hackworth is lecturing at all levels of the military educational establishment.
Lieutenant Douglas E. Stephens, U.S. Naval Reserve— I am in no position to question Colonel Hackworth 's combat history. I can comment on his remarks about one of the most respected, caring, and competent Chiefs of Naval Operations in recent memory. From the time Admiral Mike Boorda took his life, I have wondered why the press and Colonel Hackworth, seemed to zero in on Admiral Boorda's combat decorations.
It is important to note that Admiral Boorda did earn the awards in question, according to Admiral Elmo Zumwalt, the CNO during the time these medals were awarded. If Admiral Zumwalt said Admiral Boorda earned the Combat "Vs," then he did, and the case should be closed.
Why not speak of the great things Admiral Boorda did for the nation and the Navy? Admiral Boorda exemplified what is good about the U.S. Navy. I believe he lived that American Dream that you hear about and long to experience. Again, I am in no position to question Colonel Hackworth's combat record. It just seems that he is filling the role of an "armchair quarterback" with no idea what the job of Chief of Naval Operations entails.
"Black Shoes in a Brown Shoe World"
(See G. Bonsall, pp. 34-38, January 2003 Proceedings)
Lieutenant John Callaway, U.S. Navy— Threecheers for Commander Bonsall! Junior officers absolutely are thirsting for tactical training. If we want to train and retain our best war fighters, this sounds like an outstanding way to do it. It is a terrific step for the training officer billet in the surface community as well. But why limit the training to just one billet? Why not train all our officers this way? In fact, the core surface warrior skills of leadership, seamanship, war fighting, and damage control all could benefit from the focus and tactical training plan Commander Bonsall describes. But one step at a time, I guess. And in this case, a giant leap for the surface warfare community.
Captain Gene Garrett, U.S. Navy— CommanderBonsall is on target. There is plenty for surface warfare officers to learn from our aviation brothers. Now that it has been said, let's do it. The tactical process Commander Bosnall outlined should be implement as soon as possible. Now for the rest of the story.
We need to train and assign engineering and combat systems maintenance officers to all our ships. This works in other navies and in the aviation community. No mater what the readiness reports say, our engineering plants are dying because of the lack of the professional expertise and adequate funds to maintain them. We are hanging on by threads. If we do not put the right professional engineers and the maintenance dollars into our plants soon, they are not going to last 25 years. Just take a look at the Aegis cruisers. They are dying before their time. Those professional engineers could be specialized surface warfare officers, limited duty officers, and/or warrant officers.
We must do the same topside. We need professional combat system maintenance officers to maintain our increasingly complex systems. In addition, bring the master chiefs back to sea. Their expertise and experience are the strong links that will make a difference in short order.
Last but not least, have the executive officer relieve the commanding officer in our commander commands. The aviation community does it, and we can do it. It makes good sense and will increase readiness.
"Disarmament Poses Difficulties"
(See N. Friedman, p. 4, December 2002 Proceedings)
Captain Rick Jacobs, U.S. Navy —Ioftenhave compared the failure to destroy the Iraqi Republican Guard in 1991 to Germany breaking off the pursuit of the British Expeditionary Force in 1940, the U.S. failure to destroy the broken Chinese Army in Korea in 1951, and similar examples of military campaigns not carried to completion. This article, however, was the first time I have seen the political comparison of the failure of will after Desert Storm and Germany after 1918. We must not allow Saddam Hussein to reconstitute as successfully as did Hitler. My congratulations and thanks to Dr. Friedman for this remarkably apposite historical analysis.
(See M. Studeman, pp. 64-67, January 2003 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Commander J. Keith Dunbar, U.S. Navy— Congratulations to Lieutenant Commander Studeman on a well-written paper. I would like to make some additional points:
- The analytic depth and breadth of information to conduct all-source operational intelligence (OpIntel) is severely lacking. The author is correct that at most levels of our intelligence centers—not just the joint intelligence centers (JIC)—very few people are focusing on being able to conduct OpIntel and all-source analysis. What does a particular piece of evidence or missing evidence mean if there are no historical trends or patterns to compare it to?
- This lack of historical information impairs our ability to provide predictive assessments of activity and most times makes us reporters of history. We are a highly classified CNN that is of little use to an operator who wants to know what the enemy is going to do and not what was he done.
- A simple spreadsheet with historical activity is all that is needed to provide effective OpIntel analysis.
- Conducting historical OpIntel information archiving is not only organization dependent, but also individual dependent. The archiving of this information is monotonous and boring, and anywhere I have established these simple analytic tools/ methodologies, I have warned people of such. The pay-off, however, in the predictive assessments we can provide is huge. I was lucky enough at Naval Central Command to be able to communicate that to the people with whom I worked. This simple tool is still in use there for tracking historical naval activity trends. But at some places, after the person who started the archiving initiative leaves, it withers and dies until the next time.
How do we fix some of theses problems—not only in the Pacific but also worldwide? It will not be easy. As far as overall archiving of historical threat naval activity, a case can be made for three different organizations: the JIC naval shops, the numbered fleets, and/or the Office of Naval Intelligence.
The numbered fleets are the forward deployed fleets, and everything a deployed carrier battle group (CVBG) or amphibious ready group (ARG) does goes through them. They are tasked with providing the support that those deployed forces need. I believe they are the best choice for collecting and archiving historical naval activity, because they are in the theater. When a CVBG/ARG enters a theater, for the most part it has no historical context. The numbered fleet has to provide that historical context. How can it do that if it is working from what the last person in that position said it was like? There has to be evidentiary proof to support that historical context.
If we are going to fix the problem, we have to rely on naval intelligence. I would recommend that numbered fleets collect the information and keep it archived for CVBG/ARG deployers and that the Office of Naval Intelligence become the historical archiver of naval OpIntel activity for the community.
(See R. Carstens, p. 2, January 2003 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Colonel Frank C. Hoffman, U.S. Marine Corps Reserve (Retired)— Whilethere are numerous positive attributes of the recently established national policy of preemption, I am somewhat taken aback at Major Carstens's connection between a strategy of preemption and a large defense budget. I can think of no causal connection between a strategy of preemption and any number of Army divisions or carrier battle groups. Furthermore, I cannot fathom any relationship between the United States's gross domestic product and preemption as an arrow in our strategic quiver. In fact, intuitively, preemption requires a much smaller military instrument, one shaped for precision with an emphasis on quality over quantity. It appears that President George W. Bush's declaratory policy is badly misunderstood.
We have four general strategic options to respond to the diffusion of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). For the past half century, we have relied on deterrence to control those states who have such weapons, and stressed nonproliferation to preclude those who want them from getting their hands on them. Both deterrence and nonproliferation are believed to have been eclipsed given the deliberate proliferation of both WMD and delivery systems by certain states. The United States has responded to this strategic trend by emphasizing defensive measures (including national missile defense), which represents a strategy of counterproliferation. Counterproliferation provides passive and active measures to negate the successful use of advanced weapons by an adversary.
With the publication of the national security strategy, we have publicly and appropriately noted that we cannot afford to wait for an opponent to strike first, given the consequences. When and where we believe ourselves to be in danger, we must strike first. Preemption, like the Israeli raid at Osirak in 1981, seeks to eliminate an enemy capability to use the weapons they have before they try to employ them.
Preemption in general, and as defined in our national security strategy, remains a limited tool. It is a viable strategic option but still a controversial one, with less utility the more one thinks about it. To rely solely on preemption against states that acquire and indicate a propensity to use missiles and/or WMD would be a serious strategic error. Reemphasizing its new importance within our overall strategic quiver, however, is clearly in the nation's interest. The United States has precision strike and special operations forces that are capable of preemptively destroying the delivery means or weapon facilities of a state with intentions of deploying WMD against the United States or one of its allies. The United States also might elect to preemptively destroy any known facility of a state it feels cannot responsibly gain access to the WMD club, such as Iraq.
Naturally, such a strategy places a premium on high-quality intelligence. Designing an attack against foreign states to preclude fallout (political and literal) and significant civilian casualties also is a challenge. Preemption raises international political costs, and runs against U.S. political and strategic culture. Inaddition, preemption against "states of concern" with limited missile or WMD arsenals may be feasible, but this option does not offer much utility against a major state. A country with several dozen weapons has options, and Korea may be trying to enter this club. It can distribute and hide such weapons, and can retaliate if attacked.
Our problem is not limited to states such as Korea however. Preemption against a non-state actor such as al Qaeda that somehow acquires modern weaponry will be hard to execute, even if less difficult to justify. Few states will admit to harboring or protecting such a group, and even fewer will help the United States if we continue to press for unilateral advantage in our foreign policy. The intelligence hurdles remain difficult, however, in a chaotic and highly mobile world. The nature of WMD development, particularly biological materials, is difficult to track and block. Readers will recall that we have not made progress on apprehending the perpetrators of last year's fatal bio-attacks, much less anticipating and preempting future attacks.
This should not mean giving up on nonproliferation policies and regimes. Such a strategy maintains normative values against such weapons, and raises the costs for would-be aspirants to the WMD club. Inthe end, a strategy that acquiesced to higher levels of proliferation and banked on preemption would create a risky imbalance and endanger U.S. interests. For that reason, the strategy maintains support for nonproliferation and threat reduction programs. Preemption did not displace the other components of our strategy; it augments preexisting elements in light of new circumstances.
Until the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, a strategy of preemption could be written off as problematic for both missile attacks and for covert attacks by states or terrorists. Preemption requires extraordinary intelligence, and the political culture of the United States leans against arguments of "anticipatory self-defense" that are the legal and moral basis for preemption. In the aftermath of a major tragedy, this aspect of the U.S. moral code and conscience already has been modified. The consequences of failing to act will weigh heavier on decision makers, and elected officials will be pressured to act more boldly if and when some group acquires and contemplates using WMD. Nonetheless, the U.S. intelligence community will remain increasingly challenged by amorphous networks and individuals who have the ability to strike at global distances. Penetrating such networks, anticipating their capabilities and their targets, U.S. intelligence leaders admit, is getting harder. Because of the intelligence thresholds, preemptive strikes will remain a limited instrument. The requisite conditions will prove too rare to make this an effective strategy, by itself.
Preemption can be a risky option, leading to escalatory reprisals or massive misunderstanding. Preemptive attacks further could be seen as a preparatory stage for more significant attacks against a state's sensors or strategic leadership. Such an attack could be seen as the prelude to the decapitation of a nation's leadership or its strategic command-and-control capabilities. An opponent might lash out with all its strategic capabilities under such circumstances. Thus, a preemptive military strike by the United States against one country's information assets could be extremely destabilizing in a crisis and could spur escalation.
The President properly extended our strategy to include preemption, and he did not overemphasize it at the expense of other tools. Given the murky world in which we live, however, preemption always will be a rare instrument. Thus, the United States needs to conduct a policy debate based on an understanding of the various types of vulnerabilities that the 21st century poses and the strategic options available to us. Just as critical, the nation's leaders must weigh the policy options available to deter, defend us from, and respond to these threats. Preemption is no panacea.
Captain Bruce A. Cole, U.S. Navy, Director, Navy Office of Information Midwest— MajorCarstens's assertionabout preemptive warfare creates the impression he believes the U.S. public is geared for it as a recurring policy. He misunderstands a few essential elements which contradict the notion that Americans want preemption as a policy.
Major Carstens was right that the United States is slow to anger. But even once angered, it does have a measure of restraint. Americans understand that Saddam Hussein and his regime are evil, yet polls show Americans are overwhelmingly in favor of the concurrence of other nations before acting in Iraq. We certainly want to put the boot to his backside, yet our direct and perhaps macho nature is held back by our eternal self-doubts. The support we want need not be universal, but it must be significant among our traditional allies. If U.S. support for preemptive action is so conflicted on Iraq, how can we assume it will be so free flowing when it comes to other situations around the world?
Second, while Americans are more informed than ever, they are not necessarily better informed. Bitter political fighting in the United States and diplomatic rancor regarding perceived U.S. unilateralism gave the public a vast torrent of opinions from across the spectrum, but the din of obliged opinion often serves to harden positions rather than lead to the desired introspection. The speed and intensity with which leaders in the United States and the world grasped their criticism or support of the administration undermined their persuasiveness to me, because I doubted they had considered the merits of the case more than the requirement of their politics.
Major Carstens also expects too much of the "unparalleled military might" of the United States. The best military in the world does not equate to unending success. Look at the agonizing process of gaining basing rights to conduct operations in Afghanistan. Certainly the reach of long-range aircraft and use of international waters for bases gives us tremendous capability in that regard, and we have the finest weapons and people history has ever known. But we have to avoid the smugness that comes with dominance. If any nation should know great powers can be humbled by the meek, it should be the United States.
And finally, we should pay close attention to international envy and disaffection with the United States' position in world history. Nations will oppose us diplomatically so they can hope to matter. Where we embrace the perfectly logical choice, we often will find disagreement or even derision. This lack of affection for us does indeed affect what we think, what we feel, and how we act. Other nations, important and not, will argue against us in every case. It may not always persuade us, but we will always hear and we will always listen.
In the end, preemption rarely will be embraced by Americans. Even in the rock-solid case against Iraq, the strongest justifications are about the aggressions it has committed and about what requirements it has not met, as opposed to what it may do. Americans will embrace further attacks on Iraq only to punish it for not Living up to U.N. resolutions. The U.S. "traditional reluctance to use force" remains.
Ronald Soucy —Iam a Navy veteran ofWorld War II,having served on the USS Ringgold (DD-500) from 1942 to 1945 as a signalman. Growing up during the Great Depression years, I remember the strong isolationist feelings expressed as the war in Europe began, while the Japanese were fighting in China. When the surprise attack was conducted against Pearl Harbor, all that changed. Japan had stabbed us in the back, and I don't think I exaggerate when I say there was a sense of indignation felt by most that united this nation as it went to war.
From this experience, I must state that a surprise attack such as Pearl Harbor does not become respectable just because it is the good old United States that does it. Calling it a "preemptive strike" does not change its nature. War is a massive act of insanity. Killing people does not solve problems, and someone needs to ask how many Iraqi deaths are worth the deposing of Saddam Hussein. How many Americans? Those who have the awesome power to make the decision need to ask themselves if they would be willing to sacrifice their own lives to get rid of Saddam. War sometimes is necessary, but it should not begin with a Pearl Harbor-type attack.
"Seaman to Admiral: Don't Add Red Tape"
(See M. Gorenflo, p. 85, December 2002 Proceedings)
Lieutenant William H. Clarke, U.S. Navy —Ican understand CommanderGorenflo's displeasure over the recent addition of a review board to the Navy's Seaman to Admiral Program. I disagree, however, with his assertion that the three-officer review board dismisses the authority of a commanding officer and is unnecessary. Not every outstanding sailor is officer material, and for every officer application that represents an outstanding candidate, there are several that need an impartial review.
The commanding officer of a submarine will come to know everyone of his sailors' intelligence, capabilities, potential, and ability to handle pressure better than most commanding officers. My tour as the "Chop" on an Ohio (SSBN-726)-class submarine taught this lesson well because I was one of those the commanding officer had to be able to rely on to react correctly at a moment's notice. But I contend the majority of commanding officers are too separated from the sailors putting in the applications to have this genuine "gut feel" for their potential. Whether it is the size of the command or the fact the command has numerous detachments, a commanding officer may never even have met the sailor submitting an application. There is no way most commanding officers can provide a genuine "extensive evaluation," and this task is filtered down to the command master chief or department heads , just like other nomination packages.
Submitting officer packages for outstanding sailors because they are super performers in the work center and are one of the command's hot runners has become the norm. One example of this "watering down" effect can be found on evaluations, where it has become standard to list officer programs and limited duty officer for even average performers, without considering what this means. Inability to make chief petty officer is not a reason to apply for officer programs either. I have sat on several of the screening boards at my base, and some of the applicants fell into this category. I was left with the impression they had not put any serious thought into becoming an officer or the responsibilities that go with it. They had not shown any effort in their prior years to become an officer, such as taking college courses, nor were their service records above average. Simply filling out an application does not make the candidate a good one. Division officers and department heads are reluctant to tell it like it is, because they want to see their sailors advanced and rewarded for the hard work they do, so they forward the packages. Commanding officers who are not close to the action end up signing them. The result is lots of chaff with the wheat.
I am a prior-enlisted officer. The characteristics Commander Gorenflo states as being valuable for Navy officers are indeed all invaluable. I can assure anyone that my prior-enlisted experience has been beneficial to me and the Navy every day since I put on my ensign bars in 1995, and I am willing to bet those who have worked for me would agree. I also aggressively encourage my junior personnel to seek information and apply for officer programs.
Trying to find three officers from a different command for a review board while serving with an operational or deployed unit is tough at best, and maybe impossible. Providing a stable instruction and modifying the time requirements of the application process are critical. On these points I agree with Commander Gorenflo. But do not get rid of the mechanism that can help ensure we get only the best officer candidates.
"Access Is Not Assured"
(See R. Natter, pp. 39-41, January 2003 Proceedings)
Rear Admiral Charles F. Horne III, U.S. Navy (Retired) —AdmiralNatter's articleon the critical need to enhance mine warfare to ensure the fleet's access is both timely and powerful. It lays out what needs to be done to improve our Navy's mine-warfare capabilities to assure access for our Navy.
A major point Admiral Natter makes is the need to "mainstream" mine warfare as a core competency for all our officers and sailors. A great way to get this overdue movement going would be to have all our Navy's schools and commands have all their officers and sailors read and discuss this article in depth.
In the 20-plus years I have been pushing mine warfare, this is the first time a four-star active-duty admiral has written an article solely on mine warfare for Proceedings. Three cheers. As Admiral Natter writes, "To defeat the growing threat, mine warfare must be a core competency of the fleet."
"What You Should Know about Attacking Computer Networks"
(See T. Gibson, pp. 48-51, January 2003 Proceedings)
James K. Pocalyko, sophomore, College of Information Science and Technology, Drexel University —Tokeep the nation'scomputer infrastructure fundamentally secure, the same rule applies as in war: Know your enemy. That also means knowing the real threats from the bogus. And in that area, the Department of Defense (DoD) almost always overstates the whole problem and understates the real problem.
When someone uses the word "hacker," what do you imagine? The goateed "teen computer hacker" illustrating Colonel Gibson's article?
Is it the antisocial middle-schooler toiling away on his PC late at night, wreaking havoc on some unknown remote box he happened to find? Maybe it's the overweight guy who never leaves his home save for a trip to the grocery store, and spends every waking minute fixated on a laptop screen, breaking into the DoD information technology infrastructure and the systems of multimillion-dollar corporations.
Or do you think of the web-savvy mega-nerd who sits quietly and intensely at a terminal, tapping away on his keyboard at a phenomenal speed, programming, fixing, and breaking code at about the same rate?
You can say a hacker is "one who hacks." That doesn't help much, so I define a hacker as a person who understands the engineering and inner workings of a computer and other electronics, one who understands that hacking is defined more by an idea, a conceptual frame of mind, and a way of life than by one specific action. In my examples, all three of those people could be called hackers, just not in the same sense of the word. And not all three pose the same danger to our nation.
Hackers come in three kinds: the poseur-hacker "script kiddie," the quiet computer-savvy "true hacker," and the vengeance-seeking "malicious hacker." Notice that these all are slang terms thrown around casually in everyday computer jargon. They serve important roles, however, in understanding the how and why of contemporary computer ethics.
Let's start with your stereotypical hacker, the so-called script kiddie. This term often is used disparagingly by more experienced computer users to refer to the newcomers and wannabes of the Internet culture. Recently introduced to the wonderful world of computers and the Internet, this hormone-driven teenager usually has interests limited to heavy-metal rock music, swearing at his parents, and the relentless mocking of others when he manages to bring down their computers and delete their data. Script kiddies consider themselves to be hackers and often refer to themselves and to one another as such. They even have gone so far as to develop a language of their own, referred to as "133t-sp33k" (pronounced leet-speek, a contraction of "elite" speak). These self-proclaimed "elite" computer users are unoriginal and antisocial. They get their kicks from breaking into someone's desktop computer and altering or deleting core Windows files. Their methodologies of destruction are no more sophisticated than a readily downloadable set of "tools" consisting of port-scanners, packet sniffers, and password crackers. Often they know little to nothing about programming and as a matte r of misplaced pride (or eschewing discipline) they refuse to learn code.
Script kiddies are not to be feared. Their methods are sometimes effective, but they are derided by more experienced computer professionals who wouldn't hesitate to squash them like a bug. Recall those news stories on TV where police are escorting an innocent-looking 15-year-old in an oversized orange jumpsuit and handcuffs. The newscaster will say something like "he is accused of breaking into the computer systems at [the Pentagon, the CIA, Boeing, Microsoft, The New York Stock Exchange] and deleting vital data." That's a perfect picture of a script kiddie.
On the opposite end of the hackerdom, we meet a much friendlier crowd, the geeky subculture known as "true hackers." Many of them are in uniform. These people know their stuff. They prefer to use their powers for good rather than for evil, and if they fix your box they actually can seem like superheroes.
Most often quiet types, they partake in activities that benefit the online world, such as securing computer networks , programming and developing useful software, and providing user-level technical support to others who may not be so knowledgeable. Usually holding a position of some importance in his workplace, this kind of hacker is your basic "go-to guy." Can't seem to open your e-mail program? No problem: he'll fix the missing Windows shortcut. Web site isn't loading an image? He fixes the missing closing tag in the HTML source. Server crashed? He gets it back online in a matter of minutes. Helpful and knowledgeable, his life seems to revolve around plans for 19-inch rackmount servers and 1024-bit SSL encryption algorithms.
Just don't confuse his kindness with weakness. The true hacker could be every bit as destructive as the typical script kiddie, only with methods that are much more original and well developed. What separates him from the bad guys are his sense of honor and belonging and the depth of his knowledge. He chooses to take the high road and instead alert the systems administrator of a security hole rather than exploit it. More than anything, he wants a safe Net.
But while we should not really fear the script kiddies and the friendly hackers, we must keep an eye out for the "malicious hacker." He's a script kiddie who has grown up, but he never got rid of his childish and devilish ways. (I use the male pronoun deliberately—this guy is always a guy.) He is not a person to be trifled with. His methods are original and powerful; his attacks are swift and unorthodox. Challenged to a battle, he will work unrelentingly to defeat you. For him, it's all about ego. He often concentrates on a single "unattainable" or "unhackable" target. He will poke and prod his way through a system until he finds something that excites him. The bigger the challenge, the better. Once he is ready, he quickly and quietly moves in for the kill, and is always careful to cover his tracks. While this deviant can be a great source of useful information when he is in one of his better moods (or in handcuffs), these are very few and far between.
As a computer technician, I often am asked the question, "Do you consider yourself to be a hacker?" My answer varies. Most common users consider hackers to be evil. To these people I will often respond with something along the lines of, "No, but I have excellent networking/programming/hardware repair skills." To others who are clued into the more realistic sense of the word, I say "Yes, I consider myself to be very proficient with computers and their systems." Post-9/11, you have to be careful what you say, and whom you say it to.
(See A. Siegel, pp. 34-36, December 2002 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Colonel H. T. Hayden, U.S. Marine Corps (Retired), author, Shadow War: Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict andWarfighting: Maneuver Warfare in the U.S. Marine Corps—This article provides important considerations for all sea ports, airports, and storage areas. There is need, however, for clarification regarding the Scud.
As Commander, I Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF) Rear Area, and Commander, Navy Port Security and Harbor Defense Group 2, I have a slightly different view of the events of 16 February 1991.
Checking only the I MEF log and the Central Command situation report may have given Mr. Siegel a number of misleading assumptions. The author should have checked the logbook of H&S Battalion, 1st Force Service Support Group, or the military police blotter for Al Jubayl on 16 February 1991.
First, after the warhead and parts of the Scud were recovered, it was determined that this missile was a version of the ones that Iraq had attempted to modify to extend their range. Iraq had cut some of the original Scud in half and attempted to construct a larger fuel tank for a possible extended range.
The Scud that hit the harbor of Al Jubayl was an extended-range version that came apart as it flew over the port. It was later believed to have been aimed at Bahrain. This was the first intact Scud warhead recovered at the time. It is correct that the single Patriot battery assigned to the critical infrastructure of Al Jubayl was not operational.
As a side note, we had a Marine officer who was distraught at the amount of bombs and ammunition we had stacked on one of the two harbor piers.
We called him "Chicken Little" because he was sure that a Scud would fall out of the sky and hit the industrial pier, killing everyone within ten miles. The detonation of ammo or bombs was not our main concern. The chemical and fuel storage areas on the commercial pier were of enormous concern. When considering critical infrastructure protection, consider all potential targets, not just the obvious military ones.
"JOs Can Help Reduce Unplanned Pregnancies"
(See G. McAllister, pp. 81-82, July 2002; J. Freeman, p. 22, September 2002; G. Gahlinger, pp. 26-27, November 2002 Proceedings)
Commander Darlene M. Iskra, U.S. Navy (Retired) —Ispregnancy on Navy shipsreally the problem, or is the problem the pervasive attitude that women who get pregnant do so to shirk their military duties? I don't know the answer, but I suspect that young women who get pregnant (and the men who share in that condition) have the mentality of the young that "it can't happen to me" and so take little or no precautions.
Current Navy policy states that "pregnancy and parenthood are compatible with a naval career." The Navy, however, concedes that pregnancy could affect a command's operational readiness by temporarily limiting a servicewoman's ability and availability to perform her assigned tasks. A shipboard environment is inherently dangerous and can be environmentally hazardous to a fetus. Thus, Navy policy requires that a pregnant woman be reassigned ashore at the 20th week of pregnancy; she also is removed if the ship is deployed, or under way and cannot guarantee medical evacuation within a six-hour period.
The Navy's policy also states that pregnancies should be planned around sea duty. And we have birth control methods for both men and women to prevent pregnancy. Downward trends in attrition and pregnancy are apparent (see Federico Garcia, Women at Sea: Unplanned Losses and Accession Planning [Alexandria, VA: Center for Naval Analyses, 1999]). The Navy's pregnancy rate at sea is considerably less than the rate for women in the civilian sector (see Jacqueline Mottern , Parenthood and Pregnancy: Results of the 1999 Survey [Millington, TN: Navy Personnel Research, Studies, and Technology, 2000]). This does not alter the most critics' opinion that any pregnancy aboard ship problematic.
It must be remembered that men can be unplanned losses also, for reasons ranging from disciplinary infractions to family obligations. But these are not considered a gender issue, and are not usually discussed when discussing unplanned losses due to pregnancy. In fact, pregnancies make up only 6% of the total unplanned losses at sea (see Garcia). While it is true that the unplanned loss rate for women is 2.5 times greater than for men, let's look at this in terms of real numbers. In a crew of 400 sailors with 20% females (320 men, 80 women), the average unplanned annual loss for that ship will be 20 women and 32 men. Yes, it is way too high, but let's not forget that most of those 20 women will likely be nonrated personnel. Are those 20 nonrated females more important to the ship than the 32 males who also leave? By the rhetoric, you would think so!
I also take is sue with Lieutenant Gahlinger's assertion that a woman is given "six weeks of uncharged leave" to give birth. That is patently untrue: she is given convalescent leave, just as any sailor is given medical leave for injuries or opt elective surgery.
Ensign McAllister used mostly anecdotal reports and perceptions to make his case. His idea that women who get pregnant should be discharged is patently unfair, as is the idea that harsh penalties should be imposed on those women who cannot finish their deployments because of pregnancy. What penalties would he impose on their male partners? The issue is how to reduce the pregnancy rate, knowing that we are not going to be able to change the fact that sexual intercourse between consenting adults will happen.
While I do not agree with some of Ensign McAllister's premises, I do agree with his assessment that leadership is the key. Along with education about birth control, standards of conduct, and moral responsibilities for both men and women, leadership must start with the division petty officers and chiefs and end with the perceived attitudes (by the officers and crew) of the commanding officer and executive officer. Command climate and active command leadership have been shown to be effective deterrents to unplanned losses due to pregnancy (see Gerard Roncolato and Stephen Davis, "A View from the Gender Fault Line," Proceedings, March 1998). How else can one account for the huge variances in pregnancy rates between ships? In addition, the presence of senior enlisted women on a ship is positively associated with fewer pregnancies (see Garcia). Ensuring senior enlisted women are on board ships is a systemic problem that can be solved only through continued assignment of women to sea duty and the continued requirement and opportunity for senior enlisted women to do so.
Having a family is a right that is taken for granted by men, but that must be planned for by women. No one is advocating that men in the Navy stop having families. It is difficult for women to balance the two competing forces of commitment to the Navy and wanting to have a family, but many women have, both in the Navy and out, since the 1970s.
"The Truth About Peleliu"
(See J. Hoffman, pp. 50-55, November 2002 Proceedings)
Clifton LaBree, author, The Gentle Warrior, General Oliver Prince Smith (Kent State University Press, 2001)— Colonel Hoffman 's article is part of a promotional effort within the Marine Corps to elevate Lieutenant General Lewis "Chesty" Puller as the ultimate role model. Why is the Marine Corps so obsessed with a man who was disliked, even hated, by many who served with him? Why should Puller be singled out in promotional material and two books sponsored by the Marine Corps when many of his peers rarely have been mentioned?
Puller was a brave man, but his flamboyant and arrogant posturing in portraying the image garnished on him by a favorable press made him look like a joke to many of his contemporaries. A former Commandant of the Marine Corps said that Puller was at the limit of his ability in command of a company.
In regard to Peleliu, many historians agree that General William Rupertus should have been removed from command of the 1st Marine Division by General Vandergrift, who was aware of his limitations, and Rupertus should have relieved Puller earlier than he did. The question of why relief was not implemented may rub some Marines the wrong way, but it is a valid question that has never been answered by the voluminous literature sponsored by the Marine Corps.
"Broaden Armed Forces' Roles at Home and Abroad"
(See J. Kelly, p. 2, October 2002; E. Reock, p. 24, November 2002 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Commander John H. Fenter, U.S. Navy (Retired) —I agree with theauthor's contention that the role of the armed forces overseas needs to be expanded in hunting down and eliminating terrorists. International law does not restrain those terrorists from killing our people, so why should it restrain us from killing them?
But I must draw the line when it comes to using the active U.S. military in domestic law enforcement. There is a good reason for the Posse Comitatus Act, just as earlier in our history there was good reason for the Third Amendment. The founding fathers and the post-Civil War Congress were keenly aware of the abuses that the military could (and did) inflict on the populace if they had police power, and made it quite clear, in the Federalist and Anti-Federalist papers and other writings, that the standing army had no place in controlling the population.
Yes, the military has provided equipment, supplies, advisors, and technology to the police. Yes, many police officers are veterans. But the military, including military police or masters-at-arms, has little training in dealing with civilian personnel in the context of state and local laws and the rights listed and protected by the U.S. and state constitutions. Military duty demands a different mind-set than law enforcement. (The use of the Coast Guard is justified because it is a federal law enforcement entity in the Department of Transportation. The justification and limits on the use of National Guard or State Militia units is laid down in each state constitution.)
The "militarization" of the police since the 1960s, particularly SWAT teams and "dynamic entry teams," has resulted in numerous tragedies wherein innocent people have been killed. The old "Joe Friday" method of walking up and knocking might have prevented these. So what if military members are experienced in the use of arms? Most situations where police are involved do not result in the use of those arms. They are resolved using a skill set built through experience and training that the military does not have. The military needs to concentrate on the mission of defending the country and honing combat skills.
Finally, today's service members are indeed volunteers, and I hope that they understand their oath. I must, however, correct a mistake that Captain Kelly made: nobody in the military has taken an oath to defend the "country." The oath is to support and defend the Constitution. That includes the Bill of Rights, which would eventually and inevitably suffer terribly if the military was given domestic law enforcement powers.
"The Way Forward for Coast Guard Boat Forces"
(See D. Goward, pp. 76-79, January 2003 Proceedings )
Senior Chief Marine Science Technician Dennis L. Noble, U.S. Coast Guard (Retired) —CaptainGoward's article onthe strides made by the Office of Boat Forces is impressive. Captain Goward and his staff should receive accolades for their efforts. The article, however, fails to address certain important items concerning the stations.
Captain Goward states that "cold-weather survival suits that should have been personal issue and sized to fit were in such short supply they had to be shared and passed along to whichever boat crew was on duty." Earlier, he mentions that "every trend at Coast Guard boat stations was going the wrong way." In other words, the units faced a lack of personnel, along with inadequate experience and equipment. Among the many solutions offered is a career path through the stations for the U.S. Coast Guard's officer corps. Captain Goward also notes that all of the proposals briefly outlined "will take time."
Captain Goward's comment about the trends at the stations is misleading. His comments imply that the problems at the units are new. A senior officer informed me, for example, that all the station's problems did not really begin until the 1980s. As is usual, the officer corps of the service knows very little of their organization's history. In 1961, the U.S. Coast Guard lost five crewmen and two crab fishermen going to the rescue of the fishing vessel Mermaid on the Columbia River. Historian Robert E. Johnson, in his book Guardians of the Sea: History of the United States Coast Guard, 1915 to the Present (U.S. Naval Institute Press, 1987), says that an editorial writer noted that the crews at the unit "had been much reduced" and crews were not as experienced as in previous years. In other words, the problem has been there since at least 1961, and I would argue, since 1915. Using the Mermaid case as an example, in more than 42 years the senior leaders of the U.S. Coast Guard have not found the solution to these problems. While bureaucracies may move slow, this is unacceptable.
One of Captain Goward's solutions to the problems is a career path for the academy officer corps through the stations. As I understand it, if academy commissioned officers are placed at stations, they do not need to prove they can be coxswains of the boats under their command. If you were in 15-foot surf and needed help, who would you rather have commanding a station—a lieutenant junior grade) with, perhaps, two years of sea duty as a watch officer, or a master chief boatswain's mate with 18 years experience in small boats? The stations need academy officers as advocates, not commanding officers.
The most damning sentence in Captain Goward's article concerns the station that did not have enough individual survival gear, so they had to share and pass along what they had "to whichever boat crew was on duty." Do senior leaders care so much about money that they put their most important resource, their people, in this type of situation? There should never be a question about money when it comes to the safety of the men and women who operate in a dangerous environment. History shows, however, that they worry more about money.
What Captain Goward and his staff did not address is the culture of the senior leadership that seems to seek out additional missions while failing to address the basic issues of funding and supporting the work of the crews that go into harm's way. Until senior leaders are willing to understand, encourage, fund and correctly support those at the stations, no amount of staff work will solve the problems faced by crews at the units.
The most telling fact about the senior leaders of the U.S. Coast Guard is that for the past 42 years they have failed the stations.
"It's a What?"
(See N. Polmar. p. 105, January 2003 Proceedings)
Lawrence Benson, Air Force civilian historian (Retired) —Inlamenting thebreakdown of the Department of Defense's 40-year-old aircraft numbering system, as exemplified by the Joint Strike Fighter being designated the F-35 instead of the F-24, Mr. Polmar did not mention what is perhaps the most egregious precedent of confusing identifiers.
I refer to the unveiling of the F-117A program in 1988. Many assumed that the rumored stealth fighter would be the F-19 (or perhaps the F-21). But those chosen few in the Air Force and Lockheed Martin privy to this black project apparently decided to break the rules and prove all the uninformed outsiders wrong by numbering the new airplane after a call sign purportedly used during flight testing.
This arbitrary choice and all the other discrepancies in mission-design-series (MDS) designations over the years have eroded one of the more positive legacies of Robert McNamara's time as Secretary of Defense: a consistent and logical way to identify military aircraft of the United States.
(See P. Van Riper. p. 2. November 2002 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Colonel Scott Lindsey, U.S. Marine Corps (Retired) —Thisarticlemade three points: transformation by buzzwords is unhelpful; we need a joint operating concept; and the Department of Defense (DoD) should eschew political-military concerns and focus on war fighting. Two out of three aren't bad.
Self-aggrandizing descriptors placed in front of well-understood terms make people think there's "something new." Staffs then invent and debate visions, concepts, and definitions that could instead be summarized in commander's intent. Maneuver, fires, intelligence, logistics, and force protection are now dominant maneuver, precision fires, information superiority, focused logistics, and full-dimensional protection. Esoteric adjectives confuse more than they clarify.
Buzzwords generate inertia and beget white papers, concept papers, and offsite workshops that repackage and recycle old thoughts. Congressional language resulted in MCOO, an experiment to demonstrate a "rapid decisive operation in this decade." So Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) wrote a concept called RDO. The first page of the white paper proclaimed RDO as "a fundamentally new approach to joint operations." In fact it regurgitated-in many cases, verbatim-the tenets of maneuver warfare found in 1989's FMFMI, Warfighting.
JFCOM currently is working on the joint operating concept of which General Van Riper speaks. More profound inclusions would be the ideas contained in other writings and past experiments:
- John F. Schmitt's Command and (Out of) Control, The Military Implications of Complexity.
- While there have been several cases of ad hoc interagency cooperation in the past, we have just recently become serious about organizational structures and concepts to coordinate all the elements of national power in crisis prevention and response. In MC02, JFCOM colocated a joint interagency coordination group (MCG) with the regional commander's staff. The MCG had real-time reach-back to parent headquarters in Washington. The ITACG produced a detailed political-military plan with a national end-state, mission areas, supported-supporting agency designations for each mission area, cri sis termination alternatives, and a first ever transition plan. General Anthony Zinni, USMC (Retired), said, "This is the first time I've seen the U.S. Government give itself a mission statement. I sure could have used one of these when I was at Central Command." Today, all regional commanders have some form of ITACG and are helping evolve the concept of cross-sector integration.
- Lieutenant General Martin Steele, U.S. Marine Corps (Retired), laid the philosophical foundation for the JIACG in 1999 when he wrote "Deep Coalitions and Interagency Task Forces" (Winter, Naval War College Review). An article by almost the same name—"Deep Coalitions: Alternative Power Projection"—appeared in the January 1999 Proceedings. These two articles were unwittingly complementary; the former proposed nontraditional partnerships for crisis response while the latter proposed them for crisis prevention. Together they covered the two overlapping "phases" of national security strategy: shape and respond.
- The capstone concept might also benefit from service concepts. Given the anti-access character of past crises and the Quadrennial Defense Review focus on forward presence, the Navy's Sea Basing concept truly is transformational. It enables both shaping and response actions—either by deployment or employment. The last sentence in the executive summary of the Army-Air Force draft concept says, "We will win battles before we fight them," reinforcing the primacy of shaping.
- More important than any of the above to a capstone concept is what General Charles C. Krulak, U.S. Marine Corps (Retired), said about transformation: "One of the areas we need to transform is in human factors-our education and training. The idea that we can somehow fight the asymmetric fight without changing how our people—leaders and troops—think about conflict is scary. The Strategic Corporal—the young man who has to make instantaneous decisions at the tactical level that could have strategic implications—will have to operate/lead in an environment that will not be like yesterday. He will be in either close terrain or in areas of great dispersion; he will be, in many instances, the decision maker. We had better educate and train that warrior to be able to win in that environment. It isn't just technology that will end up being the deciding factor. It will be the human factor that will eventually spell success or failure. It is the human factor and all that surrounds preparing that human to fight and win that needs transformation and restructuring."
Once we have a joint operating concept, the next step should be to expand joint and interagency experimentation to national security experimentation. Agrarian, industrial, and informational societies are competing for diminishing resources and transportation corridors in unstable places. Instability is the enemy and it comes in many forms—political, economic, military, irredentism, religious, health, and environmental. Its mitigation requires a cross-sector approach. National security experimentation means commercial and nongovernment participation. During pre- and post-hostilities, the military will set and maintain security conditions so another organization—whose mission is most closely aligned with the nature of the crisis—can address the root issue. DoD will be a supporting, instead of a supported, agency. Future experiments should include strategic sectors: transportation, communications, and energy. The shaping and transition phases of experiments should include "players" from financial, medical, legal, media, construction, education, and entertainment sectors.
Many people wrongly think effects-based operations is a "new way to fight." Not true. Effects-based operations is a 21st century paraphrase of an old way to fight, one first written about 2,502 years ago by Sun Tzu. Today's goal to "transform the force" might more accurately be to "reform" the force-to form again the thinking that gave clarity, precision, and timelessness to Sun Tzu. "Shape him with effects" should be the approach to 21st century challenges to our national security.
Just as Sun Tzu's primary target was the enemy's mind, the purpose of an effects-based approach-according to Vice Admiral Arthur Cebrowski, U.S. Navy is to change behavior. An effects-based approach is a combination of a scientific targeting process and commander's intuition—both enabled by a deep understanding of the enemy—with the goal of influencing behavior to achieve objectives.
For response, DoD will likely be the lead. For shaping, the Department of State and Department of Defense will work closely and, ideally, harmoniously. The Department of Defense should embrace, not avoid, "pol-mil concerns." War fighting is only half the equation.