Dangerous Waters: Modern Piracy and Terror on the High Seas
John S. Burnett. New York: E. P. Dutton, 2002. 332 pp. Notes. Glossary. Bib. Index. $24.95.
Reviewed by Lieutenant Commander Ian D. H. Wood, Canadian Navy
In this fine book, John Burnett has provided a thorough account of the risk that pirates present to the world's mariners. He manages to weave a detailed expose on the treachery of maritime piracy into a thrilling true story of his own travels on board a very large crude carrier, which is presented under the pseudonym Montrose (for security reasons). This former reporter for United Press International displayed a great commitment to the book, undertaking a substantial voyage as well as completing an exhaustive set of interviews with individuals from the leading agencies working to combat piracy.
During the narrative of his travels on board the Montrose, the author also manages to provide descriptions of all known types of piracy and the world's piracy hotspots, and demonstrates a clear understanding of the economic and human impact of this chilling phenomenon. In addition, detailed endnotes, charts, a glossary, and a bibliography will keep both novices and professional mariners engaged throughout.
The book begins with a gripping account of the author's own experience with piracy in 1992 on board his sloop, the Unicorn, while cruising in the South China Sea. This first attack reveals the most basic, yet lethal, armed robber variant of pirate. Throughout the rest of the book, the increasingly organized nature of international piracy is demonstrated clearly. The pirates Burnett describes range from moderately well-organized gangs to highly trained and well-resourced international criminal groups. The author convincingly suggests that piracy has flourished in some areas of the world because of apparent state sponsorship or complicity in attacks. In the aftermath of 11 September, the author places the issue of piracy directly in the domain of international terrorism. He challenges his readers to consider the ill-defined distinction between piracy for political gain and terrorism at sea.
This book has garnered praise from many of the international marine agencies working to reduce the frequency and brutality of piracy. One such organization, NUMAST (a British maritime officers' union), stated that Dangerous Waters provides a rare insight into the dangers mariners are exposed to at sea in the face of piracy. By raising awareness of this problem, the author's work also reinforces the excellent work being undertaken by other groups, such as the International Transport Workers' Federation Seafarer's Trust. Burnett also highlights the efforts of the Regional Piracy Center in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, which is a monitoring and warning agency sponsored by the International Chamber of Commerce under the auspices of its International Marine Bureau. The author lauds the efforts of these preventative organizations by showing how their commitment counters the potentially negative impact piracy and maritime terrorism might have if it were able to interrupt the strategic waterways of the world, such as the Panama and Suez Canals and the Straits of Gibraltar and Malacca. If not for informative books such as Burnett's, the antipiracy efforts of these organizations might go unnoticed by the general public.
This kind of vivid, readable yet informative book is vital. It might awaken the minds of people naively unaware of their dependence on maritime shipping and, even more tragically, of the brutal reality professional mariners face in the service of international maritime commerce.
Lieutenant Commander Wood is the author of “Piracy Is Deadlier than Ever” in the January 2000 Proceedings. He presently attends the Canadian Forces Command and Staff College in Toronto, Ontario.
American Empire: The Realities and Consequences of U.S. Diplomacy
Andrew Bacevich. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002. 311 pp. Bib. Index. $29.95.
Reviewed by Craig Swanson
The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989 left U.S. policymakers and academics struggling to make sense of a suddenly confusing and ambiguous world. Without the clear threat of monolithic Soviet-sponsored communism, U.S. foreign policy in the 1990s appeared to many observers as ad hoc and reactive, lacking a consistent grand strategy or even a clear vision of objectives. In American Empire, Boston University international relations professor Andrew Bacevich offers "a critical interpretation of American statecraft in the 1990s" and attempts to discover order among the seeming chaos of the post-Cold War world.
Bacevich concludes that the continuity of U.S. grand strategy in the past decade has been a "commitment to global openness—removing barriers that inhibit the movement of goods, capital, ideas, and people." The stated goal of this openness has been to encourage global economic growth and the spread of democratic ideals. On the surface this would seem to be a very idealistic and even altruistic foreign policy goal that would benefit all participating countries equally. The author maintains, however, the actual desired goal of this strategy is "an open and integrated international order based on the principles of democratic capitalism, with the United States as the ultimate guarantor of order and enforcer of norms." This would be in U.S. interests, argues Bacevich, since it would promote the expansion of "an American imperium." These "policies reflect a single-minded determination to extend and perpetuate American political, economic, and cultural hegemony." This begs the question: is the post-Cold War United States an imperial power and, if so, what kind?
Rather than lifting all boats with a rising tide of liberal democratic capitalism, the author contends, the promotion of openness is an effort to "perpetuate American preeminence and to foster an international order conducive to U.S. interests." By accepting its own political and economic model as the norm, the United States automatically assumes an uncontestable hegemonic role. A secondary advantage of this strategy is that it provides a strong justification to preserve an "unquestioned military superiority" even in the absence of a peer competitor. As the sole remaining superpower, the United States has maintained the new world order it has so carefully created and nurtured.
This "strategy of openness" appeals to U.S. policymakers because it seemingly threatens no one and is in keeping with longstanding values and principles. Bacevich demonstrates how this has been a consistent aspect of U.S. foreign policy that predates Cold War containment. Encouraging the openness of markets, ideas, and institutions was one of the central pillars of the containment strategy. In fact, the origins of this adherence to openness have far older roots in U.S. diplomatic history than the Cold War, to a time when the United States was certainly anything but a superpower.
In overseeing this new global order characterized by a strategy of openness, recent U.S. foreign policy as characterized by Bacevich is an attempt to secure the rewards of an empire without paying the associated costs of having a formal empire. He concludes that "America today is Rome, committed irreversibly to the maintenance and, where feasible, expansion of an empire that differs from every other empire in history." There are, however, significant differences from the Roman Empire. The United States did not secure nor does it maintain its "empire" through military conquest. With the exception of lands gained in the 18th and 19th centuries, the United States has not incorporated new territory into its political structure. The United States has not exploited inherently unequal relations by paying below market prices for raw materials while prohibiting industrial development. Clearly, the United States is not Rome.
While the author perhaps overstates his case by suggesting the United States is an empire, he does reveal an underlying truth. Simply possessing great wealth and power, coupled with a willingness to use it to protect and promote national self-interests, can very well lead others to the perception of the United States as an imperial power.
Dr. Swanson is an assistant professor of international relations at the Marine Corps Command and Staff College in Quantico, Virginia.
The Pepperdogs
Francis J. West Jr. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2003. 365 pp. $25.00.
Reviewed by Colonel W. Hays Parks, U.S. Marine Corps Reserve (Retired)
For much of the 20th century, the U.S. Naval Institute had a firm editorial policy that novels were not to be reviewed in Proceedings. The word "stubborn" comes to mind, given great mid-century naval novels such as Richard McKenna's The Sand Pebbles and Herman Wouk's The Caine Mutiny (now both part of the Institute's Bluejacket library). The code was broken in the 1970s with James Webb's Fields of Fire, now a Vietnam War classic. In a letter, Marine Colonel John McKay opined that if Proceedings were to consider changing its policy, his letter is what a review of Field of Fire might say. The rest is history.
The change is a good thing, for The Pepperdogs is worthy of reader interest. Its author, Francis J. "Bing" West Jr., served with distinction in Vietnam on special assignment from Headquarters Marine Corps in 1966 to develop Marine small-unit combat narratives. On his recommendation, the Stingray concept of coupling recon elements (for so long, passive intelligence collection tools) with artillery was adopted, creating a successful offensive tool. Subsequently, he wrote the official monograph Small Unit Actions in Vietnam and privately published The Village, a history of a Marine combat-action platoon. He later served as Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs during the Reagan administration. Today he runs a company that trains Marines in combat decision making. He took time from his busy schedule to pen The Pepperdogs. For that, readers will be grateful as they enjoy a techno-thriller about honor, duty, and patriotic sacrifice.
Pepperdogs refers to the name a Marine Reserve recon team gives itself as it serves on peace operations in Kosovo. The team members are guinea pigs in a chemical enhancement program to extend the duration of Marines in combat. The team also has access to new technology as a test bed for the digital battlefield. The Pepperdogs display great ingenuity; one of them even has developed a team Web site.
On the day of his scheduled departure, a team member is taken hostage by Serb paramilitaries. Sent in pursuit, the team disobeys its orders and crosses into Serbia.
True to life, the action unfolds on multiple levels: tactically, with the hostage takers and the Pepperdogs; operationally, at the 25th Marines Combat Operations Center and on board the command ship USS Bon Homme Richard; and at higher levels, with interaction between a U.S. ambassador, a Serbian general, and the White House. There is a human-interest element, as the mother of the Marine hostage is near death from cancer, holding on to life as she awaits her son's return.
The Pepperdogs set the agenda with their actions, pursuing fearlessly while digging themselves deeper and deeper with their insubordination. Contact between them and hostile or potentially hostile forces is frequent and realistic, making this more than a simple chase narrative. The friction of personalities and politics is familiar, but not necessarily predictable. Anticipated outcomes are thrown askew when one of the team members begins posting brief but frequent situation reports on the Pepperdogs' web site, drawing national and international attention. To say more would spoil the book's suspense. The narrative is generously supplemented with maps describing the mountainous, snowy terrain in which the story unfolds.
Bing West has written an excellent tale, taking advantage of his Washington senior leadership experience and his small-unit background. He has seen action at both levels, and the book benefits greatly from it. This book is highly recommended reading, and it offers a useful teaching or discussion tool for leadership courses in weighing conflicting moral and official responsibilities in executing today's nontraditional missions.
Colonel Parks served in reconnaissance, infantry, and judge advocate assignments during his career, including service with the 1st Marine Division in Vietnam. He was the 1990 Proceedings Author of the Year.