Winner, Naval Intelligence Essay Contest
On 30 May 1942, a naval intelligence officer made one of the most important judgments in modern U.S. history. The war in the Pacific and the fate of the nation seemed to rest on his shoulders as he briefed Admiral Chester Nimitz at Pacific Fleet headquarters on the possible dates and disposition of a Japanese task force. Sensing the officer's hesitation to commit to a precise assessment, Admiral Nimitz said, "I want you to be specific. After all, this is the job I have given you—to be the admiral commanding the Japanese forces, and tell me what is going on."
The intelligence officer carefully recapped what he knew and delivered his assessment: Japanese carriers would attack Midway on the morning of 4 June and could be sighted at 0700 approximately 175 nautical miles from Midway bearing 325 deg. Six days later, when the enemy force was detected, Admiral Nimitz turned to his intelligence officer and remarked with a smile, "Well, you were only 5 minutes, 5 degrees, and 5 miles out." The rest of the story is a glorious page in the history of our Navy. The officer was Captain Edwin T. Layton, who today stands as the paragon of Naval Intelligence professionals.1
Is the intelligence community ready to take up Layton's torch should another high-intensity, major-theater war flare in the Pacific? If we look at contemporary afloat and shore-based assistant chiefs of staff for intelligence we find omnicompetent N2s. They know a great deal about world history, regional affairs, targeting, systems, and collections. But the reality is that these N2s are not true experts on any one country (unlike Captain Layton, who spoke Japanese, spent several years in Japan in the early 1930s, and was a committed "student" of the Japanese Imperial Navy).
Today, our afloat and shore-based N2s increasingly are reliant on joint intelligence centers to analyze potential threats and provide situational awareness for the fleet, especially on nations boasting large and operationally active militaries. So how ready is the Joint Intelligence Center, Pacific (JICPac), in Hawaii to support the Navy today and in future conflicts? Where is the intellectual depth that we found in officers such as Captain Layton?
While there are many talented people working long hours in the JIC producing intelligence on a raft of subjects, on close inspection I believe the command is facing a crisis in analysis. The Navy's operational intelligence culture that thrived through the late 1980s is decaying. In peacetime, the analytic weaknesses I will detail prevent theater intelligence from realizing its full potential. In wartime, the fleet may have no Laytons to save it.
Put Data in Historical Perspective
At issue is the quality of intelligence support to the fleet. JICPac's reporting on geopolitical events, general military capabilities, and orders of battle is, by and large, excellent. The challenge with operational intelligence—tracking units, studying their movements, tactics, patterns of operations, and likely warfighting roles and capabilities—is that it requires advanced information-management methodologies. Analysts must apply scientific methods to accumulating data, straining information bits into appropriate categories, manipulating input, stripping away dross, and culling facts. Good operational intelligence relies on capturing thousands of raw data shards and piecing them together into a stained-glass window of understanding.
Unfortunately, JICPac does not have well-kept records that go back for years on many of our priority areas of interest. At some point it was forgotten that pattern analysis is based on thorough, painstaking record keeping using creative database tools that allow patterns to jump off charts, diagrams, and spreadsheets. We have failed in key target areas to build pyramids of knowledge based on wide factual foundations. Too often, analysts have deemed documenting evidence an extravagance rather than a necessity.
In addition, we do not reward analysts who think creatively about problems and design unique ways to track adversary operations. Absent a day-in-day-out, year-in-year-out documenting effort, we neither will achieve precision in our assessments nor be in a position to provide the right level of threat and situational-awareness intelligence to the fleet. Experience teaches that intelligence estimates not grounded in solid evidence enjoy limited persuasiveness.
A fundamental problem of intelligence is that we do not exploit fully the body of material we collect. It is recognized widely all the way to the national intelligence level than we, the intelligence community, swallow far more data than we can digest. Valuable nuggets of information lay unprocessed on the cutting-room floor in places such as the Kunia Regional Security Operations Center in Hawaii. We sacrifice learning specific details that might, over time, build an important picture of an adversary because the focus is on current intelligence highlights. Intelligence centers in Hawaii, competing with CNN, run their engines hot on what happened yesterday, and as a consequence neglect the mundane processing, exploitation, sifting, and compiling of data for mid- to long-term purposes. The ultimate irony is that we are losing our ability to put today's events in perspective because we do not take time to examine the "take," preserve it well, or produce tools to retrieve archived data quickly.
A hidden danger of poor record keeping and underexploitation of available data is that analysts are unable to perform a systematic review of all accumulated information on a given subject. Without historical references to consult, analysis tends to be based primarily on experiences during the tenure of the resident "expert." For military personnel at JICPac, two years in one analyst job would be considered lengthy. Assessments, therefore, frequently are based on a small sampling of data. It is not uncommon for analysts at JICPac, under constant deadline pressures, to make analytic calls based on the last six months of message traffic and a few e-mails or phone calls to fellow "experts." The shortcuts theater analysts routinely take to compensate for lack of time, records, training, special compartmented clearances, and/or experience in the job have predictable results: finished analytic products long on form and short on substance. Resultant distortions of potential adversary operations and capabilities, no matter how slight, may have dire consequences for our maritime forces engaged in future conflicts.
The shortage of reliable, detailed records and reference tools extending back years makes life hard for many analysts in the JIC. Research is a painful endeavor. It is not unusual for JICPac experts to get frustrated trying to find details on past foreign military operations to determine capability trends. Moreover, analysts often find it difficult to compare and contrast exercises spanning more than two years (the nominal outer storage limit for our message-handling systems). Very few analysts are keeping detailed plots containing locational data of high-interest foreign naval or naval aviation forces extending years, a geographic "norming" technique routinely used by analysts in the Cold War. The fleet suffers as a result.
For example, the Seventh Fleet has yet to receive intelligence it requested on historical exercises of a militarily active Asian country. In 2002, forward-deployed naval force commanders and their intelligence officers requested a ten-year review. Not possible. A six-year review? Too hard. JICPac eventually deferred the tasker to the national intelligence community, which promised a three-year review. The Seventh Fleet was told to look for the finished product to be published the following year.
In June 2002, the USS Fort McHenry (LSD-43) and USS Chancellorsville (CG-62) transited through the Sea of Japan for a port call in Vladivostok. Before they arrived, Russian aviation forces flew a number of aircraft sorties that JICPac initially assessed as routine monthly operations. In fact, the aircraft were operating further south than normal and likely were intended to demonstrate Russia's continued ability to carry out a number of different missions. A detailed accounting of prior Russian aircraft activity with baseline norms for geography, time of day, day of the week, time of year, type and number of aircraft, and length of mission could have enabled JICPac analysts to ascertain in quick and specific ways how these flights deviated from routine patterns, and hence provide perspective analysis to these ships as the activity occurred. To be sure, the USS Kitty Hawk (CV-63) would have found data such as this useful prior to the Russian Su-24 Fencer and Su-27 Flanker flyovers in the Sea of Japan in fall 2000, after which photos of the flight deck were e-mailed to the aircraft carrier's commanding officer.
Indeed, transiting ships and carrier battle groups could receive improved intelligence support if the JIC trapped and managed its information better. Although predeployment reports are disseminated to ships, there is a shortage of highly detailed information on peacetime naval and air operating areas for major countries in the Pacific. For countries equipped with large militaries, good record keeping can make possible the construction of graphics displaying boundaries of foreign ship and aircraft patrols, exercise areas, and the likely times these platforms will occupy these zones. Taken a step further, JICPAC should be using such references to help identify, correlate, and disseminate contacts for the common operational picture, as well as to push messages containing value-added insights to deployed forces. Ship captains and battle-group commanders expect and deserve this level of situational awareness as they operate in the Pacific theater.
Unfortunately, even records on some events, such as foreign military responses to U.S. sensitive reconnaissance operations, tend to include only some variables, not all known facts on each interaction. Partially documenting events thwarts a comprehensive understanding of these activities. We still have not fully learned our lesson from the EP-3 incident off China in April 2001. More data on fighter reactions to airborne reconnaissance missions could be gleaned and a more comprehensive understanding of such operations could be achieved if a more focused analytical effort were under way.
Likewise, support can be improved for our hydroacoustic survey ships, which are almost always forward-deployed around the Western Pacific. As of this writing, there are no consolidated records published in the record message traffic or on-line at JICPac that allow the Navy to determine the number and type of historical reactions to our survey operations. China's military reactions, protests, and demarches over the USNS Bowditch's (AGS-21) hydrographic survey operations in the Yellow Sea in spring 2000 and fall 2002 served as a reminder that we must track closely regional responses to our operations.2 Of course, recording instances of no responses, sometimes known as "negative intelligence," also is important for accurate statistical analysis.
Blame for these shortfalls in fleet support cannot be laid at the analysts' feet. Most are overworked trying to field an increasing number of taskers from deployed military forces and senior decision makers working nearby at major Navy and joint commands on Oahu. The current organization and manning of the JIC also exert their own pressure: an unbelievably small number of experts actually produce most of JICPac's deliverables. The response by most of these beleaguered analysts is to hunker down and narrow their focus to the specialty areas assigned them. As a result, they have less and less time to reach outward, consult others who may have more mature records, foster close relations with national intelligence officers working similar problems, disaggregate prior assessments, explode assumptions, ascertain genuine historical facts, or entertain new hypotheses that could better explain Pacific military forces' operations and trends. What is more, analysts in a rush are tempted to "satisfice," choose the first explanation that seems to fit, or simply update longheld assessments that may have weak evidentiary bases. These are predictable approaches employed by the overtasked. The net result of these problems is manifest in a general sluggishness in responding to taskers, shallow assessments, and fuzzy forecasts.
Even more disturbing for the Navy, watch officers at JICPac charged with guarding the fleet's interest have few historical records to reference. As a result, they find it challenging to discriminate important events in theater and provide critical information that adds value and properly characterizes emerging situations. Even in cases where databases are maintained, "dayshops" often do not make these sites accessible to watch standers. The watch, which typically is comprised of new arrivals, quickly can find itself without the experience, background, or tools to respond to, much less anticipate, developing events. The paucity and general tardiness of JICPac record message advisory reports attest to this dilemma. Submarine support is the only exception to this otherwise troubling situation. When the Navy gave up its fleet intelligence assets wholesale to Joint Intelligence in 1991, I do not think our leaders could have imagined such an erosion in tactical and operational intelligence support skills.3 Sadly, anecdotal evidence suggests other theater JICs are no better.
Train Analysts to Analyze
The good news is that analytical weaknesses in theater intelligence analysis can be bolstered with good leadership and training. By getting more involved in the analytical process, JICPac managers can begin to hold analysts accountable for the underpinnings of their substantive judgments. The chain of command must review how records are kept in their respective divisions and determine where improvements can be made.
In many cases, new and more creative tools must be developed from scratch. Computer models for statistical analysis of various industries represent a starting point for analytic tools that could assist intelligence officers in identifying trends and true (versus apparent) deviations from normal behavior. With these tools will come a need for JICPac leaders to explain to young database managers that the fruit of their labors may not be evidenced for years. Seniors must convince juniors of the essential value of these seemingly dull tasks as well as provide incentives and rewards. Perhaps most important, the leadership needs to allot time for this effort to be carried out and sustained over the long haul. JICPac is hiring more Asia analysts, so hope exists that the workload on individual analysts will be distributed more evenly.
Regardless of how many experts JICPac manages to acquire, however, the command must decide to make an investment in training people to analyze. The JIC should coordinate with the defense intelligence establishment to investigate ways to cycle people through analysis training courses. The Central Intelligence Agency recognized the absolute necessity of this training when it created its "Tradecraft in Analysis" curriculum in the mid-1990s. Operational Intelligence Mobile Training Teams would go far in teaching proven techniques for monitoring and analyzing foreign militaries. The Defense Intelligence Agency also offers analysis courses. The current on-the-job training permits flawed analytic approaches to endure. JICPac also must examine new approaches to ensuring analysts have the data they need to build clear pictures of potential adversaries. Perhaps the most difficult challenge will be to improve information processing and exploitation, activities controlled by other organizations with different constraints and lines of authority. As it currently stands, on a daily basis we are letting valuable data slip through our fingers to be lost forever. The theater intelligence center should tackle this problem head-on now.
Theater intelligence staff members in the Pacific are under much stress, but it is amazing how well they perform despite being asked to do far more with fewer resources. While there are pockets of true excellence at the JIC, there is significant room for improvement in the fundamental business practices of the command, particularly as they relate to operational intelligence. Already the Navy has decided it cannot trust the Joint Intelligence Center to satisfy fleet needs. Naval Intelligence is turning inward to grow more Captain Laytons with expert knowledge to guide our maritime forces through the next high-intensity combat situation in the Pacific.4 Can we afford to recreate analytic cells outside the JIC? Or is it time to fix analysis in the intelligence centers? Theater intelligence cannot afford to wait to shore up its analytic foundation.
Commander Studeman serves on the Seventh Fleet staff as N20 intelligence operations, fleet support, and intelligence officer. He previously was assigned to Joint Intelligence Center, Pacific, where he was chief of the Pacific Command studies Team. Prior tours include the Fleet Ocean Surveillance Information Facility, Rota, Spain, and air intelligence officer for VA-35 Black Panthers. He is a graduate of the Naval Postgraduate School’s National Security Affairs Regional Studies Program.