Network-centric warfare reduces the art of war to tactics and targets. The Navy must restore the balance between strategy, operational art, and tactics—before it discovers firsthand that simply netting maritime forces will not be decisive in combat.
Network-centric warfare (NCW) increasingly is becoming a new orthodoxy—a set of beliefs that cannot seriously be challenged. Its disadvantages or critical vulnerabilities are not publicly discussed or are grudgingly admitted. The Clausewitzian thoughts on the nature of war, the relationships between policy and use of military power, and the effect of fog of war and friction are tossed away as unimportant in the information age. The art of war is watered down until it is indistinguishable from the science of war. There is little discussion of the role of psychological and moral factors. The enemy rarely is mentioned, and he seems to be incapable of frustrating our plans and actions. Information superiority is assumed to be absolute, regardless of the opponent. Command and control increasingly is centralized. Operational art is given short shrift, but most of the proponents of NCW seem unaware that U.S. joint doctrine is based on operational art. Tactics and targeting represent the core of network-centric warfare, with most of the discussion revolving around so-called grids and targets. The collection and transmittal of information from diverse sources primarily is designed to speed the targeting process, rather than focusing on military objectives and tasks.
The Nature of War
NCW proponents have a very different view of the nature of war than Carl von Clausewitz and other classic military and naval thinkers. These advocates are neo-Newtonians in their firm belief that war can be conducted as a well-designed machine. They believe that the new information age has made the classical theory of war irrelevant. Yet von Clausewitz's ideas on the character of war are as viable today as they were in his time. No technological advances, no matter how dramatic, can change the true nature of war.
Von Clausewitz observed that a war never consists of a single short blow but of innumerable and related parts.1 A war is shaped by human nature, the complexities of human behavior, and human limitations and physical capabilities. Thus, the outcome of any war cannot be predicted with certainty because so many intangible elements are an integral part of it.2 Uncertainty is not the result of gaps in information but largely is caused by lack of comprehension or false interpretation of the information acquired. We did not need more information prior to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941, but much better comprehension of the information we already possessed.
Some leading NCW proponents argue that future operations will be nonlinear in space, time, and intensity. In their vision of future wars, there will be no forward lines of troops, no rear, and flanks will have little meaning. They apparently equate nonlinearity with the purely physical elements of war, implying that a future war will be short and decisive because nonlinearity in time will allow operations to be conducted simultaneously and continuously. Operational pauses will occur rarely. The problem is that continuous high-intensity combat can be conducted at the tactical level, but usually not at the operational and strategic levels. Campaigns and major operations normally are divided into several phases because the ultimate objective cannot be accomplished in a single fell swoop, even against a much weaker opponent. Without phasing, there is the risk of overshooting the point of culmination. Operational pauses are directly related to these phases.
NCW proponents acknowledge that friction and fog of war existed in the past, but they erroneously believe that these phenomena were caused by the lack of "battlespace awareness."3 They assert that a vast array of sensors and computers netted together will reduce friction to manageable levels. The uncertainties, however, and the imperfections in the knowledge of the situation on which the commander's decisions and actions are based cannot be fully mastered, regardless of advances in information technologies. Friction and fog of war, chance, and luck make any war highly unpredictable and full of unforeseen events.
Tactics and Operational Art
Network-centric warfare places too much emphasis on tactics and the tactical level of war. The prominence of terms such as battlespace dominance, situational awareness, and information grid are the best proof of how tactics and technology dominate thinking in the U.S. military. The true meaning of many operational terms is distorted, while these new terms—which clearly are tactical—also are applied to the strategic level of war.
NCW is a tactical concept. The fact that the theater commander in Operation Enduring Freedom directed employment of diverse and netted forces from his main headquarters in Tampa, Florida, thousands of miles away, is not an example of the sound application of operational art. The netting of forces was used to further centralize decision making at all levels. Commander, Central Command, not only observed but actually interfered in purely tactical decisions and actions. He did not delegate authority by establishing an intermediate level of command close to the combat area.
Carried to its extreme, NCW will lead to a complete "tacticization" of strategy—where strategy is defined and dominated by purely tactical considerations. Operational art—that intermediate area of study and practice between strategy and tactics—is ignored totally. There is no discussion of the effect that the netting of forces will have on the conduct of major operations and maritime campaigns. The most serious omission is the critical role that leadership plays at all levels of war.
Military Art versus Military Science
The U.S. military is well on its way to eliminating the distinctions between the art of war and military science because of its obsession with new technologies. As explained by its leading proponents, NCW bears a striking resemblance to various discarded theories of war fashionable over the last two centuries. In the late 18th century, the efforts to make the art of war "learnable" in all its aspects led to the elimination of all the differences between the art of war and military science.4 The art of war was considered the practical application of certain mathematical laws determined by theory.5 The "geometric" or "mathematical" school dominated thinking on warfare in France, Prussia, and England. Because war would be conducted by maneuvering, forms and rules of tactics and fortifications warfare were carried over into strategy.6 Von Clausewitz ridiculed those theoreticians who removed moral values from theory, only dealing with materiel and reducing warfare to a pair of mathematical equations of balance and superiority in time and space.7
The U.S. Navy's concept of netting surface ships, aircraft, and shore commands and installations is much like the theories of the proponents of the "Young School" in the French Navy in the 1880s and afterward. Like NCW, the Young School theory emerged as a response to rapid technological changes and espoused the netting of naval forces through the electric telegraph and signal stations.
The leading proponent of the Young School, Vice Admiral Theophile Aube, argued that the ever-increasing effect of scientific advances and machines made the role of moral factors in warfare irrelevant. He believed that command of the sea, obtained through a naval battle or blockade, was not a worthy objective. For him, a naval battle, as exemplified by the Battle of Lissa in 1866, was nothing more than an orderless and senseless destruction of materiel and human lives unrelated to the success achieved.8 From that erroneous premise, Admiral Aube deduced that the battleship, the key factor in obtaining command of the sea, was unnecessary for the French Navy.
Young School proponents believed they had found a new concept for attack and defense of the coast, consisting of a network of "sleeping" torpedoes and fortifications, combined with the sporadic use of ram ships, floating batteries, gun boats, and high-speed torpedo boats supported by armored ships.9 Admiral Aube believed the extreme mobility that steam gave to all warships, the speed and sureness of information permitted by the electric telegraph, and the ability to concentrate forces provided by the railroad would allow every point on the coast to be strongly and rapidly defended.10
Admiral Aube confidently predicted that mines and automotive torpedoes would make effective blockading impossible in the future, robbing the battleship of her traditional value as the chief means of commanding the sea.11 He envisaged torpedo boats operating in groups, conducting scouting, and then attacking the enemy's fleet. It became obvious, however, that their small size and corresponding low seaworthiness and short radius of action made it impossible for torpedo boats to operate too far from the shore. They also had great problems in detecting their prospective targets, maintaining contact, and pursuing their quarry. These difficulties adversely affected the employment of cruisers because their success was predicated on the successful search for the enemy fleet by torpedo boats.
The proponents of the Young School tried to resolve these difficulties by extensive use of mathematical methods. Various circle templates were invented and mathematical-tactical planning games were carried out in which each movement and encounter was forecast using complex mathematical equations.12 These theories, which dominated French naval thought for more than 20 years, had highly negative consequences on French theory, fleet construction, and personnel policies.
A New Theory of War
It increasingly is argued that network-centric warfare amounts to a new and emerging theory of war, driven by advances in computer and information technologies. This is a misreading of the lessons of history. One need only read the claims made by the proponents of torpedoes, mines, submarines, aircraft, guided missiles, and the early analog computers to realize the blunders of contemporaries as to the value and effect of new technologies. Technological advances have never delivered what their proponents promised. With the exception of nuclear weapons, no technological advance was ever the sole, or even the most important, factor in the emergence of a new theory of war. Changes in society and politics, and dramatic changes in international relations, were much more important for the emergence of new theories of war. These, in turn, were invariably consequences, not causes, of some large-scale war that dramatically changed the internal politics and international situation. The information revolution and globalization today cannot be equated with such upheavals of social and international order as generated by the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars or World War I.
The empirical evidence to support a claim of a new theory of warfare is slim and insufficient. Some aspects of network-centric warfare were applied in the Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1996, NATO's Operation Allied Force in 1999, and Operation Enduring Freedom in 2001-2002. The first example did not include combat, while in both Kosovo and Afghanistan the U.S. forces and their partners faced much inferior and largely passive opponents. In addition, the necessary historic distance is lacking for deriving lessons. General Giulio Douhet's theories on the dominant role of air power in warfare in the 1920s proved to be terribly wrong, even though he used evidence from World War I that was much broader and deeper than our experiences thus far with NCW.
The relationship between military theory and practice should not be turned upside down. Any military theory is derived from the study of past wars, campaigns, and major operations. This is in contrast to the fields of art and nonmilitary sciences where theory is developed first and only afterward tested through series of scientific experiments. Von Clausewitz's theory of war was not created in a vacuum but was the result of his thorough studies of some 150 campaigns, in particular those conducted in the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars. Von Clausewitz cautioned that his work presents material for theory, but not theory itself. He avoided creating a rigid structure of thinking because he did not want his readers to think a correct theory could be created by fitting the evidence into a preexisting framework.13
One reason von Clausewitz's theories remain valid today is that they are general in nature.14 Von Clausewitz stressed that theory must constantly pass the test of reality. Theory also is much broader than reality. Hence, it must be sufficiently flexible and open to accommodating large numbers of imponderables and constant changes.15 Whenever practice contradicts theory, the theory must be modified or abandoned. In evaluating the application of NCW in a conflict such as Kosovo or Afghanistan, one also should focus on the disconnect between theory and practice and then make modifications to the concept.
Misusing and Distorting History
Network-centric warfare enthusiasts pay little attention to historical experiences and lessons, with the exception of those events from the more recent past in which the role of technology is exaggerated to suit preconceived notions. Information warfare disciples often use history by singling out and then distorting the effect a technological development had in a certain war. At the same time, the role of those factors that are hard to quantify—such as leadership, training, and doctrine—are downplayed or omitted. It is accepted among military historians that superior generalship and training—not the telegraph or railroads—were the principal reasons for the German's victories in their war with France in 1870-1871. This is now ignored by some leading proponents of information warfare who argue instead that the Germans won because they were better in exploiting industrial era technology—the civilian railroad.16 Likewise, the early German victories in 1940 are attributed to innovative exploitation of weapons common to both sides—the tank, aircraft, and radio.17 The fact that the Germans had distinctly inferior platforms and technology in their campaign in France in 1940 is conveniently overlooked.18 The Germans won their victories because of a more accurate vision of the future war, better integration of combat arms, and superior leadership, morale, and training.
In another example, NCW proponents assert that netting forces will enable a shift from "platform-centric" and attrition warfare to a much faster and more effective warfighting style characterized by speed of command and self-synchronization.19 In other words, they imply that all warfare until the emergence of NCW was attritional, and thereby willfully ignore or dismiss the overwhelming evidence to the contrary. The skillful application of tenets of operational warfare invariably resulted in decisive victories, as exemplified by the campaigns of Napoleon I, Helmuth von Moltke Sr., and other great military leaders of the 19th century. The skillful application of operational art was the principal reason for the German victories in 1939-1941, the Soviet victories on the Eastern Front in 1943-1945, and the success of numerous Allied amphibious landing operations in the Pacific, Atlantic, and Mediterranean. Both attrition and decisive warfare remain integral parts of war in the modern era.
Information Superiority
There is much repetition of the claim that netting U.S. forces will lead to "information superiority" or "battlespace dominance"—the more information, the better. Yet information dominance should not be expressed in absolutes, but in relative terms. Whether one side or the other will obtain information dominance depends on space, time, force, and the objectives to be accomplished. More information and superior information technologies do not, by themselves, translate into information dominance, even when fighting inferior opponents. Experience also shows that information superiority does not guarantee sound decisions or ultimate victory. Although increasingly critical, information is just one of many factors in the commander's success in combat. Timely and relevant information is of little value if war is conducted with an unsound and incoherent strategy and poor application of operational art or tactics. Admiral William F. Halsey's actions during the Leyte Gulf operation in October 1944 are a classic example of a commander possessing information superiority but still making bad decisions that nearly led to a humiliating defeat by an inferior enemy force.
In discussing information dominance, the technocrats ignore any knowledge that cannot be measured or quantified.20 One of the leading and most vocal proponents of information technology asserts that today's technology could provide the ability to see a battlefield as large as Iraq or Korea with unprecedented fidelity, comprehension, and timeliness, by night or day, in any kind of weather.21 This might be true at the tactical level, but not at the operational and strategic levels of war, where intangible elements such as the enemy's intentions, plans, reactions, soundness of doctrine, and morale are crucial to success.
"With the exception of nuclear weapons, no technological advance was ever the sole, or even the most important, factor in the emergence of a new theory of war."
The emphasis on obtaining a complete picture of the situation is fraught with dangers. The most serious problem is that emphasizing the need for information dominance will lead commanders to wait instead of act. At worst, the belief that there is such a thing as complete knowledge of the situation will breed commanders highly averse to taking risks. One of the distinguishing traits of the successful operational commander is the ability to act quickly and be willing to take prudent risks.
Another major problem is information overload, especially at the operational and higher levels of command. Data saturation is a continual, real-life problem.22 The information overload experienced during Allied Force and Enduring Freedom cannot be compared with what can be expected in a war against a strong and resourceful enemy. The situation will be even more serious if the networks are used primarily to pass along data, instead of processing it into information. The sheer amount of information collected and transmitted to the users most likely will overwhelm the processing capability of lower levels of command. Processing more information may saturate commanders and their staffs with a flood of indigestible data.23 A better solution is to separate the relevant and critical information from the larger mass of data. To accomplish this, greater attention must be given to enhancing U.S. intelligence capabilities throughout the chain of command.
Situational Awareness
Proponents of NCW assert that the main reason why no plan survives initial contact with the enemy is that situational awareness steadily deteriorates. It is reestablished periodically, only to degenerate again. In contrast, the netting of forces will create high awareness and allow situational awareness to be maintained, improving the ability to deter conflict, or to prevail if conflict becomes unavoidable.24 The true reason, however, that plans do not survive initial contact with the enemy is the presence of friction and the fog of war. The enemy has a will of his own and usually does not conform to expectations. While new technologies have improved our ability to know more about tangible elements of a situation at the tactical level, they cannot remove all the uncertainties at the operational and strategic levels because of vastly different factors of space, time, and force. NCW is not going to magically lift the fog of war or remove the friction in warfare, as the ongoing—and so far unsuccessful—pursuit of al Qaeda's leadership in Afghanistan illustrates.
Shared Awareness
Shared awareness of the battlespace and a shared understanding of a commander's intent apparently will enable forces to self-synchronize, operate with a small footprint, and be more effective when operating autonomously.25 This potentially is the biggest problem in the practical application of NCW. Having a common operating picture will lead operational commanders to be increasingly involved in purely tactical decisions, instead of focusing on the operational and strategic aspects of the situation within their respective areas of responsibility. At the same time, tactical commanders easily could be distracted by the operational or even strategic aspects of the situation. Each commander should be provided only as complete as possible a picture of the situation within his area of responsibility and the key elements of the situation in his area of interest. This, in turn, argues against flattening the command organization and for retaining intermediate levels of command with associated intelligence organizations.
Speed of Command
Network-centric warfare enthusiasts claim that information superiority will enhance the speed of command, leading to "decision superiority," allow the flattening of the command organization, and permit the conducting of parallel and continuous operations without pause. The value of speed of command, however, should not be made the predominant factor to the detriment of the human factors that are the heart of the command-and-control process. Too much emphasis on the speed of command can lead easily to haste and unsound decisions. The time gained should be used for information processing and planning. NCW eerily resembles the ill-fated von Schlieffen Plan of World War I, which envisaged the defeat of the Allied armies in France in just 42 days. Success was predicated on speed and the idea that the offensive must never be allowed to come to a standstill. A delay of just 72 hours in railway mobilization and deployment would spell disaster.26 The German armies would have to force the pace of the war, never allowing the enemy to seize the initiative. The French forces would have to be crushed in a single major "cauldron" (encirclement) battle, and the escape of the French forces would result in what von Schlieffen called "endless war." The Clausewitzian concepts of friction, the genius of war, and fog of war all were tossed out.27
Self-Synchronization
Self-synchronization has become the most often-quoted advantage of NCW, apparently referring to the tactical level, where it is relatively easy to achieve. In contrast, synchronization at the operational and strategic levels requires synchronization not only of combat forces, but also of operational functions and nonmilitary sources of power. This is much more complicated and requires detailed planning and interagency coordination. In addition, NCW proponents overlook the fact that synchronization is related to sequencing; without proper sequencing of objectives and/or tasks, synchronization is useless.
Network-centric warfare is unlikely to radically change the ways campaigns or major operations are planned or conducted. The principal purpose of the commander's intent is to provide subordinate commanders two echelons down sufficient freedom of action in accomplishing their assigned tasks. The commander's intent is the heart of the German-style task-oriented command and control. In contrast to current practice in the U.S. military, properly written commander's intent does not include directions on how subordinate commanders are to accomplish their assigned tasks.
Intermediate Level of Command
The need to increase the speed of command should never be the dominant factor in determining command structure. The number of intermediate command echelons should be limited to those needed to accomplish the assigned missions. Eliminating intermediate command echelons because technology allows a larger span of control cannot be explained in terms of sound command organization.
The proponents of information warfare apparently ignore the fact that the commander's responsibilities are much broader—especially at the operational and strategic levels—than making decisions in combat. An intermediate command echelon between tactical commanders and theater-strategic commanders is necessary to ensure uninterrupted planning in peacetime, crisis, and war. This level of command also establishes and maintains other operational functions, specifically intelligence, command-and-control warfare, operational fires, logistics, and protection. Synchronization of these functions must be planned and executed by the operational command echelon.
Another consequence of eliminating the intermediate level of command will be further centralization of operational planning and execution. Significant restrictions will be imposed on the initiative of subordinate commanders. This will reduce combat effectiveness drastically. Motivation and morale also will suffer because subordinate commanders will execute the orders of the highest operational commanders in the theater. These commanders, in turn, will be involved in making tactical decisions.
Conclusion
Network-centric warfare is a natural consequence of advances in information technologies, and it is here to stay. At the same time, it is not a panacea to all the problems of modern warfare at sea. The weaknesses and potential vulnerabilities of NCW need to be identified early so that timely action might be taken to deny success to any opponent. Much more empirical evidence is needed before making definitive judgments about the combat potential of NCW. But perhaps the most critical need is to put the human factor—and leadership in all its aspects—at the center of NCW.
The insistence on achieving information superiority and speed of command is perhaps one of the worst consequences of the use of the new technologies. What the information warfare enthusiasts call "shared awareness" looks more like an excuse for the highest operational commander in a theater to unnecessarily interfere in the tactical decisions and actions of subordinate commanders.
The trend toward greatly increased centralization of both planning and execution seems to be well under way. It must be reversed. NCW proponents might be true believers in self-synchronization and self-organization at the lower command echelons. These benefits will not be realized unless the method of issuing task-oriented command and control is embraced at all levels of command.
Thus, rather drastic changes in the way we educate and train our people will be needed. The key prerequisites for the successful application of task-oriented command and control are understanding that war is not a science but an art, common tactical and operational concepts, sound tactical and operational doctrine, common vocabulary, high-quality professional education and training, and perhaps most critical, the highest degree of leadership.
Despite the claims to the contrary, network-centric warfare is not a decisive form of warfare at sea. The U.S. Navy needs to start the long overdue shift toward a balance among tactics, operational art, and strategy. There is much potential in netting maritime forces, but how much of it is realized and successfully applied will depend, as in the past, on the sound and skillful application of tenets of operational warfare.
Dr. Vego is professor of operations at the Naval War College. He is the author of Operational Warfare and Naval Strategy and Operations in Narrow Seas.
1. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984), p. 79. back to article
2. LGen. Paul K. van Riper, USMC (Ret.), and MGen. Robert H. Scales Jr., USA (Ret.), "Preparing for War in the 21st Century," Parameters, Autumn 1997, pp. 2, 5. back to article
3. David S. Alberts, John S. Garstka, and Frederick P. Stein, Network-Centric Warfare: Developing and Leveraging Information Superiority, 2d ed. (Washington, DC: DoD C4ISR Cooperative Research Program, August 1999), p. 71. back to article
4. Volkmar Regling, "Grundzuege der Landkriegfuehrung zur Zeit des Absolutismus und im 19. Jahrhunderrt," Military Historical Office, editor, Deutsche Militaergeschichte, 1648-1939 (Herrsching: Manfred Pawlak Verlaggesellschaft and Munich: Bernard & Graefe Verlag, 1983), p. 144. back to article
5. Hans Delbrueck, The Dawn of Modern Warfare, vol. 4, History of the Art of War, trans. Walter J. Renfroe Jr. (Lincoln, NE/London: University of Nebraska Press, 1985), p. 389. back to article
6. Delbrueck, The Dawn of Modern Warfare, p. 388. back to article
7. Carl von Clausewitz, Vom Kriege, ed. Dr. Werner Hahlweg (Bonn: Ferdinand Duemmlers Verlag, 1952), pp. 244-45. back to article
8. Volkmar Bueb, Die 'Junge Schule' der franzoesischen Marine. Strategie und Politik 1875-1900 (Boppard am Rhein: Harald Boldt Verlag, 1971), p. 17. back to article
9. Francois-Emmanuel Brézet, "Lehren der Geschichte und technischer Fortschritt am Beispiel der Entwicklung der Doktrin der Jeune École in Frankreich," ed. Joerg Dueppler, Seemacht und Seestrategie im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert (Hamburg: Verlag E.S. Mittler & Sohn, 1999), pp. 144-45. back to article
10. Theodore Ropp, The Development of a Modern Navy: French Naval Policy 1871-1904, ed. Stephen S. Roberts (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1987), p. 157. back to article
11. Larry H. Addington, The Patterns of War since the Eighteenth Century (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1984), p. 103. back to article
12. Bueb, Die 'Junge Schule,' pp. 30-31. back to article
13. Scot Robertson, The Development of RAF Strategic Bombing Doctrine, 1919-1939 (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1995), p. 6. back to article
14. Introductory essay by Peter Paret, in von Clausewitz, On War, p. 11. back to article
15. Robertson, The Development of RAF Strategic Bombing Doctrine, p. 6. back to article
16. Adm. William Owens, USN (Ret.), with Ed Offley, Lifting the Fog of War (New York, NY: Farrar, Strauss and Giroux, 2000), p. 21. back to article
17. Owens with Offley, Lifting the Fog of War, p. 80. back to article
18. Williamson Murray and Thomas O'Leary, "Military Transformation and Legacy Forces," Joint Force Quarterly, Spring 2002, p. 21. back to article
19. VAdm. Arthur K. Cebrowski, USN, and John J. Garstka, "Network-Centric Warfare: Its Origins and Future," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, January 1998, p. 32. back to article
20. Williamson Murray, "Clausewitz Out, Computers In: Military Culture and Technological Hubris," The National Interest, Summer 1997, p. 63. back to article
21. Owens with Offley, Lifting the Fog of War, p. 14. back to article
22. Cdr. Alan D. Zimm, USN (Ret.), "Human-Centric Warfare," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, May 1999, p. 29. back to article
23. Murray, "Clausewitz Out," p. 63. back to article
24. Cebrowski and Garstka, "Network-Centric Warfare," p. 33. back to article
25. Alberts, Garstka, and Stein, Network Centric Warfare, p. 91; Wayne P. Hughes Jr., Fleet Tactics and Coastal Combat, 2d ed. (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2000), p. 285. back to article
26. Holger H. Herwig, "Germany and the 'Short-War' Illusion: Toward a New Interpretation?" The Journal of Military History, July 2002, p. 684. back to article
27. Herwig, "Germany and the 'Short-War' Illusion," p. 685. back to article