At least one critic has suggested that the implementation of network-centric operations (NCO) foreordains the death of operational art (op art). As outlandish as this claim sounds, it may gain adherents unless the underlying assumptions of each construct are examined and the interrelation ships understood. In the future, operational art combined with NCO may achieve strategic and operational objectives with unprecedented effectiveness.
Reconciling NCO with Op Art
At least six key assertions of network-centric operations affect operational art.
Network-centric operations will collapse the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war. Because NCO can move information rapidly between levels, and combat power can be strategically directed at the tactical level, some have suggested that the operational level of war will become "irrelevant." The strategic level will interact directly with the tactical level. For example, the President will have greater capability to operate in the targeting process by approving or denying real-time requests to strike time-sensitive targets. But the operational level can be ignored only at great peril. In Vietnam, the United States won at the tactical level, but this did not translate into strategic victory because we ignored the operational level of war and operational art. At the operational level, the combatant commander and his staff must be thoroughly familiar with op art to link tactical actions to strategic objectives and convince their superiors that they have done so.
Tactical actions increasingly will create strategic implications. With a high degree of situational awareness, tactical commanders can take action to achieve strategic objectives. During the Revolutionary War, Americans tactically defeated the British at Yorktown, which eventually led the British government to withdraw from the colonies. It seems intuitive that tactical commanders who possess superior knowledge of the battlefield should be able to achieve strategic effects more readily, but op art cannot be ignored in this area either. Operational art's main role is "to 'orchestrate' the employment of military forces and nonmilitary sources of power to accomplish strategic and operational objectives in a given theater." Some of the most famous examples come from World War II—General Dwight Eisenhower's campaign in Europe and General Douglas MacArthur's campaign in the Pacific. Operational art can realize the full potential of this new capacity to employ forces to achieve strategic objectives.
Operational pauses no longer are a consideration. One NCO proponent declares, "[I]f forces were networked to create near-real-time situational awareness, we could act continuously. We would no longer need to pause before deciding on further action; the information and coordination needed would already be there." First, this assumes that the whole force is networked, which is precarious given that allies and coalition partners will have a hard time keeping up with U.S. information technology advances. Second, operational pauses result from more than lack of information and coordination. They also are caused by weaknesses in forces or logistics. In Desert Storm, a shortage of strategic lift prevented a quick, decisive U.S. response, which allowed Iraq to build up forces, loot Kuwait, and destroy oil field infrastructure. Operational-level pauses might even be planned to let diplomatic efforts catch up with military developments. Op art supporters advocate controlling the timing and tempo of conflict, which puts the operational commander in control.
The nonlinear nature of the NCO environment will prevent successful application of op art elements. Plenty of past military involvements have been nonlinear-and successful. For Operation Uphold Democracy in Haiti, General Hugh Shelton controlled timing and tempo to achieve success by using arranging operations. Uphold Democracy was a phased campaign with the strategic objective of returning the elected government to power, and military planning focused on creating a secure environment in Haiti as a precondition to achieving the strategic objective. The first phase restored order and physical security in key areas. The second delivered humanitarian aid and expanded civil order. The third phase returned government functions, and the last phase handed control of operations to a United Nations-led force. The phased approach supported managing timing and tempo to achieve success.
The quick tempo of future war fare will not allow a phased approach to operations. NCO advocates point to the complex synchronization matrices that coordinate and deconflict actions, but they miss the point that op art endures even if tools change.8 Lieutenant General Franks, VII Corps Commander, was criticized in the Gulf War for not pursuing Iraqi ground forces more vigorously. During the initial ground assault, he halted the western prong of his attack because of the difficulty in synchronizing his large forces under darkness. He thought the risk of fratricide was too high. Later, General Franks realized he was too tactically focused and bound by synchronization. He started to look at the operational-level actions of the Iraqis, changed his battle plan, synchronized his forces without complex matrices, and attacked with improved results.9
Faster decision cycles lead to quicker victory. Advocates point to Colonel John Boyd's observe, orient, decide, and act (OODA) loop as evidence that quick decision cycles will yield quick victories. "Ideally, the stimuli can be made numerous enough to overwhelm enemies with new developments, forcing them continually to revisit decisions, redirect efforts, and pause for observations, even to the point that they cannot ever take action."10 This assumes the adversary uses an OODA loop. If he uses a different mental paradigm, quick victories based on NCO capabilities may be optimistic. Furthermore, in the long term, adversaries will adapt to the threat of NCO. No revolution lasts forever.
Two key assertions about operational art are significant with respect to network-centric operations.
Op art can be applied to all levels of war. On U.S. entry into World War IT, President Franklin Roosevelt decided Europe had to take priority over the Pacific—an example of arranging operations at a strategic level. At the operational level, examples of op art can be found as far back as the Roman Legions. At the tactical level, battles became larger than one person could control, so op art was applied to orchestrate the instruments of force.
The level of decision maker does not equate to the level of decisions. In a network-centric environment, information will allow senior decision makers to make informed decisions for lower-level decision makers. This may be more efficient at the tactical level, but it will not be more effective at the operational or strategic level. In the Kosovo conflict, General Wes Clark felt tremendous political pressure to achieve strategic results rapidly. In response, he watched real-time imagery from unmanned aerial vehicles to identify enemy targets then called the joint force air component commander and ordered him to attack them. This was efficient in that pilots could strike targets the combatant commander knew to be important for tactical reasons and would lead to satisfying operational objectives. But it was woefully ineffective with respect to achieving strategic objectives. The combatant commander could have improved strategic effectiveness dramatically by working with allied governments to approve results-oriented target sets.
Each level of war is complex, and if a decision maker abandons his level even briefly to make decisions at a lower level, effectiveness will be lost. This problem is not new to warfare, but the vast amount of information that network-centric operations provides raises the stakes.
What Conclusions Can Be Drawn?
One illustration using the concept of leverage shows how op art applied in a network-centric environment can achieve synergy and thus strategic and operational objectives with unprecedented effectiveness.
The Joint Staff recognizes leverage as "gaining, maintaining, and exploiting advantages in combat power across all dimensions," and as the "centerpiece of the operational art." NCO proponents say information superiority will deliver leverage in every future war by increasing "speed of command, preempting adversary options, [creating] new options, and [improving] the effectiveness of selected options." Returning to Desert Storm, if General Franks's subordinate commanders knew where all the forces were located, they could have leveraged the breach in the Iraqi fortifications to continue the attack. In addition, as the fighting progressed, if General Franks had glimpsed General Norman Schwarzkopf's situation map, he would have realized earlier that the Republican Guard was not preparing a counterattack but was in full retreat.
The moderate proponents of network-centric operations said it best: "To reach its full potential Network Centric Warfare must be deeply rooted in operational art." Both constructs occupy the same trade space. Both apply to all services. Both apply across the levels of war and the range of conflict. Both will be needed to maintain U.S. military dominance in the battle space. In short, operational art provides the framework to channel the power of network-centric operations.
Commander Copley, a graduate of the Naval War College, is a senior intelligence director, Headquarters, U.S. European Command.